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This thesis endeavours to answer an empirical puzzle, namely, how an extreme-right party, the Greek 
Golden Dawn, transitions from movement to party (thus de-radicalising its political behaviour), or from 
party to movement (thus radicalising its behaviour), following periods of profound changes to its external 
and internal living conditions. The thesis builds a bridge between the literature on far-right parties, social 
movements and party change & behaviour.  
In answering this, the thesis advances a framework of extreme-right behaviour and change, which aims 
to examine the conditions (when, how, where) under which change in political behaviour of electorally 
successful extreme-right parties plays out. It argues that extreme-right parties are movement-parties, 
oscillating between a party face and a movement face, manifested across three political arenas: 
grassroots, electoral and parliamentary. The thesis posits: (1) Political praxis and issue salience are 
appropriate party behavioural dimensions, allowing identification of vast amounts of behavioural change 
(2) Political & institutional actors and leadership & factions largely define the external and internal 
conditions, respectively, within which change in the behaviour of extreme-right parties, towards de-
radicalisation or radicalisation, is more or less likely.  To this, the thesis develops alternative and case-
specific hypotheses, with regards to both scenarios (de-radicalisation and radicalisation), on extreme-right 
parties and on the Golden Dawn.  
The thesis utilises a qualitative case-study methodology through which it is able to delve into an in-depth, 
qualitative analysis that allows it to identify what the case under investigation is accomplishing and how. 
By analysing an extensive amount of primary data, and through the development of a novel empirical 
approach that systematically measures the behaviour of extreme-right parties across two faces and the 
three main arenas (political impact-claims), the thesis tests the alternative hypotheses and solves the 
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Chapter 1: Extreme-right party behaviour and change  
 
Within the party family of far-right parties, populist radical right parties have attracted extensive academic 
research in the past three decades. Alternatively, the study of extreme right parties has drawn significantly 
less academic attention. This thesis is a case study of one of the most successful extreme-right parties, 
the Greek Golden Dawn (hereafter known as GD), and this thesis, as its recourse, aims to provide a bridge 
between the literature on far-right parties, social movements and party behaviour, and party change. It 
investigates extreme-right party change through the prism of a behavioural approach. It develops a 
theoretical framework for studying changes on extreme-right party behaviour, as well as a novel empirical 
approach that systematically tracks these changes: the political impact-claims analysis. At the core of the 
theoretical framework lies the argument that extreme-right parties are, in essence, movement-parties, 
having two faces that define their political behaviour: a movement face and a party face. These two faces 
are mainly involved in three political arenas. The party-face is predominantly concerned with the electoral 
and legislative arenas, while the movement-face is predominantly concerned with the grassroots arena.  
Specifically, with regards to the case under investigation within this thesis, there is an overarching event 
– which is the starting point of the thesis – which served to usher in a kick-start and startling change that, 
in a profound way, gave rise to a series of external and internal conditions within and upon GD (an 
‘external shock’), namely the arrest of GD’s leadership in September 2013, which led to unprecedented 
change. This was an external factor that dramatically altered the external conditions of GD, setting in 
motion a series of other developments that soon were about to affect its internal conditions, as well. In 
short, this external ‘shock’1 was an abrupt, and almost complete, institutional and political exclusion from 
the party system, but external factors are usually interlinked and affect the internal conditions of all 
parties, including GD. As the thesis shows (in Chapter 5), the most important internal factors, firstly 
affected by this external shock, were the leadership and the factions within GD. It is the aim of this thesis 
to identify what change GD underwent. As well, it is imperative to answer when, where and how this 
change, during periods of changing external and internal conditions, transpired.  
                                                            
1 Hereafter, the thesis uses interchangeably the terms ‘external shock’, ‘shock exclusion’, ‘complete/full-blown 
exclusion’ or ‘arrests’, always referring to the period before/after the event of GD leadership arrests, happened in 
September 2013.  
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Adopting a qualitative case-study methodology, and through the method of political impact-claims (or 
impact-claims or PICs)2, the main finding of the thesis is that GD has changed towards de-radicalisation 
and ‘partial’ de-radicalisation or ‘partial’ radicalisation. 
  
1.1 The research agenda and puzzle 
 
The research puzzle this thesis endeavours to answer is an empirical one, namely, under what conditions 
an extreme-right movement-party, the Greek Golden Dawn (GD), transitions from movement to party, 
thus de-radicalising its political behaviour, or from party to movement, thus radicalising its behaviour, 
when faced with profoundly changing external and internal conditions which dramatically alter the 
environment within which it operates, specifically following an ‘external shock’ involving political and 
institutional exclusion from the party system. Additionally, it aims to answer this empirical puzzle by 
examining changes of political behaviour, through a single method that can measure these changes 
empirically and systematically: the political impact-claims. In other words, the main overarching goals of 
the thesis are to examine when and how it affected this change, what change it had undergone (e.g., de-
radicalisation and/or radicalisation) and where it initiated this change (e.g., dimensions of political 
behaviour); as well as to analyse this change through an empirical approach that systematically captures 
this transition from movement to party (and vice versa). Thus, it is the main purpose of the thesis to 
develop, and test, alternative hypotheses as to when, how and where change of extreme-right party 
behaviour is likely to have unfolded, with regards to both de-radicalisation and radicalisation scenarios. It 
should be noted from the beginning that it is not the goal of this thesis to answer why any of the identified 
change, either towards de-radicalisation and/or radicalisation, has happened in the first place. Thus, the 
thesis does not engage in any causality language.  
The thesis builds on a variety of literature submissions and aims to contribute towards a better 
understanding of the behavioural changes of ERPs through single case-study research. Therefore, this 
thesis is informed by three main, and largely interrelated, questions: 
1. When is extreme-right party change of political behaviour theorised to play out? 
                                                            




2. How can we conceptualise and measure the political behaviour of electorally successful extreme-
right parties?  
3. How and where the change of extreme-right movement-party behaviour is mainly observed, and 
how change of extreme-right movement-party behaviour can it be measured systematically? 
In answering the first question, namely ‘when is extreme-right party change of political behaviour 
theorised to play out?’, building on the literature on party change (e.g. Harmel & Janda, 1994), at the core 
of the thesis’ theoretical argument lies the assumption that political parties, in general, are more or less 
likely to be changing their political behaviour when the external (political environment) and internal 
conditions (party environment) within which they operate alter profoundly. In other words, external and 
internal conditions define the environment where parties are more or less likely to change. Thus, the 
thesis develops and tests alternative hypotheses regarding the important factors that, according to the 
literature, are thought to be more and less likely to alter these conditions of extreme-right parties 
(hereafter ERPs): political & institutional exclusionary factors (external) and leadership & factions 
(internal) (Rydgren, 2005; 2007; Harmel and Tan, 2003).  
Regarding external conditions, since their emergence in Europe, around three decades ago, far-right 
parties (hereafter FRPs) have evolved into one of the most electorally successful new party families in the 
post-war period. In academia, they also seem to have attracted huge attention among scholars studying 
political parties. Although defining what exactly these parties are is an ongoing and unresolved debate, 
there seems to exist a strong consensus with regards to two points about these parties: i) They are defined 
by three main ideological features: nationalism (or better nativism), authoritarianism and populism 
(Mudde, 2007), ii) There exist two main sub-families of FRPs: Populist radical right parties (hereafter 
PRRPs) and extreme-right parties (hereafter ERPs). The former are the most electorally successful3 and 
most researched, while the latter have largely been electorally irrelevant and less researched (Mudde, 
2016). The difference between these two sub-families is a difference of kind and not degree. The main 
distinction between the two lies in the fact that PRRPs are not anti-democratic (per se), but rather illiberal 
democratic, while ERPs are anti-democratic (Mudde, 2007:23). There are two main variants of ERPs: neo-
fascist and neo-Nazi parties. ERPs, in contrast to PRRPs, are also characterised by their core feature of 
                                                            
3 This thesis defines as electorally successful those political parties which have at least one seat in the national 
parliament of their respective countries. 
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violence, in both words and deeds, which is a central element to their identity (Vasilopoulou & 
Halikiopoulou, 2015:6).   
From the FRPs4, PRRPs have undergone various transformations. They began as electorally small, isolated 
and marginal within existing party systems, without ever having the chance to enter office. However, they 
managed to achieve electoral success quickly, mainly in Western Europe throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
but also, more recently, in Eastern Europe (Minkenberg, 2015). Around the turn of the millennium, many 
of them underwent another significant transformation by entering office, largely as a result of their 
increasing electoral relevance (Bale, 2003). Thus, as part of their increasing inclusion in politics, and 
because of the inconsistent relationship of these parties with (liberal) democracy, the literature began 
investigating whether they had moderated, according to the inclusion-moderation thesis. In short, there 
is an overriding assumption that radical parties enjoying political and institutional inclusion are more likely 
to tame their radicalness and moderate their behaviour over time (Akkerman et al., 2016).  
However, not all of FRPs underwent or are undergoing these transformations, partly because of 
unfavourable external conditions, such as political and institutional exclusion. For example, many FRPs 
have been experiencing a lack of political opportunities due to their political isolation arising from a cordon 
sanitaire vis-à-vis FRPs, with other parties who deny them cooperation in any political arena, usually 
framing them as extremists. Prominent examples of isolation of PRRPs include ‘National Rally’ (formerly 
Front National) and Vlaams Belang (VB). Of relevance here is the mirror thesis to inclusion-moderation: 
exclusion-radicalisation. It assumes that parties which are excluded from the political game (political 
exclusion) are likely to show no alteration in their behaviour (in short, no softening up). Instead, they 
radicalise even further (Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2014:1141). The exclusion refers to their isolation in the 
electoral arena, with other parties refusing to ‘cooperate’. In the parliamentary arena, other parties do 
not respond to their requests or vote along with them in roll-call voting (Van Spanje & der Brug, 
2007:1022), refusing to even enter office with them. Although this political exclusion is employed against 
PRRPs as well, it is more frequently employed against ERPs, which are constantly faced with the possibility 
of being blocked from institutional politics (Ellinas, 2020). 
Moreover, many FRPs which face political exclusion have to deal with institutional exclusion, as well. The 
latter is usually manifested in the form of legal means; ranging from weak means, such as fines for 
individual far-right politicians for racial incitement, to strong means, such as cuts to public funding or even 
                                                            
4 Hereafter, ‘FRPs’ refers to both populist radical right parties (PRRPs) and extreme-right parties (ERPs) 
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an outright ban (Brems, 2006:141-148). However, weak legal means are more frequently imposed against 
certain politicians from PRRPs, while strong legal means are more frequently used against ERPs (Bale, 
2007). To this, the exclusion-radicalisation thesis has been understudied when it comes to changes of 
political behaviour of FRPs. There exist only a handful of prominent studies, such as the comparative 
studies of Akkerman & Rooduijn (2015) and Van Spanje & der Burg (2007), and a case-study on the NPD 
by Minkenberg (2006).  
As a result of changing external conditions which involve institutional and political exclusion, there could 
be situations where FRPs, including ERPs, have changed towards a de-radicalisation of their political 
behaviour, contrary to the expectations of the exclusion-radicalisation theory. In short, it is assumed that 
the effects of harsh legal means, such as bans or the possibility of being banned, are thought to have 
tamed right-wing extremists by forcing them to de-radicalise their behaviour, in order to avoid any more 
costly legal battles (Ellinas, 2020: 137). This de-radicalisation is mainly manifested by toning down their 
extremist rhetoric publicly; mellowing their programmatic positions on their core policy issues, as well as 
seeking out a wider electoral pool. For example, Akkerman & Rooduijn (2014) provide some evidence that 
exclusion of FRPs, including ERPs, does not necessarily lead to radicalisation. Also, there is the example of 
the ERP of Jobbik, which has moderated significantly in recent years (Biro-Nagy & Boros, 2016).  
The literature it is far less scant when it comes to investigating changes of FRPs’ political behaviour 
following periods of factional reconfigurations inside FRPs (Williams, 2011). It is often argued that two 
main factions can be primarily distinguished among most political parties: the moderates and the 
hardliners (or militants5) (Art, 2011). According to most factional assumptions, political parties are more 
likely to soften up their behaviour when moderates prevail, thus de-radicalising their behaviour, while 
they are more likely to radicalise their behaviour when hardliners prevail (Harmel & Tan, 2003). 
Following this discussion thus far, this thesis hypothesises that political parties in general, including FRPs, 
begin to change when their external and internal living conditions alter profoundly. As to when they begin 
to change, some of these conditions might evolve slowly, while others might be changing more rapidly.  
In some situations, the external and internal conditions are actualising profound change as a result of an 
‘external shock’. In short, an external shock becomes a discrete event, part of a wider cluster of events, 
and a profound ‘external stimulus’. External stimuli refers to specific happenings (e.g., events), discrete 
events or incremental changes that trigger, primarily the external conditions towards a profound change 
                                                            
5 The thesis interchangeably uses the terms hardliners and militants. 
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(Harmel & Janda, 1994). Thus, external stimuli are beyond the direct control of the party itself. Harmel & 
Janda (1994) distinguish four main external stimuli that create conditions under which political parties are 
more or less likely to change: i) shock, ii) event, iii) trend and iv) modification. They posit that some of 
these have more impact on party change than others. Specifically, the external shock, as long as it 
threatens the primary goal (see discussion further in this chapter) of the party (as well as critical party 
actors within the party who perceive it as such) is the most potent stimuli for initiating a process of 
dramatic party change. An external shock is: “an external stimulus so directly related to performance 
considerations on a party’s ‘primary goal’ that it causes the party’s decision-makers [. . .] to undertake a 
fundamental re-evaluation of the party’s effectiveness on that goal dimension” (Harmel & Janda, 1994: 
267–268).  
As stated previously, ERPs face, systematically, both political and legal means of exclusion at the same 
time (Ellinas, 2020; The Independent, 20106; The Slovak Spectator, 20177; Deutche Welle, 2018b8). To a 
large extent, larger than most other political parties, political and institutional exclusionary factors define 
the external environmental conditions of ERPs. Thus, it is very likely that when these factors change their 
behaviour, vis-à-vis an ERP, so do the external conditions under which an ERP operates. It could be 
assumed that when these means intensify, thus becoming more severe, especially by being imposed 
suddenly and unpredictably, they might bear the characteristics of an ‘external shock’. If this is the case, 
then it could be assumed that these means can dramatically change the external living conditions of the 
ERP, by worsening its options within its political context. In turn, it could be expected that the strategies 
embraced by ERPs, as well as the overall behaviour, also change (e.g., Wilson & Cordero, 2006:3). What is 
more, such a development is very likely to affect the internal conditions of ERPs, as well. It is very likely 
that internal party actors, such as leadership and factions, will react to such an external, unanticipated 
and violent shock and respond by demanding, or not, changes to the political behaviour of their party 
(Calca & Gross, 2019:3). Thus, it is very likely that the ERP itself will respond to these changing conditions 
by either de-radicalising or radicalising its political behaviour. Under these chronological conditions - such 
as the period before and after the intensification of political and legal exclusion, as well as before and 
after factional reconfigurations within an ERP - the thesis anticipates a detection of change of extreme 
right party behaviour, either towards de-radicalisation and/or radicalisation. 
                                                            
6 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/court-bans-bnp-from-recruiting-new-members-1920509.html 
7 https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20617009/extremist-charged-with-holocaust-denial.html 
8 https://www.dw.com/en/far-right-npd-germanys-upper-house-votes-to-cut-off-partys-state-funds/a-42419885  
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1.2 The theoretical approach 
 
Extreme right Parties as movement-parties across Political Arenas  
This thesis argues that as long as ERPs are qualitatively different from PRRP, focusing on the same 
behavioural dimensions for detecting changes does not seem to be a wise strategy, because the main 
behavioural dimensions are likely to differ, as will the way these different types of party are likely to 
change. A comprehensive theoretical approach to the study of ERPs’ political behaviour seems to be 
lacking. In order to fill in this literature gap, the thesis develops a theoretical model which lays out which 
dimensions are the most important to the behaviour of ERPs and which are sufficient to conclude if an 
ERP has de-radicalised or radicalised its overall behaviour following periods of profoundly changing 
external and internal conditions.  
Thus, in answering the second main research question, namely, ‘How can we conceptualise and measure 
the political behaviour of electorally successful extreme-right parties?’, the thesis begins by attempting to 
show how the core ideological feature of ERPs, that is violence, is concerned with various behavioural 
dimensions. Drawing insights from the literature on far-right parties and social movements, the main 
argument of the thesis is that ERPs can be primarily understood as movement-parties (Kitschelt, 2006; 
Minkenberg, 2018; Pirro & Gattinara, 2018; Caiani & Císař, 2018; Ellinas, 2020; Froio & Gattinarra, 2020). 
How this dimension plays out is illustrated in Figure 0.1 below. By being movement-parties, ERPs can 
exercise their core ideological element of violence, in behavioural terms. More specifically, ERPs are 
movement-parties because they are ‘doing’ politics in conventional political arenas, such as the electoral 
arena, and less conventional arenas, such as the grassroots arena, while electorally successful ERPs are 
also concerned with the parliamentary arena (Kitschelt, 2006). Thus, it is argued that ERPs have two faces: 
a social movement-face, which is predominantly exercised in the grassroots arena (where they can engage 
in their core ideological feature of violence) and a party-face, which is predominantly exercised in the 
















At the core of the argument lies the assumption that ERPs cannot easily change their overall behaviour 
related to their movement-face, even when seeking to prioritise the electoral and legislative (or 
parliamentary)9 arenas, as well as in situations when they are experiencing difficult external and internal 
conditions, such as complete (e.g., institutional and political) exclusion and factional power 
reconfigurations. This is because, through their movement-face, ERPs can exercise their core ideological 
element of violence, a defining and vital element to their political identity that sets them apart from all 
other political parties, movements or otherwise, in contemporary democracies (Mudde, 2007; Ellinas, 
2013; 2020:50).  
Based on the theoretical model of approaching ERPs as movement-parties which do politics in three main 
political arenas, the next research goal of the thesis is to answer ‘Where is extreme-right party change of 
political behaviour mainly observed?’ According to the literature (Harmel & Janda, 1994:275; Janda, 
1990:14; Bale, 2012) on party change, a political party has changed its behaviour if there is an alteration 
from time ‘A’ to time ‘B’ in its organisational structures, strategy (e.g. primary goal), ideology and policy 
positions and actions. These are usually considered the main dimensions that constitute party behaviour. 
When it comes to assessing changes in the behaviour of FRPs, there are many gaps. For example, most of 
the existing comparative studies (e.g.  Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2014; Akkerman, 2011) have focused on one 
dimension; that is, changes in policy positions, with regard to the main core issues of FRPs (notably 
immigration). Also, there are shortcomings in terms of conceptualisation and measurement. For a start, 
there are other more pertinent dimensions of FRPs’ political behaviour to look at in order to observe 
                                                            











changes in their behaviour, and every study seems to rely on a completely different method for measuring 
such changes (e.g., Akkerman et al., 2016).  
Contrary to the existing literature, this thesis argues that change of ERPs’ political behaviour is mainly 
observed by examining their transition from movement to party and vice versa, across the three political 
arenas that they are most concerned with. This is a more fruitful approach in examining extreme right 
party behaviour, as these parties are, in essence, movement-parties. This approach helps to examine, 
more holistically, extreme-right party behaviour. In detecting this transition, the thesis examines potential 
changes on two dimensions of extreme-right political behaviour, which are sufficient in reaching the 
conclusion of whether they have de-radicalised or radicalised. These are: i) political praxis (i.e., actions) 
and ii) policy issue salience and which, in this thesis, are examined: i) over time, ii) across the three political 
arenas, and iii) across the two faces of ERPs.  
Political praxis, or what parties do, is one of the least studied dimensions of party behaviour. ERPs, in 
particular, are distinguished from other party families in the way they practice politics, through their 
actions in the grassroots arena primarily. Specifically, their violent and unconventional actions in the 
streets is what makes these political formations unique (Ellinas, 2020). To this, the thesis argues that the 
political praxis of ERPs in the grassroots arena is a vital element of their political identity and, perhaps, 
the most pertinent dimension in studying the evolution of their political behaviour. Studying changes on 
parties’ policy issue salience is one of the most studied dimensions of party behaviour. This is because 
issue salience is an area most likely to detect changes in the behaviour of parties. It is often assumed that 
parties are more prone to change based upon the amount that they devote to policy issues, rather than 
based upon the altering of their positions (Harmel et al., 1995; Klingemann et al., 1994:24; Janda et al., 
1995:178-9; Harmel et al., 2018:279). Similarly, as political praxis, policy issue salience can be observed 
across the two faces of ERPs and across the three political arenas. In short, the thesis argues that these 
two dimensions of political behaviour are the most useful in assessing changes of ERPs’ behaviour towards 
de-radicalisation and/or radicalisation, as they capture the transition of ERPs from movement to party or 
from party to movement.  
The next question is how a conclusion can be reached on whether ERPs have de-radicalised or radicalised 
by changing their behaviour on these two dimensions over time? The thesis theorises that, in short, ERPs 
radicalise their behaviour when they emphasise more their movement-face compared to their party-face, 
and de-radicalise their behaviour when they are doing the opposite. With regards to political praxis, if 
ERPs have changed (either to de-radicalisation/moderation or radicalisation), this would be observed with 
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regards to their use of unconventional and conventional repertoires of actions in the grassroots arena 
over time (see also chapter 2). If they have abandoned unconventional actions, as well as decreased the 
salience of their core policy issues that sparked their initial mobilisation (e.g., immigration and law and 
order) in the grassroots arena, following periods of external and internal changes of their living conditions, 
then they have de-radicalised. If they did not, then they are on a radicalisation10 course. 
In answering the question ‘How can change in extreme-right movement-party political behaviour be 
measured systematically?’, the thesis delves into the methodological literature on measuring party and 
social movements behaviour. The thesis presents the political impact-claims analysis, drawing insights 
from methods that measure dimensions of political parties’ behaviour, such as policy positions (e.g., 
through an analysis of parties’ pledges, expert surveys, etc.) and issue salience (e.g., Comparative 
Manifesto Project), as well as social movements’ behavioural dimensions, such as repertoires of actions 
(through protest event analysis or political claims-making analysis methods). In brief, this analysis looks 
at the primary data of parties and codifies instances where they claim that, through their actions, they 
have brought about a political outcome in favour of their interests and ideas. The political impact-claim is 
broken down into constituent parts (see Table 0.1 below) such as: cause of impact (e.g., specific action), 
policy issue, political arena, extreme-right face, type of action (e.g., conventional/unconventional) and 
entity that delivered the outcome (e.g., the government). It can also tell us how the ERP frames and 
interacts with its context in its attempt to justify its claimed impact, as well as about its primary goal. This 
concept and data-driven method (Beach & Pedersen, 2016:125) systematically measures the behaviour 
of ERPs with regards to both of their faces across the three political arenas in which they are most active 
in and over time. It can produce both quantitative and qualitative patterns of ERPs’ behaviour.  
The definition of ‘political impact-claims’ (hereafter PICs) is quite straightforward. These are instances 
where the ERP (or, in fact, any party) claims that it has delivered a political outcome by its own activities 
and which is in favour of its interests and ideas. Consider the examples below, shown in Table 0.1, which 




                                                            
10 Chapter 2 discusses in detail the terms ‘de-radicalisation’ and ‘radicalisation’.  
11 Hereafter, the thesis refers to ‘political impact-claims’ and ‘impact-claims’ interchangeably.  
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Table 0.1 Movement-face and party-face political impact-claims by Golden Dawn. 
Movement-face political impact-
claim 
Party-face political impact-claims 
Example 1:Grassroots Arena Example 2:Electoral Arena Example 3:Parliamentary 
Arena 
‘’…On their passing through the 
town streets, Nationalists were 
being applauded from people who 
were voicing their support to 
Golden Dawn.  
Just ‘suddenly’, and during the 
presence of Golden-Dawners 
(cause), illegal immigrants-street 
vendors were absent…’’(outcome) 
(GD, 2012:56). 
‘’The government obeys 
Golden Dawn in fear of our 
enormous electoral strength 
at the polls (cause). “14th of 
September 2012: A Golden 
Dawn spokesperson at the TV 
station Skai: “Any crime 
committed by an illegal 
immigrant should be treated 
as a felony” (cause). 17th of 
September 2012, Samaras: 
“Illegal immigrants’ crimes are 
felonies”…After three days of 
delay, it seems that the 
government is now waking up 
and finally announcing the 
adoption of said measure 
(outcome)…” (GD, 2012:48) 
‘’The parliamentary control 
of Golden Dawn (cause) 
forced the state to 
compensate the Greek 
small-business owners 
(outcome)’’ (GD, 2013:99)12. 
 
In Table 0.1 (above) political impact-claim Example 1 captures the actions and issues of GD in the 
grassroots arena. The action here is a grassroots activity by GD’s local branch members, such as a visit to 
a street market. This action is claimed by GD to have brought an outcome where ‘illegal’ immigrant 
vendors left the street-market once they noticed GD members. Thus, the issue is ‘immigration’. Examples 
2 and 3 capture the behaviour of GD inside the party arenas, with regards to its party-face. In Example 2, 
the claimed cause is ‘electoral strength’, as evidenced in the polls. Although electoral strength is not 
actually a directly observable action, it, however, captures how GD was claiming to have delivered impact. 
‘Electoral strength’, as measured in the polls, is the most directly observable measure to capture parties’ 
behaviour in the electoral arena.  Also, in Example 2, the claimed issue by GD is ‘immigration’. Example 3 
captures the behaviour of GD in the parliamentary arena. The claimed action is ‘parliamentary actions’ 
(e.g. interpellations, questions, etc.), with claims to have delivered an outcome on the issue of the 
                                                            
12 https://bit.ly/2AXemKg  
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‘economy’. The analysis of these impact-claims, however, requires a discussion of the context, to some 
extent. Political impact-claims are discussed further in Chapter 4. 
  
1.3 Research design  
 
1.3.1 Methodology and the case selection 
 
This thesis is a single case study type of research. Thus, the thesis employs a single case study qualitative 
methodology that allows it to identify what the case under investigation is doing and how. A single case 
study research is defined as a qualitative approach where the researcher explores a single case, through 
an in-depth examination of data (Creswell & Porth, 2018:153). The unit of analysis in a single case study 
can be either identifying changing patterns over time across within-case units, or identifying changing 
patterns of within-case units at a single point in time (Gerring, 2007:21). The methodological approach of 
this thesis is innovative, as it does both. It compares GD’s behaviour across three political arenas per time 
period and it compares its behaviour between different time periods.  
 
With regards to case selection, from the variety of case study typologies found in political science (e.g., 
Lijphart, 1971; Gerring, 2007:89-90), the case study of this thesis is classified as a deviant case (Lijphart, 
1971; Gerring, 2007:105-6). The selection of GD as a case-study is justified, as it is a deviant case of a 
movement-party (Ellinas & Lamprianou, 2016, 2017) of the extreme-right party family (Ellinas, 2013), 
which experienced profoundly changing external and internal living conditions (Vasilopoulou & 
Halikiopoulou, 2015). Secondly, it has been one of the most electorally successful ERPs in Europe thus far, 
having seven years of experience (from 2012 to 2019). For comparison, the ERPs of L’SNS and ELAM 
emerged as electorally successful only in 2016, thus leaving researchers and observers not much time to 
assess any changes in their behaviour. In addition, it seems that they have not yet experienced such 
profoundly changing external and internal conditions as GD has. Therefore, as long as a case-study ‘is a 
form of analysis where one or a few units are studied intensively, with an aim to elucidate features of a 
broader class of - presumably similar but not identical – units’ (Gerring & McDermott, 2007:688), GD (with 
regards to the general population of electorally successful ERPs) constitutes an ideal case for examining 






The thesis systematically analyses one primary source: GD’s official old website, www.xryshavgh.com. 
Although this might suggest that the thesis avoids analysing a diversity of sources, a hallmark of qualitative 
case studies (Creswell & Porth, 2018:155), this is not exactly the case. The website is, for GD, its ‘average’ 
platform for spreading its ideas. In other words, on its website, it re-posts a variety of other information 
from all other mediums, such as its two official newspapers, its actions in the parliament and actions in 
the grassroots arena; across the local, regional and national levels. In short, GD’s old website included an 
enormous amount of data, which enabled this thesis to systematically analyse a vast amount of primary 
data. Specifically, it analyses around 28,500 post items for detecting impact-claims. These are short texts, 
each averaging between 200 and 300 words.  
For reasons of external data triangulation (see chapter 5), secondary and primary sources on GD have 
been analysed as well, beyond the impact-claims from GD’s website. This was done in order to strengthen 
the empirical validity of the thesis’ findings, by demonstrating, with additional sources, key points in the 
chronology when, how and where GD changed towards de-radicalisation and/or radicalisation.  
 
1.3.3 Time frame 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to study if an electorally successful ERP has changed its behaviour 
following periods of profound change. The studied timeframe starts from the first year of GD’s electoral 
breakthrough in May 2012, up until December 2016. Although the selected timeframe is relatively short 
for a study on party change, it is, however, analysed and measured systematically on a month-by-month 
basis. The selected period was not for practical reasons: the retrieval, categorisation, analysis and coding 
of the primary data was an extensively time-consuming and labour-intensive task. 
 
1.4 Originality and contribution of the Thesis  
 




1.4.1 Theoretical contribution  
 
For its theoretical contribution, the thesis approaches ERPs as movement-parties. To this, the thesis 
argues that it is problematic to approach ERPs solely as political parties or solely as social movements 
(e.g., Caiani & della Porta, 2012). This is because ERPs exercise politics as both parties and social 
movements at the same time. Hence, the political behaviour of ERPs is manifested across three main 
political arenas which make up their party and movement faces. These are the grassroots arena, which 
makes up their movement-face, and the electoral and parliamentary arenas, which make up their party 
face. Thus, the thesis theorises and investigates the behaviour of ERPs through this interaction, across the 
three arenas and their two faces.  
Another theoretical contribution lies at a behavioural dimension that the thesis examines, in order to 
assess how ERPs are transitioning between their movement and party faces. This is the study of their 
political praxis. The study of political praxis, as another behavioural dimension of political parties, has 
largely been neglected in the literature on party politics, with the primary focus often being on studying 
words rather than deeds. In particular, ERPs are mostly well-known for their contentious actions. The 
contribution of the thesis lies in merging, into a unified theoretical framework of extreme-right party 
behaviour, the political praxis across movement and party arenas.  
 
1.4.2 Empirical & Methodological contributions - Re-evaluating the assessment of de-radicalisation 
and radicalisation: The ‘political impact-claims’ analysis 
 
The thesis makes significant empirical and methodological contributions. For example, empirical Chapter 
5 investigates changing patterns of GD’s behaviour towards de-radicalisation and radicalisation through 
other secondary and primary data, beyond the impact-claims, in order to develop case-specific 
hypotheses and strengthen the empirical validity of the thesis’ empirical findings. It finds that the GD 
movement-party had decreased its overall grassroots activism and abandoned violent actions, while, at 
the same time, softening some of its programmatic positions on key issues following the shocking event 
of the arrests. It had also significantly increased its parliamentary activity. However, this thesis argues that 
looking at the activity of the GD inside each arena separately (instead of simultaneously) cannot possibly 
capture the entire picture of whether GD de-radicalised or radicalised. This is because, for example, the 
nature of the political praxis differs in each arena and so do the conditions (e.g., means, resources and 
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motives) under which GD, or any other ERP, undertakes it. What is more, changes in issue salience across 
the three arenas can also tell us a lot about de-radicalisation and radicalisation; something which is still 
lacking in the literature. This thesis aims to fill in these gaps by looking at the political impact-claims of GD 
across the three political arenas and its two faces.  
It would be assumed that it is more likely for GD to undertake more action inside parliament, as it is a 
significantly costless action, instead of in the grassroots arena, which is far more costly (both in terms of 
funding and of organisation), especially in a period where it is cut off from public funding. However, 
throughout the studied timeframe of the thesis (May 2012 – December 2016), a cordon sanitaire on the 
amount, or nature, of parliamentary actions GD could undertake was not imposed. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that it takes considerably less time for an MP to get approval from the leadership, 
so as to prepare and submit a one-paged parliamentary interpellation, rather than to organise a party 
dissemination activity in the grassroots arena. The former is less costly, compared to the latter activity, 
which would often involve finding dozens of local activists, equipping them with hundreds of party 
newspapers and finding places to tour for dissemination of party material, all of this away from societal 
and institutional hostile actors. 
In the electoral arena, chapter 5 finds that GD had softened some of its positions on its key issues and had 
embraced economic issues, following the arrests, at the expense of its core issues (e.g., immigration); a 
strong sign of de-radicalisation. However, FRPs, especially ERPs, have important reasons to display a 
different and less extreme face in the electoral arena, as they must appeal to wider audience (Mudde, 
2007). In this regard, one has also to take into account the internal party literature of an ERP before 
reaching a conclusion that it has, indeed, de-radicalised.  
In the grassroots arena, chapter 5 finds that GD, following the arrests, witnessed both a quantitative (less 
activities) and a qualitative change (abandoning contentious actions) in its grassroots activism, largely 
attributed to the harsher imposed legal means.  As well, on its signatory issues, GD’s opposition to 
immigration ‘lost much of its violent undertones’ (Petsinis, 2017:33). These findings bear strong evidence 
that GD had de-radicalised. It had increased its party-face activity at the expense of grassroots activity. 
However, none of the existing literature on GD systematically and simultaneously assesses GD’s behaviour 
across the party and movement arenas. Therefore, it would be more precise to note, with more safety, 
that GD has now de-radicalised in the grassroots arena, according to the literature thus far. Still, the 




Although GD’s political praxis in the party-face arenas might have increased significantly at the expense 
of the grassroots arena, pointing towards a change of de-radicalisation, GD might have seen itself as more 
effective in making an impact in the grassroots arena. This is where one of the added values of the impact-
claims arises, which is a significant contribution of this thesis. As impact-claims essentially capture the 
areas where a political party sees itself as more capable of exerting power, the impact-claims can dig deep 
into the behaviour of parties and unearth neglected dimensions of party behaviour. In this regard, an ERP 
might still see itself as more impactful in the grassroots arena, despite significantly decreasing its 
grassroots activism (and issues) and increasing its attention in its party arenas. In this light, the ERP is still 
in a radicalisation phase, as it sees its grassroots activism as the more effective way of exerting power, 
materialising political outcomes and influencing political opponents in favour of its interests and ideas.  
 
Thus, a more in-depth analysis of GD’s internal party literature across all three political arenas would shed 
more light on this finding, in an effort to reach safer conclusions about whether it has de-radicalised or 
not, as well as how this change has played out. The impact-claims analysis is an alternative way of looking 
at this change. It is important to note that studies (Ellinas, 2020) indicate that GD neither de-radicalised 
nor radicalised further following the arrests. For example, Ellinas (2020) argues that, in the grassroots 
arena, GD entered a process of ‘organisational stagnation’ (evidenced by the shutdown of many branches 
and a notable decrease in activism) and he notes that, following a period of changing external and internal 
conditions, GD placed more emphasis on the development of its party face by downplaying its issues and 
activism in the grassroots arena; a sign of de-radicalisation. However, Ellinas (2020), and the existing 
literature on the GD, thus far, does not systematically assess the interaction of GD’s behaviour across 
party-face and movement-face arenas. In this regard, the thesis argues, when examining the behaviour of 
ERPs across their political arenas, that it is important to adopt a uniform method that simultaneously 
captures their behaviour in the grassroots, electoral and parliamentary arenas. Simply put, it is more 
efficient to assess their de-radicalisation and radicalisation by looking at the same thing. It is even more 
effective to do this with an extensive analysis of its internal literature, as well. This thesis does both. 
 
This thesis is one of the very first studies to assess the interaction of GD’s party and movement faces 
systematically across both of its faces, while, at the same time, analysing a vast amount of its internal 
literature. Ultimately, it is an alternative, and presumably more effective, way of tracing patterns of de-
radicalisation and radicalisation for ERPs. An analysis of GD’s impact-claims is likely to bring to the surface 
a more in-depth picture of GD’s behavioural de-radicalisation and/or de-radicalisation, from what the 
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literature has, thus far, identified. So, the development of GD’s political impact-claims might highlight a 
different pattern than its political praxis, and overall behaviour, across arenas, as identified by the 
literature on GD thus far. This pattern, however, would not be expected to be diametrically different from 
what the literature has identified thus far (see Chapter 5). This is a major empirical and methodological 
contribution that this thesis makes.  
 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis  
 
The thesis is comprised of nine chapters and is divided into two main parts: i) Theory, Concepts and 
Methodology, and ii) Findings and Conclusion. Each part includes four chapters.  
Chapter 2 is the conceptual chapter of the thesis. It defines and classifies far-right parties. The aim of the 
chapter is to disentangle ERPs from the theoretical contribution of the thesis, emphasise their 
movement/party dichotomy and show why GD is a deviant case within the far-right party family. Thus, 
the chapter demonstrates why ERPs are a different variant within the far-right party family and shows 
why they can be better approached as movement-parties when studying their behaviour. It also presents 
the two main behavioural dimensions the thesis looks at for identifying de-radicalisation and radicalisation 
of GD: political praxis and issue salience.  
Chapter 3 lays out the theoretical framework of the thesis. It theorises ERPs’ behaviour across political 
arenas and per political praxis, and issue salience. It also theorises under what changing external and 
internal conditions ERPs are more or less likely to change their behaviour. The chapter concludes by 
developing testable hypotheses regarding both de-radicalisation and radicalisation scenarios of ERPs. 
Chapter 4 is the methodological chapter. It presents the political impact-claims analysis. It discusses how 
the novelty of political impact-claims lies in the fact that they can measure extreme-right behaviour 
systematically over time, with regards to both their faces and across the three main political arenas of 
ERPs, as well as on the main behavioural dimensions of political praxis and issue salience.  
Chapter 5 is the first empirical chapter of the thesis. The chapter builds an empirical narrative by 
scrutinising the secondary literature on GD, as well as by analysing primary data and providing original 
findings, beyond the political impact-claims. The aim is to provide an external triangulation to the further 
findings which will come out as a result of the analysis of GD’s political impact-claims, and which will be 
presented in the next three empirical chapters (6 - 8). Through this empirical narrative, the chapter, in the 
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end, generates testable case-specific hypotheses with regards to the de-radicalisation and radicalisation 
of GD, as evidenced on its PICs. In short, the chapter aims to develop the question: ‘What can we expect 
to see in the PICs of GD, based on what we know thus far about GD’s de-radicalisation and radicalisation?’ 
This question will be answered in the next three empirical chapters.   
Chapter 6 tests the external factors hypotheses (e.g., de-radicalisation and radicalisation) on GD’s 
movement-face (grassroots arena), over the two ‘external Phases’ (see Chapter 5) and according to the 
thesis studied timeframe (May 2012 – December 2016), through GD’s PICs. The chapter finds that, 
following the shock exclusion of the arrests, GD changed its behaviour towards de-radicalisation by 
emphasising its movement-face and de-emphasising its party-face. For example, in Phase 1 (before 
arrests), GD was, mainly, claiming to have resorted to unconventional actions for delivering impact, while 
it was claiming to have resorted to conventional actions in Phase 2 (after arrests). 
Chapter 7 tests the external factors hypotheses (e.g., de-radicalisation and radicalisation) on GD’s party-
face (electoral and parliamentary arena) by analysing GD’s PICs. It shows that, in Phase 1, GD mainly 
emphasised its actions in the electoral arena. In Phase 2, the most emphasised arena was the legislative 
arena, through the action category of ‘parliamentary actions.’ In Phase 1, the most salient issue in the 
party arenas was, by far, ‘Immigration’ in the electoral arena, through the claimed cause of ‘electoral 
strength’. In Phase 2, the new salient issue was ‘Corruption’ in the parliamentary arena. In conclusion, the 
chapter argues that GD changed towards de-radicalisation following the arrests, with regards to its party-
face, through the issue of ‘Corruption’; an issue that could be naturally addressed only inside the party 
arenas, as well as by de-emphasising its core issues (e.g., ‘Immigration’ and ‘Law and Order’), which 
sparked its initial mobilisation in the grassroots arena in Phase 1. 
Chapter 8 tests the internal factors de-radicalisation and radicalisation hypotheses on GD’s movement 
and party faces, over the three ‘factional Phases’ and according to the thesis studied timeframe (May 
2012 – December 2016), through the PICs. It finds that GD was in a radicalisation course when the militants 
were the dominant faction, before the arrests (Phase 1). When the moderates became the dominant 
faction, in Phase 2 (after the arrests and throughout the time the leadership was in jail), GD changed 
towards de-radicalisation. However, in Phase 3 (leader out of jail), when the militant re-emerged as the 
dominant faction, GD changed towards ‘partial de-radicalisation/radicalisation’.  
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. It summarises the main findings before highlighting the various 
contributions this thesis makes:  theoretical, methodological and empirical. Next, it discusses areas of 
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generalisability. The last section discusses avenues for future research that this thesis has opened up. In 
particular, it argues that a political impact-claims analysis of other parties can investigate new promising 


























































Chapter 2: Extreme-right movement-parties: Concepts, 




This is the conceptual chapter of the thesis. It delves into the definitional literature on what constitutes 
the political far-right. The aim is to highlight the main distinction between the two main variants of far-
right parties; that is, populist radical right parties and extreme-right parties. Another main goal is to 
highlight the dichotomy of the movement/party faces of ERPs, and show why studying changes in the 
political behaviour of ERPs by approaching them as movement-parties is a fruitful research strategy. Thus, 
the chapter bridges the literature on far-right parties and that of social movements in order to achieve 
this. The chapter endeavours to disentangle the movement/party dichotomy of ERPs from its theoretical 
contribution, in an attempt to fulfil another goal of the thesis, which is illustrating why ERPs, and the 
Golden Dawn in particular, is a deviant case within the far-right party family. To this, at the end, the 
chapter discusses the context under which GD rose to prominence and introduces the case of the GD. 
The chapter consists of five main sections. The first section defines and classifies the far-right political 
family, distinguishing between the two main variants, the party and non-party sector, with the main 
distinction between the two the fact that the party sector runs for elections, while the non-party sector 
does not. Within the party sector, the chapter identifies the two main variants, populist radical right 
parties and ERPs. Section two focuses exclusively on ERPs and argues that what distinguishes them from 
PRRPs is their overt belief in anti-democracy, which is manifested as part of their ideological attachment 
to the ‘fascist myths’. Section 3 attempts to show why approaching ERPs as movement-parties is a fruitful 
strategy in identifying changes in their political behaviour. The section presents the two main behavioural 
dimensions that it focuses on specifically for this purpose; that is, political praxis and issue salience. 
Political praxis captures the stringent belief in anti-democracy of ERPs. In behavioural terms, this is 
translated into contentious, and mostly violent, actions. Changes in issue salience is an important and 
useful dimension in identifying behavioural changes across the three arenas where ERPs are doing politics. 
Section 3 concludes by defining what de-radicalisation and radicalisation are, as well as how they are 
helpful concepts in identifying changes in the behaviour of ERPs.  
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Section 4 introduces the far-right political family in post-authoritarian Greece until the electoral 
breakthrough of GD in the June 2012 national elections. Section 5 discusses the context of the Greek crisis, 
under which political opportunities for ERPs, such as GD, to succeed electorally, opened up. Section 6, 
introduces the case-study of the thesis, the Golden Dawn. It shows how and why this is an extreme-right 
movement-party par excellence and a deviant case within the far-right party family.  
 
2.1 Far-right Parties: Definitions & Classification 
 
Since the successful emergence of far-right parties (FRPs) in electoral politics, in the 1980s, there has been 
an intense academic debate on how to define them and what label should be given to these parties. 
Mudde (1996) talks about a ‘war of words’, identifying 58 ideological features of these parties and 26 
definitional labels. Despite the fact that a final conclusion has not yet been reached, there has been 
observed, however, an increasing consensus over the years, in the literature, on three main issues 
regarding the study of the far-right: i) Analysing the ideology of these actors is the most useful approach 
to detect which parties and actors belong to this family (Mudde, 2000, 2007; Vasilopoulou, 2010:43), ii) 
The far-right is an overarching category that includes heterogeneous actors (e.g. party and non-party 
sector), which all, however, share some minimum ideological features (Minkenberg, 2003:150; Mudde, 
2007:5) iii) There are two main variants of this party family that compete in elections: radical right parties 
and extreme right parties. Hence, this project adopts the term ‘far-right’ as an umbrella term, 
encompassing all the varieties of the far-right, including electoral and non-electoral, such as: political 
parties (e.g. Halikiopoulou, 2018; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015:5-6. Ellinas, 2010; 2013; Golder, 
2016), movements, minor violent groups and sub-cultural milieus (Minkenberg, 2003; 2013:5; 2017; 
Gatinara and Pirro, 2018:5). Although ‘far-right’ is, by no means, the universally accepted term, it is the 
least problematic in any attempt to understand and analyse the variety of political actors that exist within 
this overarching category. As long as one of the main aims of this chapter is to highlight the main 
differences and similarities among all of these various actors, the term ‘far-right’ serves this scope exactly 
(Halikiopoulou, 2018:64-65). What is more, most of the authors who use the term ‘far-right’ limit the 
scope of the term to political parties only. This is understandable given that most of the literature on FRPs 
deals with electorally successful political FRPs (Minkenberg, 2003:150; Mudde, 2007:5). However, 
neglecting to incorporate, in this category, actors from the non-party sector runs the risk of missing out 
on how easily ideas and persons are likely to be transferred back and forth, especially in the case of the 
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relationship between ERPs and other extra-parliamentary extreme-right party and non-party actors 
(Minkenberg, 2013:13-14; Rydgren 2018:25). This is important in terms of understanding their political 
behaviour, in particular, and their transformation, in general.  
The main distinction between a far-right party and the non-party far-right sector is that the former run 
elections, try to win office and engage in electoral campaigns, while the latter does not engage at all in 
such activities (Minkenberg, 2017:25). In the non-party sector of the far-right, what can be found are 
social movements, the ‘groupuscular’ right and sub-cultural milieus (Griffin, 2003; Mudde, 2007:5). What 
primarily distinguishes these various groups are the kind of organisation and goals they adopt. What all of 
these groups have in common is their engagement in the grassroots arena, through conventional and 
unconventional repertoires of actions, albeit in varying degrees. Social movements try to mobilise public 
support, mainly through conventional means, such as large-scale demonstrations (Minkenberg, 2017:25). 
The term ‘groupuscular right’ refers to small and marginal political groups, each of which has miniscule 
active membership, and may have an extremely low or non-existent public profile, yet are ideologically 
mature formations. ‘Its diminutive size, marginality and relative inconspicuousness bestow on it qualities 
which suit the purposes of its organizers’ (Griffin, 2003:3 cited in Umland, 2002:369). These minor groups 
act relatively independently from parties and social movements, do not have formal organisational 
structures and are usually more inclined towards violence than parties and movements (Minkenberg, 
2013:13).  Sub-cultural milieus are ideological networks that provide guidance to far-right ideas (Mudde, 
2007).  
 
Table 2.1 (see below) offers some well-known examples belonging to each sub-category of the far-right 
party sector. Regarding the non-party sector, it is beyond the scope of this project to identify all the myriad 
















Table 2.1 The Far-Right Political family: Party and Non-Party Sectors 
 PARTY SECTOR NON-PARTY SECTOR (country) 
  Radical Right 



































































Estonia EKRE - Conservative 
People's Party of 
Estonia 






Finland True Finns     
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France National Rally (former 
Front National) 
    
Germany Alternative for 
Deutschland 
NPD    
Germany  Die Rechte    
Greece Greek Solution Golden Dawn    
Hungary Jobbik Our 
Homeland 
Movement 
   
Italy Lega (former Lega 
Nord) 
Forza Nuova    
Italy Brothers of Italy Casa Pound    
Italy  Tricolour 
Flamme 
   
Netherlands PVV – Freedom Party     
Poland  National 
Rebirth of 
Poland 
   
Romania Great Romania Party United 
Romania 
Party 
   






   
Slovenia SNS - Slovenian 
National Party 
    
Spain Vox National 
Democracy  
   
Spain  Falange 
Española de 
las JONS 
   
Spain  La Falange    
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Sweden Sweden Democrats Nordic 
Resistance 
Movement 
   
UK UKIP British 
National 
Party 
   
UK  Britain First    
Source: Author’s own compilation based on: Mudde, (2005; 2007), The Popu-list (2019); Gattinara and 
Froio, 2014; Note: This is not an exhaustive list of all the FRPs (including non-party sector) across 
Europe.  
 
When it comes to political parties, as Table 2.1 (above) shows, the overarching category ‘far-right’ includes 
two main varieties: radical right parties and extreme right parties (e.g. neo-fascist and/or neo-Nazi). In the 
far-right party sector, the most successful parties are those of the radical right variant (Mudde, 2007). 
PRRPs have always been, as of today, the most electorally successful party sub-family of the far-right, 
drawing the most scholarly attention (Betz, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Norris, 2005). Radical right parties are 
‘radical’ because they share ‘an ideological and practical orientation towards root and branch systemic 
change of the political system’, while others are ‘extreme’ because they advocate ‘an ideological and 
practical opposition to the values and practices of democracy, either as it exists in a particular system or 
as a system that may, but does not necessarily, involve a propensity to violence’ (Mudde and March, 
2005:24). The radicalism and extremism of FRPs must be understood within the system in which they 
operate (Carter, 2005). Because FRPs are a phenomenon largely found in contemporary Europe, where 
the liberal context is dominant (though not in all of Europe), this means that radical-right parties are anti-
liberal democratic, but not antidemocratic per se, whereas extreme right parties are anti-democratic per 
se (Mudde, and March, 2005:25). Although radicalism and extremism can be found on both the left and 
the right, FRPs are defined as ‘right’ because they all share a belief that human inequalities are natural 
(Mudde, 2007:26; Carter, 2005:17). 
Most of the literature on FRPs seems to agree that the study of their ideology is the most useful in order 
to define what far-right parties are (Mudde, 2000; 2007; Minkenberg, 2003:151; Carter, 2005; 
Vasilopoulou, 2010:43; Pirro, 2014; Mair and Mudde, 1998). The analysis of FRPs’ ideology has been 
comprehensively elaborated in the writings of Mudde (1995; 1996; 1999; 2000; 2007) and has since 
gained dominance in the field with regards to the conceptualisation of FRPs. This thesis adopts Mudde’s 
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definition, as well, because it helps to encompass and, at the same time, distinguish all the variations of 
the far-right, as suggested by others as well (e.g. Ravndal and Bjørgo, 2018:7). Mudde (2007) develops a 
minimum and maximum definition of the far-right. A minimum definition refers to the ideological feature 
that all institutional and non-institutional far-right groups share. This ideological feature is nativism. A 
maximum definition refers to those core ideological features that all far-right actors must share (e.g. the 
possible number of similarities), albeit with some caveats. The maximum features are nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism for radical-right parties, while, for extreme right actors, these are nativism, 
authoritarianism and anti-democracy (Mudde, 2007:22-23).   
Nativism is the ultimate core ideological feature that all actors within the far-right label share, either party 
or non-party (Mudde, 2007:26; Betz, 2018). Nativism, which is a combination of nationalism and 
xenophobia, is defined “as an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by 
members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are 
fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007:19). Non-native elements can 
be defined on either religious or cultural, ethnic, racially-based terms, depending on the type of far-right 
actor (Mudde, 2000). The first ideological feature of the maximum definition is authoritarianism, defined 
as ‘the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely’. 
In this interpretation, authoritarianism includes law and order and ‘punitive conventional moralism’ 
(Mudde, 2007:23). Authoritarianism does not necessarily predispose an anti-democratic stance. However, 
it does not exclude one. The second and last feature is populism, defined as an ideological feature rather 
than as a discourse or a political style (Mudde 2004: 543; Pappas, 2016). However, populism is a core 
ideological feature for radical right parties only. Populism captures the anti-establishment and anti-liberal 
democratic stances of radical right parties (Akkerman et al., 2016:8).    
 
Nowadays, PRRPs are the most electorally successful variant of the far-right (Kitschelt 1995; Mudde, 2007: 
121). Up until the 1980s, some of the PRRPs were associated with political violence and with some fascist 
elements (Hainsworth, 2008:15). However, over the years, they have significantly distanced themselves 
from these features. For example, during the 1970s, fascist elements, such as myths of national rebirth or 
violence, could be found in FN’s discourse (Fieschi, 2004:136), but, today, these elements are absent in 
the FN, which has managed to distance itself from this past (Williams, 2006:96). PRRPs have drawn a 
demarcation line from biological racism, fascism and use of political violence, as evidenced in their 
programmatic agendas and public rhetoric, largely because of their increasing electoral relevancy 
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(Eatwell, 2000:411; Halikiopoulou, 2018:69). These parties have managed to achieve high electoral results 
by adopting a new ‘master frame’ (Rydgren, 2005). This master frame includes abandoning a belief in 
biological racism and, instead, adopting the idea of ethnopluralism (Rydgren, 2005:247). In short, 




2.2 Extreme-Right Parties  
 
There are some fundamental differences between PRRPs and ERPs. The (populist) radical right is not just 
a more moderate form of the extreme right (Mudde, 2007:31). Most of the literature agrees that this has 
to do with ERPs’ one main ideological feature, which differs from PRRPs: their overt commitment to anti-
democracy (Ignazi, 2003; Mudde, 2007:23-24; 31; Kopecek, 2007:284; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 
2015). The feature of anti-democracy can be subdivided into two sub-features that capture their core anti-
democratic beliefs. These are the adherence to fascist myths and the propensity towards the use of 
violence (Griffin, 1991; Koopmans, 1996; Goodwin, 2010:181-182; Pappas, 2016:25; Minkenberg, 
2017:23). Firstly, radical right parties outright reject violence in words and deeds, while extreme right 
parties see it as a means to achieve political ends (Carter, 2005:17, 75; Minkenberg, 2003:152). Secondly, 
the radical right shows commitment to democracy by accepting its minimum criteria, such as majority 
rule, free and fair elections and procedural democracy, and does not seek to displace it (Rydgren, 2018:24; 
Betz, 2005; Minkenberg, 2000; Copsey, 2007; Mudde and Kaltawasser 2012; Pappas, 2016; Rydgren, 
2018:24). In other words, it rejects pluralism (of interests and ideas) and (ethnic) minority rights (Mudde, 
2007:149).    
In particular, ERPs seem to have been forgotten for a while. Since the emergence of the third wave of far-
right parties (Mudde, 2007; 2016), the literature reached the conclusion that ERPs, which espouse fascist 
and Nazi ideas and use violence, are doomed to electoral failure in contemporary Europe (Ignazi, 1992; 
Golder, 2003; Carter, 2005; Ivarsflaten, 2006). In addition, after Mudde’s (2007) work, which seemed to 
have settled the definitional debate to a large extent, studies on the use of the ‘extreme’ as a label, or 
studies on ERPs, have decreased dramatically (Arzheimer, 2018)13. ERPs, mainly because of these overt 
anti-democratic commitments espoused, had been stigmatized. Unable to cut off this stigma and gain a 




wider legitimacy, they have remained electorally at the margins (Goodwin, 2010; Ivarsflaten, 2006; Carter, 
2005). Given the absence of successful ERPs (besides some victories of the NPD in some states and of the 
BNP in some cities during the early 2000s) (e.g. Goodwin, 2010; Sommer, 2008), these parties have not 
attracted much academic interest when compared to the PRRPs. However, this does not mean that they 
have stopped existing or have disappeared. In fact, in recent times, they have been more successful than 
ever, as Table 2.2 (below) shows, evidenced by the electoral success of Jobbik in 2010, Golden Dawn in 
2012, ELAM in 2016 and L’SNS in 2016. However, as Table 2.2 (continued in next page) also shows, the 
majority of them are still electorally unsuccessful.  
Table 2.2 The electoral fortunes of Extreme-right Parties across Europe. 
Extreme Right Parties that contest elections for the national parliament (excluding federal) 
Country Extreme Right Party Name Highest Ever 
result in % 
Most recent 
result in % 
Electorally 
successful? 
Belgium Nation   No 
Cyprus National Popular Front 5.6 (2018) 5.6 (2018) Yes 




Czechia Workers' Party of Social Justice 1.14 (2010) 0.2 (2017) No 
Germany NPD 3.6 (1969) 1.4 (2017) No 
Germany Die Rechte   No 
Greece Golden Dawn 7 (2015) 7 (2015) Yes 
Hungary Jobbik 20.22 19.06 Yes 
Hungary Our Homeland Movement 3.29 (2019) 
(European 
election) 
3.29 (2019) New 
Italy Forza Nuova 0.67 (2006) 0.26 (2013) No 
Italy Casa Pound 0.9 (2018) 0.9 (2018) No 
Italy Tricolour Flamme   No 
Poland National Rebirth of Poland 3.10 (2011) 3.10 (2011) No 
Romania United Romania Party 2.97 (2016) 2.97 (2016) No 
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Slovakia L'SNS – Peoples’ Party – Our Slovakia 8.04 (2016) 8.04 (2016) Yes 
Spain National Democracy  0.06 (2004) 0.01 (2015) No 
Spain Falange Española de las JONS 2.11 (1979) 0.0 (2019) No 
Spain La Falange   No 
Sweden Nordic Resistance Movement 0.03 (2018) 0.03 (2018) No 
Sweden Party of the Swedes 0.07 (2014) 0.07 (2014) Defunct 
UK British National Party 1.9 (2010) 0.0001 
(2017) 
No 
UK Britain First   Defunct 
Sources: Author’s own compilation based on: Mudde, 2005; 2007; The Popu-list (2019); Gattinara and 
Froio, 2014; Note: 1) electorally successful are defined as those parties that have gained at least one seat 
in their national parliaments. 2) ERPs which did not contest at the national level (so far) no results are 
included except if noted in parentheses. 3) Jobbik is in italics because after 2014 is perhaps not an ERP 
anymore (see Biro-Nagy and Boros, 2016). 4) This not an exhaustive list of all the ERPs across Europe. 
 
ERPs’ participation in democratic elections is nothing more than a tactical strategy to tear down the 
democratic system (Givens, 2005:20). The extreme-right is characterised by monism. It aims at the 
repression of dissent, seeing any opposing ideas to it as illegitimate (Lipset and Raab, 1970:6). ERPs seek 
ideological inspiration from the inter-war fascist European regimes. In the ideological core of ERPs lie the 
components of what Griffin defines as the ‘fascist minimum’. These are two fascist myths: the myth of 
rebirth or the palingennetic myth and the myth of decadence (Griffin, 1991), illustrated in Figure 2.1 
below.  




The two sub-features of anti-democracy, as shown in Figure 2.1, should then be discussed in order to 




Use of violence 
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2.2.1 Anti-democracy: The fascist myths  
 
ERPs differ from PRRPs in that they are rooted in fascist and Nazi ideologies. Neo-fascist and Neo-Nazi 
parties are variations of the extreme-right party family. These parties espouse what Griffin (1991) terms 
as the ‘fascist myth of national rebirth and palingenesis’. They seek the creation of a ‘new-man type’ and 
see the state as the ‘key unit superseding the interests of the individual, and an expression of national 
unity and national autarky’. Both fascism and Nazism share these beliefs, whereas the latter (as the 
national socialist variation of fascism) only differs in its emphasis on racial principles (e.g. existence of 
superior and inferior races) and its anti-Semitism (Kopecek, 2007:282). Also, ERPs parties share the neo-
fascist traits of the Third Position, which, in essence, is an indirect reference to the fascist myths (Copsey, 
2007). Third Position (or Way) is presented by the extreme-right as an outright rejection of both capitalism 
and communism, with the aim of misleading its audience from its adherence to National Socialism. As 
Griffin notes (1999:10), “What makes Third Positionism a form of neo-fascism is the way it duplicates the 
structural matrix of all fascist thought, namely the vision of a rebirth (palingenesis) of the nation (in this 
case as part of a wider European process of regeneration) in a new order which will put an end to the 
decadence of the prevailing liberal democratic system and the threat posed by communism”. 
Thus, the neo-Nazi ‘Nordic Resistance Movement’ states that it is: “a revolutionary, National Socialist 
organization – this sets us apart from SD [Sweden Democrats] and other nationalist parties. In essence, 
this means that we endeavour to create an entirely new society. We believe that the current system in 
itself is racially and culturally degenerate, and economically corrupt. We therefore reject this entire system 
and do not believe it can survive long-term”14. In a similar line of thinking, the ‘National Rebirth of Poland’ 
(NRP) describes the modern world as being in a state of ‘degeneracy’. It supports overthrowing the current 
system through revolutionary means (NRP, no date.)15. For the NRP, The Third Position believes that the 
global National Revolution can only be completed by shaping a New Man who will practice what he 
preaches (NRP, no date b)16. BNP’s leader had stated, in 2006, that his party envisions ‘a revolutionised 
Britain, with massive changes affecting all levels of society, economic, social and cultural’ (Copsey, 
2007:69), which aims for the ‘cultural and spiritual rebirth of our land and people’ (Goodwin, 2010:71).  
 
                                                            
14 https://nordicresistancemovement.org/status-quo-ante-revolution/ 
15 https://en.nop.org.pl/third-position-10-point-declaration/ 
16 https://www.nop.org.pl/deklaracja-trzeciej-pozycji/  
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2.3 Extreme-right political behavior & change: ERPs as movement-parties across Political 
Arenas 
 
There has always been the contention in the literature that FRPs bear characteristics of social movements, 
in that they practice politics in both the electoral and protest arenas (Minkenberg, 2003; Rydgren, 
2007:257). In recent years, there has been observed a rise in far-right street politics (Gattinara and Pirro, 
2018:1-3), which resulted in an increasing plea in the literature for appreciating the movement 
characteristics of FRPs and scrutinizing further the interplays of FRPs, between electoral, legislative and 
grassroots arenas (e.g. Caiani, M. and Císař, 2018; Caiani, and Della Porta, 2018:469-496; Minkenberg, 
2018). Despite the fact that, increasingly, far-right politics is expressed in the non-party sector, as well, 
little research has been produced in analysing this relationship (Gattinara, 2017:4; Gattinara and Pirro, 
2018:8; Muis and Immerzeel, 2017:13). What primarily distinguishes parties from movements is that the 
former participate in electoral contestation, while the latter seek ‘to advance their agenda by contention 
and disruption via street politics outside of established institutional arenas’ (Kitschelt, 2006:279). Thus, 
movement-parties are political parties that seek to do both; that is, they participate in elections, as well 
as engage in various conventional, and sometimes contentious, actions through participation in the 
grassroots arena (Kitschelt, 2006).  
In contrast to PRRPs, ERPs, such as the BNP, NPD, GD and L’SNS, have a more symbiotic relationship and 
closer links with the non-party far-right sector (Caiani, et. al., 2012:29; Minkenberg, 2018:14). In fact, ERPs 
are a characteristic example of movement-parties (Kitschelt, 2006). The grassroots arena and street 
politics are of crucial importance to ERPs. To a large extent, this is a rational choice. Because of their poor 
electoral results and the stigmatisation they face, ERPs are more likely to prefer drawing public attention 
with protest activities, rather than through institutional channels (Gattinara and Froio, 2014:16; Gattinara, 
2017). In that case, for ERPs, their organisation is also structured accordingly, in order to engage in the 
grassroots arena, as well. For example, ‘Casa Pound’ formally has the structure of a political party, while, 
informally, it has the setup of a social movement (Gattinara and Froio, 2019)17. What is more, in many 
cases, ERPs are self-defined as ‘movements’. Indicatively, Forza Nuova is self-defined as a ‘political 
movement’ (Gattinarra and Froio, 2014:9), Golden Dawn as a ‘Popular Nationalist Movement’, while 







Griffin described the BNP as a ‘movement for the cultural and spiritual rebirth of our land and people’ 
(Goodwin, 2010:71).  
ERPs differ from social movements, not only in that they participate in electoral politics, but in 
organisational terms, as well. Whereas social movements (either left or right) and other extra-
parliamentary groups are loose bottom-up formations with no leadership, ERPs are hierarchically 
organised top-down, with a strict leadership principle (Minkenberg, 2006:35). What is more, this feature 
renders ERPs as a unique type of other movement-parties as well. While other movement-parties, such 
as the Greens or radical left parties, involve a  bottom-up organisational structure, ERPs are closed 
organisations with a strict hierarchy principle (Führerprinzip) run from the top (Carter, 2005; Ellinas, 
2020:96). The ubiquitous presence of the leader eliminates the set-up of institutional mechanisms for 
distributing resources, selective incentives and resolving internal conflicts (Ellinas, 2020:96). This 
organisational feature, what Penebianco (1988) would call ‘charismatic parties’ along with their resort to 
contentious activism, renders ERPs as a unique type of movement-parties. However, this feature can 
render their organisational development highly unstable in periods of changing external and internal 
conditions (Ellinas, 2020:50).  
 
2.3.1 Political Praxis 
 
The activities of political parties, or the ‘political praxis’, in any political arena, is only one aspect of party 
behaviour, ‘however, the proportions and the timing of party activity are quite indicative of the preferences 
and the intentions of parties’ (Isaksson & Akademi, 1994:95). In other words, the political praxis is an 
appropriate and relevant dimension to look at for examining party behaviour.  
For movement-parties, political praxis is not the only dimension that characterises their behaviour. It is 
however, a key element that distinguishes them from more conventional political parties. Movement-
parties systematically engage in street activism, most often in a variety of conventional actions, while at 
times they might engage with more disruptive actions (Ellinas, 2020:15). Regarding FRPs, whereas PRRPs 
are known for their ideas, ERPs are mostly known for their actions, notably their propensity to contentious 
form of activism. This is one of the most important distinctions between PRRPs and ERPs. For, ERPs their 
political praxis involves both conventional and unconventional (e.g. violent) actions; a type of activism 
mostly found in social movements than in political parties (Ellinas, 2020:18; 33-35).  
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For ERPs, beyond strategic considerations, there are ideological reasons for why the grassroots arena is 
important, and their political praxis in this arena, in particular. In this arena, they can translate their 
revolutionary beliefs (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015:68) into concrete actions. Largely this 
explains their higher propensity to street activism and their resort to contentious activism compared to 
PRRPs (Ellinas, 2020:17). Thus ERPs spend a lot of physical and material resources in the grassroots arena. 
They can practice their unconventional political behaviour (i.e. violent and disruptive actions) by targeting 
their enemies, such as political opponents or ethnically (or racially) religious others (Weinberg and 
Assoudeh, 2018:592). Kriesi et al. (2012) suggested that FRPs usually do not operate in both electoral and 
protest arenas at the same time. Only when circumstances allow it, they would put on movement clothes 
(Gattinara and Pirro, 2018). However, electorally successful ERPs do operate in both arenas. Beyond the 
electoral and legislative arenas, they have to compete in the grassroots arena, as well. In this arena, in 
order to sustain their dominance, they would have to compete with the non-party far-right sector.  
As most contemporary ERPs today are isolated at the margins of society and, thus, do not have access and 
influence to these means (e.g. army), they seek to translate this belief into action through their 
engagement in street politics. For neo-Nazi parties, this tactic echoes Joseph Goebbels’ well-known 
dictum ‘it is more important to control the streets of a city than its council chamber’ (cited in Goodwin, 
2010:176).  But the resort to street-level activism is for ERPs to large extent a rational choice as well. As 
ERPs live in a ‘pre-modern’ era of organisation, lacking the financial, communicative and institutional 
resources other established parties might been enjoying. In order to compensate for this lack of access 
they spend more energy into the streets and undertake labour intensive campaign techniques. PRRPs are 
less reliant on street campaigns and activism mainly because of their legislative or entrepreneurial status. 
Many PRRPs have reached a stage of political maturity, having passed the threshold of relevance and 
institutionalised themselves in their party systems (Ellinas, 2020:17).  
 
However, ERPs do not always engage spontaneously or arbitrarily in violent actions. They have trained 
teams for doing this. To this end, ERPs are militia-type parties (e.g. Duverger, 1954:36) a feature that sets 
them apart from any other political party of any party family (or sub-family) in contemporary Europe. ERPs 
usually have paramilitary wings, which are either unarmed or armed, as the case of GD vividly 
demonstrates (Georgiadou, 2013). These paramilitary or vigilante teams are composed of members who 
are all dressed up uniformly (Bjørgo, and Mareš, 2019). Depending on the country context, these teams 
imitate the paramilitary wings of various fascist parties of the inter-war period (Minkenberg, 2013b:28; 
45 
 
Georgiadou, 2013). ERPs, such as GD’s leader, describe their party members as being ‘street soldiers’, 
above all (Golden Dawn Watch, 2018)18. 
The resort to vigilantism/paramilitarism directly captures the dimension of ‘violence’ of ERPs, which, 
again, is driven by their ideology and which seeks inspiration from fascist regimes of the inter-war period 
(e.g. Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015:57). ERPs engage in material and physical violence. Material 
violence involves damage of building, memorials or cultural sites that are against ERPs perception of 
history. Physical violence usually takes the form of assaults against immigrants, left-wing 
activists/politicians, ethnic or religious, minorities or gay people (Caiani, et. al, 2012:80; Weinberg and 
Assoudeh, 2018). ERPs and other non-party extreme-right groups tend to resort to violence more often 
when the issue of immigration is politicised, which constitutes their primary breeding ground for extra-
parliamentary mobilisation (Giugni et al., 2005).   
For example, members of the Casa Pound, armed with bats, attacked an anti-racist demonstration, 
injuring a left-wing MEP and her assistant (Politico, 2018)19, while, between 2011 and 2016, 20 arrests 
took place against Casa Pound’s members on accusations of use of violence against leftists and immigrants 
(Open, 2019)20.  Jobbik gained notoriety through its paramilitary wing, the ‘Hungarian Guard’. Dressed up 
in semi political/military uniforms, reminiscent of the uniforms used by the paramilitary wing of the 
‘Arrow party’, established by the Nazis during the occupation in Hungary, members of the Hungarian 
Guard were patrolling Roma populated villages (Minkenberg, 2013b:28; Kreko and Mayer, 2015:190). 
L’SNS, which sustains security units reminiscent of the paramilitary group ‘Hlinka Guard’ of Josef Tiso, the 
inter-war leader of Slovakia and Nazi Germany’s ally, attempted to imitate the activities of the Hungarian 
Guard by patrolling railway stations in areas where there are many Romani people, in order to increase 
the safety of the people, as the party claimed (The Slovak Spectator, 2016a21; 2016b22). Similarly, teams 
of NPD members have recently been patrolling train stations, with the aim of ‘protecting Germans from 
the criminality of migrants’ (Deutsche Welle, 2018)23, while wearing vests saying ‘Protection Zones’ (The 
Telegraph, 2019)24. The Czech neo-Nazi DSSS set-up ‘protection crops’, as it had called them, for patrolling 
Romany density-populated villages (StandUpToHate, 201025; Zgut and Gyori, 2017). The ‘Nordic 
                                                            




22 https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20120687/kotleba-to-spend-state-money-on-militia.html?ref=av-center  
23 https://www.dw.com/en/germany-police-investigate-far-right-npd-video-showing-protection-patrol-on-trains/a-44717751 
24 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/01/03/far-right-vigilante-groups-take-streets-small-german-town-following/ 
25 http://standuptohate.blogspot.com/2010/06/far-right-renews-vigilante-patrols.html  
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Resistance Movement’ also has a rich record of violent activity (Counter-extremism Project, no date26; 
Blomberg and Stier, 2019:2). Although the BNP has not been sustaining a paramilitary wing, as most of 
the other ERPs described above, it was associated with violence throughout its existence. Many of its 
activists and members have been linked to violent actions (Goodwin, 2010:182). BNP’s splinter party, 
‘Britain First’, had paramilitary units patrolling mosques (The Independent, 2018)27.  
 
2.3.2 Policy Issue Salience 
 
Most of the literature focuses on examining changes in parties’ programmatic policy positions in the 
electoral arena. Because comparatively studying and measuring changes in parties’ ideology is a difficult 
task (e.g. lack of internal party sources, difficulty in ascertaining reliable and replicable measurements, 
etc.), issues of policy positions are considered to be an indirect reflection of a party’s ideology. Thus, even 
slight changes in policy positions can signal ideological change. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that there 
is prevalent agreement in the literature that party ideology is more resistant to change amongst all 
dimensions, as parties are characterised by ‘ideological immobility’ (Downs, 1957: 110-111). Thus, if a 
change in ideology is observed, then a party has changed considerably. However, assessing changes in 
policy positions of FRPs on their core issues might not be the best strategy for detecting changes in their 
behaviour. These parties are characterised by their positional distinction on their core issues (Van Spanje, 
2010). In addition, voters prefer these parties because of their anti-immigration positions (Der Brug et al., 
2005). For example, FRPs tend to stick to their positions, in spite of a public opinion shift, as these parties 
believe that their supporters vote for them because of their ideology and their distinct policy positions on 
their core issues, in contrast to mainstream parties (Adams et al., 2004, 2006). Thus, an alteration of their 
core issues’ policy positions means selling out their core ideas and policy issues (e.g. immigration and law 
& order). In turn, this can cause electoral punishment for niche parties, such as FRPs, greater than that for 
mainstream parties (Adams et al., 2006:525). Studies have found that these ‘niche’ parties, such as FRPs, 
tend to only follow position preference shifts of their own voters, instead of the median voter (Ezrow et 
al., 2011: 226). In particular, ERPs are characterised by strong ideological dogmatism, and they very rarely 
alter their ideology (Backes, 2006:140). 






With regards to the dimension of policy issues, assessing changes of issues saliency of FRPs seems to be a 
better indicator for measuring changes in party behaviour. Scholars on party change (Harmel et al., 1995; 
Harmel et al., 2018:279; Klingemann et al., 1994:24) posit that parties are more prone to change based 
upon the amount that they devote to policy issues, rather than based upon the altering of their positions 
(Janda et al., 1995: 178-9). With regards to FRPs, other studies, as well (e.g. Akkerman et al., 2016), suggest 
that assessing the saliency of FRPs on their core issues (e.g. immigration, law and order) is a good indicator 
for observing changes in their behaviour. As long as FRPs are niche parties (e.g. Meguid, 2005; Abou-
Chadi, 2014), mobilising on a few issues that usually do not belong to the socio-economic political axis, 
then changing their behaviour through embracing more of these issues, while downplaying their core 
issues in terms of saliency, can signal a change in behaviour. The thesis argues, if ERPs follow this pattern, 
outside the grassroots arena, then it could be interpreted as embedding themselves even more in their 
party-face. 
Based on the literature, this thesis argues that for ERPs the highly salient issues are: either i) those policy 
issues that are informed by their core ideological features, or ii) those issues that the ERPs can primarily 
address in the grassroots arena, the arena where they first gained prominence in. In reference to their 
political praxis, this thesis sees as core issues for ERPs those issues that can, in principle, be addressed 
primarily in the grassroots arena. Such issues are, for example immigration and law & order, which make 
up a huge bulk of ERPs’ political praxis in the grassroots arena. Therefore non-core, or secondary policy 
issues to the policy agendas of ERPs are issues that usually belong to the socio-economic political axis and 
which are not primarily addressed in the grassroots arena (Caiani and Della Porta, 2012). The most 
prominent of these issues are primarily the ‘economy’ as well as others such as ‘environment’, 
‘agriculture’, ‘current affairs’ (Froio et al, 2020). 
 
2.3.3 De-radicalisation & Radicalisation  
 
In classifying changes of ERPs’ behaviour the thesis relies on the terminology of moderation / de-
radicalisation and radicalisation. The thesis prefers the use of ‘de-radicalisation’ over ‘moderation’ for the 
reasons explained below.  
Moderation and radicalisation generally refer to an actor’s position vis-à-vis the existing political (social 
or economic) system or practices. Moderates work within the existing political system, and seek gradual 
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change of the political system in which they are operating in and might disprove. In contrast, radicals28 
espouse a revolutionary and radical agenda and seek to overthrow the current system in its entirety, 
through the use of physical and material violence (Schwelder, 2011:350). More specifically, moderation, 
most often, refers to a process where an actor begins to embrace liberal notions, such as support of 
individual rights, tolerance, pluralism or cooperation, and is open to the possibility that other perspectives 
exist which are valid (Schwelder, 2011:352). Moderation and radicalisation are broadly defined as 
processes rather than categories. They refer to a movement along a continuum (each process with distinct 
steps), from the radical to the moderate and vice versa (Schwelder, 2011:352).  
Moderation, for the PRRPs, has been interpreted as a process along a continuum, often moving ever closer 
to mainstream right-wing parties (Akkerman et al., 2016). Adopting such an assumption for the ERPs 
would be too strict, as these parties are even further right to PRRPs. As ideology is highly resistant to 
change (Harmel & Janda, 1995), it cannot be expected that in a matter of few years, ERPs would respect 
liberal and democratic norms in both words and deeds, or that they have become ‘mainstreamed’. Still, a 
similar line of thinking is useful for approaching ERPs’ shift towards either moderation or radicalisation. 
For example, it would be more relevant if moderation for ERPs was understood as a process where ERPs 
change to become more like PRRPs (Copsey, 2007). A first step in doing this would, perhaps, be adopting 
a more encompassing definition of moderation as a final outcome. The following is more appropriate: ‘A 
movement from a relatively closed and rigid worldview to one more moderate than it had been, but still 
not satisfying many definitions of moderate’ (Schwelder, 2006; 2011:359). The second step would be to 
add the term de-radicalisation along the continuum, towards the end outcome of moderation. De-
radicalisation refers to a process where a radically (or extremely) violent or militant actor decides to 
abandon militancy (Ashour, 2007). However, de-radicalisation is not the same as moderation, as it does 
not necessarily entail an increasing acceptance of liberal and democratic norms.  Applying this thinking to 
ERPs, these parties begin a process of de-radicalisation when they decide to abandon violent actions, in 
particular, and unconventional repertoires of actions, in general.  
The thesis posits that further radicalisation for ERPs can be best understood as moving in this direction 
(radicalisation) by being more active in grassroots activities and resorting to more unconventional 
repertoires of actions, as well as downplaying (or even abandoning altogether) their electoral aspirations. 
                                                            
28 As this thesis is, in essence, about ERPs, it would be more appropriate to adopt the term extreme and extremists instead of 




Thus, radicalisation can be understood as a process where ERPs change to become more like the non-
party far-right sector (discussed previously in this chapter). 
Changing towards moderation, for radical political actors, means that they must first go through two 
sequential steps; first changing their behaviour and then their ideology. Changes in behaviour are strategic 
or tactical. Behavioural moderation usually begins when radical actors decide to take advantage of open 
opportunities in the political context. Such an opening will, first, produce behavioural effects and then 
ideological effects (Schwelder, 2011:355). Thus, moderation ‘entails the modification of both behaviour 
and ideology (beliefs) as they are brought in line with the ‘rules of the game’” (Schwelder, 2011:353). As 
a result, most of the literature suggests that moderation, as well as de-radicalisation, is an outcome of 
sequencing (Schwelder, 2006; 2011).  
 
However, as long as moderation requires ideological changes as well, something that this thesis does not 
focus on, the thesis prefers to use the term ‘de-radicalisation’ instead, which entails moderating changes 
in the political behaviour only, and not on ideology. This thesis argues that, in the case of ERPs, if 
moderation is detected at the behavioural level only, (thus de-radicalisation), it could adequately answer 
whether an ERP has changed, perhaps moving in this direction (de-radicalisation) without necessarily 
requiring ideological moderation, as well. This project does not argue in favour of dropping ideological 
moderation altogether. On the contrary, in situations of external shocks, it is reasonable to expect parties 
to amend their ideology. It only argues that behavioural moderation (de-radicalisation) is an entire 
process that can be detected in various dimensions of political behaviour, which, if satisfied by a party, 
allows observers to sufficiently conclude that any party, and an ERP in particular, has changed.  
  
Requiring FRPs, to change their ideology might be too strict a criterion, which might lead to missing out 
on observing changes in other behavioural dimensions. As stated above, ERPs in particular, are 
characterised by strong ideological dogmatism, and they very rarely alter their ideology (Backes, 
2006:140). For example, recent comparative studies concluded that PRRPs have not become moderate 
over time with regards to their ideology. However, they have changed, at times, with regards to a series 
of other dimensions (Akkerman et al., 2016). In addition, FRPs rarely moderate their ideology. One of the 
very few and often-cited cases is the transformation of the Italian neo-fascist MSI to the radical-right, and 
then its merging with a conservative right-wing party (Ignazi, 1996; Griffin, 2011:200).  On the contrary, 
behavioural moderation occurs more often for FRPs, with examples such as Jobbik (Biro-Nagy & Boros, 
2016), BNP (Copsey, 2007; Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2010), FN (Ivaldi, 2016), SD (Rydgren & Van der 
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Meiden, 2016:23) and, at times, the VB (Lucardie et al., 2016). Social movement research also argues that 
ideology is too monolithic a concept for assessing ideological variations over time within an ERP, as ‘it 
lacks the flexibility required to link ideas, actions and events’ (Caiani et al., 2012:12).  
 
This project argues that, in the case of ERPs, the most relevant dimension for examining behavioural 
changes is their party/movement faces interaction. It is inside these three arenas (electoral, parliament 
and grassroots) of their two main faces where most of their energy goes. As these parties are, in essence, 
movement-parties, in periods of closed opportunities, they are likely to prioritise one face over the other. 
Therefore, in situations of de-radicalisation, the ERP begins to ‘play by the rules of the game’ (Schwelder, 
2011:353), without necessarily modifying core features of its ideology. According to theoretical 
framework of this thesis, which is fully developed in the next chapter (chapter 3), the ERP plays by these 
rules if it begins emphasising more its party face, while downplaying its attention to the movement face. 
If it does the opposite, then the ERP is on a course of further radicalisation.   These two faces are 
manifested across three arenas and through the behavioural dimensions of political praxis and policy issue 
salience.  
 
2.4 The Greek FRPs and reasons for non-success: A context of closed opportunities  
 
The long-term failure of ERPs in Greece, as Table 2.3 (below) shows, can mainly be attributed to a context 
characterised by a closed political opportunity structure (Vasilopoulou, 2010; Vasilopoulou and 
Halikiopoulou, 2015:21). For a long time in the international literature, Greece’s FRPs fate tended to run 
parallel to those of Spain and Portugal. The failure of FRPs in these countries was mainly attributed to the 
lack of post-material and post-industrial transformations, to these countries’ authoritarian past that 
rendered far-right ideas obsolete and to the ability of mainstream parties, especially the right-wing, to 
eliminate, with ease, FRPs by absorbing their main ideas and political actors into their ranks (Kitschelt, 
1995; Ignazi, 2003:192-4; Hainsworth, 2008:62; Davis, 1998; Ellinas, 2013:543). However, with regards to 
Greece, there are other relevant political opportunity structures which explain the marginality of FRPs up 
until 2007.  
As Vasilopoulou (2010:166) observes, since 1981 up until the 2007, ‘The Greek political culture, institutions 
and history had not been conducive to the creation or the survival of a radical right party’. Party 
competition dynamics seem to account, to a large extent, for this absence. During this period, the Greek 
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party system was a classic two-party system (Pappas, 2003). This meant that two major opposing parties, 
the centre-left (PASOK) and the centre-right (ND), benefited from a high concentration of political forces 
by being able to form governments by themselves. Thus, no other third party had any electoral blackmail 
or coalition potential (e.g. Sartori, 2005) that might threaten the majorities formed by these two parties. 
In part, this is one of the main reasons why a FRP was able to succeed in 1977 (Nicolacolpoulos, 2005:262). 
From 1974 to 1981, the party system was more fragmented, better classified as polarised pluralism. Thus, 
for example, on the right pole, ND moved to the centre and had left an open gap on its rightmost flank, 
which National Alignment was able to fill (Kolovos, 2005:31; Pappas and Dinas, 2006:477-8). But, from 
1981 until 2012, with a short break between 2007 and 2011, the two main parties were able to manoeuver 
on these extreme flanks and absorb their electorate, personnel and ideas, thus shutting down any 
potential opportunities for small parties, in general. After 1981, Greek politics was described as 
‘polarisation of political conflict and rhetoric’ (Legg and Roberts, 1997:142), characterised by an 
adversarial political style that encouraged the sharp division of opinion between the two large parties, 
PASOK and ND (Pappas, 2003). Table 2.3, below, presents all the FRPs that have run elections in Greece 
since 1974 up until 2019. 
 
Table 2.3 The electoral fortunes of the FRPs in Greece: 1974-2019 (continued in next two pages) 
 
Year Election Name of Party Percentage Seats 
1974 Parliamentary National Democratic Union 1.1 0 
1977 Parliamentary National Alignment 6.8 5 
1981 Parliamentary Progressive Party 1.7 0 
1981 European Progressive Party 2 1 
  
Movement of Greek Reformers 0.9 0 
1984 European National Political Union  2.3 1 
  
Progressive Party 0.2 0 
  
United Nationalist Movement 0.1 0 
1985 Parliamentary National Political Union 0.5 0 
1989-Jun Parliamentary National Political Union 0.3 0 




United Nationalist Movement 0.2 0 
  
New Politicians 0.2 0 
  
European Economic Movement 0.1 0 
  
National Militants 0.1 0 
1989-Nov Parliamentary N/A N/A N/A 
1990 Parliamentary National Party 0.1 0 
  
Nationalist Alignment 0.03 0 
1993 Parliamentary National Party 0.14 0 
1994 European Golden Dawn 0.11 0 
1996 Parliamentary National Political Union 0.24 0 
  
Hellenism Party 0.18 0 
  
Golden Dawn 0.07 0 
1999 European Front Line  0.75 0 
  
Hellenism Party 0.26 0 
  
Hellenic Front  0.2 0 
2000 Parliamentary National Coalition  0.21 0 
  
Front Line  0.18 0 
  
Hellenism Party 0.09 0 
2004 Parliamentary Hellenic Front 0.09 0 
  
Popular Orthodox Rally 2.17 0 
2004 European Popular Orthodox Rally 4.12 1 
  
Hellenic Front 0.25 0 
  
Patriotic Alliance 0.17 0 
2007 Parliamentary Popular Orthodox Rally 3.8 10 
2009 European Popular Orthodox Rally 7.15 2 
  
Golden Dawn 0.46 0 
  
Greek Union 0.06 0 




Golden Dawn 0.29 0 
2012-
May 
Parliamentary Popular Orthodox Rally 2.89 0 
  
Golden Dawn 6.97 21 
  
National Unity Association 0.61 0 
2012-
June 
Parliamentary Golden Dawn 6.92 18 
  
Popular Orthodox Rally 1.58 0 
  
National Hope 0.07 0 
2014 European Golden Dawn 9.39 3 
  
Popular Orthodox Rally 2.69 0 
  




National Unity Association 0.3 0 
  
National Front 0.15 0 
  
National Resistance Movement 0.04 0 
2015-Jan Parliamentary Golden Dawn 6.28 17 
  
Popular Orthodox Rally 1.03 0 
  
National Resistance Movement 0.0001 0 
2015-Sep Parliamentary Golden Dawn 6.99 18 
  
Patriotic Union-Greek Popular 
Gathering 
0.08 0 
2019 European Golden Dawn 4.88 2 
  
Greek Solution 4.18 1 
  




Free Homeland 0.73 0 
  







  Greek Solution 3.74  
2019 Parliamentary Golden Dawn 2.93 
 
Source: 2009-2010: (Vasilopoulou, 2010:165), 2011-2019: updated by the author from Greek Ministry of 
Interior. Note: In bold are the electorally successful FRPs (e.g. gained at least one seat) 
 
During the 1970s and 1980s, ND followed a strategy of personnel absorption from FRPs. This was a partial 
engagement strategy (e.g. Downs, 2009) that involved accepting, into its ranks, far-right politicians, but 
not embracing at all their ideas or their programmatic positions, such as the release of junta colonels or 
the banning of the Communist Party (Georgiadou, 2013). For example, in its attempt to tame the ‘PASOK 
hurricane’ in the 1981 elections, ND appealed to FRPs, most notably to National Camp, in order to stop a 
single ‘nationalist and anti-Marxist vote’ from being wasted (Tsiras: 2011:89). It, first, welcomed NC 
members and party cadres to its ranks by offering them (and to its leader as well) prestigious positions on 
its ballots (e.g. ballot ‘Epikrateias’ – Mainland Greece). Thus, ND manoeuvred onto the far-right space 
and, without adopting any far-right programmatic appeals (Georgiadou, 2013; Ellinas, 2012:200), it 
captured 4.59% of NA votes, while 30% of ND’s votes went to its own candidates originating from the 
junta period (Tsiras, 2011:89). Other FRPs in the early 1980s were unable to escape ND’s absorption 
strategy, largely aided by the strong bi-polarism, and remained largely unsuccessful. The return of high 
polarisation between the two large parties in 1985 parliamentary elections helped ND to absorb NPU’s 
electorate. The collapse of NPU by the end of 1980s signalled the end of the electorally relevant, extreme 
right (Kolovos, 2005:117). 
In the mid-1990s, political opportunities began opening up for FRPs (Nicolacopoulos, 2005:273-276). For 
example, the establishment of the National Party (NP) in 1989, and later of the Hellenic Front, heralded a 
new era in the Greek far-right, embracing nationalism as their core ideology, as well as immigration as a 
top issue (Ellinas, 2012:201-2; Kolovos, 2005:123). Their emergence coincided with the fall of communism 
and the subsequent inflows of migrants, especially from Albania to Greece. Immigration began being 
politicised as a negative development. A large part of the political elites and the media since then have 
talked about the need to protect national identity, framing migrants as a socio-economic threat to the 
native population, as well as illegal immigrants (‘λαθρομετανάστες/lathrometanastes’), suggesting their 
exclusion from lawful presence or refugee protection (Karamanidou, 2016:2004; Karyotis, 2012; Psarras, 
2013). However, the absorption strategy by ND continued successfully during the 1990s as well, despite 
some further small openings of political opportunities, such as ‘nationalist crises’ (the Macedonian issue 
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in 1993 and the Imia crisis in 1996). In 1993, Antonis Samaras, capitalising on these issues, left ND and 
established Political Spring (a borderline case of an FRP), gaining 4.9% of the votes. However, by the 1996 
elections, the fading salience of these issues, ND’s more nationalist turn and its strategy of personnel 
absorption led Political Spring to oblivion (Ellinas, 2010:148-9). FRPs of the 1990s were also unable to 
succeed, perhaps partly due to the fragmentation of FRPs. During this period, the far-right entered a new 
period of more intense fragmentation and obscurity, where each wing followed its own path (Georgiadou, 
2008; Tsiras, 2011:97), while the collapse of ‘the real existing socialism’ deprived FRPs of one of their most 
salient issues: anti-communism. 
 
However, these processes were incremental changes (e.g. Harmel and Janda, 1994) that were about to 
open up significant opportunities for FRPs, which, combined with further opened opportunities in the 
early 2000s, were to be crystallised into far-right success in 2007 (Ellinas, 2010:125-30). On the demand 
side, in the early 2000s, xenophobic attitudes remained high and political distrust reached new levels, 
while 18% of Greeks saw as positive a scenario involving the emergence of a party similar to that of Le 
Pen’s (Kolovos, 2005:41, 207-11). On the supply side, these further opportunities were mainly ND’s 
convergence to the centre regarding the politicisation of new nationalist issues and, for the first time, the 
cooperation of heterogeneous far-right minor parties and actors under the umbrella of LAOS, and the 
latter’s media visibility (Ellinas, 2010).  
After the election of PASOK’s Simitis to the Premiership, in 1996, Greece entered a new phase of moderate 
politics. ND’s new moderate leader, Karamanlis, embarked upon a strategy of so-called ‘politics of the 
middle space’. This involved turning towards the centre of the left-right political axis (Vasilopoulos and 
Vernardakis, 2011:4). This process of convergence towards the centre by the two main parties, most 
notably by ND, which meant openings at the rightmost flank of ND, is often said to have been one of the 
main reasons for the emergence of the PRRP of LAOS (Vasilopoulos and Vernardakis, 2011:4). Karamanlis, 
himself, had written off (from his party) Karatzaferis, the leader of LAOS, because the latter had disagreed 
with the former’s strategy of ‘middle space politics’ (Georgiadou, 2013). On the 14th of September 2000, 
Karatzaferis announced the establishment of LAOS. LAOS was a typical example of a (populist) radical right 
party (Vasilopoulou, 2010:159). The party declared its commitment to the minimum criteria of democracy, 
such as majority rule. The party succeeded because, as Vasilopoulou (2010) shows, it managed to 
incorporate left and right issues and appeal to a heterogeneous vote base. The party managed to present 
itself as being similar to mainstream parties in many ways, as this was the only way to escape the 
gravitational pull of bipolarism, which had, for long, been punishing small parties.     
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All of these conditions were largely unfavourable for an ERP like GD to succeed electorally. Right-wing 
extremism was largely de-legitimised in post-authoritarian Greece (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 
2015:22) and an FRP could only succeed if it presented its external image as similar to those of mainstream 
parties, as LAOS did (Vasilopoulou, 2010). But, the appearance of the Greek crisis was about to 
dramatically alter these conditions and open up new opportunities for ERPs like GD.  
 
2.5 Greek Crisis: Political opportunities for ERPs open up 
 
Periods of accelerated crises usually provide fertile opportunities for FRPs to thrive (Minkenberg, 2000). 
The Greek crisis proved to be an ideal opportunity for GD to rise. Since its onset, Greece experienced a 
multifaceted accelerated crisis (economic, political and ideological), which translated into an overall crisis 
of the nation-state (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015). These crises opened up further opportunities 
for radical and extremist politics.  
The government of PASOK under Papandreou (2009-11) signed a memorandum of understanding on the 
23rd of April, while further austerity measures continued when the interim government (PASOK, ND and 
LAOS) approved a further €110 billion bailout. These measures affected various social groups, most 
notably the middle-class. GDP growth was reduced considerably, property tax was increased sharply, 
salaries in the public sector dropped significantly (in some jobs reaching 40 -50 % reduction), public 
investment was cut and welfare spending reduced, as well. Unemployment increased from 9.6% in 2009 
to 27.5% in 2013, while youth unemployment rose from 25.7% in 2009 to 44.7% in 2013. In the meantime, 
the inability of the Greek state to deal with its economic deficiencies brought to a fore a political crisis. 
“The economic crisis became translated into a political crisis and resulted in the implosion of the two-party 
system, allowing small parties to enter the political scene” (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015:29). The 
effects of this crisis are best captured in the 2012 elections. Bipolarism dropped sharply, with an all-time 
low of 32%, while party fragmentation increased. Anti-establishment, populist and extremist parties, such 
as radical left SYRIZA, populist right-wing ANEL and GD, achieved unprecedented electoral success. 2012 
unfolded under a new societal cleavage that transcended left-right politics, dividing parties into pro-
bailout (centre-left PASOK, centre-right ND, left-wing DIMAR) and anti-bailout (KKE – Communist Party, 
SYRIZA, ANEL, GD). Trust towards political parties fell sharply, as well (Dinas and Rori, 2013; Vasilopoulou 
and Halikiopoulou, 2015:26-29).  
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However, the crisis had even wider implications. It brought to the surface the weakened democratic 
institutions of the state and its inability to deal with it. In Greece, during the post-authoritarian era, a 
democratic institutional system was operating in parallel with mass clientelistic networks, largely being 
preserved by the two main parties (ND and PASOK). The latter resorted to rent-seeking behaviour, using 
their state privileges as a means for providing rents to people in exchange for their votes (Pelagidis and 
Mitsopoulos, 2011). As a consequence of the coexistence of these two opposite functions, a ‘populist 
democratic system’ had been established. This system was unable to respond to an external shock (the 
economic crisis) and to protect the state. Thus, instability was inevitable (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014:389). 
During the crisis, the state was perceived by its citizens as incapable of addressing socio-economic effects. 
This is evidenced by a large drop in ‘good governance indicators’ over time. The state lost its legitimacy 
and the social contract binding the state and citizens together was breached. In other words, not only did 
different political parties and policy agendas lose their legitimacy, but the entire metapolitefsi era was 
perceived as illegitimate and ineffective (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015:26-28). Indicatively, a poll 
published in April 2013 found that 30% considered that, during the junta regime, Greece was in an overall 
better situation than presently, 59% considered that life was safer during the junta days and 46% said that 
living standards were better than the present, as well (Bistis, 2013:51).  
 
2.5.1 Movement parties and political violence  
 
Protest behaviour in the grassroots arena has always been a distinctive characteristic in contemporary 
Greek politics. As Pappas and O’Malley (2014:14-16) note, contentious protest politics has been a long-
term phenomenon in the country, even when it was experiencing long periods of economic euphoria (e.g. 
1980s up until the early 1990s). For example, they note that 48% of people, in 1999, said that they had 
participated in a strike at least once in their life, while in the 2000s, the rates were the highest in Europe. 
This was happening once the government, either left or right, was about to commence reforms. This 
behaviour was sustained by populism and state benefits under a clientelistic social contract (Papas, 2014), 
up until the ‘December 2008 riots’. Since then, contentious behaviour has been translated into certain 
forms of violent political expression. As Georgiadou and Rori (2019:1) have suggested, since the prolonged 
riots of December 2008, “Greece has entered a new phase of radicalisation (Economides and 
Monastiriotis, 2009), marked by an extended use of violence (Sotiropoulos, 2018:11). By its unpresented 
magnitude and durée, the ongoing financial crisis (Featherstone and Papadimitriou, 2017), as well as its 
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blueprint on the party system (Dinas and Rori, 2013) have triggered the emergence of circumstances that 
promote the toleration, acceptance and use of violence.” 
During the crisis, Greek politics saw an increasing ‘violent turn’ and an increasing demand for radical 
politics, which was increased and crystallised in the 2012 elections (Chryssochoou, Papastamou and 
Prodromitis, 2013:47; Andronikidou and Korvas, 2012; Papasarantopoulos, 2012). They were, firstly, 
reflected in the Aganaktismenoi movement during the summer of 2011. Political parties that saw the 
largest electoral success in the 2012 elections, such as radical left SYRIZA, populist right-wing ANEL and 
GD, were largely engaged in politics in the grassroots arena. Thus, in essence, they were operating as 
movement-parties, at least initially (Fielitz, 2016; Fielitz, 2018). Moreover, violence against politicians was 
justified, while a survey showed that 51% of Greeks agreed that unprovoked violence against random 
irregular migrants by vigilante groups was justified (Lazaridis and Skleparis, 2015:179).   
 
2.5.2 ND’s rightwards shift, the implosion of LAOS and the politicisation of immigration  
 
The election of Antonis Samaras as leader of ND, in November 2009, signalled a turn closer to the far-right 
(Van Versendaal, 2011)29 for the party, and the beginning of a full absorption strategy (e.g. of both 
personnel and programmatic positions), vis-à-vis the far-right. Firstly, the engagement strategy of ND, vis-
à-vis LAOS, was evident in the electoral arena. In the 2010 municipal elections, LAOS contested in 10 
prefectures (out of 13) and, in 4 of them, it supported a joint candidate along with ND, while, in one, it 
joined forces with PASOK. In Athens, LAOS also supported a joint candidate with ND (Greek Ministry of 
Interior, 2010)30. Secondly, the engagement strategy of ND was evident in the executive arena, when ND 
invited LAOS to participate in the interim government of Papadimos, despite the fact that its participation 
was mathematically unnecessary, as both ND and PASOK had already formed a majority (Karamanidou, 
2014:13). During a period of rapidly increasing public distrust towards established parties and the 
austerity measures, LAOS was about to soon lose its anti-establishment status, due to its cooperation with 
ND and PASOK and its acceptance of austerity measures (Ellinas, 2013). A few months before the 2012 
elections, and seeing its electoral rates below the threshold, it left the interim government, but its anti-








establishment profile in the eyes of voters had already gone. In fact, before the 2012 elections, LAOS was 
set on a course of merging into ND. Numerous LAOS MPs expressed their willingness for such a move, but, 
when the leader announced the autonomous participation of LAOS in the upcoming elections (Voria, 
2012)31, 7 (out of 15) LAOS MPs withdrew and joined ND. The space for an ERP had now significantly 
opened up.  
Furthermore, in the period leading up to 2012 elections, (anti)-immigration, at times, had topped the 
agenda and was one of the main issues of the 2012 elections (Ellinas, 2013; Teperoglou and Tsatsanis, 
2014; Dinas and Rori, 2013). A survey showed that, in the June 2012 elections, 27% of respondents 
identified immigration as the second most important issue affecting their vote (Lazaridis and Skleparis, 
2015:179). Many people perceived a new wave of immigrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa 
as a threat to Greek national identity and ethnic composition and associated them with crime 
(Triandafyllidou and Kouki, 2013: 7). During the crisis, Greece experienced the highest rise and levels of 
anti-immigrant attitudes in the developed world, with only 41% saying GR is a welcoming place for them 
(mipex.eu). Given the long-lasting, ineffective management of immigration by Greek governments, the 
result was that most of the incoming immigrants were undocumented (Triandafyllidou, 2011:7). Thus, 
irregular immigration during the crisis rose from 280,446 in 2007 to 391,478 in 2011 (Karamanidou, 
2014:3). When PASOK, in January 2011, announced the construction of a wall along the Greco-Turkish 
border (after pressure from the EU), according to a source, 46% of the respondents considered it as an 
absolute necessity, regardless of its cost (Triandafyllidou, 2013:32).  
During this period, both ND and PASOK resorted to anti-immigration rhetoric and co-opted and 
implemented policies initially owned by LAOS, and then by GD (Karamanidou 2014; Triandafyllidou and 
Kouki, 2013). For example, the PASOK-led Ministry of Citizenship prosecuted landlords who housed 
irregular immigrants, in order to protect ‘Greek and migrant families’. Further tougher measures were 
passed, with the goal of tackling the criminalisation of street trade. Procedures for deporting irregular 
migrants accelerated, as well as the setup of ‘detention centres’, with bad living conditions, for irregular 
migrants across the country. The implementation of those policies mirrored the rhetoric of PASOK during 
that period, which, in some aspects, was used to contain the rise of GD (Karamanidou, 2014:12). In 
addition, an engagement strategy of ND, vis-à-vis the far-right, was evident at the level of political 
discourse and policy co-optation, on issues such as immigration and law & order. In early 2010, Samaras 




pledged that, if he was elected PM, he would abolish the citizenship law immediately (To Vima, 2010)32. 
Although it might be argued that abolishing the right of second-generation migrants to citizenship has 
been a long-term goal for ND, the impact of the far-right was, however, evident (Triandafyllidou and Kouki, 
2013). Up to the 2012 elections, Samaras framed the immigration issue as a law & order issue. He stated 
that ‘we will remove the ghettoes of illegal immigrants, we will occupy our cities and neighbourhoods’, 
while he was referring to migrants as ‘invaders’. The word ‘ghettoes’ was used in a similar manner by both 
LAOS and GD to describe immigrant areas (Karamanidou, 2014:13). Just before the 2012 elections, LAOS’s 
leader, in referring to Samaras’ speech, where he presented his agenda on immigration and law & order, 
said that ‘the copy never has the same value as the original’ (Naftemporiki, 2012a)33. 
 
2.6 The Golden Dawn: Ideology and Profile 
 
After spending a year in prison, Nikolaos Michaloliakos (founder and current leader of GD), in 1980, 
started publishing a magazine called ‘Golden Dawn’. The magazine was making broad references to Hitler 
and the Third Reich and was characterised as openly pro-Nazi (Bitsis, 2013:43). A few years later, Golden 
Dawn was founded (14 February 1983) by its current leader, Nikos Michaloliakos, under the name 
‘People’s Association-Golden Dawn’ (Ellinas, 2013:547). Since its establishment in the 1980s, GD evolved 
from a closed circle aimed at spreading Nazi ideas (thus, a sub-culture) to an actor of the groupuscular 
right (Chasapopoulos, 2013:128) and, lastly, to an electorally successful ERP in 2012. 
The literature unanimously agrees that GD is an ERP, of the neo-Nazi party variant (Georgiadou, 2013; 
Ellinas, 2013, 2015; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015).  Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou (2015) show 
that GD is a pan-nationalist, authoritarian party acting as a militia-type political party. GD formulates the 
two fascist myths (elaborated by Griffin, 1991) of nationalist palingenesis and social decadence. It also 
meets Mann’s (2004) main characteristics that describe a fascist group. That is, statism, nationalism, 
paramilitraism and national-transcendence (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015:50-63). To this end, GD 
justifies the fascist myth of national transcendence through the populist ultra-nationalism it puts forward, 
emphasising the superiority of the unique Greek language and ancient heritage, while glorifying the 







struggle against inferior others. GD employs the fascist myth of national rebirth (Halikiopoulou and 
Vasilopoulou, 2015:64-77) through its palingenetic ultra-nationalist vision, which cries out for the 
restoration of the glorious past and considers the Greek people as chosen by God as superior to all 
outsiders. They are those who must free the Greek nation from its perpetual threat and ideological 
descent, under the hegemony of GD. GD aims to transcend social cleavages and cleanse the nation of 
internal dissidents (political opponents), as well as external (those not belonging to the organic nation). It 
seeks to achieve the realisation of fascist myths through violence and militarism, which are key ideological 
features of GD (Ellinas, 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2015:77).  
Violence has always been a core feature to GD, which has translated into actions by its deep adherence 
to Nazi ideology (Ellinas, 2013:549). Party members declare themselves ‘street soldiers’, while, in order 
to become members, they must commit acts of violence (Ellinas, 2013). To this, GD sustains paramilitary 
groups, so-called ‘hit-squads’ (‘tagmata efodou’), and, thus, is a classic example of a militia-type of party 
(Georgiadou, 2013). GD has gained notoriety over the years because of its violent actions. At first, GD 
came to light during the early 1990s, as part of the national-wide fervent over the Macedonia issue, where 
its violent activities against immigrants and left-wing students were first recorded officially (Psarras, 2012; 
Ellinas, 2010, 2013; Chaspopoulos, 2013). GD, for a long time, did not contest elections, up until 1994, and 
could be best described as belonging to the groupuscular right of the non-party far-right sector. After the 
mid-1990s, it began to shave away its Nazi-like references, seeking alliances with other far-right actors 
(Tipaldou and Uba, 2018). However, it never abandoned violence (Ellinas, 2015). GD sees immigrants in 
phyletic terms and, in fact, no-one can be naturalised, as it supports an organic nation based on common 
‘race, blood and ethnic origin’ (Georgiadou, 2013; Papastathis, 2015). For example, after 2008, GD focused 
on building local strongholds in immigrant density-populated areas of Athens. By capitalising on the 
increasing anti-immigrant sentiments of residents, GD, by violently taking law & order to its own hands, 
gained their sympathy as a guardian of the region (Dinas et al., 2013).  
In terms of internal organisation, GD is hierarchically structured top-down, based on the leadership 
principle of Führerprinzip. The leader, Nikolaos Mihaloliakos, has an indisputable concentration of power. 
Under the leader, in terms of top organs are the party congress, followed by the central committee (made 
up of 60 members) and then followed by the political council (Ellinas, 2013:552). GD is also a typical 
example of a movement-party (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2017; Kafe et al. 2018:51). GD describes itself as 
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a ‘Nationalist Popular Movement’ (GD, 2013:149b)34. Since its electoral breakthrough in 2012, it has 
experienced a rapid organisational evolution across the country, sustaining local branches in more than 
60 cities (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2016). The central role of its leader played a crucial role in keeping 
ideological and organisational coherence (Ellinas, 2013:552-3). Investment in local expansion and online 
activity were among the important factors that facilitated its electoral persistence (as well), in 2015, 
despite the imprisonment of its leader and the banning from pubic resources, in September 2013 (Ellinas, 
2015:13-15; Ellinas and Lamprianou 2016). As Ellinas and Lamprianou (2016:815-17) show, since its 
electoral breakthrough in 2012, GD has been very active in the grassroots arena, organising a variety of 
indoor, such as various speeches, and outdoor grassroots actions, such as party material dissemination, 
commemorative events, protest marches and actions of social activism (e.g. food and blood donations). 
Table 2.4 presents the electoral results of GD in national and European elections. As it shows, GD had, for 
long, been on the margins. Its electoral breakthrough occurred sharply in 2012. GD experienced 7 years 
of electoral success, up until 7 July 2019, where it failed to pass the 3% threshold and enter national 
parliament.  Tables 2.5 and 2.6 (below) present the results of GD in the municipal and local elections 
respectively. 






1994 European 0.11 7,242 0 
1996 Parliamentary 0.07 4,487 0 
2009 Parliamentary 0.29 19,624 0 
2009 European 0.46 23,609 0 
May-12 Parliamentary 6.97% 440,966 21 
Jun-12 Parliamentary 6.92% 462,025 18 
2014 European 9.39% 536,913 3 
Jan-15 Parliamentary 6.28% 388,387 17 
Sep-15 Parliamentary 6.99% 379,722 18 
May-19 European  4.87% 275,734 2 
Jul-19 Parliamentary 2.93% 165,711 0 
Source: Greek Ministry on Interior (https://ekloges.ypes.gr/). Note: In other years, Golden Dawn ran 
elections as part of an alliance with various other far-right parties not included in Table 3.2 (Vasilopoulou 
and Halikiopoulou, 2015:19). For example, in the 1999 and 2004 European elections, GD aligned with the 
'First Line' and with the 'Patriotic Alliance', respectively (Georgiadou, 2013).   
                                                            
34 https://bit.ly/2Pd9RUC  
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Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 2 2 
Attica 6 6 
Northern Aegean 0 0 
Western Greece 2 1 
Western Macedonia 1 1 
Epirus 2 1 
Thessaly 2 1 
Ionian Islands 1 2 
Central Macedonia 3 3 
Crete 1 1 
Southern Aegean 2 2 
Peloponnese 2 1 
Mainland Greece 2 1 
Source: Greek Ministry on Interior (https://ekloges.ypes.gr/)  
As Tables 2.5 (above) and 2.6 (below) show, GD managed to achieve a breakthrough at the municipal and 
local level in 2014. In 2019, it experienced a slight decline at the municipality level, with 4 less seats, 
though, at the local level, it managed to sustain the seats it had won in 2014.   
Table 2.6 GD local election results, 2014, 2019.  




Athens (centre) 4 5 
Thessaloniki 2 0 
Patra 0 0 
Heraklion 0 0 
Piraeus 1 2 
Larissa 0 0 
Volos 0 0 
Peristeri 0 0 
Rhodes 0 0 
Ioannina 0 0 








This conceptual chapter has delved into the definitional literature on what constitutes the political far-
right. It highlighted the main distinction between the two main variants of far-right parties; that is, 
populist radical right parties and extreme-right parties. The chapter has also examined the dichotomy of 
the movement/party faces of ERPs, and has shown why studying changes in the political behaviour of 
ERPs by approaching them as movement-parties is a fruitful research strategy. In doing so, the chapter 
endeavoured to disentangle the movement/party dichotomy of ERPs from its theoretical contribution, in 
an attempt to fulfil another goal of the thesis, which is illustrating why ERPs, and the GD in particular, is a 
deviant case within the far-right party family. To this, at the end, the chapter discussed the context under 

















Chapter 3: Theorising extreme-right movement-party 





This is the theoretical chapter of the thesis. The main aim of this chapter is to theorise under what 
conditions ERPs radicalise and/or de-radicalise with regards to two dimensions of their behaviour: political 
praxis and issues salience, across the three political arenas in which they are exercising politics (electoral, 
parliamentary and grassroots). Thus, the chapter engages in a broad theorisation, bridging the literature 
on party behaviour, party change, FRPs and social movements (including ultra-nationalist movements). 
The three main sub-questions to be addressed are: When, where and how does extreme-right change 
play out. At the heart of the theoretical argument lies the assumption that ERPs are movement-parties, 
thus having a movement-face (exercised in the grassroots arena) and a party-face (exercised in the 
electoral and parliamentary arenas). Therefore, in periods of profoundly changing external and internal 
conditions within their environments, they are likely to prioritise one face over the other. If they prioritise 
the party-face, then they are changing towards de-radicalisation, while, when they prioritise their 
movement-face, they are on a course of radicalisation. 
The aim throughout the chapter is to develop alternative hypotheses with regards to the question 
concerning under what conditions (e.g., when, where and how) de-radicalisation and radicalisation are 
more or less likely to play out across the three political arenas, during changing external and internal 
conditions that have been affected by external and internal factors. These would be political and 
institutional factors (external) and leadership and factions (internal).   
The chapter consists of four main sections. The first section shortly introduces the four deductive, and 
short, hypotheses it aims to test in the the empirical chapters. The second section theorises where 
extreme-right behaviour is observed and how it is exercised by ERPs across the three arenas, on the 
behavioural dimensions of political praxis and issue salience. The third section theorises about the ‘when’ 
question, with regards to external factors (such as political and institutional); that is, under what changing 
external conditions is it likely to see extreme-right party change, as well as how this change will likely be 
played out by ERPs. 
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The fourth section theorises about under what changing conditions of the internal environment of ERP 
are we are likely to see change (e.g., when). It discusses the preferences, beliefs and actions of internal 
factors, such as leadership and factions. It, then, theorises under what changing conditions inside ERPs, 
with regards to these factors, are we likely to witness a signal of change towards de-radicalisation and 
radicalisation, developing testable hypotheses for both scenarios.  
 
3.1 De-radicalisation and Radicalisation Hypohteses 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to develop short and testable hypotheses regarding the de-radicalisation 
and radicalisation outcomes of ERPs and of GD. This chapter delves into a deep theorisation addressing 
under what conditions these two scenarios are likely to unfold. Before directly confronting this task, this 
section first presents the four main short hypotheses that it aims to test in the subsequent empirical 
chapters.  
The thesis is centred on four main deductive and short hypotheses, derived from the two main clusters of 
External (e.g. external shocks such as leadership arrests and imprisonment) and Internal factors (e.g. 
factions and leadership change), which, according to the literature, are thought to be the most likely 
factors in affecting the external and internal environments of ERPs. 
External Factors Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: (De-radicalisation): There is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to de-radicalise as 
they achieve and seek to maintain parliamentary representation.  
Hypothesis 2: (Radicalisation): There is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to radicalise or re-
radicalise when they assume social movement characteristics. 
Internal factors Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: (De-radicalisation): Exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such as 
Golden Dawn)  leaderships and factions, may result in de-radicalisation outcomes when moderates are 
mainly the influential faction.  
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Hypothesis 4: (Re-Radicalisation): Exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such as 
Golden Dawn) leaderships and factions, may result in re-radicalisation outcomes when the 
hardliners/militants are mainly the influential faction.  
In chapters 3 and 5 (the theoretical chapters of the thesis) the above four hypotheses are referred to and 
re-iterated across the text, when appropriate. This is done in order to uninterruptedly remind to the 
reader the main hypotheses the thesis aims to test, as well as helping the reader navigate each section 
with reference to a hypothesis. The four hypotheses will be re-iterated and further elaborated at the end 
of Chapter 5, in an attempt to theorise how the de-radicalisation and radicalisation hypotheses of GD are 
likely to be manifested in the PICs. What follows is a deep theorisation on how the above hypotheses were 
formulated. 
 
3.2 Theorising extreme-right party behaviour across Political Arenas 
 
In contemporary democracies, political parties in opposition exercise politics in three broad political 
arenas: grassroots, electoral and parliamentary. Governing parties are also concerned with a fourth arena, 
the executive. Electorally successful political parties are mainly concerned with the realisation of three 
primary goals defining their political behaviour: vote-maximisation, policy-seeking and office-seeking 
(Storm, 1990); corresponding to their behaviour in the electoral, parliamentary and executive arenas, 
respectively. Parties can also pursue more than one of these goals at any time (Vasilopoulou, 2010:245). 
Electorally successful political parties in opposition devote most of their resources to two main arenas: 
electoral and legislative. There has been a gap in assessing party behaviour across political arenas. This 
gap is even more noticeable when it comes to FRPs and ERPs, in particular. Largely dominated by the party 
competition literature, which sees all political parties as vote-maximisers above all (e.g. Downs, 1957), the 
behaviour of parties has primarily been studied in the electoral arena, thus overlooking to a large extent 
their behaviour in the parliamentary and grassroots arenas. ERPs are practicing politics predominantly in 
the grassroots and electoral arenas, while electorally successful ERPs are concerned with the 
parliamentary arena, as well.  
For all political parties, as part of these main arenas, there could also be many other ‘mini-arenas’, where 
parties might place more emphasis on some mini-arenas than on others (Isaksson & Akademi, 1994:92). 
For example, as part of the parliamentary arena, there could be the plenary assembly, and the various 
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parliamentary committees where parties can exercise their parliamentary duties. The process of drawing 
up candidates lists or the process of electoral campaigning, as well as other activities for pursuing vote-
maximisation (e.g. media), can be thought of as part of the broader electoral arena. As part of the 
grassroots arena, the various local branches and associations that political parties might set up across 
their country in order to engage with local activism and electoral campaigning can be considered as mini-
arenas of the broader grassroots arena. However, these various ‘mini arenas’ are part of the broader 
electoral, parliamentary and grassroots arenas and can adequately capture the behaviour of parties 
(Isaksson & Akademi, 1994).  
 
3.2.1 Electoral Arena 
 
The electoral arena is the primary arena, where parties can exercise their vote-maximisation goals.  All 
parties are expected to prioritise vote-maximisation. Even parties which are not primarily vote-maximisers 
are expected to prioritise vote-maximisation, at least at certain points in their lifespan, if they wish to 
have political relevance. Borrowing from Downs (1957), all political parties will, over time, mellow their 
either radical or extreme rhetoric, positions and strategies and seek to move closer to the median voter, 
so as to broaden their electorate and achieve electoral survival. PRRPs, are thought to have achieved this 
through the adoption of the new master frame of ethnopluralism, according to which all human races are 
equal but within each country only people of the native group are allowed to reside in, so that to avoid 
cultural mixing (Rydgren, 2005). As a result, many had escaped political exclusion and managed to even 
enter office as coalition partners (Akkerman and De Lange, 2012; Akkerman et al., 2016). Part of this 
transformation was a process of de-radicalising their behaviour witnessed by toning down their affinity to 
demonstrate any extreme-right ideas or actions. Even PRRPs that face permanent political exclusion, such 
as FN and SD (Ivaldi, 2016), are thought to adopt vote-maximisation strategies, so as to overcome 
isolation. Under these conditions, FRPs are expected to enter a course of de-radicalisation, or for PRRPs, 
of a moderation.  
However, in the case of ERPs, the incentives of prioritising vote-maximisation strategies, at least for a long 
period of time, differ from that of PRRPs. For ERPs, this prioritisation seems to be short-term and 
predominantly for tactical reasons. ERPs are considered to be entities not normally sticking to the 
electoral logic (Ellinas, 2020), even though other parties founded on ideological principles tend to adapt 
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in the end (Michels, 1915:122). In the electoral arena, ERPs lack the necessary communicative and 
financial means associated with modern or post-modern electoral campaigning, such as wide use of the 
media and funds from private large donors, often observed in most established political parties in 
contemporary democracies. To this, along with their pariah status in the party system, ERPs are more 
likely to rely on volunteer activists for electoral campaigning, rather than on external consultants or 
private donors. In this regard, they are more likely to spend most of their energy campaigning in the 
streets through a range of ‘pre-modern’ camping activities, such as leafleting, meetings with voters on the 
streets or public speeches in squares, rather than on the TV, as ERPs are still in a pre-modern era of 
election campaigning (Ellinas, 2020:51).  
However, as long as ERPs are also parties, they are likely to adopt vote-maximisation strategies as well, 
and adapt themselves to the new means of campaigning, if they wish to survive electorally. Although ERPs 
are not immune to electoral factors (e.g. electoral results) in shaping their behaviour, their incentives in 
prioritising electoral logic differ from most parties in other aspects, as well. ERPs are more likely to adhere 
to their electoral logic in accordance with constituency representation rather than on a pure vote-
maximisation logic, which would require wider openings towards significant de-radicalisation (Ellinas, 
2020:52). Regarding the internal factors of ERPs, militants (those actors within ERPs who favour 
contentious over conventional actions) are thought to act independent of the electoral environment (e.g. 
electoral success or failure) and, thus, their mobilisation patterns would not be largely affected. Similarly, 
the leadership of ERPs is also characterised by immobility in changing electoral environments (Ellinas, 
2020:52).  Given these conditions, ERPs are likely to prioritise ideological purity as a primary goal, rather 
than programmatic flexibility (Art, 2011; Ellinas, 2020:122). Consequently, electoral factors, and the 
electoral arena specifically, are not thought to significantly impact their behaviour, either towards de-
radicalisation or de-radicalisation.   
For PRRPs, when it comes to de-radicalisation and radicalisation as a result of political exclusion, such as 
the FN and VB tended to prioritise vote-maximisation as their primary goal (Mudde, 2007:289; Ivaldi & 
Lanzone, 2016; Lucardie et al., 2016:219), while, at the same time, not moderating some of their core 
programmatic positions, in order to overcome isolation. This prioritisation of votes seeking is mainly 
evidenced through, toning down their anti-establishment rhetoric, softening their programmatic positions 
on some of their ownership issues, denouncing extremist ideas and actions, embracing a wider range of 
policy issues, such as the economy and by including moderates or political opportunists in their electoral 
lists, or even announcing their intention to enter a government coalition (Akkerman, et. al., 2016). 
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However, as explained above, it could be assumed that, in the case of ERPs, if they focus too much on 
pursuing a vote-maximising strategy, which is a strategy that clearly focuses on the party-face - which it 
would entail more energy spent in the electoral and parliamentary arenas, by recruiting moderates, or by 
embracing more policy issues, which both are likely to be appealing to a wider electorate - this might 
result in downplaying their movement-face which is manifested in the grassroots arena, where they first 
gained prominence and built their identity.  
On the other hand, ERPs are not only movements, but parties as well. As parties are going through 
different phases of development, their stances towards prioritising vote-maximisation change (Harmel & 
Svasaand, 1993). For Pedersen (1982), the ultimate goal of every minor party is to grow and persist 
electorally, and it can achieve this only through prioritising vote-maximisation.  Especially for electorally 
successful ERPs, prioritising vote-maximisation is essential if they wish to survive electorally. “Once a party 
grows and especially after an electoral breakthrough, it is reasonable to expect electoral considerations to 
trump the logic of constituency representation” (Ellinas, 2020:123). Thus, it could be assumed that, while 
electoral factors, such as electoral results, might have less impetus in changing the behaviour of ERPs 
towards de-radicalisation or radicalisation, when they are outside parliament, for electorally successful 
ERPs, electoral factors are likely to have more impact. In this regard, electorally successful ERPs are likely, 
at least at times, to prioritise vote-maximisation, and spend more energy in the electoral than in the 
grassroots arena, a sign of de-radicalisation. Conclusively, the relevance of the thesis’ Hypothesis 1, 
explicated in the beginning of this chapter: there is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to de-
radicalise as they achieve and seek to maintain parliamentary representation. 
 
3.2.1.1 Political Praxis  
The political praxis in the electoral arena is not directly observable. On the one hand, PRRPs and ERPs 
might seek alliances with nearby competitors, by joining candidates lists, which is a directly observable 
action. In that way, parties are attempting to expand their electorate appeal and are willing to make 
compromises, a sign of de-radicalisation. However, ERPs in particular, face permanent political exclusion. 
To this, it could be assumed that the ways in which ERPs might prioritise vote-maximisation can be 
observed through the actions they undertake so as to appeal to voters. These could be, for example, 
electoral campaigning actions, such as appearances in the media, canvassing and dissemination of party 
material. These actions, however, fall under the grassroots arena, as ERPs do not have at their disposal 
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elaborate communicative tactics for pursuing large and costly electoral campaigns, as they also face 
exclusion from the media (Mares, 2016).  
To some extent, if ERPs prioritise vote-maximisation, this can be observed through the actions of their 
political opponents in their attempts to contain the electoral strength of their ERP competitors. The 
opponents of ERPs are unlikely to invite them to join candidate lists or to govern alongside, in an attempt 
to absorb their votes. However, as ERPs are a threat to the electorate of established parties, there would 
be an attempt to contain their electoral strength. Thus, the opponents of ERPs would engage in a variety 
of actions inside the electoral arena, so as to contain the electoral strength of ERPs. These actions could 
be alliances with nearby competitors to ERPs, such as PRRP individual politicians or the parties themselves, 
or meeting the demands of ERPs by implementing policies or adopting laws relevant to the most key issues 
of ERPs (e.g. immigration). Most evidently, the attempt to appease the electoral strength of ERPs is 
observed through the policy co-optation process (Meguid, 2005; Minkenberg, 2013). This process involves 
other party actors co-opting the programmatic agenda of FRPs, in terms of issues positions and issue 
salience (mostly on the issues of immigration and law & order) or, more generally, by adopting a ‘far-right 
rhetoric’, with the aim of diminishing their electoral strength.  
In the electoral arena, political parties compete with each other on a variety of policy issues in their 
attempt to capture as many votes as possible. Parties can choose which issues to compete over, with FRPs 
usually competing over the core issues of their issue profile, where they are most likely to have 
‘ownership’, such as immigration and law and order (Meguid, 2005). If established parties wish to re-
capture lost votes from an upstart party, which might also be a nearby ideological competitor, they are 
more likely to engage in policy co-optation by adopting the programmatic agenda of this upstart party. In 
the case of FRPs, these nearby competitors are usually the mainstream right-wing parties. When nearby 
competitors, such as mainstream right-wing parties, co-opt the agendas of FRPs, this is usually an 
indication that the agendas of ERPs have begun posing an electoral threat to mainstream parties, 
especially to the mainstream right-wing party. In this regard, the ERPs are on a course of de-radicalisation 
in the electoral arena, mainly because they are aiming towards widening their electoral appeal by 
adopting vote-maximisation strategies, despite, still, being extreme. The co-optation tactics of 
mainstream parties adopting far-right agendas have been described in various terms, such as ‘contagion 
from the right’ or ‘rightward shift’ (Norris, 2005; Van Spanje, 2010). This competition over issues, 
programmatic positions and rhetoric, among others, is largely about the capturing of votes and 
predominantly takes place inside the electoral arena (Meguid, 2005). As long as the goals and actions of 
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political parties inside the electoral arena involve strengthening their electoral appeal, the electoral arena 
for ERPs is primarily concerned with their party-face.    
However, political parties also take their own actions inside the electoral arena in order to win votes. To 
this, the electoral manifestoes are, perhaps, the most popular, and widely used, tools of all political parties 
directed at the electoral arena (Hix & Jun, 2007:667). Electoral manifestos constitute the programmatic 
agendas of political parties and reflect the external image of parties. The voluminous literature on party 
competition assesses the programmatic manoeuvrability of parties within the competitive party space.  
ERPs are thought to de-radicalise their programmatic agenda, as evidenced in their manifestoes, on their 
signature issues when they aim to broaden their electoral appeal, thus displaying programmatic flexibility 
(Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015). However, ERPs can also display this de-radicalisation beyond their electoral 
manifestoes, in their internal party literature, such as their official newspapers and websites.  
 
3.2.1.2 Policy Issues Salience 
 
Policy issue salience in the electoral arena is mainly observed to the various issues parties devote most 
attention to, as presented in their electoral manifestoes. The latter is often considered as the main tool 
for all parties to appeal to the wider electorate. In their manifestoes both PRRPs and ERPs are likely to talk 
most about issues they ‘own’ such as immigration and law & order issues and less about secondary issues, 
those issues that belong to the socio-economic political axis, such as the economy.  
Therefore, when PRRPs and ERPs talk most about their core issues, and less about secondary issues, in 
the electoral arena, for example, as evidenced in their manifestoes or internal party literature, then they 
are in a radicalisation course. When they are doing they opposite – talk most about secondary issues over 
core issues – then they are n a de-radicalisation course.  
 
3.2.2 Legislative arena 
 
The study of ERPs’ behaviour in the legislative arena has largely remained unexplored. Most of the limited 
amount of studies (e.g. della Porta et al., 2012; Froio & Gattinara, 2014; Froio, 2016; Gattinara, 2016) that 
empirically investigate the evolution of behaviour of the extreme-right, including the party and non-party 
73 
 
sector, deal with electorally unsuccessful extreme right parties. Although these studies provide insightful 
ideas and are a significant step towards bridging the gap between far-right movements and parties, it can 
be expected that unsuccessful ERPs will still be more inclined towards the grassroots arena, as they do 
not have to spend any time resources inside the parliament. In contrast, electorally successful ERPs have 
to, each day, deal with a variety of parliamentary actions, such as parliamentary interpellations, 
preparation and proposals of law, speeches and voting, while, at the same time, engaging in activities in 
the grassroots arena. To this, it can be expected that their incentives and opportunities for keeping a 
balance between the two arenas differs significantly from minor and electorally irrelevant ERPs.   
In the party politics literature, research on how parties behave in the parliamentary arena has been far 
less compared to the electoral and the executive arenas (Hix & Jun, 2007:667). In short, a legislative arena 
is where the ideas, interests and policies (e.g. programmatic agendas) of parties could be translated into 
policy outcomes, by being adopted as formal state laws or implemented as policies. Thus, this is the main 
arena where parties can realise their policy-seeking goals. As in the electoral arena, similar co-optation 
tactics can be observed from close FRP competitors in the parliamentary arena, as well (Van Spanje, 2010). 
For example, close competitors might be voting, along with an FRP, in the plenary bills proposed initially 
by an FRP, or they might co-opt a motion, bill, interpellation, etc., initially tabled by an FRP. However, how 
parties exercise their primary goals might interact with their actions in the two arenas. In other words, 
vote-maximisation or policy-seeking is not unique to each of the two party arenas. For example, FRPs in 
opposition, through successful pursuit of vote-maximisation in the electoral arena as a primary goal, might 
indirectly influence governing parties to adopt and implement policies in the legislative arena. Thus, 
through vote-maximisation as a primary goal, electorally successful FRPs might be pursuing and achieving 
policy-seeking, as well. In short, all political parties, and especially electorally successful parties, are very 
likely to spend some time resources in the electoral and legislative arenas.  
Most ERPs are electorally unsuccessful and, thus, have been long absent from the parliament arena. To 
this, it could be assumed that, for ERPs, the parliamentary arena is the arena where they are the least 
experienced. Spending years on the margins of their party system, and predominantly engaged in street 
activism in the grassroots arena (Art, 2011), ERPs are expected to be less experienced inside the 
parliament. Also, the parliament is an arena which mainly appeals to more politically skilful personnel, 
who are likely to be more familiar with drafting bills and preparing interpellations. However, ERPs usually 
lack this personnel. The parliament arena is also the place where parties can largely exercise their policy-
seeking goals. However, faced with exclusion, the governing parties are likely to ignore the demands of 
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ERPs, mainly at the policy-making level. As a result, it could be assumed that ERPs would be less 
incentivised to spend a lot of time resources inside the parliament.  
On the other hand, ERPs constantly face political and legal exclusion. ERPs are permanently excluded in 
the electoral arena, lacking any opportunity of cooperating with others (Mares, 2016). In addition, ERPs 
might be deprived of state funding, face anti-racist legislation or banning from organising various 
conventional and contentious actions by the police and various anti-fascist actors, which limit their 
opportunities for engaging with street activism. Under these conditions, the parliament arena could be 
the only arena left to further their interests and ideas without any substantial constraints. Although ERPs 
are likely to face exclusion in the parliamentary arena as well, for reasons discussed next, they are usually 
unconstrained in the amount of time resources they can spend inside the parliament. Thus, the relevance 
of the thesis’ Hypothesis 1: there is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to de-radicalise as they 
achieve and seek to maintain parliamentary representation. For example, it could be hypothesised that, 
in periods of unfavourable conditions, ERPs might turn to the parliament, so as to gain legitimacy and 
show to their voters that they are working on their demands, as a legal entity, through democratic means. 
If they choose this option at the expense of energy spent in the grassroots arena, then they are in a course 
of de-radicalisation as they further embed themselves in their party-face.  
 
3.2.2.1 Political Praxis  
Inside the parliament, political parties have a variety of actions available that they can choose to 
undertake. In most European countries, parliamentary praxis can be divided into two broad categories 
that reflect contemporary European democracies: i) parliamentary actions with direct material 
consequences for society, and ii) parliamentary actions with no direct material consequences for society. 
The former refers, primarily, to law changes which, once implemented, affect some aspects of society. In 
the latter, there is no law change and, thus, no direct material consequences for society, apart from an 
answer or reply from governing actors to the political party that submitted or raised the legislative activity 
inside the parliament (Green-Pedersen, 2010:348-49). However, the mere submission of a parliamentary 
interpellation/question with no direct material consequences for society can, at times, to a politicisation 
of an issue, which might eventually lead to a law change. In empirical reality, in the first category falls 
parliamentary activities, such as voting on bills, law proposals and bill amendments. The latter two can 
also sometimes fall into the second category, as long as there is a certainty from a part of the political 
party beforehand that they are highly unlikely to be adopted. The most frequent parliamentary activities 
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with no direct societal effects, and mostly common across European democracies, are questions to the 
minister (either written, oral or both) and interpellations. These are mostly symbolic because of their 
limited impact on the policy-making process (Van Aelst & Vliegenthart, 2014). Parliamentary questions 
are usually considered as ‘the continuation of election campaigns by different means’ (Green-Pedersen, 
2010:497). In other words, parties do not necessarily seek an answer to their questions, but, mostly, they 
seek to further their own interests. Parliamentary interpellations/questions, what Green-Pedersen (2010) 
calls ‘non-legislative activities’, are attractive to opposition parties, in particular, because the government 
must respond to the issues raised by the opposition (Green-Pedersen, 2010:348). Additionally, as parties 
are usually unconstrained in the number of questions that they can submit, for parties in opposition, it is 
expected that parliamentary questions are their most frequent activity inside the parliament. ERPs are 
very likely to face exclusion from their opponents in the parliamentary arena as well. They are very likely 
to not receive a reply their questions from those Ministries that are concerned with their signatory issues 
such as immigration and/or law and order, especially under conditions of political and legal exclusion. At 
the policy-making level as well, ERPs are highly unlikely to see their law proposals being discussed in the 
plenary under conditions of political and legal exclusion. However, they are usually unconstrained in the 
amount of parliamentary activities they can pursue inside the parliament. They can continue on 
submitting various questions so as to demonstrate to their constituencies that they are working on their 
issues.   
Consequently, in terms of radicalisation and de-radicalisation of ERPs, the mere number of parliamentary 
activities ERPs submit could be a good indicator of the time resources that they dedicate inside the 
parliamentary arena. As the parliamentary arena is an arena that is primarily concerned with the party-
face of ERPs, it could be assumed that the more parliamentary activities they undertake, the more they 
tend to emphasise their party-face. Thus, they are on a course of de-radicalisation.  
 
3.2.2.2 Policy Issues Salience  
 
As in the electoral arena, a bulk of the literature is devoted to studying party parliamentary behaviour 
through the perspective of issue competition. Thus, from an issue salience perspective, parties are likely 
to talk more, in their activities inside the parliament, about policy issues that they ‘own’ (Otjes & 
Louwerse, 2018: 500). For instance, studies have found that the Greens in Denmark talk much more about 
the environment in their (secondary) legislative activities, (e.g. those which have no direct to society), 
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than any other party (Green-Pedersen, 2010:359), while the radical right Vlaams Belang is most active on 
the immigration issue than any other party in the Belgian party system (Walgrave & De Swert, 2007). 
 
Parliamentary questions are thought to be a simple way inside the parliament for opposition parties to 
keep their ownership on their key issues (Green-Pedersen, 2010:350). Parties ask more questions about 
topics they ‘own’ in order to maintain issue ownership. They may be used to mark a party’s territory vis-
a-vis other parliamentary parties (Walgrave et al., 2015:789–90). Additionally, parties might be asking 
questions frequently about their issues, so as to demonstrate to their voters that they are working on 
their issues and represent their constituencies. Therefore, it is assumed that green parties will mostly ask 
questions about the environment and FRPs will ask questions about immigration (Otjes & Louwerse, 
2018:499).   
 
In the case of ERPs, there could be expected the same pattern. They are likely to talk mostly about issues 
that they own, such as immigration and law and order. In terms of radicalisation and de-radicalisation, if 
they continue to talk mostly about their signatory issues (e.g. immigration, law & order, etc.), this could 
be interpreted as sticking to their profile that continues a course of radicalisation. If they, however, start 
to engage with more issues that do not belong to the socio-cultural axis, but to the socio-economic axis, 
such as the economy, or are not part of the issues that they ‘own’, then this could be interpreted as 
entering a course of de-radicalisation.  
 
3.2.3 Grassroots Arena 
 
The grassroots arena involves the exercise of politics at the local level, specifically local party activism. It 
refers to the attempts by parties to infiltrate local societies, so as to spread their ideas and further their 
interests through the set-up of various local branches or associations, usually in cities and towns across 
the country. These local units recruit local activists who, through actions such as leafletting, canvassing, 
local donations, putting up posters, etc., spread the message of their parties. Being active in the grassroots 
arena means that a party has a strong local organisational structure (Ellinas, 2020). However, most 
political parties have, over time, been withdrawing their efforts in the grassroots arena. In contemporary 
democracies, most political parties have reached a phase of ‘cartelisation’ by increasingly relying on state 
benefits and relying less on direct contact with their voters at the local level (Katz & Mair, 1995). In party 
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organisation terms, most parties today are either electoral-professional, cartel cadre or business-firm, 
thus not having much interest in investing in local expansion and activism (Krouwel, 2006). Additionally, 
the methods of electoral campaigning are changing, with parties increasingly needing to hire external 
consultants, while using a variety of communicative tools to advertise their message, at the expense of 
local activism. Moreover, the role of the media in this process has increased the amount of resources 
required for running electoral campaigns. Thus, parties today are increasingly more interested in receiving 
large donations from lobbyists and interest groups so that they can run costly electoral campaigns, instead 
of relying on local fundraising, which, in essence, is far less lucrative when compared to large donations 
(Farrell & Webb, 2000; Norris, 2004). While, for most political parties today, the grassroots arena is less 
important, for movement-parties, like the Greens, radical left parties and ERPs, it is still far more important 
(Della Porta, et. al. 2017). For movement-parties, the establishment of local units and street activism is 
part of their identity. After all, movement-parties cannot be called movements unless they have a strong 
presence on the streets.  
The grassroots arena is the most vital arena for ERPs and it is more important for them than for any other 
political party or/and movement-party. There are many reasons for this. Firstly, it is the place where they 
have gained prominence since their foundation. Thus, it is intrinsically attached to their profile and 
identity and to their very origins. In the grassroots arena, they can exercise their contentious and violent 
actions, which is in accordance with their central ideological belief of overthrowing the political system 
through violent means. Additionally, they can seek and recruit new activists who might be transformed 
into future politicians. There, they can reach segments of society that are difficult to reach, such as young 
voters and rural populations. As well, through local activism, they can improve their electoral results, as 
grassroots activism is at the forefront of party activism (Ellinas, 2020:57). Moreover, ERPs lack the financial 
resources needed for running costly electoral campaigns. Thus, they are more reliant on their local units 
in the grassroots arena for infiltrating local society (Ellinas, 2020:58).  
The grassroots arena is also important for ERPs because it helps them to fight back against institutional 
hostility in periods of unfavourable external conditions (discussed in the next section). Because, most 
often, legal means of exclusion target ERPs at the national level, local activism allows ERPs to claim 
political relevance at a time when the national party is in retreat. “Vibrant local units make it harder for 
the state to repress ERPs and complicate militant democratic strategies to combat extremism. Simply put, 
local party organisations can be a form of ‘organisational hedging’ for parties facing uncertain institutional 
or social environments, especially where they can successfully combine a broad repertoire of conventional 
78 
 
and contentious activities” (Ellinas, 2020:58). In this regard, under adversarial external conditions, the 
grassroots arena offers ERPs the opportunity to continue on a course of radicalisation, by being 
particularly active at the local level, as their actions in the electoral and parliamentary arena might be 
under more scrutiny by state and political actors. Thus, the relevance of Hypothesis 2: there is a tendency 
for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to radicalise (or re-radicalise) when they assume social movement 
characteristics. 
On the other hand, ERPs are likely to face instability in the grassroots arena, as a result of legal and political 
means of exclusion. This is largely because of the organisational nature of ERPs and of the Führerprinzip, 
in particular (Carter, 2005). Because of the absolute power of the leader, all party units are required to be 
subordinated to the orders of the leader. However, because ERPs lack the necessary institutional 
mechanisms in managing internal conflicts, where informal relations are more likely to prevail, not all local 
units are expected to develop similarly. “Lacking institutionalised mechanisms for controlling their 
peripheral units, ERPs cannot bring about the level of organisational isomorphism one would expect from 
such highly centralised organisations. ERPs need local organisations more than other parties, but, unlike 
in the case of communist parties, local organisational presence can turn from asset to liability’’ (Ellinas, 
2020:59).  In this regard, it could be expected that some local units in the grassroots arena might follow a 
de-radicalisation path by abandoning contentious activism while others might follow a reverse course. 
The conditions under which this process might develop is discussed in the section internal factors further 
in this chapter.  
 
3.2.3.1 Political Praxis  
While some PRRPs might engage in street activism, their actions are similar to that of most parties of other 
party families, which might occasionally engage in street activism, as well, by putting up posters, 
leafleting, cleaning public spaces and canvassing (Gattinara and Forio, 2014). In the grassroots arena, ERPs 
have the most diverse repertoire of actions when compared to any other party or movement-party, as 
they systematically, and simultaneously, engage in conventional and unconventional/contentious 
activism. The table 3.1 below includes some of the most frequent conventional and contentious actions 
ERPs resort to. Conventional actions include electoral campaigning, such as canvassing, meeting with 




Table 3.1 Extreme right movement-parties: Conventional & Unconventional repertoires of actions 
CONVENTIONAL (INSTITUTIONAL) UNCONVENTIONAL (CONTENTIOUS / 
NON-INSTITUTIONAL) 
















party members or 












clashes with the 
police and 
assaults on 
humans such as 
leftists or 
migrants) 
Source: Caiani et. al. (2012:79-80), Gattinara and Froio, (2014:8) 
 
In terms of radicalisation and de-radicalisation, when ERPs resort to less unconventional means, meaning 
less violent actions over time, this is often seen as indicating that they have entered a process of de-
radicalisation by abandoning militancy (Caiani & Borri, 2013; Gattinara, 2017: 10-11). If this is the case, 
with ERPs, it could be hypothesised that they, most likely, have made a behavioural change towards de-
radicalisation, with regards to their movement-face. If the opposite happens, then, most likely, the ERP is 
either maintaining itself in the radicalisation phase or it is radicalising even more. 
 
3.2.3.2 Policy Issue Salience 
Changes in saliency of policy issues can also be observed in the grassroots arena. What mainly drives the 
mobilisation of ERPs in the grassroots arena is the politicisation of their core issues, such as immigration 
or law & order (Giugni et al., 2005:157-8; Gattinara, 2017). Thus, the various conventional and contentious 
repertoires of actions of ERPs are usually associated with specific policy issues. For example, when ERPs 
undertake conventional actions, such as distributing party material in the streets, they are likely to talk 
about which issues are, according to them, more salient than others, in order to justify the distribution of 
their party material. Additionally, when engaging in contentious actions, such as damaging the goods sold 
by immigrant street-market vendors, they would justify this action because of the salience of ‘illegal 
immigration’ where illegal immigrants steal the jobs of the natives, which is what had driven them to 
undertake this action in the first place.  
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In terms of radicalisation and de-radicalisation, with regards to issues salience in the grassroots arena, 
Kitschelt (2006:288) posits that movement-parties begin to abandon their movement-face when: i) there 
can be observed declining salience of the core movement issue that initially inspired the mobilisation in 
the grassroots arena, and ii) when policy reform is observed at the state level, consistent with the 
movement-party’s issue demands. In the case of ERPs, this is the immigration issue, above all (Mudde, 
2007). However, the aim of this project is not to measure the saliency of the immigration issue in the 
politics of a given country, but rather the saliency of this issue with regards to the ERP.  
Hence, an increasing trend of conventional and contentious actions concerned with issues ERPs ‘own’, 
such as immigration and/or law & order, would signal a course of radicalisation, as the ERP is primarily 
concerned with its signature issues. In contrast, when this trend decreases and the ERP starts talking about 
other issues, beyond its signatory ones, which usually do not belong to the socio-cultural axis, such as the 
economy, this would signal a turn towards de-radicalisation, as the ERP attempts to expand its issues 
palette, so as to appeal to a wider electorate. Additionally, a change towards de-radicalisation would also 
be observed if its key issues are mostly addressed through conventional actions.  
 
3.3 Theorising extreme-right party change: External Factors 
 
In researching changes in the political behaviour of FRPs, studies usually begin with the inclusion-
moderation and exclusion-radicalisation theses (e.g. Van Spanje & Der Brug, 2007; Akkerman & Rooduijn, 
2014), with more recent studies (e.g. Akkerman et al., 2016) integrating these theories with literature on 
party change (e.g. Harmel & Janda, 1994). In essence, these theses are a direct reference to the openness 
and closeness of the opportunity structures for FRPs and movements. They posit that the first thing to 
look for when approaching changes in the political behaviour of FRPs is the external environment. This is 
because FRPs are not ‘normal’ parties, like all of the others, given their radicalness. Some of them have 
been accepted as coalition partners by their opponents, while others have been permanently excluded, 
as they are considered a threat to democracy by their opponents (Van Spajne & Der Brug, 2007:1022). In 
short, the inclusion-moderation thesis argues that open opportunities provide an open political 
environment where a FRP is more likely to shift towards moderation, while closed opportunities provide 
a closed political environment where a FRP is more likely to shift towards radicalisation.  
Subsequently, the question is whether there is a set of opportunities more important than others. As well, 
what specific factors can largely define the openness (thus inclusion) or closeness (thus exclusion) of the 
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opportunity structures for ERPs? To this, ERPs face varying degrees of openness and closeness of their 
external environment. Identifying the theoretical underpinnings behind these questions can help to 
anticipate under what conditions ERPs are expected to change. For ERPs, the most relevant factors are 
the political and/or legal means employed by other political actors against them (Mudde, 2007:289; 
Downs, 2002; Downs et al., 2009).  
 
3.3.1 Political & Institutional factors 
 
Political means of exclusion 
Means of exclusion against FRPs are usually sub-divided into two main categories: exclusion/isolation 
through political means and exclusion/isolation through legal means (Downs, 2002; Downs et al., 2009). 
Political and legal means of exclusion belong to the political and institutional sets of political opportunity 
structures, respectively. Political means of exclusion against FRPs, alternatively known as the so-called 
‘cordon sanitaire’, involve a mutual agreement between all parties (or, at least, the most established 
parties) within a party system to deny any political cooperation with a far-right party, primarily at the 
national level, thus aiming for their isolation and permanent exclusion from the executive arena (Downs, 
2002:38). Although the erection (or not) of a political cordon sanitaire is a process that largely involves 
political actors, other actors might opt to exclude the far-right, such as the media (Art, 2007). In essence, 
political means of exclusion are strategies employed by other parties in dealing with the far-right, mainly 
at the electoral arena, as they aim at retrenching its electoral advancement. Political and state actors can 
also opt for ‘legal means’ of exclusion against a far-right party (Downs et al., 2009:156). Legal exclusionary 
means against non-democratic actors is a reference to the concept of militant democracy. This concept, 
having originated in the inter-war period (e.g. Lowerstein, 1937), aims at repressing those political actors 
who threaten its survival. In the social movement literature, legal means are often referred to as ‘state 
repression’ (Minkenberg, 2006; Fennema, 2000). Social movement scholars (e.g. Minkenberg, 2006; 
Koopmans, 1996, 1997; Linden & Klandernmans, 2006) have incorporated ideas from this literature in 
order to assess the effects of legal means of exclusion on FRPs’ behaviour. 
In the realm of FRPs, there could be found only a few cases that systematically, and exclusively, face 
political means of exclusion, and these are all PRRPs, such as French FN, the VB and the SD. Many PRRPs 
have participated in government, thus having already overcome any political exclusion (Akkerman & de 
Lange, 2012). Even PRRPs that might be facing political exclusion, when the main centre-right party is in 
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need of coalition partners, might be tempted to release the cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis a PRRP. However, 
strategic considerations for lifting a cordon sanitaire are often made by referring to the extremity of the 
FRP. To this end, political exclusion is more often employed against ERPs that are outright extremists and 
openly violent (Van Spanje & Van der Bur, 2007:1026). In fact, ERPs, most often, systematically face a 
variety of legal means of exclusion, whereas the political exclusion is already in place. 
 
Legal Means 
Legal means of exclusion, such as ban from public funding, fines and court trials for hate speech and/or 
actions, usually aim at repressing the supply of political extremism, (e.g. ideas, issues and actions of FRPs) 
and the demand of political extremism (Minkenberg, 2006:38). Regarding the political supply of FRPs, 
which this thesis is mainly concerned with, militant democratic measures are thought to impact the overall 
behaviour of ERPs, including their ideas, issues salience and political praxis (e.g. Bale, 2007; van Spanje & 
de Vreese, 2015; Mares, 2016). 
Repressive means pursued by the state vary and, thus, vary their potential impact on the behaviour of the 
targeted actors. To this, there could be distinguished ‘harsh’ and ‘soft’ repressive means. These means 
against FRPs could take various forms and are too numerous to list here (see Mares, 2016: 67 for a more 
complete list). Some of the most frequent harsh measures are: cuts in public funding, complete outlawing 
of party (i.e. ban), prosecuting individual politicians for hate speech, lawsuits, criminal prosecutions, 
injunctions and higher thresholds of representation through electoral laws (Downs, 2002:37; Van Spanje 
& de Vreese, 2012:117). Party ban, or the possibility of being banned, is often considered to be the most 
severe legal mean and, thus, it has received most of the scholarly attention (Mares, 2018; Berms, 2006; 
Bourne, 2011). Frequent soft repressive means involve measures such as declining requests to organise 
public meetings, speeches marches and demonstrations in city squares and roads, and aim primarily 
against ERPs, as ERPs are usually the main organisers of such activities, given their emphasis on street 
activism in the first place (e.g. Koopmans, 1996). Thus, ERPs, in contrast to PRRPs, face ‘everyday 
institutional hostility’ from other state institutions, as well, such as administrative agents, notably the 
police. Although PRRPs might occasionally face soft legal means, such as fines for individual PRRPs 
politicians for racist remarks (Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015), for ERPs, this is a very frequent occurrence. 
“Arguably, much of the ‘everyday institutional hostility’ against ERPs takes place in this nexus between 
political and administrative institutions”. Soft repressive means do not directly threaten the life of the 
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ERP, but make it more difficult and can have, for example, a direct impact on its activism in the grassroots 
arena (Ellinas, 2020:141).  
The next step is to theorise under what conditions ERPs might follow a de-radicalisation and/or a 
radicalisation path, with regards to their supply side; that is, their issues salience and political praxis.  
 
3.3.2 De-radicalisation Hypothesis 
 
This section discusses further the theoretical expectations behind external factors Hypothesis 1 (de-
radicalisation), according to which, there is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to de-radicalise as 
they achieve and seek to maintain parliamentary representation.   
With regards to state repression, which creates an unfavourable external environment for ERPs, it is 
thought that legal means of exclusion have a de-radicalisation/moderating effect on their political 
behaviour such as, salient issues and political praxis. Within such an unfavourable (‘closed’) context, 
resulting from state repression, the adoption of a de-radicalised political behaviour and the attempt to 
align with mainstream politics seems to be the only way in order to gain more social consensus and 
overcome stigmatisation (Caiani & Borri, 2013:574). In that respect, extremist actors learn to adapt to 
institutional hostility and change course toward de-radicalisation (Bermeo, 1992:138). Moreover, and in 
accordance with the resource mobilisation theory from social movement literature (Kriesi, 2004), there is 
the hypothesis that targeted ERPs would de-radicalise their overall behaviour by toning down their mainly 
public rhetoric and programmatic agenda, as well as abandoning contentious actions, for tactical reasons, 
so as to avoid further repression, such as prolonged and costly legal battles or contending with the fear 
of a possible ban from state funding (Ellinas, 2020:139). As ERPs are usually deprived of large public 
funding, as cartel parties are, while many ERPs are banned from public funding altogether, a change 
towards de-radicalisation seems to be the only way forward. Thus, ERPs are thought to enter a phase of 
de-radicalisation by de-emphasising their movement-face and embedding themselves in their party-face 
by embracing institutional politics.  
Social movement literature assumes that the further away an extreme right actor is from the far-right 
party sector, the more radicalised its reaction to repressive means would be (Caiani and Della Porta, 2012). 
This rests on the insight that these actors lack any substantial institutionalisation, and any experience 
thereof, that would incentivise them to prioritise electoral logic (Caiani & Borri, 2013:568). Actors from 
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the groupuscular right and sub-cultural milieus are more prone to the use of more radical actions, as they 
act completely outside of the institutional arena (Caiani & Borri, 2013:572). Because these actors are 
‘ideological communities’, repression would lead them to use more violent actions (Tilly, 200535). In this 
regard, non-electoral extreme-right actors would intensify their street activism and contentious actions 
in reaction to repression (Della Porta & Diani, 2006:181; Della Porta, 2005:3). However, following this 
point, it could be assumed that ERPs are likely to be more incentivised to under-emphasise their militant 
activism in periods of repression, as the use of contentious actions (violent) might put the survival of the 
party-face under risk and might risk the exit of more moderate members, who prefer the use of more 
conventional and institutionalised means. Thus, it could be hypothesised that ERPs are likely to decrease 
or stabilise their unconventional actions and engage in more routinised forms of interaction by prioritising 
vote-maximisation (Koopmans, 2004). To this, harsh repressive means seem more likely to have a greater 
impact towards de-radicalisation on ERPs, but the contrary on non-party extreme-right actors. Thus, harsh 
legal means, such as anti-racist legislation prohibiting racist words and deeds, can have an immediate and 
direct effect on ERPs. Because of their wider electoral relevance, compared to non-party extreme-right 
actors, ERPs are under more scrutiny from political and state actors. Under these conditions, ERPs have 
little choice but to obey, at least to some legislation and in the short run, even for tactical reasons, so as 
to avoid further legal ramifications.   
Some ERPs have displayed de-radicalisation of their behaviour following periods of institutional hostility. 
This de-radicalisation was mainly evident in the electoral arena and was manifested by toning down their 
extremist rhetoric publicly; softening their programmatic positions on their core policy issues, as well as 
embracing a vote-maximisation goal. An example is the BNP. Although the BNP never managed to fully 
transform itself into a PRRP, and it had always remained committed to biological racism and the fascist 
myths (Macklin, 2011), it made a significant attempt towards de-radicalisation with a ‘modernisation’ 
strategy initiated by its leader, Nick Griffin, in 1999. This strategy aimed at a de-radicalisation of its 
external public image by toning down some of its most extreme rhetoric and aspects of its programmatic 
agenda. The BNP even adopted a civic nationalist rhetoric on its electoral manifesto, similar to that which 
PRRPs in Western Europe employ; dropping references to biological racism and to the fascist myths 
(Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2010). Although it is possible that internal factors, such as party actors and 
party leadership, played a significant role in this de-radicalisation, to a great extent, this de-radicalisation 
(or ‘modernisation’ strategy) is also attributed to the legal means against BNP’s leader, Nick Griffin, in 
                                                            
35 Tilly, ‘Repression, mobilization, and explanation’. 
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1998 (Goodwin, 2010). Similarly, Jobbik had entered a de-radicalisation phase by initiating a de-
demonisation strategy and declaring itself a ‘centrist people’s party’. Although, in its 2010 electoral 
manifesto, Jobbik was more or less describing Roma people as ‘parasites’, in its manifesto of 2014, Jobbik 
was now accepting Roma people as equals (Boros & Nagy, 2016). 
There seems to exist the suggestion that the effects of harsh legal means, such as bans or the possibility 
of being banned, are thought to have tamed right-wing extremists by forcing them to de-radicalise their 
behaviour (Ellinas, 2020:137). One of the most discussed cases, and the only PRRP that was banned so far, 
the Belgian VB, seems to have entered a moderating course after facing a ban and a motion of possible 
cuts to public funding. For example, the VB changed its position from repatriation of all immigrants to a 
strict assimilationist policy; that people from different ethnic backgrounds can stay as long as they do not 
fight against European values (see also Bale, 2007:153). Similarly, Coffe (2005:219) concluded that ‘the 
existence of the cordon sanitaire and the juridical process against the party were important catalysts for 
the change of the party’s language’, towards more moderate tones, while Lucardie et al. (2016:219) 
surmised that external pressure, such as the possibility of further legal actions against the VB, were ‘clearly 
the main incitement to amend the racist reputation of the party’.  Although these moderate changes were 
often considered the result of the vote-seeking strategy of the VB to enlarge its electorate, it also meant 
that the party avoided being cut off of public funding (Erk, 2005; Bale, 2007; Coffe, 2005).  
The ERP, ‘Slovak Togetherness’, the progenitor to the LSNS, faced a ban motion by the General Prosecutor, 
which led to an eventual ban, in 2006, by the Supreme Court. The court decision argued that the electoral 
programme of the ERP was undemocratic and was calling ‘for the establishment of an Estates System 
based on national, Christian and social principles that would replace parliamentary democracy’. The result 
was for the ‘Slovak Togetherness’ to be the first dissolved party in post-communist Slovakia. Not long 
after, key members of the ‘Slovak Togetherness’ found refuge in an existing ERP, which led to the 
formation of today’s LSNS. In order to avoid any further legal actions, the LSNS avoided statements on its 
electoral programme, such as calling for the establishment of a new political order (Ellinas, 2020:223).  
Legal exclusionary means can also affect the political praxis of FRPs. This is particularly evident for ERPs 
that are far more well-known for their extreme actions, when compared to PRRPs. Thus, it is important to 
go beyond merely programmatic responses by ERPs when faced with institutional hostility. In particular, 
state repressive means are thought to primarily impact the mobilisation patterns of ERPs in the grassroots 
arena (Ellinas, 2020:139). It is assumed that, in response to state repression, ERP would either decrease 
(de-radicalise) or increase (radicalise) their mobilisation (Tilly, 2005). In the social movements’ literature, 
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although there is no uniform agreement as to whether repression enhances radicalisation or not, with 
regards to the overall behaviour of ERPs, there is more consensus that it would have the most direct 
impact on the repertoires of actions (Minkenberg, 2006).  
 
For ERPs, regarding de-radicalisation of political praxis, “the choice of action by ERPs that are too radical 
might put the survival of the organisation under risk. At the same time, it might discourage those members 
who, having chosen to join more ‘conventional’, institutionalised organisations, might condemn too radical 
tactics” (Caiani & Borri, 2013:572). In that respect, some social movement theorists argue that repression 
reduces the pace of street actions (Olzak, Beasley and Olivier, 2003), as well as extreme-right violence 
(Koopmans, 1997). What is more, there is the assumption that harsh legal means, such as the possibility 
of a ban or an actual ban, lead to a de-radicalisation of the ERPs’ action repertoires, by forcing them to 
either decrease their street activism or limit their contentious actions. For example, the L’SNS, after its 
electoral breakthrough in 2016, resorted to an active period of contentious activism, but the ERP soon 
came under the microscope of the courts and had to deal with a motion for a possible ban in 2017. During 
that period, the L’SNS experienced a significant drop in contentious activism, a process largely attributed 
to the possibility of being banned (Ellinas, 2020:225). The re-emerged Czech ERP, ‘Workers’ Party of Social 
Justice’, although it had renewed its paramilitary wing, was less able to resort to a broader range of 
contentious actions, when compared with the period before the ban (Mares, 2011:45).  
There are also instances of ERPs that have de-radicalised their actions, not necessarily because of harsh 
legal actions, but rather because of their own choice. The most prominent example is Jobbik. Following 
the initiation of its de-demonising strategy in 2013, Jobbik had severed its links with the non-party 
extreme-right sector and had also significantly decreased its contentious activism, including violent 
actions (Pirro et al., 2019). Although there are context specific factors that likely explain the de-
radicalisation course that Jobbik adopted, such as the overdominance of Fidesz, the complete co-optation 
of Jobbik’s agenda a strategy to enlarge its electoral appeal in order to survive electorally by de-radicalising 
its agenda (Pytlas, 2016), the case of Jobbik demonstrates that even extreme-right movement-parties can 
experience a transitory phenomenon, in accordance with the literature, and that electoral logic might lead 
ERPs to abandon, or at least underemphasise, their movement-face.  
Hence, external factors Hypothesis 1 (De-radicalisation) assumes: There is a tendency for ERPs, such as 
Golden Dawn, to de-radicalise as they achieve and seek to maintain parliamentary representation.  
Following this discussion, Table 3.2 (below) presents the de-radicalisation hypothesis: 
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Table 3.2 External Factors: De-Radicalisation Hypothesis 
External Factors: De-Radicalisation Hypothesis 
an ERP will de-radicalise its behaviour by, most likely, overall, emphasising more its party-face than its 
movement face. As regards to the political praxis, this would be evidenced by spending more time 
resources inside the electoral and parliamentary arenas, by adopting vote-maximisation strategies, and 
increasing its activity inside the parliament (by submitting more parliamentary 
questions/interpellations, bill motions, etc.). In the grassroots arena, the ERP will be resorting less to 
unconventional actions compared to conventional actions, while its overall actions in the grassroots 
arena would be less compared to its activity in the electoral and parliamentary activities.  
As regards to issue salience, the ERP, would be, overall, talking more about its core issues, such as 
immigration and law & order issues, in the party-face arenas (electoral and parliamentary), when 
compared to the grassroots arena. Additionally de-radicalisation it is also evidenced with the ERP 
talking, at the same time, more about secondary issues in the grassroots arena and less in the party-
face arenas.  
 
3.3.3 Radicalisation Hypothesis 
 
This section discusses further the theoretical expectations behind external factors Hypothesis 2 
(Radicalisation), according to which, there is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to radicalise (or 
re-radicalise) when they assume social movement characteristics. 
Contrarily to the de-radicalisation argument, discussed in the previous section, for ERPs that face full-
blown exclusion (i.e. political and institutional means of exclusion), the exclusion-radicalisation thesis 
suggests that these parties will opt for further radicalisation (or remain radical/extreme) by ‘freezing’ their 
ideological positions and policy agendas, and resorting to contentious actions  (Akkerman & Rooduijn, 
2014; Giugni et al., 2005:155-156). Similarly, the prominent proposition in social movement studies shares 
similar theoretical expectations with the exclusion-radicalisation thesis: a movement’s strategies and 
repertoires of actions vary, depending on the openness and/or closeness of the repressive context; 
anticipating more radical (i.e. unconventional) actions when repression is severe (closed context) and the 
opposite when the context is less repressive (open context) (Tarrow, 1989; Giugni et al., 2005; Caiani et. 
al., 2012:78). Radicalisation is usually more evident in the actions repertoires of ERPs, where their 
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programmatic positions and public rhetoric might remain unaltered. Thus, severe repression measures 
are likely to lead to increasing militancy, protest activities and an escalation in violence from the extreme-
right non-party sector (Della Porta, 1995; Koopmans, 1995; Caiani & Borri, 2013:564). According to the 
resource mobilisation theory, if an ERP enjoys state funding, it is likely that, with more resources at its 
disposal, it might enhance its mobilization in the grassroots arena, by enhancing its movement-face at the 
expense of its party-face, thus continuing on a radicalisation path (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & Ash, 
1966). 
The argument goes that, complete isolation stigmatises the FRP and hits its public legitimacy, resulting in 
difficulty for the FRP in extending its public support (Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2014:1141). Thus, a faction of 
staunch ideologues (e.g. hardliners) are likely to prevail and be averse to openings for moderates, so as 
to overcome isolation. In this regard, they are likely to turn to even more radical tactics in order to help 
realise their ideological goals. If they cannot present their ideas freely in political arenas, they may decide 
to participate in more radical or even violent practices of political action (Minkenberg, 2006:138). Under 
conditions where legal means result in a lack of resources (e.g. cut of public funding) for the excluded FRP, 
the party building becomes more difficult and the social costs of activism and protesting become higher 
(Muis & Immerzeel, 2017:7). As a result, the excluded ERP tends to recruit mainly highly-ideologically 
motivated members who do not have anything to lose, in terms of social stigmatisation, anyway. These 
supporters are more likely to favour ideological rigidity (and remain isolated) over making a move towards 
the mean voter and seeking cooperation with others (Goodwin, 2010; Art, 2011:47-50). Thus, excluded 
FRPs are more likely to ‘freeze’ their ideology, programmatic positions and overall political behaviour and 
opt for radicalisation. In this scenario, militant democratic measures might encourage the most extremist 
elements within ERPs (and the most dominant at this phase) to resort to radicalisation, in the opposite 
direction that militant democratic measures would expect (Bale, 2007:138). 
Empirically speaking, the German NPD is an indicative example. After the 2001 failed attempt to ban the 
ERP, the NPD saw a significant membership loss, who deserted the party in order to move to various more 
violent groupuscules of the non-party extreme right sector. However, its remaining members seem to 
have become more committed by further embracing radical ideas and actions (Minkenberg, 2006). Even 
after the second failed ban attempt in 2016/2017, the NPD displayed higher levels of activity in the 
grassroots arena, when compared with the period immediately before (Ellinas, 2020). In Slovakia, after 
the banning of ‘Slovak Togetherness’ in 2006, the ERP was transformed into the today’s L’SNS. The L’SNS 
did not abandon its activism in the grassroots arena (Nociar, 2012) and sustained high levels of street 
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activism, even after its electoral breakthrough in 2016 (Ellinas, 2020:140). Along similar lines, the Czech 
‘Workers’ Party’ was banned and re-emerged with a new name, the ‘Workers’ Party of Social Justice’, 
keeping consistent its activism in the grassroots arena (Mares, 2011).  
Hence, external factors Hypothesis 2 (Radicalisation) assumes that, there is a tendency for ERPs, such as 
Golden Dawn, to radicalise (or re-radicalise) when they assume social movement characteristics. 
Following this discussion, Table 3.3 below presents the radicalisation hypothesis: 
Table 3.3 External Factors: Radicalisation Hypothesis 
External Factors: Radicalisation Hypothesis 
an ERP will radicalise its behaviour by, overall, emphasising more its movement than its party-face. 
As regards to the political praxis, this is evidenced with the ERP increasing its activity inside the 
grassroots arena along with decreasing its activity in the electoral and parliamentary arenas. It is 
also evidenced with downplaying vote-maximisation strategies. In the grassroots arena, the ERP will 
be resorting less to conventional actions and more to unconventional actions. 
As regards to issue salience, the ERP, would be talking more about its core issues, such as immigration 
and law & order issues, in the grassroots arena, when compared to the party-face arenas (electoral 
and parliamentary). Additionally radicalisation it is evidenced with the ERP talking at the same time, 




3.4 Theorising extreme-right party change: Internal Factors 
  
The conditions under which external factors motivate ERPs to change towards either de-radicalisation or 
radicalisation are inevitably interconnected with internal factors, especially in periods of external shocks. 
Internal factors define the internal environment of parties, altering the conditions under which parties 
are more or less likely to change. Scholars on party and social movements’ change posit that the effects 
of external factors (e.g. state repression) would not kick in unless party and movements actors undertake 
some action (Harmel & Janda, 1994; Giugni et al., 2005; Della Porta, 2013:157; Crenshaw, 2001:575). In 
political parties, these internal factors that are primarily responsible for changing the internal conditions 
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most often involve the party leadership and the various factions (Harmel & Janda, 1994), with the 
leadership usually having a heavier role within ERPs (Eatwell, 2003). 
 
This section theorises under what conditions leadership and factions reconfigurations may result in de-
radicalisation and/or (re)radicalisation behavioural outcomes for ERPs. The aim is to present the 
theoretical underpinnings of the internal factors Hypotheses 3 and 4 the thesis aims to test. To this, 
Hypothesis 3 (De-radicalisation) assumes that: exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to 
ERPs’  leaderships and factions may result in de-radicalisation outcomes when moderates are mainly the 
influential faction.  Hypothesis 4 (Re-Radicalisation) assumes that: exogenous shocks (such as arrests and 
imprisonment) to ERPs  leaderships and factions  may result in (re)-radicalisation outcomes when the 
hardliners/militants are mainly the influential faction.  
 
 
3.4.1 Leadership and Factions  
 
All political parties are thought to be made up of various factions. At times, some of these factions have 
more power than others, thus dominating a party. For Panebianco (1988:37-38), a dominant faction (or 
coalition) in a party is those ‘organisational actors who control the most vital zones of uncertainty’; that 
‘coalition of internal party forces with which the party’s leader must at least, to a certain degree, 
negotiate’. According to Harmel and Tan (2003:411), a dominant faction might be, firstly, a single 
dominant faction or, secondly, a coalition of many factions (or a faction of factions), where the dominant 
faction is that one faction (within this dominant coalition of various factions) which, most often, wins most 
disputes over the other factions of this dominant coalition. Harmel and Tan (2003:411-13) have developed 
three main theoretical expectations under which conditions leadership and dominant factions can 
effectuate party change. Firstly, a new dominant faction is more likely to bring about change when its 
primary goals, desires and interests are further away from those of its main rival faction. Secondly, a new 
dominant faction is more likely to bring more party change when it completely replaces the previous 
dominant faction than it would if the replacement was partial. Lastly, the relationship a new dominant 
faction has with leadership is important in determining the magnitude and nature of party change. When 
a new faction becomes truly dominant, but the leadership does not agree very much with its goals, desires 
and interests, the leadership is more likely to hamper the ability of the new dominant faction to initiate 
party change. In addition, even in cases of a long-term tenure and already in-place party leadership, when 
a new faction begins being dominant (and the leadership tends to agree with the goals of this new 
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dominant faction), the leadership would still be more likely to maintain the current status quo in their 
party than it would have been if a new leadership arose in full accordance with the goals of the (new) 
dominant faction (Harmel & Tan, 2003:411-415). 
  
In most political parties, including ERPs, two of the most frequently found factions (or coalitions of 
factions) are the fundis (or hardliners, or ideologues, or militants) and the realos (or moderates) (Carter, 
2018). In ERPs, moderates are politically skilful people who participate mainly in conventional politics. 
Moderates adopt a more pragmatic approach to politics, which allows some room for compromise in 
exchange for political gains. Their involvement in politics might be short-term and opportunistic (Ellinas, 
2020:96-97). Hardliners, or better termed as militant activists in the case of ERPs (as they would prefer 
militant activism, instead of conventional politics) are crucial for the ranks of ERPs. These are usually 
people renowned for their history of engaging in riskier contentious, and even violent, actions. These 
constitute the so-called ‘political soldiers’ for ERPs.   
An external shock, which imposes a full-blown exclusion against an electorally successful ERP, is very likely 
to bring about some developments in the power configurations of these two main factions inside the ERP, 
as long as these party actors see the external shock as a threat to the realisation of their primary goal 
(Harmel & Janda, 1994). Especially for ERPs, in periods of adversarial external conditions, ERPs are very 
likely to experience internal schisms and instability. This theoretical proposition has largely to do with 
their organisational set-up. As Ellinas observes (2020:96):  
‘’This rare combination of organisational structure and contentious actions forces ERPs to reach out to 
heterogeneous political personnel, including both moderates and militants. The extent to which the ERP 
manages to conciliate these personnel is crucial for its further development, and largely determines the 
de-radicalisation or radicalisation direction”. 
One important factor is considered to be the perception of the movements’ actors themselves, and the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the repressive measures against them, irrespective of objective facts. In 
other words, this refers to the ‘symbolic reality’ of movements with regards to their perceptions about 
political opportunities (Goodwin & Jasper, 1999:29). This assumption is also shared by scholars on party 
change, who theorise that the effects of external conditions would not kick in unless party actors perceive 
them as impacting on the realisation of their primary goals (Deschouwer, 1992). It, further, anticipates 
that extreme-right movements resort to more radical actions (e.g. confrontational and violent) when they 
perceive the repressive context as closed (higher repression) and their repression as illegitimate (Caiani & 
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Borri, 2013:564; Art, 2011; Klandermans & Mayer, 2006). However, this largely depends on the primary 
goals the leadership and factions within ERPs share, as well as how they would perceive the external 
conditions.According to the thesis’ internal factors Hypothesis 3, exogenous shocks (such as arrests and 
imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such as Golden Dawn) leaderships and factions may result in de-radicalisation 
outcomes when moderates are mainly the influential faction. According to the thesis internal factors 
Hypothesis 4, exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’  (such as Golden Dawn) 
leaderships and factions  may result in (re)-radicalisation outcomes when the hardliners/militants are 
mainly the influential faction. The following two sub-sections discuss the theoretical underpinnings of the 
internal factors de-radicalisation and radicalisation hypotheses.  
 
3.4.2 De-radicalisation Hypothesis 
 
This section discusses the theoretical expectations behind internal factors Hypothesis 3 (de-
radicalisation), according to which, exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such 
as Golden Dawn)  leaderships and factions may result in de-radicalisation outcomes when moderates are 
mainly the influential faction. 
Assuming that party actors perceive the external shock as a threat to the realisation of their primary goals, 
this can either accentuate the rivalry between these two main factions or unite them towards a mutual 
goal. When the former happens, on the one hand, this, firstly, means that, most likely, hardliners and 
moderates would assess the exclusion differently. Under these conditions, moderates would be more 
willing to overcome exclusion than hardliners. More specifically, under these conditions, moderates 
within ERPs are more likely to favour actions and issues in the electoral arena, adopt vote-maximisation 
as the primary goal and outwardly reject any form of violence (Art, 2011:32). In addition, they are more 
likely to be willing to seek alliances in the electoral arena with other party actors (such as with PRRPs or 
with the mainstream right), in order to overcome isolation. Moderates might opt for some compromises 
and, because of their political skills, they can attract voters from nearby PRRP competitors. Also, they tend 
to be open to the idea of sharing office and, thus, they might also embrace office-seeking aspirations. 
Under these conditions, the prevalence of moderates within ERPs can help them overcome isolation by 
appealing to a wider electorate, thus changing towards a course of de-radicalisation.  
Although, for reasons discussed in the next sub-section, militants are more likely to prevail, at the end of 
the day, inside ERPs, there might be situations where moderates might have, at least in the short-term, 
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the upper hand within ERPs. For example, from 2011 up until 2014, the moderates within the NPD gained 
the upper hand and pushed for a de-radicalisation course. Moderates (The Saxon wing) were increasingly 
gaining influence and eventually, in 2013, their leader Hogel Apfel, became the new NPD leader. Finding 
support from other moderates, the NPD under Apfel now aimed at appealing to a wider electorate and 
enhancing de-radicalisation, but the new leadership and the supporters of de-radicalisation were unable 
to settle the internal conflicts that soon erupted between moderates and militants, and the NPD saw its 
militants abandoning it. After the resignation of Apfel, in 2013, the new leader, Frank Franz, continued 
the push of de-radicalisation, but the NPD continued seeing its militants jumping ship into other ERPs, 
such as Die Rechte and Der Dritte Weg (Ellinas, 2020:211-212). Under these conditions, the NPD did not 
manage to find a balance between its movement and party faces and substantially decreased its presence 
in the streets, and subsequently its activity, entering a prolonged electoral irrelevancy at the regional 
level, as well (Ellinas, 2020:212).   
Following this discussion, Table 3.4 (below) presents the de-radicalisation hypothesis:  
Table 3.4 Internal Factors: De-Radicalisation Hypothesis 
Internal Factors: De-Radicalisation Hypothesis 
Under conditions where the moderates prevail, the ERP is more likely to adopt vote-maximisation 
strategies, over-emphasise the actions and issues of its party-face, manifested in the electoral and 
parliamentary arenas, and, at the same time, de-emphasise its movement-face actions and issues. 
As regards to the political praxis, this is evidenced with an increasing activity in the electoral and 
parliamentary arenas along with a decreasing activity in the grassroots arena. It is also evidenced, 
with an overall decreasing activity in the grassroots arena, specifically of unconventional actions. 
As regards to issue salience, this is evidenced with an overall increasing trend of secondary policy 
issues, specifically in the electoral and parliamentary arenas, along with a decreasing trend of salient 
core issue, specifically in the grassroots arena. It is also evidenced with an increasing trend of salient 
core policy issues in the party-face arenas along with a decreasing trend of core policy issues in the 
grassroots arena. De-radicalisation is also evidenced by embracing more secondary issues at the 





3.4.3 Radicalisation Hypothesis 
 
This section discusses the theoretical expectations behind internal factors Hypothesis 4 (Re-
radicalisation), according to which, exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such 
as Golden Dawn) leaderships and factions  may result in (re)-radicalisation outcomes when the 
hardliners/militants are mainly the influential faction. 
Radicalisation is likely to happen under two main conditions: i) both moderates unite towards a mutual 
goal, ii) militants over-dominate the moderates. With regards to the former, in the case of ERPs, exclusion 
gives incentives to both hardliners and moderates to agree on a primary goal, so as to overcome the 
exclusion, while, at the same time, adopting a victimisation discourse as true anti-establishment parties 
(Mudde, 2007; Lucardie, et al., 2016:216). As a result, conditions of exclusion are more likely to lead to 
stronger feelings of solidarity within the ERP and stronger feelings of antagonism towards outsiders, 
which, in turn, could lead to radicalisation (Husbands, 2002; Koopmans, 1996; Minkenberg, 2006; Van 
Spanje & Der Brug, 2007; Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2014:1141). 
On the other hand, when the militants prevail, within ERPs, these actors are less likely to favour the same 
goals and aspirations with moderates. Militants are less willing to sever their links with the non-party far-
right sector and make openings in the electoral arena. Militants usually favour policy-purity as a primary 
goal, which entails the use of unconventional actions, and are more likely to favour actions and issues in 
the grassroots arena (Art, 2011:32). They would welcome political and legal isolation and see it as an 
opportunity to enhance the radicalness of their party further. Militants are likely to favour vote-
maximisation, as well, in order to maintain the electoral survival of their movement-party. However, they 
are more likely to downplay this goal, as long as it requires big openings in the electoral arena, which, in 
turn, might threaten ideological/policy-purity and force them to abandon actions and ideas in the 
grassroots arena. Thus, radicalisation is more likely to occur under conditions where exclusion affects the 
internal organisational dynamics of ERPs, by further enhancing the influence of the militants (Art, 2011). 
Regarding leadership, in the case of ERPs, it is of crucial importance which main faction the leadership 
sides with following exclusion. Thus, what the leader wants and does can largely affect how party actors 
interpret the external shock and, secondly, which main faction will be dominant (how much leverage they 
would have on initiating party change and in which direction) (e.g. de-radicalisation or radicalisation). 
When, for example, the leadership opts to adopt moderation in order to overcome isolation, this choice 
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is very likely to erupt in internal conflicts within the ERP, between militants and moderates (Goodwin, 
2010b; Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2014:1143). 
Moderates and militants cannot easily co-exist within ERPs and, at the end of the day, only one faction 
would end dominant. This is largely attributed to two organisational features of ERPs, their organisational 
fluidity, and the Führerprinzip principle, which render them unable to distribute selective incentives and 
resolve internal conflicts. To this, there seem to exist strong theoretical and empirical reasons to 
anticipate that the militant activists are more likely to prevail in periods of internal stifles within ERPs 
(Ellinas, 2020:97).  Theoretically speaking, in ERPs, there exist two important conditions that favour the 
dominance of militants. Firstly, the leader is more likely to favour contentious actions and, thus, to 
embrace militants who can take riskier actions. Because loyalty to the leader is an important characteristic 
of ERPs, the involvement of militants in contentious and riskier actions grants them higher levels of loyalty. 
To this, they are more likely to receive more resources and selective incentives directly from the leader. 
Secondly, militants share an experience in engaging in contentious actions since the early stages of ERPs, 
when they were still tentatively experimenting with electoral politics and most of their energy was going 
to the streets. This grants them loyalty to the leadership, which in turn, is reluctant to sanction them 
because of their violent actions. Militants are very influential and they are the most likely to build strong 
informal networks within the ERP (Ellinas, 2020:97).  Thus, these networks the militants tend to form 
within the ERP, are likely to complicate efforts for institution-building and process-routinisation, both 
necessary for the further development of the party-face of ERPs (Ellinas, 2020:98).  
Empirically speaking, there are also reasons to expect that the militants are more likely to dominate over 
moderates in internal battles. For example, the legal process of banning the Dutch ‘Centre Party ‘86’, 
which opened up internal feuds with regards to the direction the ERP had to choose, resulted in the 
prevalence of the hardliners (Mudde, 2000:145-148), while, after the first failed ban against the NPD, the 
militants prevailed and enhanced radicalisation (Minkenberg, 2006). Similarly, after almost a decade of 
experimenting with de-radicalising its public rhetoric and programmatic agenda, so as to appeal to a wider 
electorate, the BNP failed to achieve this goal. Internal feuds followed in the late 2000s and the moderates 
were chased away (Goodwin, 2011, in Akkerman & Rooduijn, 2015).  
Following the discussion above, all of these factors help to explain why militants end up in the top 
positions of ERPs, as well as why the leadership tolerates militants, even those who engage in extreme 
contentious actions, such as physical and/or material violence, and whose actions might endanger the 
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legitimacy of the ERP and trigger state repressive means against them (Ellinas, 2020:97). Overall, militants 
have a weightier role in ERPs than in other parties and this affects how they subsequently develop.  
Following this discussion, Table 3.5 (below) presents the radicalisation hypothesis: 
Table 3.5 Internal Factors: Radicalisation Hypothesis 
Internal Factors: Radicalisation Hypothesis 
Under conditions where the militants/hardliners prevail, the ERP is more likely to over-emphasise 
actions and issues of its movement-face, manifested in the grassroots arena, and, at the same time, de-
emphasise its party-face actions and issues. As regards to the political praxis, this is evidenced with an 
overall increasing activity in the grassroots arena along with a decreasing activity in the electoral and 
parliamentary arenas. It is also evidenced in the grassroots arena, with an increasing trend of 
unconventional actions in the grassroots arena along with a decreasing trend of conventional actions.  
As regards to issue salience, this is evidenced with an overall increasing trend of salient core issues, 
specifically in the grassroots arena, along with a decreasing trend of salient core issue, specifically in 
the electoral and parliamentary arenas. It is also evidenced with an increasing trend of salient secondary 
issues in the party-face arenas along with a decreasing trend of salient secondary issues in the 
grassroots arena. 
 
Conclusively, as this section has shown, according to internal factors Hypothesis 3 (De-radicalisation): 
exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such as Golden Dawn)  leaderships and 
factions may result in de-radicalisation outcomes when moderates are mainly the influential faction. 
While internal factors Hypothesis 4 (Re-Radicalisation) assumes: exogenous shocks (such as arrests and 
imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such as Golden Dawn)  leaderships and factions may result in (re)-radicalisation 









This theory chapter has delved into the literature on party change, party behaviour, FRPs and social 
movement literature (including ultra-nationalist movements). Its main aim was to theorise under what 
conditions (when, how and where) ERPs’ political behaviour changes and how this change is manifested 
towards de-radicalisation and radicalisation. The chapter argued that changes in ERPs’ political behaviour 
can best be studied by approaching ERPs as ‘movement-parties’. The chapter argued that this change can 
be best captured by looking at two main behavioural dimensions of ERPs: i) political praxis, and ii) policy 
issue salience. The chapter, then, theorised how these two dimensions are manifested across the three 
political arenas that make up their movement and party faces.  
The chapter aimed to theorise on under what external and internal conditions ERPs are more or less likely 
to change their political behaviour towards de-radicalisation and radicalisation. It showed that political 
and institutional factors largely define the external environment of ERPs, while leadership and factions 
largely define their internal conditions. To this end, external and internal factors tend to largely 
characterise the environments where ERPs are more or less likely to change their behaviour. The chapter 
concluded by developing alternative hypotheses with regards to both de-radicalisation and radicalisation 
of ERPs, regarding both external and internal factors, and how they are likely to be manifested across the 



















The main aim of this chapter is to present the political impact-claims analysis and argue that it is a better 
measurement tool for systematically tracking the behaviour of ERPs. The added-value of this method is 
its ability to track the behaviour of ERPs, with regards to both of their faces and across the three political 
arenas. 
This chapter is split into three main sections. Before introducing the ‘political impact-claims’, Section 1 
critically reviews existing methods for measuring changes in the behaviour of political parties and social 
movements. It argues that existing methods lack the ability to systematically trace the behaviour of ERPs, 
with regards to their actions and issues across the three political arenas in which they are mainly active. 
Section 2 begins by discussing what impact of FRPs is, how it plays out and where it is observed, according 
to the literature. This is done in order to establish that the elaboration of ‘political impact-claims’ method 
is concept-driven, as well. Next, Section 2 introduces the ‘political impact-claims’ as a better measurement 
tool for systematically tracking the behaviour of ERPs, discussing its advantages over other methods of 
measuring party and behaviour.  
Section 3 presents the data this thesis analysed for identifying impact-claims. The data come from four 
sections of GD’s old official website. They were preferred over other data, such as newspapers, because 
they could provide a more systematic analysis of GD’s behaviour. For example, these data for GD operate 
as the middle-ground between its internal party literature (aimed at party members – the internal image) 
and the external party literature (aimed at the wider electorate – the external image) (Harmel et al., 2018). 
This is because, in this website, GD was re-posting information that was being published in other affiliated 
websites and its official newspapers, as well. Next, Section 3 discusses how the data have been retrieved, 
sampled and how other issues that emerged in due process were solved. The final part of this section 
presents the methods of data analysis, such as qualitative coding (e.g. Saldana, 2015), by providing some 





4.1 Existing methods for investigating party & social movement behaviour 
 
This section argues that existing methods for systematically measuring the behaviour of movement-
parties, like ERPs, are inadequate. Thus, it introduces a new method, the ‘political impact-claims’, as a 
potentially better way for carrying out this task.  
 
4.1.1 Existing methods for investigating party behaviour 
 
With regards to political parties, the most frequently studied behavioural indicator for investigating party 
behaviour is programmatic policy issue positions. They are considered as the most proximal behavioural 
indicator to party ideology, as ideology best captures the identity of any party. Thus, if significant changes 
are found over time on this indicator, then they signal party change (Harmel et al., 1995; Harmel et al., 
2018:279). This is because ideological changes rarely occur, as parties ‘cannot directly repudiate their 
founding identity and the issues they espoused in the past’ (Klingemann et al., (1994:27). Various methods 
for doing this exist, the most well-known being expert surveys (Benoit and Laver, 2006) and the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (hereafter CMP) (Vlokens et al., 2009). There exist, as well, other less 
widely-used methods, such as analyses of the pledges of political parties (Konstandinova, 2014), media 
content analyses (Kriesi et al., 2006), computerised content analyses (Rooduijn, 2014), elite interviews, 
voter surveys, etc. (Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007).   
The most widely used methods are expert surveys and the CMP. These methods allow for the systematic 
measurement of parties’ issue policy positions for cross-country and cross-time analyses. The CMP has 
been a very useful tool for examining the issue salience of political parties, but less useful for issue 
positions, and its use is widespread despite criticisms. The CMP adopts an issue salience approach, which 
assumes that political issues are salient in nature and where each party gives more emphasis to some 
issues over others, irrespective of their positions on these issues (Gemenis, 2013:3). Therefore, the CMP 
measures how much parties talk about certain issues. On the pros of the CMP is the fact that it generates 
a ‘solid basis and reliable estimates as a general standard for validating other methods that are quite good 
when compared to other accepted approaches’ (Gabel and Huber, 2000:94). 
Expert surveys, the most widely used being the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), are a useful way for 
examining changes in, mainly, issue positions and, to a lesser extent, issue salience. For at least three 
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reasons, expert surveys are a useful tool in this endeavour. Firstly, they reflect the estimations of experts 
and, thus, they acquire legitimacy and weight. Secondly, they position political parties based on what they 
say and what they are doing at the time of investigation. Lastly, expert surveys can be conducted relatively 
quickly; their content is comprehensive and the data used are highly comparable, thus facilitating 
comparisons across time and space (Mair, 2003). However, there are serious disadvantages with expert 
surveys. For example, they are more like peer surveys than expert surveys, as they largely reproduce 
received wisdom about each party (Mudde, 2009:332-3). Most importantly, these methods lack the ability 
to capture important dimensions of ERPs’ behaviour, such as their actions in the grassroots arena. 
Some suggest (Kriesi et al., 2006:930) that ‘the most appropriate way to analyse the positioning of parties 
(...) is to focus on the political debate during electoral campaigns, as reflected by the mass media.’ 
However, this way includes serious shortcomings, mainly of reliability. The media are heavily influenced 
by a broad variety of factors, including commercial and political, such as negativity bias of journalists. For 
example, with regards to FRPs, there are even more serious reasons to doubt the accuracy of the media, 
as many of them in Europe openly state their opposition, and even their willingness, to fight against these 
parties (Mudde, 2009:333). 
 
Elite interviews (e.g. Leech, 2002; Tansey, 2007) with prominent party actors, who are responsible for the 
publication of their parties’ newspapers, website material, preparation and submission of parliamentary 
actions (deciding on the content and frequency of grassroots activities), is also a very useful method. Thus, 
in order to track changes with regards to all of these dimensions, a researcher must conduct interviews at 
(at least) two different time points with, more or less, the same actors. However, for a Ph.D. project, 
relying on such a method is very likely to involve serious limitations. For a start, this might be a costly task. 
Secondly, it is highly unlikely that all of the same actors would be available in time A, time B and time C. 
Also, such a method is not systematic in tracking changes in the behaviour of an ERP (for example, month-
by-month, or at least annually), as it would only provide snap-shots of extreme-right party behaviours.  
 
Quantitative approaches, such as the Chapel Expert Survey (CHES) and the CMP, exclude from their 
analysis ERPs, largely because of their electoral irrelevancy. Another shortcoming is that expert surveys 
and the CMP rely on a pre-defined coding scheme of policy issues, before the start of the analysis. This 
has serious disadvantages when it comes to analysing the issue salience, or positions, of FRPs, in 
particular. For example, the CMP was firstly developed in the 1970s and, thus, some of its issue categories 
have become outdated. For example, the codebook does not include ‘Immigration’, a core issue of FRPs 
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(Akkerman et al., 2016). Moreover, this does not give freedom to the researcher to include issues that 
might be context specific.  
Moreover, these existing methods have serious limitations when it comes to the data being analysed. For 
example, the CMP, and analyses of parties’ policy pledges (Kostadinova, 2014), look only at electoral 
manifestoes. However, electoral manifestoes can provide only ‘snap-shots’ of party behaviour 
(Halikiopoulou et al., 2016:12). By relying only on manifestoes, the literature leaves aside a vast amount 
of rich primary data and, indeed, scholars using the CMP have noted that ‘elections are about more than 
what is written in a document produced by party leadership or the party congress’ (Adams, Ezrow and 
Somer-Topcu, 2011). For expert surveys, what data is being used remains largely unspecified (Mudde, 
2009). Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, these existing methods are suited for tracking behaviour of 
political parties only inside the electoral and legislative arena. Suffice to say that, once again, these 
methods cannot capture changes in the behaviour of ERP, where much of their energy goes into an 
additional arena; that is, the grassroots.  
Lastly, most of these existing methods are better suited to track changes on the issue policy positions of 
parties. As said in Chapter 2, changes in issue positions is not the most appropriate indicator to look at 
when tracing party change, in general (Harmel et al., 1995; Harmel et al., 2018), and of ERPs, in particular, 
as the latter rarely alter their positions, most prominently on their core issues, even when external stimuli 
undergo a dramatic change. This is because ERPs are characterised by very strong ideological dogmatism 
that significantly limits their manoeuvrability (Backes, 2006:140). Concluding, existing methods that track 
party behaviour are only half of the story when it comes to tracking ERPs’ behaviour. ERPs do not operate 
as political parties only, but also as social movements; that is, they also have a movement-face.  
 
4.1.2 Existing methods for investigating social movements’ behaviour 
 
Methods investigating the behaviour of social movements help to examine the movement-face of ERPs. 
The most prominent methods for systematically investigating changes in the behaviour of social 
movements are: protest event analysis, frames analysis and political claims analysis. Perhaps, the most 
widely employed is protest event analysis. This method quantifies mainly unconventional actions or 
actions that occur outside the institutional arena, based on data retrieved from newspapers (Koopmans 
and Statham, 1999; Koopmans and Rucht, 2002). This method is useful in capturing the interaction of 
protest with institutional political opportunities. However, it largely leaves out, from the analysis, more 
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conventional and other party-related actions, such as parliamentary. This is an important gap because 
electorally successful ERPs are political parties as well, having to deal with legislative actions daily. Another 
method is political discourse analysis, or the framing method (Benford and Snow, 2000). Framing is 
understood as a dynamic process where the content of frames changes constantly (Benford and Snow, 
1992:137; Snow, 2000:628; Rydgren, 2005). This method provides both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence, though it is more interpretivistic. The analysis of political actors’ frames helps one to examine 
how social movement and political actors construct frames that fit their own ideas and interests, in order 
to challenge dominant meanings of political reality and cultural norms (Benford and Snow, 2000).  
However, both of the above-mentioned methods have limitations in capturing changes in ERP’s 
behaviour. Protest event analysis is largely restricted to quantifying protest as a hard event. Thus, it looks 
mainly at unconventional actions and excludes ‘discursive protest’. The latter refers to the interpretivist 
side of grassroots actions, where actors put meaning to their actions by, for example, justifying what they 
do and why they do it (Koopmans and Statham, 1999:5). Although the latter is taken into account by the 
framing method, this method is not well-suited for tracking protest activities.  
 
As a middle-ground between protest event analysis and the framing method, Koopmans and Statham 
(1999) have come up with political claims analysis. The unit of analysis here is not the event of the protest 
or the frame, but the instance of the claim, irrespective of its size. An instance of claims-making is a unit 
of strategic action (or intervention) in the public sphere, defined as: The purposive and public articulation 
of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, 
affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors (Koopmans, 2007:189). In 
this regard, this method has many advantages. Firstly, by taking into account a variety of action forms, it 
systematically captures the evolution of both conventional and unconventional actions. Secondly, it 
integrates protest event analysis with framing processes, thus proving both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence (Koopmans and Statham, 1999). This integration allows political claims analysis to gauge the 
interaction of actors with the political and discursive opportunities over time. Thus, this method helps to 
examine how political actors interact within their context and how this interaction evolves within a 
context and over time. However, this method is not well-suited for tracking behavioural changes of 
individual political actors, as its main aim is to capture the interaction of claims in the public sphere (e.g. 
the media). Thus, this method mainly analyses data coming from the news media. For reasons of negative 




Concluding this review, a potentially better method is needed for tracking the behaviour of ERPs. Firstly, 
such a method must rely on analysis of primary data. Secondly, it must systematically track extreme-right 
behaviour over time (e.g. on a monthly basis). To this, scholars on party change (e.g. Harmel and Janda, 
1994) argue that, if we wait too much in the period following an external shock, then we are very likely to 
miss changes in party behaviour that might not be related to the external shock itself. Thirdly, it must 
combine measurement of extreme-right behaviour with regards to both its party and movement faces at 
the same time. Fourthly, ideally, such a method would be applicable to other ERPs, in particular, and to 
other political parties, in general, across time and space.  
 
4.2 Far-right impact and the ‘political impact-claims’ empirical analysis 
 
This section discusses first what the impact of FRPs is, how it plays out and where it is observed, before 
presenting the method of political impact-claims. This is done in order to highlight that the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of the impact-claims method has been achieved through a back 
and forth between a concept-driven (by assessing existing concepts in the literature before analysing the 
primary data) and data-driven (new terms, variables and measurement processes emerged during data 
analysis) measurement approach, as case-study research is characterised by this iterative process (Beach 
and Pedersen, 2016:125). The second part of this section presents the method of ‘political impact-claims’. 
It argues that it is a better way for tacking changes in the behaviour of ERPs, as they capture their actions 
and issues across their two faces and the three political arenas. 
 
 
4.2.1 What is the impact of FRPs? 
 
Party impact can be briefly defined as the ability of a party to force oppositional actors to adopt (at the 
rhetorical level) and implement (at the policy-making level) its ideas and interests. On a broad level, 
political impact of FRPs can be understood as the ability to promote a policy outcome that would not have 
been observed if it was not for the agency of this party (Williams, 2006). Thus, Carvalho (2016:666) defines 
the impact of FRP’s on immigration policies as their ‘ability to disseminate their xenophobic agenda into 
the official state policy’, and that impact can be assessed by looking at ‘the potential transposition of FRPs 
proposals into the policy cycle by examining the selected FRPs’ own proposals’ and whether these were 
translated into national immigration policies.  Thus, in order to observe FRPs’ political impact, one has to 
104 
 
look at the actions of the agent (i.e. the FRP) and whether these have been translated into political 
outcomes.  
Michelle Williams (2015; 2018) divides studies on far-right party impact into three main approaches: i) 
institutional, ii) systemic responsiveness and iii) agent-oriented or goal attainment. Institutional 
approaches look mainly at the party size (e.g. electoral rates) and how institutional constraints, such as 
electoral thresholds, openness in the party space and means of exclusion, hamper or empower certain 
parties to strengthen their electoral appeal. In this regard, larger parties with more favourable 
opportunities (e.g. holding in office) have greater opportunities for making impact. According to these 
approaches, FRPs are assumed to cause impact when they are electorally successful and/or when they 
participate in government (Williams, 2018:308).  
 
Systemic responsiveness approaches refer to the responsiveness of parties to public demands. These 
approaches have mainly to do with the supply side of FRPs, notably their ideology, through which FRPs 
manage to construct appealing master frames and convey a message to the public, distinct to that of 
established parties, but in accordance with the availability of political and discursive opportunities within 
their context, which, in turn, grants them electoral success (e.g. Rydgren, 2005; Norris, 2005; 
Halikiopoulou et al., 2013). Thus, according to this approach, impact is observed indirectly in the parties’ 
ability to appeal to public demands, achieve success and, in turn, force established actors to co-opt their 
message in order to win back lost votes. Thus, impact results when FRPs’ demands are translated, by 
established actors, into policy outcomes through legislative means (Williams, 2018:307).  
 
Agent-oriented (or goal attainment) approaches see parties as having their own primary goals, making 
calculated decisions in order to realise these goals. According to this approach, impact can be observed 
by examining whether parties have, over time, achieved their goals (Williams, 2018:307). In this approach, 
FRPs can achieve their goals by governing either alone or in a coalition. But, since this is a rare occurrence, 
FRPs seek to achieve their goals by influencing other parties within the party system. Thus, studies 
examining the impact of FRP, through this approach, understand impact as ‘interaction effects’ of FRPs, 
generated through the inter-party competition dynamics with other parties over specific policy issues, 
and whether this interaction produces impact (Williams, 2018:309; Minkenberg, 2017:30). In fact, this 
area of FRPs’ impact has received most of the attention as part of the party competition literature. 
Accordingly, impact is largely understood, though not limited, as spatial shifts within the party system and 
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it is observed when mainstream parties turn more ‘rightwards’ on mainly core far-right issues (e.g. 
immigration, law & order), in order to compete better for votes with FRPs. Thus, the electoral success, or 
the possibility of further electoral success of a FRP over mainstream parties, is said to be the main cause 
impacting on other actors to adopt an accommodative strategy vis-à-vis FRPs, by co-opting the positions, 
issue salience, public discourses, tactics, strategies, policies, narratives and frames etc. of FRPs and, thus, 
turn themselves more to the right (Harmel and Svasaand, 1997; Downs, 2001; Schain, 2006; Hainsworth, 
2008; Van Spanje, 2010; Carvalho, 2013; Bale et al., 2010; Abou-Chadi, 2014; Pytlas, 2016). Such strategies 
have led FRPs’ leaders to claim impact (Mudde, 2007:278), such as JM Le Pen’s perpetual claim ‘why settle 
for the copy when you could have the original?’ (Hainsworth, 2008:113; Art, 2015). For example, when 
the French Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua, stated that his goal was to push towards ‘zero immigration’ 
to appeal to the FN voters in the 1993 legislative elections, it was conceived as a classic case of ‘clothes 
stealing’ or informal co-opting of the ERP discourse (Carvalho, 2016:665; Hainsworth, 2008). Established 
actors, of course, can opt not to follow this co-optation strategy by, for example, ignoring or excluding 
FRPs from the political game and, thus, not giving them the opportunity to impact. Overall, the strategies 
of the established parties, vis-à-vis FRPs, can be perceived as one of the most visible dimensions of radical 
right impact (Pytlas and Kossack, 2015:118). All of these approaches treat the party as the individual unit 
of analysis and impact is understood as the final outcome of a party’s ability to use its power in order to 
produce outcomes; that is, impact (Williams, 2018). 
The impact of FRPs is often divided into indirect and direct impact (Williams, 2018:310-11; Carvalho, 
2013:180-181; Minkenberg, 2017:30; Schain, 2006). This distinction has mainly to do with the extent to 
which the effects of FRPs are either indirectly or directly attributable back to FRPs themselves or not. 
Direct impact refers to those FRP effects which can be directly attributed to FRPs, such as policies or 
administrative acts executed by FRPs in government. FRPs have indirect impact when they exert influence 
over other actors, for example, by exercising pressure and lobbying activities on policy makers, or when 
they tap into governing parties’ electorate. Direct effects are more observable when FRPs are in 
government. However, even here, pivotal bargaining processes are at work, since no FRP has yet governed 
alone, though they have governed in coalitions (Minkenberg, 2017:30). However, as the analysis of 
political impact claims will highlight, ERPs are in a position to exert direct impact, as well. By being 
movement-parties, ERPs can intervene in the grassroots arena and, through unconventional actions, take 
the law into their own hands and deliver impact.  
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Following the discussion above of what impact of FRPs is, how it plays out and where it is mainly observed, 
as an alternative, and potentially better way for measuring changes in the behaviour of ERPs, this thesis 
introduces the method of ‘political impact-claims’. Based on the discussion above, these are instances 
where a party claims to have achieved the realisation of a political outcome because of its own activities.  
 
4.2.2 What is a ‘political impact-claim’ and how do I recognise it when I see it? 
 
The analysis of ‘political impact-claims’ seeks to integrate many aspects of the aforementioned methods 
of measuring party and social movement behaviour, in an attempt to provide a better way for 
systematically tracking changes in the behaviour of both the party and movement faces of ERPs.  
In short, political impact-claims are instances where a political actor claims that it has achieved impact. 
An example would be when an FRP claims that, after tabling a motion for restricting migrants’ rights in 
the labour force, governing actors responded to this motion and implemented this policy. Specifically, 
political impact-claims are statements by a FRP (or any other political party for that matter), in a written 
or verbal form, where it claims that, through its own actions and/or presence or through the actions of 
other actors, what has materialised is a political outcome that is in favour of its interests and/or ideas. 
Thus, impact-claims are firstly causal claims. If there is not a reference to an activity by a certain political 
actor, and its subsequent effects, then the claim is not an impact-claim. There must be a claimed cause 
and a claimed outcome in the claims. They are labelled as ‘impact’ claims and not just a general causal 
claim because: i) the claimed outcome of the claim is always something which is in favour of a FRP’s 
interests and ideas, and ii) the cause of this claimed outcome is always related either to the presence or 
to the actions of the FRP. They are termed ‘political’ because their content is always political. In short, 
impact-claims always talk about having realised impact. The elaboration and operationalisation of the 
impact-claims definition is a result of a literature-(concept) driven data-driven approach (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2016:125). In other words, the literature on what impact is and how it plays out was taken into 
account before analysing the primary material. However, from the data, new processes emerged on how 
the impact of FRPs, and of ERPs specifically, plays out.  
When ERPs claim impact in the grassroots arena, or in the parliamentary arena, they must refer to a 
grassroots-related or to a party-related action and on a certain issue. Thus, there can be extracted 
information about their behaviour in the grassroots and parliamentary arena. A comparison of the impact-
claims over time helps to trace changes in these claimed actions over time and across political arenas, 
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with regards to their two faces. Therefore, the study of impact-claims can uncover various patterns in 
ERPs’ behaviour. To illustrate this point further, Table 4.1 provides three examples of impact-claims that 
capture both the party and movement faces of GD. 
Table 4.1 Examples of party face and movement-face political impact-Claims  
Examples of Political Impact-Claims 
Example 1: Party-face Example 2: Movement-face Example 3: Movement-face  
“Finally, after the intervention by 
compatriot Lliopoulos last week 
in the Parliament, through a 
parliamentary interpellation to 
the Minister of Health, the 
cardiac surgery clinic of ‘Hagia 
Sophia’ at ‘Children’s Hospital’ 
opens its doors again…” “…The 
sharp rise of GD pushed the 
authorities to reconsider 
parents’ agony, and through its 
key intervention, GD managed, 
in only a week’s time, the re-
opening of the clinic.” (Golden 
Dawn, March 2013). 
 
“Five days ago, members of 
GOLDEN DAWN, along with local 
area residents, blocked the tolls 
of Rio at Patras, protesting for 
the criminality of Roma people in 
their neighbourhoods. The main 
request of the people was the 
immediate departure of Romani 
(cause). On the other hand, the 
local authorities showed a 
complete indifference, with the 
result being increased violent 
incidences against Greeks. 
However, the presence of 
Golden Dawn was felt strongly 
and enforced…the mobilisation 
of local authorities, despite their 
reluctance (outcome).” 
 
“A GD team, led by MP 
Barbarousis, visited the street 
market of Mesologgi this 
morning (cause). In his 
statements, the MP stressed 
that the goal is to contain 
trafficking. ‘We are fighting 
against trafficking. We came 
here to see the local police 
authorities doing checks.’ In 
passing, the GD team was 
hearing positive comments 
from the majority of the people 
(and from legal street market 
vendors, too) for their presence 
and many were those who were 
asking them to keep on fighting 
even the tiniest delinquency 
(step 1). The local police were 
obstructing (step 2). Thus, GD 
did the checks. GD’s members 
wandered around the street 
market and destroyed three 
stands of illegal street market 
vendors, while three other 
foreigners, who were illegal, 
packed their stuff up and left 
(outcome).”   
 
 
As shown in the Table 4.1 (above), example 1 is an impact-claim that talks about the party-face of GD 
inside the parliamentary arena. This is evident when GD claims that, through parliamentary means, such 
as the submission of a parliamentary interpellation, as well as its rising electoral popularity, they have 
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impacted on the governing actors to deliver a political outcome on the policy issue of health, in favour of 
its interests and ideas. In addition, the researcher can extract information about the type of impact (e.g. 
direct/indirect) and the geographical level of impact (e.g. local/national). In the example above, the 
impact-claim is indirect and describes an outcome that has occurred at the local level. Example 2 is an 
impact-claim that captures the movement face of GD. Thus, it is happening in the grassroots arena. This 
is evident when GD claims that, through protesting and confrontational actions (blocking the tolls and its 
‘strong presence’), it had impacted on the local authorities to get mobilised with regards to an issue 
related to ethnic minorities. Example 3 is also an impact-claim that captures the movement face of GD 
and, more specifically, its unconventional actions. In this example, GD talks about having caused impact 
through unconventional actions (e.g. destroyed stalls). This example is direct impact (e.g. Schain, 2006; 
Williams, 2018), as GD claims that it has, by itself, taken the law in its own hands and delivered a political 
outcome on the issue of ‘Law & Order’.  
 
4.2.3 Why Political Impact-claims? Advantages of political impact-claims over other methods of 
measuring ERPs’ behaviour 
 
In contrast to existing methods for measuring issue policy positions and issue salience of political parties, 
impact-claims can systematically measure dimensions of both the movement and party faces of ERPs, 
instead of providing only ‘snap-shots’. In contrast to protest event analysis, impact-claims capture 
conventional, as well as institutional (e.g. parliamentary actions) actions of ERPs and, contrary to political 
claims, impact-claims focus on analysing primary material written by ERPs themselves. An analysis of 
impact-claims can produce qualitative evidence, as well, through means of qualitative content analysis, 
by analysing how they frame their impact. For example, the ERP would discuss the other entities and their 
role in bringing about the end outcome of the impact-claim and its relationship with them. When FRP 
make an impact-claim, they construct a frame on why and how the political outcome came about. Political 
parties do not make claims without giving a meaning to their actions and to the actions of their opponents. 
Politics is embedded in a conflicting world. Thus, parties add characterisations to their opponents and 
ascribe adjectives to their opponents and to themselves. To this, parties will rarely talk in a positive tone 
to those entities. This can also indicate with which political entities the ERP (or any party) that makes the 
impact-claim is in conflict with. Therefore, impact-claims can also capture the interaction of an ERP with 
the political and cultural opportunities within its context. 
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Political impact-claims have the capacity to capture alterations in party behaviour, in terms of policy issue 
salience, strategies and actions, in both the institutional and non-institutional arenas during ‘everyday 
politics’. In the party competition literature, the program-to-policy argument posits that parties are bound 
by pledges and policy positions, as put in their manifesto during electoral periods. If they diverge much 
from them, voters would perceive them as unreliable, thus punishing them electorally (Downs, 1957; 
Strom, 1990:573). However, during non-electoral periods, parties have good incentives to alter their 
policy positions and overall political behaviour. For example, in the short-term, changing policy positions 
might be a good strategy to attract more voters. In this regard, impact-claims are not static, as pledges or 
policy positions, both as put in the manifesto, tend to be. Parties might (in fact do) discover new issues 
during non-electoral periods. In that sense, impact-claims could also capture unexpected events; that is, 
instances where the party claims an impact outcome that was not expected to have an impact, let alone 
put in its manifesto. Factors that shape the realisation of policies might change in-between elections. In 
turn, parties are forced to change their rhetorical activities, corresponding to the issues at stake (Bischof, 
2017:2). What is more, impact-claims can capture shifts in parties’ issue priorities, as a result of external 
events or during times of critical junctures. With the latter, such as the economic crisis, the refugee crisis 
or natural disasters, parties are expected (in fact, they are being forced) to respond to these issues in one 
way or another (Bischof, 2017). In that sense, impact-claims have the capacity to uncover patterns in 
behaviour of the party that would have remained hidden in a traditional study of tracing party behaviour 
through manifesto policy positions and/or pledges. 
Political impact-claims can measure changes in party behaviour systematically (e.g. month after month). 
This is important for studies on party change. It is assumed that if we wait for long (e.g. one electoral 
period) to observe the effects an external shock might have on a party, then there is a high likelihood that 
a variety of other factors could intervene in due process, which might not be directly related to the effects 
of the external shock (Harmel et al., 1995). Thus, there might arise the risk of missing the chance to 
observe significant party change. For example, through a systematic measurement, we know where to 
look in the timeline in order to observe the effects of the external shock.  
 
4.3 Data retrieval, sampling and data analysis procedures 
 
This section begins by presenting the primary data analysed for identifying impact-claims and justifies why 
other data were not that relevant for this task. It proceeds by discussing how the data have been retrieved 
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and sampled, and how other issues in due process were solved. The section concludes by presenting the 
methods of data analysis, such as qualitative coding, and provides some examples on how impact-claims 
were coded. 
 
4.3.1 The data 
 
The data this thesis analysed for impact-claims were retrieved from GD’s (old) official website, 
www.xryshavgh.com36; a useful primary source for many other works (e.g. Vasilopoulou and 
Halikiopoulou, 2015; Lamprianou and Ellinas, 2016; Boussalis and Coan, 2015). More specifically, the data 
analysed in this thesis come from four sections of GD’s official website, which are the ‘news’, ‘events’, 
‘parliamentary control’ and ‘press office’ (see Table 4.2 below). These sections (combined) include around 
thirty thousand posted items, which are mini-texts. The length of each post item37 varies from a couple of 
sentences to more than 1,000 words. Table 4.2, illustrates some descriptive attributes of the four sections 
that are relevant for the impact-claims exercise. 
 
Table 4.2 Data retrieved for analysis from GD’s old website 
                                                            
36 Around early August 2019, a while before the finishing of this thesis, this website changed domain and is no 
longer operational. Thus, it is referred to as GD’s old website. GD’s new official website is www.xrisiavgi.com (see 
discussion further in this chapter).  
37 For an indicative example, see further below in this chapter. 
The four sections that were retrieved for the Impact-Claims analysis 
 
Section (in Greek) Number of 
Posts (exact 
number) 
Average length – in 
words- of post text 
(approximate 
estimation) 








25,277 250 words 11/05/2012 high 
Events 
(εκδηλώσεις) 





1,555 200 07/07/2012 high 
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Note: Period: First day a post item appeared in a certain section, up until 31st December 2016 
 
As Table 4.2 (above) shows, the post items in GD’s old website went as far back as the 11th of May 2012. 
There were no post items earlier than this time. Thus, 11 May 2012 is the starting point for data retrieval 
and analysis. The end date of data collection and analysis is 31 December 2016. The selected timeframe 
is justified by the fact that it captures most of GD’s period of parliamentary representation. In other words, 
GD was both electorally successful and (thus) was doing politics inside both the parliamentary and 
grassroots arenas at the same time. The aim of this project is to find out whether electorally successful 
ERPs, after the experience of an external shock, radicalise by putting more energy into the grassroots 
arena (movement face), while downplaying their attention to parliament (party face). Therefore, a 
selected timeframe where GD has no parliamentary representation would not have made much sense, as 
it is more plausible to assume that electorally unsuccessful ERPs are more likely to put more energy into 
their movement face anyway.   
‘News Section’ was the most active section of the website. Every 4-6 hours, during the researched period, 
GD was posting something. Here, GD was discussing current affairs. Also, this was the only section where 
GD was also providing, at times, numerous posts that could be found in all of the other sections of the 
website, as well as from its two newspapers and other affiliated websites, which might suggest that this 
was a section that GD put a lot of emphasis on.  
Events Section: In this section, GD, beyond the mere description of its grassroots activities (which was a 
research goal for Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2016; 2017), was commenting on the content of the grassroots 
activity; for example, what was said indoors, such as who the speaker was, the topic of the speech and a 
brief summary of what the speaker discussed (which could also be something from the ongoing political 
events inside and outside Greece and not necessarily relevant to the topic of the speech). GD was 
commenting, also, on its outdoors activities by describing what had been done. In other words, in this 
section, GD, especially when it was commenting on outdoor grassroots activities, attempted to praise the 
achievements of its activities (e.g. protest, marching and food donation) and it was here where impact-
claims were detected. Moreover, in this section, GD did, in some post items, include the names of those 
with whom it had met (e.g. head of a hospital or of a nursing home for elderly people) and the name of 
Press Office 
(ΓραφείοΤύπου) 
1,488 95 words 11/05/2012 high 
Total= 31,937  
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the institution, as well as its exact location (e.g. street-market in Nea Zihni village in the city of Serres, 
Greece) (see GD, 2012:52).  
Parliamentary Control: The posts items here talked about the activities of the party in parliament. These 
could have been, for example, a discussion about a recently submitted parliamentary question or 
speeches from various MPs at a plenary assembly or at various parliamentary committees. In numerous 
posts, GD did not provide any text at all. Instead, it posted the video38 of a parliamentary speech delivered 
by various MPs of theirs. Also, in this section, GD posted, verbatim, numerous parliamentary questions 
that were submitted over time. However, the main difference here from the section ‘Questions to 
Parliament’ (where it posted almost all of its parliamentary interpellations) is that, whereas in both of 
them, it provided, verbatim, its parliamentary questions, in the section ‘Parliamentary Control’, it 
commented a bit on them (e.g. by justifying why they submitted it) and it is here where impact-claims 
could be found. To the best of the author’s knowledge, there was no previous research using material 
from this section. 
Press Office: The posts here are quite short (around 60-90 words each). In these posts items, GD seemed 
to be using more official language than in any other section of the website. These posts were short 
statements discussing ongoing political events, all authored as ‘Golden Dawn-Press Office’. GD, here, was 
announcing its official position with regards to significant political events that either may have concerned 
the party itself (or not) or on issues that were high in the political agenda of the country at the time of the 
post. To the best of author’s knowledge, there was no previous research for this section. 
Table 4.3 below, summarises the descriptive attributes of all of the other sections of the website39, 
providing a short description of what they talk about, as well as why they were not relevant for the impact-
claims analysis.  
 
 
                                                            
38 The website included a vast amount of multimedia content as well, such as videos and podcasts. These have not 
been retrieved for analysis, as the majority were inaccessible by the date of data collection (e.g. late 2016). Also, the 
analysis of political impact-claims has analysed only written material. Thus, they are not presented here. A future 
study, though, can analyse multimedia content, and public speeches specifically.  
39 Only website sections that were being updated, either daily, weekly or monthly, will be presented here. Sections 
that were static are sections which provided the bio of the party leader, or the party’s MPs, a list of its local branches 
across the country, the electoral manifestoes of the party and sections that describe the ‘ideology’, the ‘identity’ 
and the ‘political positions’ of the party.  
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Table 4.3 Sections of GD’s old website not retrieved for analysis 
ALL THE OTHER SECTIONS OF THE WEBSITE THAT HAVE LOW RELEVANCE FOR DETECTING IMPACT-
CLAIMS 
Section Number of 
Posts/ first 
post date 
What does it talk about? Average length – 









312 / 22, 
September, 
2014 
activities in the European 
Parliament and speeches of 
their MEPs 
150 low 
Articles from the 
party leader 
510 / May, 
2012 
They are mostly ideological 
in nature. 
700 medium 
History-Culture 760 / May, 
2012 
Ideological. 800 low 
Ideological Texts 1040 / May, 
2012 
Ideological.  800 Low 
Letters – “The voice 
of the People”  
1,680 / 
May, 2012 





7,100 / July, 
2012 
Interpellations submitted 
to the Parliament.  
 Low  
Self-government 220 / 
September, 
2014 




GD also has two official newspapers, the ‘Golden Dawn’ and ‘Forward’ (‘EMPROS’). Regarding the former, 
it was being published on a monthly basis, but, after 2012, it was (and is) published on a weekly basis, 
comprised of 23 A4 pages. Up until December 2016, 1,009 issues had been published. The newspaper 
‘Forward’ is also published on a weekly basis and it was first published in June 2013. As of the end of 2016, 
217 issues had been published. These two newspapers might have been very relevant for impact-claims 
analysis. However, for three main reasons, they have been left out. Firstly, it would have been a very time-
consuming task to analyse the thousands of post items, as well as thousands of newspapers pages, which 
would have exceeded the possibilities of a Ph.D. project. Secondly, by analysing only the newspapers, a 
more systematic, in terms of time, and dynamic way of analysing GD’s behaviour would have been missed. 
Newspapers were being published every week, whereas website post items were being posted every 3 to 
4 hours. Thirdly, the website, and more specifically the four sections being analysed, were operating as 
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the average medium for GD. This means that the website was re-posting texts published in other affiliated 
platforms sites of GD, such as the website www.ethinkismos.net and 
https://koinonikosethnikismos.wordpress.com/, as well as articles from both of GD’s newspapers.  
For the above reasons, these four sections constitute the best source for identifying impact-claims. These 
sections provide a middle ground between the internal and external party literature of GD, as they aim at 
a different group of recipients, such as party members (the internal arena), as well as against the whole 
electorate (Mudde, 2000:21). In addition, for GD, its website was (and is) the most easy and non-costly 
medium to disseminate its interests and ideas, given, also, its lack of public funding and the ban it had 
been facing (at times) from the entire media (Ellinas, 2015:15). Given, also, the huge amount of 
information it was publishing on its website, it suggested that, in this medium, GD was expending a lot of 
its energy.  
 
4.3.2 Data Retrieval & Sampling Procedures 
 
Because of the large amount of data included in the ‘News’ section, there had to be a most efficient way 
for dealing with these data, so as to be time efficient. As long as the main research goal was to find and 
analyse specific information only (e.g. instances where the party claims to have had impact on certain 
policies), this provided a good beginning for choosing an appropriate sampling method. Hence, techniques 
of multi-stage and purposeful qualitative sampling (Palinkas et al., 2015) have been employed in the 
‘News’ section, such as a priori (a deductive path) and ongoing-or emerging/opportunistic (an inductive 
path) sampling. No sampling techniques were employed in the other sections, as the amount of 
information was significantly lower.   
As a first step, all post items in all four sections of the website, from May 2012 up until November 2012, 
were analysed (or read). At this point, the four sections had been identified, discussed previously, as the 
most relevant ones that included impact-claims, thus were taken for analysis. A variety of impact-claims 
had been identified. It was also found that a specific pattern appeared in all of the impact-claims. This was 
that all impact-claims, coming from all four sections, shared some common specific words. These were 
words that directly referred to the party itself, such as: ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘our’, ‘Nationalists’, ‘Golden Dawn’, 
‘Golden-Dawners’, ‘Compatriots’, ‘members’ (of Golden Dawn), ‘cell’, ‘local branch’, ‘Popular Association’, 
‘Nationalist Movement’, etc. (see a full list in the Appendix 1). Therefore, a dictionary list was made up, 
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including all of these words. These words, after all, captured the essence of the political impact-claim 
definition presented above, as, for it to be an impact-claim, GD had to refer to itself as causing something 
or claiming that something had been done because of it. Thus, it seems inevitable and non-surprising that 
it had to directly refer to itself by using these words when it made an impact-claim.  
At the second step of the sampling process, all posts items from all these four sections, in the period May 
2012 – December 2016, as they exactly appeared (including images, hyperlinks, paragraphs structure, 
fonts formatting, etc.) in the website, were pasted into a MS Word document (one document for each 
month) and then transferred onto NVivo (qualitative data analysis software). The NVivo was, then, 
instructed to highlight the whole paragraph, where at least one of the dictionary words appeared. Next, 
all of the highlighted paragraphs were ready for analysis. Non-highlighted paragraphs were left out from 
the analysis. However, it must be noted that, on average, one in every two post items included highlighted 
text. Thus, this sampling process did not leave out large time gaps. In other words, nearly half of the post 
items from each day included highlighted text. Lastly, it is important to note that those segments of the 
text (highlighted paragraphs where the dictionary words appear) were not retrieved and read 
independent of the entire post item. All of the highlighted text was read, along with the title of the post 
and the non-highlighted text. This sampling process was time-efficient and largely satisfied the criteria of 


















On the upper left side of Figure 4.1, some of the sections of the website are shown, which are, in order of 
appearance: ‘news’, ‘events’, ‘parliamentary control’, ‘Ideological Texts’, ‘History – Civilization’ and 
‘Letters’ (previously titled as ‘The voice of the people’). This post item came from the ‘News’ section. 
Figure 4.2, Illustrates how Figure 4.1 looked in NVivo:  





In NVivo, the post item from GD’s website was exactly the same as shown in Figure 4.2 (above). The 
highlighted text is the text that NVivo was instructed to highlight. NVivo highlighted the specific 
paragraphs because there appeared some of the dictionary words (in red). These are “GOLDEN DAWN’, 
‘a team of compatriots’, ‘L.B.’ (=local branch), ‘Golden-Dawners’, ‘Compatriots’, ‘Nationalists’, 
‘GOLDENDAWN’ and ‘local branch’. The underlined text is the instance of an impact-claim, which reads: 
“Just ‘suddenly’, and during the presence of Golden-Dawners (cause), illegal immigrants-street vendors 
were absent. In terms of public order, once the presence of Golden-Dawners was noticed in the streets of 
Giannitsa, the police force was discreetly accompanying the nationalists’ marching” (outcomes). This 
statement meets the criteria of an impact-claim. It is, first of all, a causal claim. Also, it is concerned with 
a specific issue (illegal immigrant vendors), describing a specific outcome (absence of illegal vendors and 
presence of police). By reading the first highlighted paragraphs, as well as the post title, it was learnt that 
this was a pre-scheduled grassroots activity (cause). Thus, it referred to a specific instance (e.g. a 
grassroots activity at the street market of Giannitsa on the 27th of September 2012). The non-highlighted 
text was not analysed at all, as it did not include any of the dictionary words.  
 
4.3.2.1 Solving other issues 
 
During the first reading of the data (from May-November 2012), two issues arose immediately. Firstly, 
some post items from one section might, as well, have appeared exactly the same in other sections. 
Secondly, it was also the case that a post item that was, for example, posted in a given section and in time 
A (e.g. 21/09/2012) appeared, as well, exactly the same in time B (e.g. 11/08/2014), within the same 
section. In both situations, the text and the title of the post item were exactly the same. Regarding the 
first issue (same post items between different sections), this occurred with the ‘News’ section. In other 
words, in the news section, there could be found hundreds of post items that appeared exactly the same 
in all of the other sections of the website (except, obviously, the ones that were not being updated). With 
regards to the second issue (same post items within the same section over time), this occurred only in the 
sections ‘Ideological Texts’ (‘Ιδεολογικά Κείμενα’) and ‘History-Culture’ (‘Ιστορία-Πολιτισμός’).  
In order to avoid double-reading, these issues had to be solved. Thus, in order to detect repeated posts 
between different sections, as well as within each section over time, an effective way was to look at the 
titles of the post items. The ‘duplicates’ tool in Microsoft Excel provided a solution. This tool highlighted 
cells that had the same value, whether a number(s) or word(s). So, at first, the post items titles (as shown 
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in Figure 4.3), only40 from all the sections of the website, were transferred into Excel41.  Figure 4.3 
illustrates how the post items titles were displayed on GD’s old website. 
Figure 4.3 Post items titles on GD’s old website. 
                                                            
40 A post title from all the sections was, on average, between 10 -15 words long (see Figure 4.3). 
41 In fact, they were transferred first to Microsoft Word, in order to delete the thumbnails (see Figure 4.3), and 
then onto Excel. Also, in Excel, each post title was put into a single cell. Two additional columns were added. The 
one included the date of the post and the other column asked from which section the post came from. 
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Next, the ‘duplicates’ tool was applied, first to each section separately (one sheet for each section), in 
order to check whether a post in time A was exactly the same in time B within each section. Over time, 
‘duplicates’ post item titles had been found in the following sections: ‘News’, ‘Events’, ‘Ideological Texts’ 
and ‘History-Culture’. These duplicate post titles were, then, checked in order to see whether the text 
was, in fact, exactly the same. It had been found that this was the case only for the sections ‘Ideological 
Texts’ and ‘History-Culture’. Contrarily, for the ‘News’ and ‘Events’ sections, where also, over time, 
duplicate post items titles had been found, the text was not the same. For example, in the ‘News’ section, 
GD had, at times, been titling many of its posts as “Illegal-immigrants news bulletin” at various time points. 
The text, however, was not the same, as (each time) it commented on different incidents. The same goes 
for the ‘Events’ section, where, for example, some posts in time A and in time B were titled ‘Speech at the 
Offices of Central Command’. However, the content of the text was different, as, for example, the topic 
or the speaker might have been different every time. So, in all of those post items titles, a character (e.g. 
1, 2, 3, etc.) was added at the end, in order for them to be undetectable for the ‘duplicates’ tool. Figure 
4.3 above shows how post items titles (the blue text next to thumbnail images) looked on GD’s website42. 
They were copied as they exactly appeared and pasted, first, into a MS Word document. Next, they were 
pasted into MS Excel (only the title (as hyperlink) and the date were pasted). At the next step, each section 
of the website was checked for duplicates, along with the ‘News’ section. This was done in order to detect 
and eliminate post items that were imported from other sections into the ‘News’ section. The result was 
that, up until December 2016, around 3,000 post items in the ‘News’ section that were duplicates 
appeared (e.g. appeared in other sections as well) and were not retrieved for analysis. So, there around 
28,500 post items were left for analysis, including all the four sections. 
Lastly, there emerged another issue. During the finishing of the thesis (around early August 2019), the 
official website of GD (e.g. www.xryshavgh.com - the one from which the data were retrieved, as 
described above) changed domain. This means that the website (www.xryshavgh.com) was not 
operational anymore and there were no working links on this website for all the data retrieved for analysis. 
However, a solution was found. Working links were retrieved from GD’s WordPress blog 
(https://koinonikosethnikismos.wordpress.com/) only for those post items in which impact-claims were 
found. This blog, like ethnikismos.net, has always been a backup site for GD (with GD posting the same 
items across all three sites to a great extent, as one can conclude from a quick browsing) and, as of October 
                                                            
42 Posts items’ titles have the same appearance in all of the sections. In some sections, however, they do not have 
thumbnail images next to them. 
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2019, are still operational, dating as far back as 2012. Specifically, 
https://koinonikosethnikismos.wordpress.com/ dates as far back as 01 December 2012. Post items from 
https://koinonikosethnikismos.wordpress.com/ were checked, along with all the post items that included 
impact-claims, in order to check if the texts were, indeed, the same. It was found out that the text was 
identical for all the post items, expect for two items for which only a part of the text was found. Lastly, 
only 5 items had a different title in the blog than the old website, but the text was identical. Thus, working 
links were found only for the post items that were retrieved for further analysis from 01 December 2012 
onwards.  
Following this discussion, in the empirical chapters that follow, the findings from the impact-claims 
analysis are presented and GD’s primary sources are all referenced in the same way. For example: ‘GD, 
2012:45’, ‘GD, 2014:156’, etc. The number next to the year refers to the numbering of post items analysed 
for impact-claims, as numbered in the author’s database, based on a chronological order, and can be 
found accordingly in the ‘Bibliography’ by looking at this number. For those primary sources that have 
working links (e.g. December 2012 – December 2016), the link is also provided in a footnote in the within-
text referencing as well, throughout the thesis. This uniform method of active citation of the primary data 
throughout helps to establish transparency and enhance the criteria of replicability in this thesis; a 
prominent criterion in for replicable qualitative research (Moravcsik, 2010:31). 
 
4.3.3 Data Analysis & coding procedures 
 
The second stage was data analysis. Impact-claims are instances where the party claims to have achieved 
impact. Thus, the unit of analysis is the instance of the impact-claim. Thus, only the text where the impact-
claim appears is taken for analysis, irrespective of its length. On that note, the length of an impact-claim 
varies from a couple of sentences to more than 500 words. An impact-claim might appear anywhere in 
the post item, including the title or, in some cases, an entire post item is an impact-claim. While reading 
through the highlighted paragraphs, once an impact-claim was identified, it was, then, further broken 
down into its constituent parts on a MS Excel codesheet. The text shown in Table 4.4 (below) is an example 





Table 4.4 A party-face political impact-claim by GD. 
Party-face impact-claim by GD 
Police operations under the instructions of Golden Dawn. They are not doing it for restricting the 
crime, but in the hopes that they will contain Popular Nationalist Movement rates (…) Yesterday, 
during the convention at the Parliamentary Committee of Public Administration, Order and Justice, 
where Mr. Nikos Dendias was present as well, our compatriot, Ioannis Lagos, raised the issues of 
crime and illegal-immigration, which could not be solved with wishful thinking tactics. More 
specifically, Ioannis Lagos referred to the situation that prevails in Patras. He characteristically put 
it: “Go on a trip to Patras, where you have been bragging that things are all right there. Go to the 
building of Pireiki-Patraiki and see how many Pakistanis, Afghans and many more are in there. The 
Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection, who is acting according to political and 
communicational tricks and not with interest for the public safety and the social good, rushed to 
run today another operation in Patras, under Golden Dawn’s instructions. Mr. Dendias believes 
that, by doing this, he will keep the people blindfolded and will contain Golden Dawn’s sharp rise. 
You are late Mr. Dendias…” (GD, 2013)43.  
 
Table 4.5 below illustrates how the impact-claim in Table 4.4 was coded. 
Table 4.5 Codesheet of Political Impact-claims Analysis 
Codesheet Questions Answers 
Date of Impact-Claim: January 2013 
Face Party 
Arena Parliament 
Type of Impact-Claim:(e.g. direct, indirect or joint) Indirect (because another actor, not GD, 
delivered the outcome) 
Policy Issue:  Immigration 
(Geographical) level of Impact Local 
Cause(s)- (overarching category) Parliamentary activities + ‘electoral 
strength’   
Cause’s attribute (e.g. specific activity): Parliamentary speech 
Outcome (e.g. string variable):  Police operation for irregular migrants in 
Patras 
(specific) Entities which delivered the outcome:  Minister of Public Order and Citizen 
Protection, Nikos Dendias 
Entities which delivered the outcome (overarching 
category) 
New Democracy (ND) actors 
 
                                                            
43 https://bit.ly/30W3gA1  
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The analysis can, then, provide quantitative (e.g. frequencies) evidence on how many impact-claims GD 
made over time. In addition, such quantitative evidence can be produced regarding all of the codesheet 
questions. In that way, a variety of patterns can be traced. However, the coding method that has been 
chosen is qualitative coding (e.g. Saldana, 2015). This is because, for the analysis, not only is the manifest 
content taken into account, but the latent content, as well. In sum, this qualitative content analysis of 
impact-claims looked at the manifest content (e.g. the visible components of the content), as well as to 
the latent content, involving, by the researcher, ‘an interpretation of the underlying meaning of the text’ 
(Graneheim and Lundman, 2004:106). Consequently, although Table 4.5 (above) illustrates how all 
impact-claims had been coded, there are examples where the cause of the claim (e.g. GD’s actions) was 
not directly visible in the content. For example, GD might ‘impact-claim’ that ‘under the fear of GD, the 
government orders the police to evacuate immigrants put in the Eidomeni settlement’ (GD, 2016:249)44. 
Obviously, GD, here, claimed that it had achieved an impact. However, the specific action through which 
it had achieved this outcome had not been specified. In the codesheet, in such examples, the cause initially 
was not coded under an ‘overarching causes category’, but, rather, as ‘fear’. Perhaps, there was a hidden 
qualitative meaning behind the word ‘fear’. Thus, it was taken into account for further qualitative content 
analysis, and it was quantified only after an in-depth analysis, in order to understand and describe the 
meaning of the content (Schreier, 2012:170). As said, one of the advantages of impact-claims method lies 
in the fact that it produces both quantitative and qualitative evidence. The results of this qualitative 




This chapter has presented the ‘political impact-claims’ analysis, through which this thesis aims to test its 
main hypothesis on the case of GD. It has argued that the added-value of this method, lies in the fact that 
it can track changes on the behavioural indicators (e.g. actions and issues) of ERPs, with regards to their 
two faces and across the three political arenas that are active (at the same time). The chapter proceeded 
by presenting the primary data that it had analysed through the method of ‘political impact-claims’. This 
involved vast amounts of primary data, which were analysed systematically, so as to track, as much as 
possible, extreme-right party change in the case of GD. The chapter also discussed how the thesis has 
                                                            
44 http://bit.ly/2BcHxJK  
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dealt with other issues that emerged in the due process of data retrieval, sampling and citation. The thesis 
endeavoured to identify the most transparent way possible for data analysis, so as to ensure that the 
criteria of validity and replicability were satisfied, as much as possible. The chapter concluded by 
presenting how the analysis of impact-claims was conducted, through qualitative coding procedures, 






























Chapter 5: Golden Dawn: External, Internal Conditions 




This is the first empirical chapter of the thesis. The main purpose of this chapter is to build an empirical 
narrative (Beach & Pedersen, 2016) of the changing external and internal conditions of GD, over time, as 
well as to provide an analysis of GD’s changing behaviour during the thesis’ studied timeframe (May 2012 
– December 2016).  The chapter builds this empirical narrative by scrutinising the secondary literature on 
GD, as well as by analysing primary data and providing original findings, beyond the political impact-
claims. PICs will be analysed later on. This is, firstly, done in order to provide an external triangulation to 
the further findings that will come out as a result of the analysis of GD’s political impact-claims and which 
will be presented in the next three empirical chapters. Thus, this chapter aims to provide further evidence 
of GD’s changing patterns of behaviour, in order to strengthen the thesis’ argument of GD’s de-
radicalisation and radicalisation, as evidenced in its PICs. Through this empirical narrative, the chapter, to 
conclude, engages in a short theoretical task, as well, by re-iterating the four  testable case-specific 
hypotheses (presented in Chapter 3, as well), with regards to the de-radicalisation and radicalisation of 
the GD, as these could be, specifically, evidenced in its PICs. These will, then, be tested in the following 
empirical chapters, through an in-depth analysis of GD’s PICs. In short, the chapter aims to develop 
insights on the question: ‘What can we expect to see in the PICs of GD, based on what we know so far 
about GD’s de-radicalisation and radicalisation?’ This question will be answered in the next three 
empirical chapters.   
The chapter is split into four main sections:  
Section 1 examines the external conditions under which GD was operating, over time as per two main 
Phases, in order to identify the extent to which external factors altered the external environment. Phase 
1: From GD’s establishment (early ‘80s) up until the event of the arrests in September 2013, and Phase 2: 
October 2013 up until the end of the studied timeframe (e.g., December 2016). It argues that, in Phase 1, 
a strategy of ‘dismissiveness’, in Meguid’s (2005) terms, and a culture of impunity characterised the 
responses of political and state actors vis-à-vis the GD, thus providing a relatively favourable context. In 
Phase 2, the arrests were a trigger event that bore the characteristics of an external shock to GD, suddenly 
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altering the context favourable to the GD, and setting in motion the realisation of a full-blown exclusion, 
including both political and legal means across all three political arenas.  
Section 2 sketches the development of the changing internal conditions inside GD, specifically the 
factional conflicts before and after the external shock of the arrests. As it shows, these conflicts could be 
parcelled into three phases, which are different from the phases identified above. These are based upon 
the events of GD’s leader imprisonment and his release from jail. These are: 
Phase 1: GD’s foundation (early ‘80s) – September, 2013 – From GDs’ foundation up until the external 
shock of GD’s leadership arrests, where the militants were the most dominant faction. 
Phase 2: October 2013 – April 2015. Following the arrests up until the release of the leader from jail, 
where the moderates were mainly the most dominant faction. 
Phase 3: May 2015 – December 2016. The militants re-emerged as the dominant faction inside GD. 
Regarding the leader’s factional preferences, Section 2 argues that the leader, Mihaloliakos, throughout 
this timeframe (early ‘80s – December 2016), sided with the militants’ faction.  
Section 3 discusses the evolution of GD’s behaviour, over time, during the thesis’ studied timeframe (May 
2012 – December 2016) and across the three political arenas, by reviewing the existing literature, as well 
as by analysing primary data. The evidence presented points towards a behavioural de-radicalisation of 
the GD, following profound changes in its external and internal conditions.    
Section 4 develops testable and GD-specific hypotheses with regards to both the de-radicalisation and 
radicalisation scenarios, based on the findings presented. These will be tested through GD’s impact-claims 
in the following empirical chapters. 
 
5.1 External Conditions: Institutional and Political Factors 
 
This section discusses the strategies of political and state actors, vis-à-vis the GD, during two Phases. Phase 
1: from the GD’s establishment up until the event of external shock of the arrests in September 2013, and 
Phase 2: from then up until the end of the thesis studied timeframe (December 2016). It shows that GD 
was facing a relatively favourable context in Phase 1 which was drastically altered into an unfavourable 
one in Phase 2. 
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This section as well as as the following section, build an empirical narrative as regards to the conditions 
under which GD was operating as regards to its external and internal environment, based on various 
primary and secondary sources, beyond the PICs. Therefore the following two sections present the 
conditions under which there could be expected a de-radicalisation and/or radicalisation of GD’s 
behaviour, according to the thesis’ four hypotheses. This task will allow to draw theoretical expectations 
of what there could be expected to see in the analysis of GD’s PICs (presented in the following three 
empirical chapters) in terms of de-radicalisation and radicalisation outcomes. According to the thesis 
hypotheses these are as follows: 
External Factors Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: (De-radicalisation): There is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to de-radicalise as 
they achieve and seek to maintain parliamentary representation.  
Hypothesis 2: (Radicalisation): There is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to radicalise (or re-
radicalise) when they assume social movement characteristics. 
Internal factors Hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: (De-radicalisation): Exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such as 
Golden Dawn)  leaderships and factions, may result in de-radicalisation outcomes when moderates are 
mainly the influential faction. 
Hypothesis 4: (Re-Radicalisation): Exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’, (such as 
Golden Dawn), leaderships and factions, may result in (re)-radicalisation outcomes when the 
hardliners/militants are mainly the influential faction. 
The third section of this chapter provides evidence, (based on various primary and secondary sources, 
beyond the PICs) to all four hypotheses of the thesis, regarding the de-radicalisation and radicalisation of 
GD across the three political arenas and its two faces.  
The last section of this chapter re-ieterates the thesis four hypotheses, and theorises, based on what we 
know so far, the conditions under which de-radicalisation and radicalisation of the GD are likely to be 
manifested in its PICs. The analysis of GD’s PICs is conducted in the following three empirical chapters 




5.1.1 Phase 1: early ‘80s – September 2013: Political and Institutional dismissiveness 
 
 
Early’80s – May 2012 
 
Political and state actors had long adopted a dismissive stance towards the ideas and actions of GD. 
Although GD’s extremist ideas and violent actions were already known to parts of the political 
mainstream, and to the state, since the 1990s, they opted for a dismissive strategy instead. One main 
reason for this could have been the lack of relevant legal provisions for banning a political party, according 
to the Greek constitution. Political parties were denouncing the actions of GD. However, they were stating 
that it was not possible to repress political ideas, only actions (Psarras, 2014:10). But there were other 
reasons, as well, embedded in a ‘culture of impunity’ towards racist violence. 
Political actors first raised their eyebrows to GD in 1998, when an MP from Synaspismos asked the then 
Minister of Justice about the overall existence of GD, through a parliamentary interpellation, without, 
however, any further developments on the part of the minister (Psarras, 2014:10). In fact, political parties 
had, for long, been neglecting (in their political discourses) the existence of either GD’s violent actions, in 
particular, or racist violence, in general. They preferred to present Greeks as open, tolerant and definitely 
non-racist (Cheliotis, 2013; Rozakou, 2012). In addition, racism towards migrants was interpreted as an 
understandable response, especially during the Greek crisis (Karamanidou, 2005; 2016; Cheliotis, 2013; 
Triandafyllidou & Kouki, 2013). As Karamanidou (2016:2009-2015) finds, for many years, political actors, 
including from mainstream parties such as ND and PASOK, had been perpetuating three main narratives 
with regards to racist violence. The first was a consistent framing of violence as isolated and very rare. 
The second was disassociating racism from the use of violence. The third was the justification of some 
forms of violence against migrant threats as legitimate. All of these narratives were built on the initial 
assessment of migration as mainly a negative phenomenon for Greek society. This discourse was 
perpetuated despite the existence of evidence suggesting otherwise. 
 
State institutions, mainly the judiciary and the police, had also adopted for long a dismissive strategy 
towards racist violence and the GD. To some extent, the justice system had been perpetuating the 
discourse of political actors. Although the justice system is an independent state actor, in Greece, it has, 
at times, been interdependent with the executive, thus maintaining the status quo, adopting a dismissive 
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strategy and being biased towards migrants and racist violence (Papantoleon, 2014). In 1998, GD violently 
assaulted a team of leftist students and it was, perhaps, the first time that GD drew much attention from 
‘justice’, with the well-known ‘Periandros’ case (the then deputy leader of GD, Antonis Androutsopoulos). 
Still, the courts acted very slowly, as the conclusion did not come out until 2009. However, the ‘Supreme 
Civil and Criminal Court of Greece’ (‘Areios Pagos’) held that a ‘hit squad’ of GD: ‘acted based on their 
decision to commit a murder (…), but they failed due to external conditions and not irrespective of their 
will.’ (case law 1607/2010) (Areios Pagos, 200945). This was a significant development. For the first time, 
GD was associated with ‘hit squads’ and its actions were admonished, on the whole, as an organisation 
and not as isolated individual acts. The court decided on an imprisonment of 12 years for GD’s (vice-leader 
back in 1998) Antonis Androutsopoulos (Areios Pagos, 2009). However, the ‘justice system’ did not link 
this case with Article 187 of the penal code, which targets the repression of criminal organisations (which 
caused GD’s arrests and its ongoing trial, on the grounds of acting as a criminal organisation).   
As some observers note (Psarras, 2014:14), Article 187 had, for long, been ‘a forgotten article of the penal 
code’, while the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights pointed towards a likely lack of legal 
knowledge regarding the relevant legal provisions (Muižnieks, 2013). Regarding prosecution based on 
racist motives, up until 2014, the only existing law which punished words and deeds on grounds of racial 
discrimination was law 927/1979 of the penal code, but this law was, perhaps, very lenient for GD’s acts. 
For example, it foresaw the imprisonment of up to two years or a fine, with an unspecified amount (case 
law 927/1979)46. What is more, this law was largely unknown to both political parties and the justice 
system, as some sources claim that it has, perhaps, been employed only once, in the trial of Konstantinos 
Plevris, for his book, ‘Jews: The Whole Truth’, in 2007 (Galiatsatos, 2013)47.  Under these circumstances, 
some estimate that, over the last twenty years, only around 1-2% of GD’s criminal actions have reached 
the courts (Attorneys of the Civil Action, 2015). In other words, when it came to repressing racist violence, 
the ‘justice’ was replete with deficiencies, a lack of relevant legal knowledge, a lack of impartiality in 
administrative and judicial procedures, excessive delays and overtly lenient sanctions (Muižnieks, 2013; 
Greek Ombudsman, 2013; Papapantoleon, 2014; Pavlou, 2009). 
 






The police are another main state organ that has, for long, adopted a dismissive strategy towards GD and 
racist violence (Dalakoglou, 2013). Police forces in Greece have, at times, been engaged in racist incidents, 
including severe physical assaults and even deaths (Galariotis et al., 2017). A culture of toleration of 
xenophobic sentiments and racist behaviour has long been embedded in parts of Greece’s professional 
security system (Lazaridis and Skleparis, 2015:181-85). In addition, some links between GD and parts of 
the police have been claimed to exist since the 1990s (Christopoulos, 2014). Given the weak legal 
framework in Greece in repressing racist violence, and its failure to criminalise individual or group racist 
assaults, the police often did hardly anything, despite their power to effectively sanction perpetrators 
(Psarras, 2012:180-191). Thus, the police also kept alive a ‘culture of impunity’, vis-à-vis GD (Papantoleon, 
2014).  
 
May 2012 – September 2013:  
 
The ‘culture of impunity’ that the GD was enjoying since its establishment was crystallised in the 2012 
elections with its electoral success. Since GD’s electoral breakthrough (May 2012) up until the arrests of 
its leadership (September 2013), GD was facing a relatively favourable context. At first, political and state 
actors were puzzled as to how to respond to GD, with the most puzzled being the ND.  
The stance of ND48, vis-à-vis GD, from the latter’s electoral breakthrough up until the arrests, can best be 
described as ambiguous, characterised by both inclusionary (or engagement) and exclusionary (or 
disengagement) strategies at the same time (Psarras, 2014:28). However, inclusionary strategies were 
more evident, mainly through policy and rhetoric co-optation of GD. ND’s decision   to opt for an 
engagement strategy towards GD right after the 2012 elections was immediately evident. Along with the 
increasing electoral relevance of GD, the ND had adopted a ‘law & order’ and an ‘anti-immigration’ 
agenda, likely so as to appeal to GD’s votes (Georgiadou & Rori, 2013:339; Fielitz, 2016). On the one hand, 
it is also likely that this was a continuation of the already ongoing anti-immigration agenda that began 
during the years right before the 2012 elections, or due to the agency of PM Samaras himself, who began 
embracing anti-immigration measures right after his election as ND leader. As well, we must consider his 
(largely) engagement strategy, vis-à-vis LAOS (as argued previously). On the other hand, it is very likely 
                                                            
48 From June 2012 – December 2014, the Greek coalition government (centre-right ND, centre-left PASOK and left 




that the success of GD, which captured many votes from ND, might have intensified this rightwards shift 
by the ND49 (Karamanidou, 2014).   
ND’s co-optation strategy was first evident in the implementation of the large-scale police operation 
‘Hospitable Zeus’ by the coalition government (PASOK-DIMAR-ND), in August 2012. It was, in part, a 
response to indirectly contain GD. The operation was initiated with the aim of tackling irregular 
immigration and implementing subsequent deportation, as well as further border control. The operation 
was criticised for its overt discrimination on ethnic origin and religious grounds, as well as abuse of human 
rights (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015:85). Six months after its introduction, in August 2012, 77,526 
people had been detained, even though only 5.7% of them had the status of irregular migrants. The latter 
were mostly people who did not resemble the ethnic mainstream conception of a Greek citizen, based on 
their racial profile (e.g. colour and religious clothing) (Kathimerini, 2013)50. However, all the governing 
parties agreed with this policy, and signs of co-optation could be found among other parties, as well. For 
example, a PASOK MP argued that ‘Hospitable Zeus’ in the centre of Athens was necessary in order to: 
‘protect the rule of law, to stop the violent squads which replace the state’. In this regard, the state was 
discursively constructing a tactic of using violence against migrants as a public order mandate 
(Karamanidou, 2016:2014-5). This provided GD an extension to the state’s control mechanism regarding 
the immigration issue (Dalakoglou, 2013).  
ND often resorted to tough anti-immigration rhetoric. ND’s Minister of Public Order and Citizen’s 
Protection51, Nikos Dendias, stressed: ‘We will not allow our towns to be occupied and become migrant 
ghettoes’, adding: ‘The country is being lost. What is happening now is Greece’s greatest invasion ever’, 
and that the immigration crisis is: ‘perhaps even greater than our financial one’. The Minister also stressed: 
‘Our social fabric is in danger of unravelling’ and, for immigrants, it was: ‘to their benefit to be repatriated’ 
(To Vima, 2012a)52. ND’s Minister of Health (and former LAOS MP) stated that: ‘We must make their lives 
hard (migrants) so that they understand that they are unwelcome and they must leave’ (Protothema, 
                                                            
49 It must be noted that it is beyond the scope of this project to identify if GD’s success has caused other political 
actors to turn more ‘rightwards’.  
50 https://www.kathimerini.gr/27644/article/epikairothta/ellada/anakoinw8hkan-ta-apotelesmata-ths-epixeirhshs-
3enios-zeys-twn-teleytaiwn-e3i-mhnwn 
51 During the ND-led government period (May 2012 – December 2014), this Ministry was primarily dealing with the 





2013)53. Since the start of the crisis, a peak in hate crimes were being reported, one after another 
(Triandafyllidou, 2013:33). In the meantime, the main opposition party, SYRIZA, was regularly accusing 
the government of adopting a ‘far-right agenda’ (To Vima, 2012b)54.  
An engagement strategy by ND, vis-à-vis GD, is also evident in its initial reluctance to adopt the so-called 
‘anti-racist bill’. In December 2011, a law was drafted for ‘combating racism and xenophobia’, which would 
incorporate into Greek law the Council of the EU Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain 
forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law (later to be known as the ‘anti-
racist bill’) (Naftemporiki, 2013a)55. However, the law was only introduced into voting in March 2013. 
After the electoral breakthrough of GD, ND’s two other coalition partners, most notably represented by 
the centre-left PASOK’s leader, Venizelos, and the Minister of Justice, Roupakiotis (DIMAR), had requested 
for political and legal means of exclusion to be triggered against GD. Venizelos had requested, at times, 
proscribing GD through legal means, by relevant amendments to the penal code (Naftemporiki, 2012b56; 
To Vima, 2012c)57. PASOK also called for all parties to impose a cordon sanitaire against GD in the 
legislative arena, by not voting along with its MPs (Naftemporiki, 2013a). DIMAR was also calling for the 
immediate implementation of the anti-racist bill (Naftemporiki, 2013b)58, as well as for all parties to 
impose a cordon sanitaire against GD (Naftemporiki, 2013c)59. Indicatively, ND never issued similar 
statements calling for a full-blown exclusion of GD through political or legal means. In fact, ND was against 
harsh repressive means against GD, such as proscription, while the majority of its MPs rejected the ‘anti-
racist bill’, in March 2013. ND’s opposition to the ban was framed as it being an anti-democratic act. For 
example, when asked about a possible proscription of GD, the PM stated: ‘I think democracy is so powerful 
that no excessive means are needed’ (To Vima, 2012d)60.  

















The ‘anti-racist bill’ was finally (re)proposed in March 2013 by PASOK, with additional legal provisions for 
protecting foreigners’ rights and severely punishing further racist crimes (Naftemporiki, 2013a; To Vima, 
2012e61), but, this time, the bill was stalled, mainly due to ND’s reluctance (Naftemporiki, 2013d)62. 
Moreover, DIMAR had left the government in June 2013 and, thus, Roupakiotis could not proceed further 
with his anti-racist bill. The newly appointed Minister of Justice (Charlampos Athanasiou, a ND MP) said 
that there is no need to implement the anti-racist bill, as the already existing law 927/1979 was legally 
adequate (Naftemporiki, 2013e)63. Moreover, prominent figures of ND had, at times, made positive 
comments about GD, such as Panayiotis Psomiades (Naftemporiki, 2012c)64 and Vyronas Polydoras, who 
had even suggested some form of cooperation between ND and GD in parliament (iEfimerida, 2013)65. 
The Baltakos affair66 also made clear that, before the arrests, there was some form of cooperation 
between some ND and GD cadres.  
State bodies, most notably the police, also intensified their behaviour of impunity towards racist violence 
and, in some cases, towards GD’s actions. As noted, during ‘Hospitable Zeus’, police arrested people based 
on their racial profile. Moreover, around the period before and after the electoral breakthrough of GD, 
prosecutions of assaults against migrants, including those committed by police forces, remained rare 
(Karamanidou, 2016:2003; Lazaridis & Skleparis, 2015:188). Under these circumstances, the claims that 
GD had some links with the police were strengthened by the latter’s stance in, at times, either turning a 
blind eye to, or even supporting, GD’s violent actions (Christopoulos, 2014). This presumed potential link 
was further strengthened after the 2012 double elections (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015:5, 86). At 
some polling stations in Athens, where most of the Greek police officers vote, GD scored between 17 and 
23%, far above its national average (6.9%). This trend seemed to have continued in the 2014 European 
elections (iEfimerida, 2014a)67, as well as in the January and September 2015 elections (To Vima, 2015a)68.  






65 https://bit.ly/2qKsK72  
66 The Baltakos affair, as Fielitz (2016:261) sums it up was about: ‘The former cabinet secretary Takis Baltakos – 
the right-hand of PM Antonis Samaras – resigned after GD revealed a video proving that arrangements were made 
between the ND and GD’.  




An additional indication is that, after the arrests of the GD leadership, Dendias initiated investigations of 
alleged GD cells inside the police. The Minister concluded that no such cells existed, although 10 police 
officers had been linked with the criminal activities of GD, as well as an additional 203 who had been 
engaged in extremist behaviour (Mandata, 2013)69. NGOs, such as Human Rights First (2014)70 and 
Amnesty International (2014)71, as well as the Greek ombudsman (2013), highlighted the apathy among 
police forces towards incidents of racist violence and emphasised the potential direct links between GD 
and the police, in contrast to the findings of Dendias.  
ND’s strategy, vis-à-vis GD, was, as noted, ambiguous. This meant that ND also resorted to exclusionary 
means against GD in the period leading up to the arrests. Right after GD’s success, most political parties 
rushed to denounce the party. Opposition came from far-right voices, as well. LAOS’s leader described the 
party as fascist, for which there is no place in Greece (Naftemporiki, 2012f)72, while the prominent neo-
fascist theoretician, Konstantinos Plevris, called on people to abandon GD (Naftemporiki, 2012g)73.  
On 26th October 2012, Nikos Dendias , the Minister of Public Order and Citizen’s Protection (responsible 
in dealing with the immigration and law & order issues) compiled a list of at least 15 violent incidents 
committed by GD’s MPs and/or members during September-October 2012, at various places across the 
country. In the majority of cases, which were identified as crimes of the penal code, he stated that legal 
means were already underway against GD, such as preliminary examination and preparation of a court 
file, to be followed up in parliament soon (To Vima, 2012g)74, as well as the possibility of GD MPs being 
caught red-handed. In the meantime, a few days earlier, Dendias announced the setup of a special unit 
inside the Hellenic police for countering racist violence (Naftemporiki, 2012k)75. In the period following 
the freezing of the anti-racist bill, Dendias stated that, with a constitutional reshuffle, there could be 
added legal provisions, which would prohibit the participation of extreme parties like GD (Naftemporiki, 
2013g)76. However, these legal means against GD rarely ever were translated into actions. They were 
largely ineffective and neither contained the racist violence nor the unconventional behaviour of GD. 
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cha.html 
70 http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-report-We-Are-Not-Nazis-But.pdf  
71 https://www.amnesty.gr/sites/default/files/pdf/2014-0403-a-law-into-themselves_report.pdf 







Various studies, either academic (Galariotis et al., 2017; Georgiadou & Rori, 2019) or reports from 
international NGOs (e.g. Amnesty International, 2014; Greek Ombudsman, 2013), relying on different 
sources and methods, unanimously agreed that, in the period following GD’s electoral breakthrough, 
racist violence was on the rise. They also agreed that most of the perpetrators were either teams of GD 
members or the police.  What is more, GD’s polling rates were climbing (Public Issue, 2013)77. Following 
its electoral breakthrough, GD had committed some of its more violent actions. These included a violent 
assault against Egyptian fishermen in June 2012 (Jailgoldendawn1)78 and the murders of Pakistani, Sahzat 
Luqman, in January 2013 (Jailgoldendawn2)79 and left activist, Pavlos Fyssas. However, the murder of 
Fyssas, largely because he was of Greek origin, was about to change the long-term adopted strategy of 
dismissiveness by political and state actors vis-à-vis GD: in short, it  proved to be the trigger event for GD’s 
shock political and institutional exclusion. 
 
5.1.2 Phase 2: October 2013 – December 2016: Full-blown Political and Legal Exclusion  
 
On 18th September 2013, five days after an attempted homicide against trade-unionists of the Communist 
Party’s party organ, PAME, GD member Roupakias (Jailgoldendawn, 2019)80 was accused of the leftist 
activist Pavlos Fyssas. A few days after, Article 187 of the penal code was triggered against GD, accusing 
the party, and its leadership, of orchestrating and participating in a criminal organisation. On 28th 
September 2013, the leadership was arrested. First, the leader, the vice-leader and MP Ioannis Lagos were 
arrested, then nine prominent MPs followed them into jail, up until July 2014. Among others, this included 
GD’s spokesperson Elias Kasidiaris, Ioannis Lagos, Elias Panagiotaros, Nikos Kouzilos, Artemis 
Mathaiopoulos, Panayiotis Eliopoulos and many police officers (iEfimerida, 2014b)81. They faced a series 
of charges on accusations of committing several beatings resulting in grievous bodily harm, blackmail and 
money laundering, among others (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015:4). In addition, GD was accused of 
some felonies which did not fall under Article 187, which included the attempted murder of Abujid 
Embarak in June 2012 (and of members of PAME in September 2013) and the killing of Sahzat Luqman (in 
January 2013) and of Fyssas (GoldenDawnWatch, 2015)82. When the trial began, the defendants were 69 
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members of GD, including all the MPs elected in 2012. Those arrested remained in jail up until 20th April 
2015, when the trial began. After that, the Fyssas murderer and GD leading figures were temporarily 
released on bail. Finally, after a long five-year trial, on the 14th of October 2020, it was ruled out that GD 
was operating as a criminal organisation running from the top. As a result, the leadership of GD, and other 
GD cadres, were sentenced to 13 years in prison. Other GD figures, such as, former MPs were sentenced 
to under 10 years in prison, while Roupakias was given a life sentence in prison83.    
Bearing in mind the long-term strategy of political and state dismissiveness towards GD, described 
previously, the arrests were, to a large extent, an unexpected development that caught many actors, 
inside and outside Greece, by surprise. It could be argued that, for GD, this development largely had the 
characteristics of an external shock. Having enjoyed, for so long, leniency from state authorities, the 
arrests (so fast, sudden and unpredictable) shut down political and institutional contextual opportunities 
that for long were though for GD to be open. The first shocking event was the arrest of its leader. For a 
party which operates based on the Führerprinzip principle (Ellinas, 2013), having its leader in jail could be 
expected to mean the party would face some difficulties in coordinating its activities, whether inside or 
outside parliament. Of further significance were the subsequent effects of the arrests, which created 
other environmental modifications (e.g. ‘a discrete event that alters the environment in which the party 
operates’: Harmel & Janda, 1994) to the political context of GD. In December 2013, with an absolute 
majority, the parliament voted in favour of a legal provision banning GD from public funding (To Vima, 
2013b)84. After then, up until its electoral failure in July 2019, GD received no public funds (Hellenic 
Parliament, 2019)85. The arrests also released all other political actors, most notably ND, from the 
dilemma of full exclusion, vis-à-vis GD. In September 2014, the anti-racist bill was eventually passed, with 
ND’s approval (Tvxs, 2014)86.  
The SYRIZA-led government of 2015 introduced a new anti-racist law (4356/2015) prohibiting any 
restriction of food distribution activities to ‘Greeks only’ by municipal authorities. Under these conditions, 
the GD was now risking facing further legal sanctions if it continued its ‘social activism’ (Ellinas 2020:159). 
GD was now facing exclusion and isolation in the parliamentary arena as well, predominantly on its key 
signatory policy issues, from across the party system. An analysis of GD’s parliamentary actions before 
                                                            








and after its full-blown exclusion/isolation would help to illustrate this point. Therefore, for this purpose, 
Figure 5.1 (see below) illustrates all of the parliamentary activities (e.g. various interpellations) submitted 
by all political parties in the Greek parliament, to the ministry that was primarily dealing with immigration 
and law & order issues (core to the agenda of GD), during the ND-led coalition government period (May 
2012 - December 2014): the ‘Ministry of Public Order and Citizen’s Protection’ (MPOCP)87. The dotted line 
indicates the date of the arrests. The most striking fact in Figure 5.1 is the sharp drop in parliamentary 
actions from all political parties right after GD’s leadership arrests.   
                                                            
87 a  ‘Ministry of Public Order’ dealt with the immigration issue during the centre-right led government period, 
whereas, during the SYRIZA-led government coalition, it was called ‘Ministry of Migration’, set up in November 




Figure 5.1 Parliamentary actions submitted to the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen’s Protection 
(MPOCP) by all parties: July 2012-December 2014. 
 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation, based on data retrieved from Hellenic Parliament88. Dotted line 
indicates the event of GD leadership arrests. 
Another striking fact from Figure 5.1 (above) is that, in the period before the arrests, ND and GD were in 
the lead on parliamentary actions, an indication that it was, for them, a more salient issue than for the 
rest of the parties, and less salient following the arrests. This also tends to suggest that ND was more likely 
following an accommodative strategy (e.g. Meguid, 2005), vis-à-vis GD, before the arrests. This assertion 
is further evidenced by the fact that, throughout the period before the arrests, Nikos Dendias had replied 
back to almost all of GD’s parliamentary actions, while, in most of them, he was providing pages of 
evidence in order to justify his reply. For example, in most of these replies on immigration-related issues, 
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he was stating, in the beginning of his reply, that: ‘We would like to assure you that the issue of illegal 
immigration is now a major national issue and, as such, is being addressed by our Ministry, as well’ 
(MPOCP, 2012)89.  
The strategy of MPOCP changed completely, vis-à-vis GD, following the arrests, not only as evidenced in 
Figure 5.1 (above), but qualitatively, as well. What is indicative is the fact that both the MPOCP and the 
‘Ministry of Migration’ (under the SYRIZA-led government) never replied to GD’s parliamentary 
interpellations following the arrests. More specifically, immediately afterwards, the MPOCP replied with 
the same answer every time: “We would like to inform you that, given the fact that many of the members 
of the party ‘Golden Dawn’ are being accused of participating in and operating a criminal organisation, as 
well as the temporary imprisonment, among others, of the leader of the party, as well as of two more of 
its MPs for committing crimes, we are not in a position to reply back to GD’s MPs through parliamentary 
means. Doing so means trespassing on the institutions of the parliament” (MPOCP, 2013)90. Following the 
shock event of the arrests, a now more formal cordon sanitaire among all the political actors against GD 
began to materialise. Right after Fyssas’ murder, Samaras called for a united front against neo-Nazism to 
be formed, including all the other parties (To Vima, 2013c)91, while pledging that he would make GD 
disappear from the political map (Naftemporiki, 2013h)92. Lastly, during the SYRIZA-led governments, GD 
never received a reply from the Ministry of Migration. More specifically, it had, at times, received the 
same reply: “We would like to inform you that the Minister of Migration, (…), due to reasons of conscience, 
refuses to enter into a dialogue with those who use parliamentary actions so as to diffuse their ideas or 
their slogan ‘blood, honour, Golden Dawn’’ (Greek Ministry of Migration, 2017)93. 
 
5.2 Internal conditions: Leadership and factions 
 
This section discusses the factional reconfigurations, between the two main factions that could be 
identified in ERPs, moderates and militants, inside GD, since its foundation (early ‘80s) up until the end of 
the thesis studied timeframe (December, 2016). Also, the preferences of the leader are also examined in 
order to identify which faction he was, more likely, sided with. The battles between moderates and 
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militants – as well as leadership’s factional preferences - in the GD are discussed over time, along with a 
sub-distinction as per political arena. The aim is to demonstrate which faction was dominant at specific 
points in time. The section finds out that there could be distinguished three, relatively distinct ‘factional 
Phases’, where one faction was more dominant than the other, presented in the Introduction of this 
chapter.  
 
5.2.1 Phase 1: 1980s – September 2013: Militants 
 
Grassroots Arena:  
Since its foundation (early ‘80s) up until the external shock of the arrests in September 2013, the GD had 
always been prioritising the recruitment of militant activists as part of its emphasis on contentious 
activism and its, for the most part, absence from the electoral and parliamentary arenas (Ellinas, 
2020:101). In the 1990s, the faction of militants activists was made up of various young males, who were 
attracted by the violent stigmatisation of GD and were eager to participate in street activism. This cohort 
of activists was predominantly represented by the figure of Periandros, the then right-hand of the party 
leader and informal deputy leader of the GD. The second wave of recruitment of militant activists 
happened in late 1990s - early 2000s, and the main pool was various football fan clubs. GD sought to set 
up various nationalist football club cells. Some well-known members who ended up in the highest 
echelons of the GD leadership were firstly recruited from these football fan clubs. For example, Antonios 
Gregos had close links with the football club of PAOK and Ioannis Lagos with that of AEK. Panagiotaros 
had close links with the football club of Panathinaikos, and he also had a prominent role in the ‘Blue Army’, 
a nationalist football fan association founded in 2000 with the goal of supporting the Greek national 
football team (Ellinas, 2020:102-3).  
Militants continued to dominate the top leadership of the GD throughout the early 2010s, as well. At the 
7th Party Congress of GD, in 2011, the majority of people who were chosen by Mihaloliakos as members 
were mostly known for their street actions rather than for their skills in conventional politics. When GD 
achieved its breakthrough in 2012, it was mainly run by militants who joined the GD in the 1990s and 
2000s. As a former local GD functionary put it: ‘This is a rare case of a party that turned the leader’s 
bodyguards into parliamentarians’ (cited in Ellinas, 2020:105).   
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When the local presence of the GD began to expand vastly in the early 2010s, the GD continued relying 
on its closed network of militant activists in running the newly set-up branches. As the leader put it: ‘It is 
important who wants to set up a branch; that is, if this comes from a person who is a fervent or active 
member’ (107). This decision aimed, primarily, at keeping the ideological coherence of GD at a time when 
electoral ascendancy brought many new members to GD. This meant that militants were given priority. 
Even shortly after the 2012 electoral breakthrough, militant activists continued to dominate the 
grassroots activism of the GD. For example, the newly appointed heads of local branches in the Attica 
region (as well as in other regions, such as in northern Greece) had frequented the Athens branch and 
were also members of GD’s Central Committee (Ellinas, 2020:108-109). However, the 2012 electoral 
breakthrough was a ‘grassroots shock’ for GD, who was lacking the necessary institutional mechanisms 
needed to manage the large influx of new local members. Thus, the GD inevitably had to accept into its 
ranks new people beyond its closed networks of militant activists. At first, and with varying methods of 
recruitment, the GD recruited people from gyms, security forces, army and the police in order to stuff its 
branches, thus aiming at institutional legitimacy in accordance with its ideological profile. Still, the practice 
of welcoming hundreds of new members without subjecting them to the process that militants 
underwent, was about to soon create tensions on many occasions. At first, party and leader loyalty proved 
difficult to establish and keeping a balance between moderates and militants at the local level was not 
achieved (Ellinas, 2020:108-111).   
 
Electoral Arena:  
For ERPs, the electoral arena might not be the arena where they are most experienced, as it is 
predominantly concerned with electoral instead of street politics. However, it is also, for them, the main 
place for reaching out to a wider audience, especially when they are electorally successful. Numerically 
speaking, the electoral arena is the largest arena, in terms of party actors, for all parties, including ERPs, 
at least in terms of visibility. Although, for ERPs, in the grassroots arena, hundreds (or even thousands) of 
party actors are active, the overwhelming majority of them will almost never get a moment of nation-
wide visibility. Additionally, actors in the electoral arena can yield more power inside parties, as they are 
competing for the spoils of a parliamentary seat and strive to be known to a wider audience. Similarly, in 
the electoral arena, the hundreds (or even thousands) of candidates that parties put on their electoral 
lists will also never get much publicity. However, unlike the party actors in the grassroots arena, most of 
them will receive their short moment of publicity during the pre-electoral period. The electoral lists of 
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parties are published by national and local newspapers and, thus, are more likely to receive some 
publicity. In this regard, the electoral arena represents the external image of parties and captures the 
extent to which they reach out to the wider electorate. In addition, moderates are predominantly active 
in the electoral arena, as they usually abstain from street activism, especially contentious activism. Thus, 
if there is a political arena where moderates are likely to gain more influence in ERPs, then this would be 
the electoral arena, primarily. In this regard, the electoral arena is the most relevant arena to look at for 
understanding the factional developments within ERPs (Art, 2011). Consequently, the factional conflicts 
of GD in the electoral arena deserves more discussion than the parliamentary and grassroots arenas, as it 
the place where the conflict between moderates and militants in ERPs is most evident.  
When the GD rose to electoral prominence, in 2012, it was inevitable that it would increase its attention 
to the electoral arena, so as to reach a wider audience beyond the niche of militant street fighters. The 
emphasis the GD was placing in the electoral arena can be best understood by discussing the power 
reconfigurations between moderates and militants as part of the process of drawing up its electoral lists. 
The process of drawing up the electoral lists is often considered as one of the ‘mini-arenas’ of the wider 
electoral arena (Isaksson and Akademi, 1994). It is, however, one of the most evident and ‘at the forefront’ 
areas of political parties, in their attempt to reach a wider audience and pursue vote-maximisation in the 
electoral arena.  
Figure 5.2 (below) can be read as a measurement of GD’s renewal of its candidates over three national 
elections: January 2015, September 2015 and July 2019, with the first election of comparison being the 
June 2012 breakthrough election. It shows two categories: i) the percentage of first-time candidates on 
GD electoral lists, which is the total of candidates in each national election who did not stand in any of the 
previous elections, including the 2014 European election, and ii) the percentage of candidates who were 
on the lists in all previous national elections, including the 2014 European election. For example, with 
regards to the first point, in the September 2015 election, 15% of the candidates had not stood in the 
2012 June election, the 2014 European election or the January 2015 national election (thus, they were 
new faces, and most likely moderates). Regarding the second point, 22% stood in all of the three previous 






Figure 5.2 GD’s candidate renewal in national elections 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation, based on GD’s electoral lists (iEfimerida, 201294; GD, January 201595; 
GD September 201596; GD, 201997) 
 
Thus, Figure 5.2 (above) shows that GD had dramatically changed, over the period of its parliamentary 
presence, its personnel on its electoral lists. In addition, large amounts of this change coincided with the 
period when the leader was in and out of jail. This finding seems to strengthen the assertion that, when 
the leader was in jail, he had lost at least some of his leverage, with regards to the selection of candidates 
in the electoral arena, while he began to regain it while out of jail. As Figure 5.2 above shows, in the 
January 2015 election, a staggering 73% of GD’s candidates had not run in the June 2012 national elections 
or in the 2014 European elections. In other words, GD underwent a huge renewal of its personnel in the 
electoral arena in January 2015. This seems to strengthen the assertion that, most likely, the majority of 
them were moderates, due to the fact that they were first-time runners in GD. Lastly, as Figure 5.2 above 
                                                            
94 https://bit.ly/36mTjzA  
95 https://bit.ly/32VPOOh  
96 https://bit.ly/2NmxNSG  


































shows (above), the steady decline of candidates running in any previous election over time seems to 
suggest that GD was losing old faces (as well); that is, most likely, militants. This is discussed further in this 
chapter.  
Figure 5.3 (below) shows the total of GD’s candidates as per national election. In the January 2015 
elections, GD had increased its candidates by 59%, compared to the 2012 June elections, and decreased 
its candidates by 18% in the September 2015 elections (when the leader was out from jail), compared to 
the January 2015 elections. This finding shows that when the leader was in jail, GD made its biggest 
opening in the electoral arena, by fielding more candidates than ever before.  
Figure 5.3 Total of GD’s candidates, per national election 
Source: Author’s own compilations, based on GD’s electoral lists (iEfimerida, 2012; GD, January 2015; 
GD September 2015; GD, 2019) 
 
Parliamentary Arena 
The overwhelming majority of the GD MPs, elected in all the three elections during the thesis timeframe, 
were old militants (and long-time members of the two highest organs, Central Committee and Political 
Council) of the GD. In the June 2012 national election, only two new faces inside the GD gained a 


























Total of GD's candidates per national election
Jun-12 Jan-15 Sep-15 Jul-19
146 
 
and Corinth, respectively. These two, most likely, they could be identified as moderates than militants as, 
shortly after the arrests, they both left GD voluntarily, refusing to admit ever knowing of any violent 
assaults perpetrated by GD98.  
 
5.2.2 Phase 2: October 2013 – April 2015: Moderates 
 
Electoral Arena 
For the GD, its founder and leader, Mihaloliakos, has always been the undisputable leader. However, it 
could be safely assumed that, for 18 months, the leader had lost, to a great extent, his communication 
links with GD, by simply being physically absent. For a movement-party like GD, where the leader has 
unconstrained power, it is reasonable to expect that this development would have had some effect on 
the internal functioning of GD. This development leads immediately to the question: Did someone else 
undertake leadership duties while Mihaloliakos was in jail? Formally, Mihaloliakos continued being the 
leader of GD while in jail. However, it seems that, for some time following his imprisonment, another GD 
leading figure assumed some leadership duties, at least in some of the most ‘vital zones of uncertainty’ 
inside GD. This was GD’s spokesperson, Elias Kasidiaris, who was eventually arrested and imprisoned in 
July 2014 (iEfimerida, 2014b)99. Kasidiaris, an old member of GD, committed to the Nazi ideas and violent 
actions of GD, was the main actor handling the task of fielding GD candidates for the May 2014 European 
parliament election, while the Mihaloliakos was in jail. This is evident, for example, when elected GD’s 
MEP, Synadinos, mentioned Kasidiaris as the main actor who reached out to him and other candidates 
and largely had handled the task of drawing up GD’s ballot; a fact also stated in journalistic sources 
(Jailgoldedawn, 2018)100.  
The majority of GD’s ballot in the 2014 European elections consisted mainly of relatively new faces in GD 
who had no record of previous activities:  30 out of total 42 candidates did not run in the 2012 elections 
or were not members of its top-ranked organs, such as the Central Committee or the Political Council (GD, 
2014)101. Thus, the ballot of GD could be described as a great opening to moderates (candidates, other 
                                                            
98 https://www.newsbeast.gr/politiki/arthro/656021/edioxan-apo-ti-hrusi-augi-ton-stathi-boukoura ; 
https://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/apoxorei-apo-ti-xrysi-aygi-o-boyleytis-x-aleksopoylos   
99 https://bit.ly/2qHdDes  
100 https://bit.ly/2Oj8rXX  
101 https://archive.fo/nUnah  
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political personnel and voters) and did not resemble one made up of persons who had a record of violent 
activity. For example, in terms of occupational status (e.g. Art, 2011:33), many of the candidates who got 
promoted (evidenced in the results that they scored) were doctors, lawyers, university professors and 
top-ranked army officials (GD, 2014). In addition, 10 out of 42 total candidates were women (an unusually 
high proportion for a neo-Nazi party), whom GD promoted by titling its news items with ‘A female perfume 
on GD’s European ballot’ (GD, 2014). These moderate new faces not only outnumbered militants, but they 
got the most visibility, as well, in the period leading up to the election day. These new candidates were 
not connected to, and perhaps not very well aware of, GD’s deep commitment to Nazi ideas and violent 
actions in the grassroots arena. However, they were willing to join GD for either ideological or 
opportunistic reasons. Many of those most visible candidates (e.g. those who scored high) in the 2014 
European elections can best be defined as moderates because (despite being relatively new faces in GD) 
they had, later, either left GD or established their own PRRPs, or had joined other populist radical right 
parties (see below). In addition, while they were in GD, they did not manage to gain a position in the 
Central Committee or in the Political Council, the top organs of the GD.  
The best performing GD MEP in the 2014 elections, Eleftherios Synadinos, left GD in 2018 and established 
his own party, P.A.T.RI.E.102, more a PRRP than ERP, which, in the 2019 national elections, fielded a joint 
candidate list with LAOS (Eklogika, 2019)103. In the 2014 European elections, prominent moderates and 
new faces did well. For example, Dr. Vasileios Chalvatzoulis finished fifth, professor Elias Eliakopoulos 
sixth, professor Georgios Galeos seventh, Dr. Dimitrios Zafeiropoulos tenth, Giorgos Vasileiou thirteenth 
and Georgia-Kokoti Areti fifteenth. All of these individuals later left GD. Chalvatzoulis, a former member 
of ND, returned to ND, Eliakopoulos rejected a proposal to join LAOS in 2015 (Jailgoldendawn, 2015a)104 
and Galeos left GD in March 2017 and joined LAOS (Jailgoldendawn, 2018)105. From the hardliners, only 
Kostas Alexandrakis (member of GD’s Political Council) did relatively well, finishing fourth. Other 
prominent long-term figures of GD, such as Eirini Dimopoulou (the chief editor of GD’s official newspaper 
EMPROS) finished 9th, while other members of the Political Council, such as Michael Tsakiris, Stavros 
Karefellakis and Alexandra Mparou, finished further away from moderates, securing the 11th, 21st and 26th 
                                                            
102  Patriotiki RIzospastiki Enosi – (Patriotic Radical Union) https://www.patrie.gr/category3.asp?subcid=12 
103 https://www.eklogika.gr/news/To-koino-tous-eurwpshfodeltio-anakoinwsan-LAOS-kai-Patriwtikh-Rizospastikh-
Enwsh-(PAT-RI-E)-24-04-2019  
104 https://bit.ly/31PLMFM  
105 https://bit.ly/357Z9UE  
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places, respectively, in GD’s ballot (Greek Ministry of Interior, 2014)106. On the same day as the 2014 
European elections, local and municipal elections were held in Greece. Here, too, GD adopted moderate 
candidates. Some prominent examples were Christos Goudis, elected local councillor in Athens, who, in 
March 2015, left GD (Jailgoldendawn, 2015b)107, and Nikos Mouzakis, candidate as a prefecture councillor 
in Athens, who later left GD to join ND (Tvxs, 2019)108.  
Thus, it seems that, following the arrest of the leader, a new faction of new faces inside GD, containing 
more moderates than militants, began gaining influence. In electoral terms, the results were a success for 
GD, which managed to significantly increase its vote share and achieve its highest ever electoral result 
(9.84%), despite facing a more unfavourable context. It seemed that, to some extent, this success could 
be attributed to Kasidiaris, who managed to field electorally appealing candidates. However, the 
imprisoned leader had a different opinion about these developments. On 31st May 2014, Mihaloliakos 
expressed his dissatisfaction in seeing new faces taking the glory for GD’s highest ever electoral result. In 
his main article in the newspaper ‘EMPROS’109, entitled ‘We are not changing!’110  he wrote:  
‘’Comrades, we have definitely achieved a huge victory, but, UNFORTUNATELY, there has been observed a 
‘same old politics’ phenomena, which, at best, describes an urban, rather a revolutionary, party. Is that 
what you want for GD? I DO NOT! And, you better know that the biggest enemy to our ‘movement’ is all 
those who say that we must change,’ (Jailgoldendawn, 2015b)111.  
Thus, the leader laid down his preferences clearly and the factions he, most likely, sided with: the 
militants. He preferred a revolutionary party that could break down the democratic system through 
violent actions. By referring to a ‘movement’ instead of an ‘urban party’, the leader positioned himself in 




107https://bit.ly/2p4WtXZ   
108 https://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/proin-xrysaygitis-epikefalis-tis-nd-sto-xalandri 
109 ‘EMPROS’ was first published in June 2013 and it is the second-in order GD’s official newspaper with national 
circulation. This is a rather softer, in its content, newspaper than the main official newspaper ‘Golden Dawn’. The 
publication of ‘EMPROS’ was most likely an attempt by Mihaloliakos to strengthen GD’s appeal to a broader space 
of the radical right (political personnel and voters). See: Jailgoldendawn, (2015c), available at: https://bit.ly/2pNP9zP  
110 Which was also posted on GD’s website with a different title: ‘A different opinion about the elections’. See: 
Mihaloliakos, (2014), available at: https://archive.is/uub7S#selection-793.37-801.3 
111https://bit.ly/2p4WtXZ     
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prioritising the movement-face. His reference to ‘same old politics’ was, most likely, a reference to the 
new faces and moderates who clearly did not share the ideas of starting a ‘revolution’.  
In the January 2015 national elections, first-time candidates scored very well on the ballots of GD. For 
example, in 41 out of 56 constituencies across the country where GD fielded electoral lists, they finished 
either in first or second place. In addition, this 73% managed to secure 81% of GD’s votes in the January 
2015 elections, thus enhancing their visibility. However, from these new faces, only two moderates (out 
of 18 elected GD MPs), Georgios Galeos and Despoina Chrysoveloni112, were elected as MPs. This is 
because first-time runners did not manage to secure first place in any of the largest consistencies, such as 
Athens, Piraeus or Thessaloniki, or secure first place in those smaller constituencies where previous 
elected MPs and long-term members of GD ran. GD also saw a 35% decline, compared to the 2014 
European elections; a first strong indication that the visibility of these new faces of GD in the electoral 
arena had begun to fade away. Perhaps the imprisonment of Kasidiaris in July 2014 might have been 
related to this decreasing visibility. Moreover, there are no strong indications that this faction had ever 
acquired the status of a truly dominant faction, according to the criteria of Harmel & Tan (2003). 
Nevertheless, if there was a period when this faction had the most influence and visibility, then this was 
in Phase 2. 
 
Parliamentary Arena  
In the January 2015 national election, two new GD figures, who were moderates and relatively new faces 
in the GD (and rather unknown to most militants) were elected, Georgios Galeos and Despina Sveroni-
Chondronasiou. Thus, in another national election, similarly as in June 2012 national elections, only two 
new entrances of moderates inside the parliament occurred for GD. The majority of GD MPs continued to 




                                                            
112  She joined PATRIE in 2018. See: Jailgoldendawn 2018d, available at: https://bit.ly/2MOdBKr  
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5.2.3 Phase 3: May 2015 – December 2016: Militants 
 
Electoral Arena 
The factional Phase 3 begun Following the 2015 January elections and the release of Mihaloliakos (April 
2015). Following the release of Mihaloliakos what followed was a process of factional realignments inside 
GD, with the militants now steadily re-gaining the upper hand. This was firstly evident in the electoral 
arena with the decreasing visibility of the moderates. However, conflicts among the militants emerged as 
well.  
In the electoral arena, around this period the new faces in GD witnessed a further decline of their visibility 
and influence. Between January 2015 and the September 2015 elections, a first noticeable wave of 
defections in GD occurred. Many defectors were these new faces and moderates. This is further evidenced 
when, in May 2015, Kasidiaris revealed this wave of defections, which, additionally, in some way, indicated 
that he, as well, had lost any leverage he might have had in influencing some of the ‘most vital zones of 
uncertainty’ inside GD. On 25th May 2015, during an online broadcasting of GD’s show (on the old website 
of GD), Kasidiaris stated:  
“With all of these prosecutions and attacks against us, only the good ones have stayed, those who can 
deal with this pressure. This has made us better internally because, with our sharp electoral success and 
the public image we got anyway, people really wanted to come to GD, and we must say that every 
irrelevant person came to GD…and with all that has happened, only the few, but the good ones, have 
stayed. And, I do not refer to voters...but to the internal cycle of GD, the few and the good ones have 
stayed.” (Jailgoldendawn, 2015d)113.  
Following the release of Mihaloliakos, it seems that Kasidiaris had either abandoned the strategy of 
opening up to new faces or that he had lost any leverage he had for pursuing such a strategy. Indeed, 
some developments show that Kasidiaris was now creating an opening to the hardliners rather than to 
the moderates. This was part of a wider strategy of GD and, most likely, under the initiative of 
Mihaloliakos, of an opening to hardliners, while, at the same time, keeping the moderates at a safe 
distance. This strategy can be observed in various texts in GD’s news platforms (e.g. website and 
newspapers), as Psarras (2018)114 observes, where GD was attempting to appeal to hardliners, while still 
                                                            




keeping some of its appeal to moderates. One illustrative example of this strategy was the following: A 
few months after his release from jail, on 1st July 2015 (Protothema, 2015)115, Kasidiaris published his book 
‘Prison’s Political Diary’, where he wrote about his experience in jail and the reasons why he was 
imprisoned. On the front cover of the book, Kasidiaris was pictured kicking a boxing sack while half-naked. 
A swastika tattoo covering his entire left arm was revealed in open view. What is more, Kasidiaris made 
frequent presentations of his book in various places across the country, often attended by large crowds. 
In addition, his book was promoted and gained a lot of publicity from GD’s website and from the 
newspaper ‘Golden Dawn’, being advertised next to the main article of Mihaloliakos. Mihaloliakos, 
himself, also promoted Kasiadiaris’ book frequently, often as the introducing person (GD, December 
2015)116. This development, as Psarras (2018) observes, was most likely an appeal by Kasidiaris himself 
(having Mihaloliakos’ approval) to the hardliners, indicating that, despite Kasidiaris’ opening to 
moderates, he and GD’s leadership remained loyal to their Nazi ideas.  
In the September 2015 election, GD saw a further slight decrease in votes, a further shock to vote-
maximisation and a call for change of strategy for GD. Also, Mihaloliakos, himself, had revealed that he 
was facing internal opposition with regards to the unsuccessful realisation of vote-maximisation. As he 
wrote in GD’s website two months after the September elections: 
“Two months following the elections and GD remains the third party in the polls; it remains stable and, of 
course, it still has a long way to fight so it can become even stronger. All of this inside a terrorising climate, 
faced with exclusion and the presence of a fifth column of ‘whisperers’ who have the audacity to claim 
that the 7% we received in the last elections was …a failure!” (Mihaloliakos, 2015)117.  
With the word ‘whisperers’, Mihaloliakos was referring, most likely, to moderates or, at least, to these 
internal party actors inside GD who were prioritising vote-maximisation. In fact, Mihaloliakos continued 
downplaying vote-maximisation. The ongoing marginalisation and exodus of moderates and new faces 
was manifested further in the September 2015 election. Old GD militants were prioritised on its electoral 
lists over new faces, who had done well in the previous elections (see Trikaladay, 2015118; Jailgoldendawn, 
2015e119; Jailgoldendawn, 2015f120). The militants now began re-gaining their power inside the GD and 
                                                            
 
115 https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/489388/upothesi-hrusis-augis-eleutheros-o-ilias-kasidiaris/ 
116 http://xaioniou.blogspot.com/2015/12/blog-post_519.html  
117 https://archive.is/TpHBQ 
118 http://www.trikaladay.gr/karatomisi-ipopsifias-voulefti-tis-chrisis-avgis-sta-trikala 
119 https://bit.ly/2BLKIIo  
120 https://bit.ly/367eJAw  
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scaring the moderates away. An indicative example is the following: in the district of Pieria, George 
Papadimitriou, a newcomer in the 2012 elections and the leader of the Katerini branch, was, by far, the 
best-performing candidate MP in the June 2012 and January 2015 elections, ahead of the old member 
and militant, Nikolaos Chrysomallis. In the September 2015 election, Chrysomallis formed an alliance with 
old members in the Thessaloniki branch and managed to get rid of Papadimitriou from the electoral list. 
He, however, did not manage to gain a parliamentary seat (Ellinas, 2020:113). 
In the electoral arena, these developments seem to suggest that, in Phase 3, GD did not wholeheartedly 
embrace the idea of prioritising vote-maximisation, evidenced by the prioritisation of militants. This was, 
most likely, a result of Mihaloliakos’ preferences. He had already expressed opposition to big changes, as 
stated previously. It seems that he did not change his opinion throughout. For example, a prominent GD 
moderate, and its most-popular MEP, Eleftherios Synadinos, stated, more or less, that Mihaloliakos did 
not care much about vote-maximisation or seeking any alliances in order to overcome isolation. As 
Synadinos stated: 
“I heard many times Mihaloliakos stating ‘let’s stay at 5%, we do not care what the people might say’. 
What does it mean ‘we do not care what the people might say’? ... people who voted for GD were hoping 
for something…we cannot get locked in at 5% so that those who belong to the core of GD get comfy” 
(Jailgoldendawn, 2018b)121.  
Three days before the September 2015 election, Mihaloliakos stated, on Real News radio via telephone: 
‘We undertake the political responsibility for the murder of Fyssas in Keratsini’ (Jailgoldendawn, 2015g)122. 
Following this, internal conflicts emerged inside and further defections followed. At first, this brought to 
the surface the conflicting strategies of Mihaloliakos and Kasidiaris. Kasidiaris, on the same day, stated, 
on the ‘Makeleio’ online political show, that: ‘GD does not assume, at all, any political responsibility for 
any murder’123. What followed was GD losing the support from the media that had been helping it, since 
its initial electoral breakthrough, appeal to a wider spectrum of the far-right, such as the newspaper 
‘Stohos’, where, soon after the September 2015 election, its chief editor distanced himself from GD, 
stating: ‘Enough is enough! The political responsibility for the murder of Fyssas rests on the defeated of 
1945, not on the Greek-in-psyche nationalists’ (Jailgoldendawn, 2015h)124. This development was a further 
                                                            
121 https://bit.ly/2Na3gaG 
122 https://bit.ly/2p2IJwR  
123 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5a2Vo1XS0Bs&t=9m17s  
124 https://bit.ly/2MNTGex  
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indication of the increasing divergence between moderates and militants inside GD. In fact, prominent 
moderates defectors mentioned the prosecution procedures against GD as one of the main reasons for 
their departure from GD, such as Goudis (2015b)125, and Elias Eliakopoulos (Jailgoldendawn, 2018c)126.  
 
Parliamentary arena:  
In the September 2015 election, the only, rather moderate, figure who got elected as an MP was Sotiria 
Vlachou. Therefore in Phase 3 as well, the overwhelming majority of GD’s MPs was consisted of old 
militants. 
However, some of the most intense internal conflicts inside the GD were about the prospect of winning a 
parliamentary seat. Many old militant members collided with newcomers over the spoils of a 
parliamentary seat. These conflicts were evident throughout the studied timeframe of the thesis, 
including the period when the leader was out of jail. In some notorious cases, even the leadership 
preferred the promotion of newcomers moderates as MPs over old militants members. Following this, 
many old members began to defect from GD, explaining their departure as resulting from disagreements 
with Mihaloliakos. However, most of these defections happened after 2016 and up until the 2019 national 
election, a period that is out of the scope of this thesis. Still, some notable defections worth mentioning 
happened before 2016. A prominent defection of an old militant was that of Christos Rigas, in 2014127. 
Rigas, a GD activist since the early 2000s, was far more popular among voters than Barbarousis in the 
constituency of Aetolia-Akarnania. The former was preferred and was elected MP in the 2012 and 2015 
elections (Ellinas, 2020:112). Rigas left the GD in May 2015 and later established his own ERP party, named 
‘L.E.P.EN’ (Efimerida Ton Syntakton, 2016128; LEPEN, 2015)129. In Larissa, the election of newcomer 
Alexopoulos sparked a feud with the old member Dimitrios Koltsidas. Although Alexopoulos left the GD 
after the arrests, the erupted friction led Koltsidas to defect from GD in 2014.  
In the parliamentary arena, old GD members who were also elected as MPs, begun defecting in Phase 3. 
Dimitris Koukoutsis, a GD member for over two decades and an MP, defected from the GD following the 
appointment of a new Kalamata council by the leadership in 2016. The next notable defection of an old 
                                                            
125 https://bit.ly/2WoRg9H  
126 https://bit.ly/2MMPWdr  
127 https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/synenteyxeis/92527_o-mihaloliakos-apofasizei-gia-ola  
128 https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/koinonia/65498_syllipseis-stelehon-tis-lepen 




militant (and elected MP) happened in March 2017, with the departure of Nikos Michos, along with his 
wife Alexandra Mparou (member of the Central Committee) (Jailgoldendawn, 2017)130. Michos disagreed 
with the leadership about its preference and promotion of newcomers as MPs in the constituency of Evoia 
(113). Shortly after their departure, Koukoutsis and Michos seemed to have turned into moderates, with 
Michos ending up with LAOS and Koukoutsis with Synadinos’ PAT.RI.E (Jailgoldendawn, 2018e131; 
2018f)132.  
Thus, the GD experienced defections of militants who were sidelined by the leadership in the process of 
gaining a parliamentary seat. However, at least during the studied timeframe of the thesis, the defections 
of moderates were predominantly more notable, and more numerically speaking, than that of militants.  
 
Grassroots Arena 
The grassroots arena is the place where most vividly demonstrates the eventual prevalence of the 
militants in Phase 3, in GD. In Phase 3, following the exodus of many prominent moderates, and many 
notorious feuds among militants as well, it was however, the militants who gained dominance inside GD 
at the end of the day. The abandonment of violent activism and the decrease in grassroots activism 
following the external shock, by the GD, will be highlighted in more detail in the next section of this 
chapter.  
However, following the external shock, GD began losing ground in the grassroots arena, by showing signs 
of weakness in competing with various extreme-right groupuscules. For example, following the arrests, 
various new Neo-Nazi groupuscules (or already existing groupuscules) intensified their violent activity in 
the streets. Some prominent examples were the Greek Combat-18, Apella, Krypteia (In.gr, 2018)133, Pro-
Patria (Sempreviva, 2017)134 and the ‘Unaffiliated Meander Nationalists’ (Maiandrioi, 2018)135. Perhaps, 
these actors re-emerged after years of dormancy, so as to fill this void of violent actions left open by the 
GD. Although  there is no study that systematically examines defections from the GD to the non-party 
extreme right sector, it is likely that, following the external shock, GD began losing newly recruited 
                                                            
130https://bit.ly/2PjRFZf   
131 https://bit.ly/2qO47X9  







militants (following the 2012 breakthrough) to these groupuscules (see more below), who were mostly 
active, often violently, in the streets. For example, Alexandors Tzoulios was a local councillor candidate 
for GD in the municipality of Piraeus, in the 2014 local elections (Koinoniki, 2018)136. However, by 2016 he 
defected from GD and joined the neo-Nazi groupuscule ‘Apella’, which glorifies the former vice-leader of 
GD, Periandros (Apella, 2016)137 and which emerged in October 2016 (Jailgoldendawn, 2018g)138. Combat-
18, which had long been praised by GD, found their violent actions gaining visibility again in 2015 
(Jailgoldendawn, 2018h)139.  
Nevertheless, and despite the various intense internal conflicts between newcomer moderates and old 
militants the GD experienced during the thesis timeframe (May 2012 – December 2016), the militants 
prevailed at the end. The eventual dominance of militants in GD in Phase 3, was mostly evidenced in the 
grassroots arena. For example, the entrance of new members, as well as the establishment of new 
branches after the 2012 electoral breakthrough, had, as a result, varying degrees of organisational 
outcomes and, subsequently, a de-radicalisation and radicalisation for the GD in the grassroots arena. Up 
until the end of 2016, GD branches controlled by militants that resorted to violent activism lived longer 
and displayed higher and more consistent patterns of activism, compared with those primarily run by 
moderates or with those branches that were not engaging in contentious activism (118). Consequently, 
in the grassroots arena, as well, at the end of the day, the militants prevailed inside the GD. However, 
following the external shock, two important changes occurred. Firstly, numerically speaking, the militants 
declined in number, witnessed by the closure of many local branches. Secondly, following the 
abandonment of contentious activism, it seems that the militants had to decrease their contentious 
activism significantly.  
What is more, other developments as well, point out to the eventual prevalence of the militants inside 
GD. For example, the GD held a party congress in 2010 and 2016, which was responsible, among other 
things, for the election of the central committee; the highest organ of the GD, made up of 60 members. 
In 2016, 37 members were re-elected. Thus, throughout this time, the GD was able to keep the majority 
of its old militant members (Ellinas, 2020:71). In short, this indicates that, during the thesis timeframe 
(e.g. May 2012 – December 2016), the militants prevailed in the GD with a short break during Phase 2. At 
                                                            
136 https://web.archive.org/web/20170706091851/http://koinoniki.gr/2014/05/oli-i-stafri-ton-ipopsifion-tou-
sindiasmou-elliniki-avgi-gia-ton-pirea/ 
137https://bit.ly/2qHCMWl   
138 https://bit.ly/2Wg4Hsd  
139 https://bit.ly/2Jp3MQY  
156 
 
the same time, the notable internal conflicts mostly after the arrests tend to suggest that the GD was 
unable to maintain a state of complete unity lacking the institutional mechanisms to manage the entrance 
of new moderate members. These conflicts were evident across all political arenas.  
 
5.3 GD’s behaviour: May 2012 – December 2016 
 
This section provides evidence, beyond the PICs, as regards to all four thesis hypotheses; the two external 
and two internal factors hypotheses. Regarding external factors, Hypothesis 1 assumes that: there is a 
tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to de-radicalise as they achieve and seek to maintain 
parliamentary representation; and Hypothesis 2 which assumes that: there is a tendency for ERPs, such 
as Golden Dawn, to radicalise (or re-radicalise) when they assume social movement 
characteristics.Regarding tnternal factors, Hypothesis 3 (De-radicalisation) assumes that: exogenous 
shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’ (such as Golden Dawn) leaderships and factions may 
result in de-radicalisation outcomes when moderates are mainly the influential faction; and Hypothesis 4 
(Re-radicalisation), which assumes that: exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’ 
(such as Golden Dawn) leaderships and factions  may result in (re)-radicalisation outcomes when the 
hardliners/militants are mainly the influential faction.  
 
5.3.1 Electoral arena 
 
The first GD electoral manifesto was published in 1996 and remained unchanged until 2011, when a new 
manifesto was issued, through which GD ran in the 2012 elections. In the 2011 manifesto, despite some 
changes in the economy, large parts of it were identical to the 1996 manifesto, especially on ‘national 
issues’ and illegal-immigration. The next full-fledged GD manifesto was presented in 2016, at the 8th 
congress (a previous shorter version of it was published in 2015, through which GD ran the 2015 elections). 
In 2016, GD extended its programmatic agenda, often discussing economic issues. Additionally, this 
manifesto signalled the de-radicalisation of GD’s programmatic agenda, evidenced in the softening on 
some of its signature issues (Ellinas, 2020:87). For example, while in the 1996 manifesto, the GD talked 
about forced deportation of ‘all foreigners’, in 2016, the manifesto focused on illegal immigration and 
demanded the provision of residency permits only to those non-EU nationals who meet the necessary 
legal provisions. In addition, it avoided irredentist claims.  
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Regarding issue salience, according to the coding scheme of the Comparative Agendas Project, in both the 
June 2012 and January 2015 elections, the GD focused mainly on three policy issues: government issues, 
defense and macroeconomics, shown in Figure 5.4 (below).  
Figure 5.4 Most Salient Policy Issues in GD Manifestoes: June 2012 & January 2015 national elections 
 
Source: Vasilopoulou et al. (2015:16-17) 
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 5.4 (above), immigration was the fourth most salient issue across both 
elections for the GD. These findings indicate that the GD reduced its salience on its core policy issues in 
between the two national elections and increased its saliency on economic issues. This finding is an 
indication of de-radicalisation in the electoral arena.   
When it comes to the internal literature of the GD, with regards to changes in its issue saliency, the only 
existing study is of Boussalis and Coan (2015), who analysed around 17,000 texts from GD’s old website 
news section, from May 2012 - August 2015. They used a quantitative method, namely word proximity. 
Boussalis and Coan (2015) provided over time changes of issue salience on the immigration issue only. As 
they found, throughout 2012, the salience of immigration was at its highest, witnessing a steady drop 
from January 2013 up until February 2015. From March 2015 up until August 2015, the salience of 
immigration in GD’s news website section increased steadily, reaching a peak in August 2015. This finding 
indicates that the GD entered a de-radicalisation course, which was most evident following the external 
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5.3.2 Parliamentary arena 
 
Figure 5.5 (below) shows the evolution of GD’s parliamentary actions during the timeframe of this thesis. 
These are all of the parliamentary actions that a political party can conduct daily inside parliament. These 
actions are various types of interpellations (see Appendix 2). They are requests always addressed to 
governing actors (e.g. Ministries, the Prime Minister him/herself, etc.), excluding bill proposals, however. 
The most striking fact from Figure 5.5 (below) is that, following the arrests, GD steadily increased its 
actions inside parliament. More specifically, following the January 2015 elections, parliamentary actions 
showed a sharp increase, compared to the previous period, while, from May 2016 to the end of Phase 2b, 
they were more frequent than ever before. These findings indicate that the GD was over-emphasising its 
party-face following the period of the external shock. 
Figure 5.5 Parliamentary actions of GD: 2012 - 2016 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation, from hellenicparliament.gr. Note: 1) Dotted line indicates the event of 
GD leadership arrests. 2) In January 2015 and September 2015, national elections took place and the 
parliament was closed because of the pre-electoral period. Thus, all political parties were inactive inside 
























































































GD's parliamentary actions: 2012 - 2016
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With regards to the evolution of issue salience in the parliamentary behaviour of the GD, Figure 5.1, 
presented previously in page XX, is a good indicator of the changes in salience on the issues of immigration 
and law & order, raised by the GD in its parliamentary actions from May 2012 up until December 2014. 
An analysis of a longer period would require more time and resources that put it beyond the scope of this 
thesis because the formation of the ‘Ministry of Migration’ happened only in November 2016. Thus, from 
January 2015 up until November 2016 (that is, during the new SYRIZA-led governments), various ministries 
were concerned with immigration, such as the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Governance and 
the Ministry of Justice. Thus, this analysis is left for future research. It is worth mentioning, again, that the 
salience of immigration and law & order issues on GD’s parliamentary praxis witnessed a sharp drop 
following the external shock and remained at very low levels up until December 2014. This finding could 
be interpreted as a sign of a de-radicalisation of GD in the parliamentary arena.  
 
5.3.3 Grassroots arena 
 
GD has a diverse repertoire of grassroots activism, including both conventional and contentious actions. 
Conventional actions range from disseminating party material (e.g. party newspapers) on the streets, by 
teams of local activists across the country, cleaning up public spaces (e.g. school yards, beaches, historic 
statues), demonstrative actions, such as marches and demonstrations by dozens of GD members and 
supporters, and contentious actions, such as destroying stalls of illegal-migrants street market vendors 
(Ellinas & Lamprianou, 2017). These activities are organised by the hundreds of activists who are recruited 
by the various local branches the GD has across the country.  
The local expansion of GD across Greece increased dramatically following the 2012 breakthrough and 
reached its height by the end of 2014, when it had set up branches in 69 different towns across Greece, 
despite facing cut in public funding from December 2013 onwards. By the 2012 elections, the GD had 
established 15 local branches, while less than a year after the 2012 elections, local branches increased to 
52. By the end of 2014, branches increased to 60. However, many of those branches were inactive, having 
organised only a handful of activities. In 2015, this expansion trend was stalled, when no new branches 
were established, and then a reverse occurred. By the end of 2016, GD local branches drop to 48, and 




Despite the fact that local expansion continued, by the end of 2014, the total of grassroots activities by all 
branches began to reduce following the arrests and their subsequent effects. Local activism increased 
significantly following the 2012 breakthrough and remained at high levels up until the arrests, but 
following the arrests, the total number of activities organised by all branches was reduced significantly, 
dropping to the levels seen prior to the 2012 electoral breakthrough, and never again reached the peak 
witnessed between June 2012 and September 2013 (Ellinas, 2020:157-159).  
GD also witnessed a qualitative change in the nature of its activities; social activism, in particular. GD had 
almost completely abandoned its social activism (e.g. food, blood donations, jobs for ‘Greeks only’, etc.), 
compared to the period before the arrests; an outcome most likely attributed to the cut in public funding 
and to the law change (no. 4531/2015)140. This is, perhaps, an indication that GD’s direct contact with the 
people began weakening on the streets, as its efforts at social activism were the only type of grassroots 
actions through which GD could appeal to a wider public (Koronaiou & Sakellariou, 2013:335). Various 
studies (e.g. Georgiadou & Rori, 2019; Ellinas, 2020) provide strong evidence that the violent actions by 
GD reduced significantly following the external shock. In analysing the violent actions reported in the GD 
newspaper141, Ellinas (2020:160-1) finds that violent incidents involving GD reduced considerably 









                                                            
140 https://www.lawspot.gr/nomika-nea/oi-nees-diataxeis-peri-ithageneias-nomos-4531-2018 ; 
https://www.tovima.gr/2015/07/08/politics/boyli-psifistike-to-nomosxedio-gia-tin-ithageneia/  
141 While official data regarding violent actions associated with GD are absent, the official newspaper of GD 
provides a good proxy for gauging its violent incidents ‘because it systematically aggregates media reports 
associating the GD with violence, and then refutes them’ (160).  
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Figure 5.6 Violence from GD, incidents reported in party newspaper (n=204) 
 
Source: Ellinas, (2020:161) 
In identifying violent incidents by far-right and far-left organisations in Greece, Georgiadou & Rori (2019) 
analysed thousands of daily newspapers and online media portals, in the period 2008-2018. They focused 
on incidents of low-intensity violence. Actors committing this type of violence usually do not belong to 
any formal organisations. That is, they are mainly closer to the non-party far-right sector. By employing 
the event analysis method, the authors were able to extract from the data the actors, targets, location 
and time of the violent incidents (Georgiadou & Rori, 2019:1-2). 
Figure 5.7 (below) illustrates the evolution of violent incidents by the most active far-right organisations 
during 2008-2018, as identified by Georgiadou & Rori (2019:9). It shows that, following GD’s electoral 
breakthrough, violent incidents attributed to GD skyrocketed, peaking in 2012 with 43 incidents. In 2013, 
they dropped significantly, while, in 2014, they declined further. From then on, until 2018, violent 
incidents attributed to GD remained stable (following another slight decline after 2016). However, violent 
actions attributed to GD were significantly more frequent throughout the period of its parliamentary 









































































Figure 5.7 The evolution of violent action by the most active organisations on the far-right: 2008-2018  
Source: Georgiadou and Rori, 2019:9 
 
In other words, as Figure 5.7 (above) shows, GD was most violently active in Phase 1, when it was enjoying 
a more favourable context. Moreover, with regards to the category ‘far-right activists’, news reports 
attributing violent actions to them decreased sharply in the years when GD was most active (e.g. Phase 1: 
2012-2013), only to increase dramatically in the period following GD’s external shock. In addition, other 
far-right organisations, such as the AME (Ανένταχτοι Μεάνδριοι Εθνικιστές - Unaffiliated Meander  
Nationalists) and its sister Neo-Nazi groupuscule, ‘Combat 18’, are reported to have begun their violent 
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5.4 Hypotheses for GD de-radicalisation & radicalisation  
 
The aim of this section is to theorise how the four short hypotheses of the thesis are likely to be 
manifested in the PICs of the Golden Dawn as regards to the de-radicalisation and radicalisation of its 
behaviour. Following the discussion in this chapter so far, concerning the conditions under which the GD 
is likely to de-radicalise and radicalise, the following alternative hypotheses can be formulated, as per 
external and internal factors, and evidenced on GD’s impact-claims:  
 
5.4.1 External Factors hypotheses 
 
Regarding the external factors hypotheses, following the external shock of the arrests, the GD abandoned 
some form of its contentious activism, most notably violent actions. As existing studies (e.g. Ellinas and 
Lamprianou, 2017; Ellinas, 2020) have shown, these developments were, most likely, a result of the 
institutional hostility that the GD was facing following the arrests. Therefore, within the de-radicalisation 
scenario, it could hypothesised: 
Hypothesis 1 (De-radicalisation): There is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to de-radicalise as 
they achieve and seek to maintain parliamentary representation.  
Alternatively, following the ‘theory’ framework in the previous chapter, and the assumptions of the 
exclusion-radicalisation theory, it could be expected that, following the period of the arrests, GD would 
also be likely to enter a process of radicalisation by putting more emphasis on its movement-face, while 
simultaneously downplaying its party-face. For example, similar to all ERPs, the GD was lacking any 
institutionalisation, similar to cartel parties or even to their PRRPs cousins, which are likely to have 
enabled it to further develop its party-face (Ellinas, 2020:17). Therefore, on the radicalisation scenario, it 
could be hypothesised that: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (Radicalisation): There is a tendency for ERPs, such as Golden Dawn, to radicalise or re-
radicalise when they assume social movement characteristics. 
 
In the political impact-claims of GD, a de-radicalisation outcome is likely to be observed, as presented 
explicitly in Table 5.1 (below). 
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Table 5.1 GD De-radicalisation Hypothesis  
GD De-radicalisation Hypothesis 
De-radicalisation Hypothesis: regarding its political praxis, GD would likely be claiming less impact 
materialised as a result of its grassroots activities, as well as less political outcomes materialized in the 
grassroots arena. Additionally, GD is likely to be claiming more impact in the grassroots arena 
materialised as a result of its conventional actions. At the same time, GD is likely to be claiming more 
impact materialised as a result of its activities in the parliament and electoral arenas compared to 
grassroots arena, as well as by adopting vote-maximisation strategies.  Regarding policy issue salience, 
it is likely, GD, overall, would be claiming less impact on core policy issues such as immigration and law 
& order while also embracing more secondary issues. Additionally, it is likely that GD would be claiming 
more impact on its core issues in the party-face arenas and less in the grassroots arena. 
 
 
In the political impact-claims of GD, a de-radicalisation outcome is likely to be observed, as presented 
explicitly in Table 5.2 (below). 
 
Table 5.2 GD Radicalisation Hypothesis 
GD Radicalisation Hypothesis 
Radicalisation Hypothesis:, regarding its political praxis, GD would likely be claiming more impact 
materialised as a result of its grassroots activities, as well as less political outcomes materialised in the 
party-face arenas (electoral and parliamentary). Additionally, GD is likely to be claiming more impact in 
the grassroots arena materialised as a result of its contentious actions. At the same time, GD is likely to 
be claiming less impact materialised as a result of its activities in the parliament and electoral arenas 
compared to the grassroots arena; as well as by adopting policy-purity as a primary goal.  Regarding 
policy issue salience, it is likely that, GD, overall, would be claiming more impact on core policy issues 
such as immigration and law & order, while not embracing much secondary issues. Additionally, it is 







5.4.2 Internal Factors hypotheses 
 
With regards to internal factors, such as leadership and factions, these are likely to have been affected, 
to an extent, by the exogenous shock of leadership imprisonment as well, as the discussion has, thus far, 
shown. Specifically, as this chapter has shown, in Phase 1, militants had the upper hand, completely inside 
the GD, across all the three arenas. In Phase 2, when the arrests followed, and throughout the period 
when the leader was in jail, the GD experimented with a brave opening towards moderates. In Phase 3, 
the moderates began losing their momentum and, with the release of the leader from jail, the militants 
were, once again, the main dominant faction inside GD. Therefore, it could be hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 3: (De-radicalisation): Exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’, (such as 
Golden Dawn),  leaderships and factions may result in de-radicalisation outcomes when moderates are 
mainly the influential faction.  
Hypothesis 4: (Re-Radicalisation): Exogenous shocks (such as arrests and imprisonment) to ERPs’, (such as 
Golden Dawn), leaderships and factions may result in (re)-radicalisation outcomes when the 
hardliners/militants are mainly the influential faction.  
Regarding the political impact-claims of GD, de-radicalisation and radicalisation during the three ‘Factional 




This empirical chapter has analysed the changing external and internal conditions of GD, before and after 
the external shock of the arrests, as well as GD’s changing patterns of political behaviour across the three 
political arenas during the thesis’ timeframe (May 2012 – December 2016). 
The chapter has shown that the external conditions of GD changed dramatically following the external 
shock of the arrests. In Phase 1 (from its foundation up until September 2013), GD was enjoying a 
favourable context, evidenced through a dismissive strategy adopted by political and institutional actors. 
This changed into an unfavourable one in Phase 2 (October 2013 – December 2016), with political and 
institutional actors adopting a strategy of exclusion and isolation vis-à-vis GD. 
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The chapter has also shown that the internal conditions of GD changed, as well, following the arrests.  
Three ‘factional Phases’ are distinguished, where one faction was more dominant that the other. 
Specifically, in Phase 1 (early ‘80s – September 2013), the militants were the dominant faction, evidenced 
though the emphasis the GD placed on grassroots activism. In Phase 2 (October 2013 – April 2015), while 
the leadership was in jail, a new faction of moderates began gaining influence inside the GD. This was 
mainly evident in the electoral arena, where moderates made up the bulk of GD’s electoral lists and 
achieved significantly higher electoral results than the militants, specifically in the 2014 election for the 
European parliament. In Phase 3 (May 2015 – December 2016), following the release of the leadership 
from jail, militants began re-gaining their influence in GD. This was evidenced in the resilience of its 
grassroots activism, which was sustained largely due to the experience of the militants. However, the 
chapter has identified that militants in Phase 3 were unable to sustain contentious activism, at least to 
the same extent as they did in Phase 1. In the meantime, the GD had also witnessed defections of many 
prominent militants following the external shock.  
The chapter concluded by developing testable and case-specific hypotheses, with regards to the 
conditions under which both the de-radicalisation and radicalisation of GD are likely to unfold, and how 


















This chapter tests the external factors hypotheses (e.g., de-radicalisation and radicalisation) on GD’s 
movement-face (grassroots arena), over the two ‘external Phases’ (see chapter 4) and according to the 
thesis’ studied timeframe (May 2012 – December 2016), through GD’s PICs. The chapter consists of two 
main sections, consistent with the two main behavioural dimensions: 1) political praxis and 2) issue 
salience. Both follow a timeframe sub-distinction based on the two ‘external Phases’.  
Section 1 analyses GD’s political praxis during Phase 1 (before arrests) and Phase 2 (after arrests), through 
its PICs. It, first, provides a comparative analysis of the movement and party actions (as the claimed cause 
of the impact-claims) over the thesis’ timeframe, through a discussion of the quantitative findings. The 
aim is to highlight the main patterns, in order to provide a primary general picture regarding the evolution 
of the two faces, before delving into an in-depth analysis of the movement-face. It shows that, in Phase 
1, GD emphasised its movement-face more, while, in Phase 2, it de-emphasised its movement face and 
emphasised its party face more. This finding seems to suggest that GD was on a radicalisation course in 
Phase 1 and changed towards de-radicalisation in Phase 2. The section proceeds by presenting the 
evolution of the unconventional and conventional grassroots actions over the thesis’ entire timeframe. It 
highlights that the identification of unconventional/conventional actions was done through a qualitative 
content analysis of the impact-claims. The findings show that, in Phase 1, GD was claiming impact through 
unconventional actions far more frequently, while it almost abandoned claiming impact through 
unconventional actions in Phase 2. This finding further strengthens the assertion that GD was radicalising 
its behaviour in Phase 1 and de-radicalising it in Phase 2. The chapter, then, proceeds with an in-depth 
analysis, by presenting the specific grassroots actions through which GD was claiming impact in the 
grassroots arena in Phase 1. A variety of grassroots actions were identified. The section proceeds by 
discussing how GD was framing the context in Phase 1. The aim is to highlight why GD was able to claim 
impact through unconventional means. The findings show that GD was framing the context in Phase 1 as 
largely favourable, through two frames: ‘a public demand for unconventional actions’ and a ‘crisis of the 
state’. Through the interaction of these contextual frames, GD was able to fill in these gaps and claim 
impact, predominantly through unconventional actions. Next, the movement-face actions of Phase 2 are 
presented. The main finding is that, in Phase 2, GD was predominantly claiming impact in the grassroots 
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arena through conventional actions. This is evidenced by the finding that GD was engaging in providing 
further evidence to its impact-claims, in an effort to prove that it had delivered impact in the grassroots 
arena, predominantly through conventional actions. This is further evidenced by the finding that GD was 
framing its context as highly unfavourable in Phase 2 because of the effects of the legal means, specifically.  
These findings signify a significant change towards de-radicalisation for GD in Phase 2. 
Section 2, ‘Issue Salience’, begins by presenting the quantitative findings over the entire timeframe, in 
order to highlight the general patterns. The findings show that the most salient issue was ‘Immigration’ in 
Phase 1, followed by ‘Law & Order’. This finding further indicates that GD was on a radicalisation course 
in Phase 1. However, in Phase 2, this trend was reversed dramatically. To this, the chapter shows that GD 
was attributing this decline in issue salience mainly to the exclusion. The exclusion impacted on its ability 
to engage in unconventional actions, which were predominantly concerned with the immigration issue. 
This finding signifies a change towards de-radicalisation in Phase 2, as GD had changed its salience on a 
core issue that initially sparked its mobilisation in the grassroots arena. In conclusion, GD changed its 
behaviour towards radicalisation in Phase 1 and towards de-radicalisation in Phase 2.   
 
6.1 Political Praxis 
 
Firstly, it is worth noting that whether a political impact-claim talks about the party or movement face of 
GD, this information is extracted from the claimed cause (e.g. action) of the impact-claim. This is because 
this claimed cause is concerned with certain actions that are usually unique to each political arena and, 
subsequently, to each of the two political faces. Before delving into an in-depth qualitative analysis of 
these specific actions unique to the movement-face and grassroots arena, it is pertinent to first provide a 
comparative analysis of GD’s movement-face and part-face actions as the claimed cause of impact-claims 
over the entire studied timeframe. The aim is to discuss the main patterns, so as to paint a general picture 
about the evolution of GD’s movement-face.   
 
6.1.1 The evolution of GD’s movement and party-faces: before and after the arrests 
 
Figure 6.1 (below) shows all the impact-claims identified during the entire period under analysis. The 
dotted line indicates the end of Phase 1 (May 2012 – September 2013) and the beginning of Phase 2 
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(October 2013 – December 2016), based on the event of the arrests which took place on the 18th of 
September, 2013. This was the first event that set in motion the realisation of the full-blown exclusion. 
This helps to divide the entire period under study into the two external Phases (see chapter 5). Overall, at 
the beginning of Phase 1, impact-claims are high, while, over time, they tend to steadily decrease. Also, 
the fact that all impact-claims show higher consistency (100%) and intensity142 (8.5 impact-claims per 
month) in Phase 1 compared to Phase 2 (intensity=4.08 impact-claims per month and 97% consistency) 
is, perhaps, reflective of the fact that GD had been facing a more favourable context, as Chapter 5 argued.  
Figure 6.1 The evolution of GD’s movement-face and party-face: Entire Period 
Sources: Database of GD’s impact-claims. Dotted line indicates the event of GD leadership arrests. 
                                                            
142 Inspired by Ellinas and Lamprianou (2016:807) consistency illustrates the degree to which GD (as regards to all 
the coding questions) had a continuous impact-claim making activity month after month. It is computed by dividing 
the total number of months for which GD did not make an impact-claim by the total number of months of the 
selected period. For example, in Phase 1, (N of months is 17) as regards to its movement actions (e.g. movement-
face), as shown in Figure 5.1 (below), GD did not make an impact-claim for 2 months. Thus 17-2=15. Therefore, 
consistency is 15/17 = 0.88 (or 88%). Intensity of impact-claims making activity illustrates how active GD was (as 
regards to all the coding questions), in impact-claim making activity, as far as the total number of impact-claims is 
concerned. For example, in the aforementioned example, GD made 71 impact-claims. Thus, intensity is 71/17= 3.8 




























Movement & Party Actions as the claimed cause of political impact-claims: 
Entire Period




Figure 6.1 above shows the claimed cause of all impact-claims divided into three overarching categories: 
‘movement-face actions’ (e.g. grassroots arena), ‘party-face actions’ (e.g. parliamentary and electoral 
arena) and ‘both’ (impact claimed in both movement and party face arenas). In sum, ‘movement actions’ 
make up the movement-face of GD, while ‘party actions’ make up the party-face of GD. ‘Movement 
actions’ show all the grassroots actions through which GD was claiming to have caused impact. Dividing 
the claimed causes into three main categories helps to identify more patterns. Firstly, movement actions 
show a sharp rise in the period following the electoral breakthrough of GD (e.g. June - November 2012). 
This trend tends to steadily decrease over time. Interestingly, during Phase 2, movement actions remain 
very low, only to moderately rise after June 2015, up until the end. However, movement actions during 
Phase 2 would never again reach the levels of Phase 1. Secondly, as Figure 6.1 shows, during Phase 1, 
movement actions show significantly higher intensity (4.1) and consistency (88%) when compared to 
Phase 2, where intensity is 1 and consistency 59%. Thirdly, in Phase 1, movement actions make up 65% of 
all the movement actions of the entire period, whereas, in Phase 2, they make up 35% of all movement 
actions. Lastly, movement actions show a sharp rise around the end of Phase 2, specifically in November 
2016.  
Party actions follow a different trend. These tend to rise during the early months of Phase 1, while after 
August 2012, they decline steadily, only to sharply rise again in December 2012. Right after this month up 
until the end of Phase 1, they remain low, staying at moderate levels. In Phase 2, party actions initially 
show a sharp rise, only to steadily decline and remain at moderate levels from June 2015 up until the end. 
Overall, in the two Phases, party actions show more stability in terms of intensity and consistency when 
compared to movement actions. For example, in Phase 1, party actions display 100% consistency and 3.8 
intensity, while in Phase 2, 90% and 2.7, respectively. However, in Phase 1, party actions make up 39% of 
all party actions of the entire period, and 61% in Phase 2. The category ‘both’ refers to impact-claims 
where the claimed causes are both movement and party actions. This category is more consistent in Phase 
1 and equally divided in the two periods. However, the category ‘both’ increases sharply at the end of 
Phase 2. This rise is also accompanied by a sharp rise of movement actions, as well.  
The most important finding from Figure 6.1 is that, from all the impact-claims of the entire period, in 
Phase 1, movement actions are 71 and party actions 65, while in Phase 2, movement actions are 39 and 
party actions 104. Considering, also, the fact that Phase 2 is significantly longer, by 22 months, the decline 
of movement actions in Phase 2 is even more striking. In short, it seems that in the period following the 
external shock (e.g. arrests), compared to Phase 1, GD tended to be claiming impact (significantly) more 
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frequently through party actions than through movement actions. At first glance, this indicates that, when 
it comes to the political praxis, after the external shock, GD emphasised its movement actions less 
frequently, thus implying some de-radicalisation. Simply put, following exclusion, GD was becoming more 
a party than a movement. However, another important finding is the fact that movement actions tend to 
rise steadily again at the end of Phase 2. Added to this, in late Phase 2 (e.g. August 2015 – December 
2016), movement and party actions seem to follow a relatively similar trend. Interestingly, in November 
2016, movement actions are even surpassing party actions. In fact, in November 2016, movement actions 
reach levels (for the first time) in Phase 2 lastly seen in Phase 1. This finding seems to suggest that GD was 
attempting to re-emphasise its movement-face. However, overall, these findings indicate that, following 
the exclusion in Phase 2, GD was de-emphasising its movement face, while, at the same time, it was 
emphasising more its party face.  
However, these quantitative findings require a closer analysis in order to safely conclude whether GD 
does, indeed, change towards de-radicalisation. For example, are these findings reflected qualitatively as 
well? A qualitative content analysis of the impact-claims follows, in order to examine, more closely, those 
impact-claims that arise from grassroots actions.  
 
6.1.2 Conventional and Unconventional actions: before and after the arrests  
 
Firstly, it is important to note that, during the analysis of impact-claims, in many cases, it was difficult to 
establish and quantify if, for example, a grassroots action, as the claimed cause of an impact-claim, is a 
conventional or unconventional action or if it is a direct or indirect impact-claim (particularly in Phase 1). 
This is because GD is not very specific in detailing the content of the impact-claims, which might be 
because GD was trying to hide its involvement in violent actions in order to avoid stigmatisation or 
repression, or because GD was engaging in both violent and non-violent actions simultaneously and in a 
single instance. It was, therefore, a challenging task to classify items into a scheme of conventional and 
unconventional actions. This issue has been observed by other studies, as well. For example, Fielitz 
(2016:266) observed:  
 
“Determining the action repertoires of GD is, however, more complicated than applying this simple 
scheme, since its members appear effectively in the public arena by disregarding conventional forms of 
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claim-making, (…) Thus, GD’s collective action provokes tensions that can easily turn conventional forms 
of claim-making, such as rallies or press conferences, into violent law-breaking clashes.” 
 
This classification of GD’s actions into conventional and unconventional has been achieved through a 
qualitative content analysis of the impact-claims. The aim was, first, to understand what GD means when 
it speaks about having caused impact through grassroots actions and classify whether the claimed impact 
was materialised through conventional or unconventional means. The qualitative content analysis of 
impact-claims where the claimed cause is movement actions, indicates that there emerges an overarching 
pattern with regards to movement actions in Phase 1. This pattern concerns the supposed ability and 
effectiveness of GD to ‘solve’ various local issues by delivering either direct or indirect impact, mainly 
through unconventional means. This pattern paints a picture where GD presents itself as highly impactful 
and effective, in Phase 1 in the grassroots arena, through its ability to use unconventional means and its 
capacity to provide ‘solutions’ to local problems. However, this pattern seems to be missing in Phase 2. In 
other words, the use of force is embedded in the impact-claims of Phase 1, mostly observed in the latent 
content of the claims, despite the non-specification of the grassroots action or reference to either 
conventional or unconventional means in the manifest content. How this pattern interacts with the 
context and plays out is analysed further in the sub-section ‘Frames’ of this chapter. But, to give an 
example, at this point: In an indirect impact-claim, in February 2013, GD claimed ‘the abolition of Ragousis 
law (citizenship law). This anti-Hellenic bill is a big victory for Golden Dawn, who has initiated bloody fights 
during the last years’ (GD, 2013:93)143. The reference to ‘bloody fights’ is about the use of violent actions 
against migrants, as ‘during the last years’, GD has been exclusively active only in the grassroots arena 
and at the local level. This (e.g. the ‘bloody fights’) has helped to classify the claimed cause of this impact-
claim as unconventional action. Thus, the qualitative content analysis of impact-claims has helped to bring 
to the surface this unconventional behaviour of GD. This claimed ability of GD to resort to unconventional 
means in Phase 1 is captured through a process involving three main steps up until the end outcome, 




                                                            
143 https://bit.ly/35jNjXy  
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These steps, illustrated in Figure 6.2 above, constitute the overarching pattern that characterises the 
impact-claims, where the claimed cause is grassroots, thus movement-related, actions in Phase 1144. 
Again, this pattern seems to be missing almost completely in Phase 2145. These steps tend to appear in 
almost all of the movement actions impact-claims, irrespective of the specific grassroots action, through 
which GD claims impact in Phase 1. Additionally, these steps detail the overall effectiveness of GD’s 
grassroots actions in delivering impact through its ability to resort to unconventional means, irrespective 
of whether this impact is indirect or direct. In turn, these steps constitute an overarching pattern, where 
GD was considering its unconventional actions, and all grassroots actions at large, as highly-effective in 
delivering either direct or indirect impact in Phase 1. The analysis of this pattern highlights that GD, during 
Phase 1, was (overall) considering itself as highly impactful because of the effectiveness of its 
unconventional movement actions.  
Thus, the step ‘likelihood to intervene’ is observed when GD does not openly or clearly specify the action 
through which it has delivered an outcome, but which indicates that a claimed outcome has been 
delivered, by other entities, because of the likelihood that GD would intervene unlawfully and ‘solve’ an 
issue through unconventional means (e.g. GD, 2012:44; 50). This step is mainly triggered (always according 
to GD) by local residents who, having in mind the ability of GD to intervene unlawfully and provide local 
‘solutions’, call in at GD’s (usually at its local branches) and complain about an issue. In turn, GD was 
claiming to be responding to their requests and being able to deliver either direct or indirect impact 
through unconventional actions (e.g. GD, 2012:23; 39; 43; 69). But, through this action, GD was able to 
                                                            
144 This discussion is elaborated further in the sections ‘Frames: The context’, later on in this chapter.  
145 Phase 2 is discussed further in this chapter. 
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claim indirect impact, as well. For example, the likelihood that it would intervene unconventionally 
prompts other actors to deliver (indirect) impact in cases where GD does it by itself (e.g. GD, 2012:45, 62).   
The step ‘spontaneity’ captures the claimed ability of GD to react spontaneously while doing its various 
pre-scheduled, grassroots actions, and engage in unconventional means, thus delivering either direct or 
indirect impact (e.g. GD, 2012: 41; 42). The dimension ‘frequency’, which largely resembles the step 
‘likelihood to intervene’, captures the claimed effectiveness of the frequent grassroots actions of GD, 
which result in realising mainly indirect impact (GD, 2013:128)146. Through its frequent presence at various 
places, GD impacts on other entities to deliver outcomes in cases where GD might, otherwise, intervene 
unlawfully and deliver it by itself (e.g. GD, 2012:73).  
Figure 6.3 (below) presents the evolution of unconventional and conventional actions over time, as 
identified by the qualitative content analysis.  
Figure 6.3 GD’s Conventional and Unconventional actions: Entire period 
 
                                                            
































































































Convnetional & Unconventional grassroots Actions as the claimed 




Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims. Note: Dotted line indicates the event of GD leadership arrests 
 
The most striking finding from Figure 6.3 (above) is that, in Phase 1, unconventional actions are 
significantly higher than conventional actions, while in Phase 2, the opposite occurs. This is another 
important finding, as it signals a qualitative change in the movement actions of GD in Phase 2. In short, 
this observation seems to strengthen the suggestion stated previously that GD entered a process of 
behavioural change following the external shock of the arrests (Phase 2), in the direction of de-
radicalisation.  
Figure 6.4 (below) illustrates the evolution of direct impact-claims. These refer to when GD was claiming 
that it has delivered an outcome by itself (either conventionally or unconventionally). Thus, all of the 
direct impact-claims take place in the grassroots arena and at the local level. The majority of these refer 
to unconventional actions, although there are instances where GD claimed to have delivered impact 
through conventional actions. Overall, these can tell us about how effective GD was seeing itself in the 
grassroots arena.  
Figure 6.4 GD’s direct impact-claims: Entire period 
 





























































































































Direct impact-claims: Entire Period
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The most striking fact from Figure 6.4 (above) is that, in Phase 2, GD almost stopped claiming to have 
delivered an outcome by itself. In contrast, in Phase 1, it was frequently claiming direct impact. However, 
it is also interesting the fact that, in late Phase 2, GD seems to be recovering in terms of consistency, but 
the intensity remains very low, when compared to Phase 1. The findings in Figure 6.4 agree with the 
findings presented in Figures 6.1 and 6.3 and suggest that GD was de-emphasising its movement-face over 
time.  
 
6.1.3 Phase 1: Before arrests 
 
Figure 6.5 (below) illustrates all of the specific grassroots actions through which GD was claiming to have 
caused impact in Phase 1, and which make up the overarching category ‘movement actions’ of Phase 1. 
The analysis of impact-claims has identified at least six distinct grassroots actions through which GD 
claimed impact. Through these actions, GD claimed to have caused either direct or indirect impact, 
through either conventional or unconventional means or both. What follows is an in-depth qualitative 
analysis of the impact-claims, as per specific grassroots action as shown in Figure 6.5 below, that would 














Figure 6.5 PICs’ specific grassroots actions categories: External Phase 1  
 
Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims 
 
GD team visits: As Figure 6.5 above illustrates, the grassroots action ‘GD team visits’ is the most frequent 
action through which GD claims impact in Phase 1. Those teams were comprised of a minimum of 6-7 
persons, up to around 30 persons, and are usually headed by an MP or by party cadres of GD’s local 








































Specific Grassroots actions categories as the claimed cause of 
impact-claims: Phase 1 (N=73)
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not, then imposing it on its own. The overwhelming majority of this grassroots action, where GD claims 
impact, takes place at various street markets across the country. Most of these visits, GD claims, are being 
triggered by local residents who complain, mostly on issues related to illegal immigration and law & order, 
by calling into GD’s local branches. For example, through this grassroots action, GD makes various impact-
claims claiming that it has caused direct impact through the likelihood that it would behave 
unconventionally. An indicative example is an impact-claim where GD claims that members from the local 
branch of Serres visited the street market in Nea Zihni in order to ‘validate some complaints we had 
received regarding the presence of illegal retailers in the area’. As a result, GD claimed, ‘once the info was 
spread that GD members had arrived, illegal retailers packed their stuff up immediately and went away’ 
(GD, 2012:52). Also, through visits at various places, GD claims to have delivered direct impact through 
unconventional means, such as material violence, by acting spontaneously. GD claims that, while a team 
led by MPs Germenis and Eliopoulos were touring the street market in Rafina, ‘when they realised the 
orgy of trafficking’, they went on to check the legality of foreigners (…) once it was found out that not 
even a single legal document existed for selling their stuff, these were removed with synoptic procedures’ 
(GD, 2012:42).  
Social Activism: Mostly through the frequency of its pre-scheduled, everyday grassroots actions of social 
activism, GD was claiming that it has materialised direct impact through conventional means. Many 
impact-claims, through this action, capture the effectiveness of GD in delivering impact through the 
frequency of its social activist actions. For example, GD made various direct impact-claims claiming that, 
as a result of its frequent visits to small businesses, such as gas stations and factories, and which are part 
of its grassroots actions programme ‘Jobs for Greeks’, undertaken by its Evoia-Voitia local branch, many 
small businesses in the region are now showing a preference in employing Greeks over foreigners (GD, 
2012: Post items, 23; 51; 66). As GD was claiming, ‘as a result of our informative visits during these 8 
months, where the programme ‘Jobs for Greeks’ of our local branch is underway, dozens of businessmen 
are now exclusively recruiting Greeks over illegal foreigners’ (GD, 2013:104). 
Party material dissemination: After GD team visits, GD claimed most of its direct impact materialised 
while members of its local branches across the country were disseminating party material at various 
places, such as neighbourhoods, streets, street markets and border stations. For GD, this action was 
usually a pre-scheduled and everyday grassroots action and it is the most frequently employed outdoor 
grassroots action by GD (Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2016). It is, by nature, a conventional grassroots action, 
but GD might engage in unconventional behaviour while conducting this action. GD claims most of its 
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impact through this action having been materialised through the likelihood that it would resort to the use 
of unconventional means and through the frequency of its actions, and, to a lesser extent, through acting 
spontaneously. Throughout the impact-claims discussed below, at their core lies the emphasis of GD on 
the effectiveness of its unconventional means of political behaviour.    
The ‘likelihood of intervention’ is captured in a direct impact-claim when GD claimed that when members 
of the Rhodes local branch were disseminating party material at a local street market, they witnessed that 
‘some stalls lost their owners, who probably were illegal Afrasians migrants and who, once they saw the 
team of black shirts and Greek flags from afar, left their stalls’ (GD, 2012:65). There is, however, the case 
when GD claims indirect impact through the ‘likelihood of intervention’ by being a bit more specific on 
the entity that delivered the outcome. For example, GD claims that, while members from the local branch 
of Kavala were disseminating party material at the Krinides street market, ‘some people at the market 
informed us that, before our arrival, some others - right on time - managed to ‘force out’ any remaining 
illegal-immigrants, not only from around the street market, but from nearby areas as well…’ (GD, 
2012:55).   
Demonstrative actions: Demonstrative actions and gatherings at commemorative events constitute the 
third larger grassroots action through which GD claims either direct or indirect impact, through 
conventional or unconventional means. Through this action, GD is more open in claiming engagement in 
unconventional means, such as confrontational and violent actions, for delivering impact. In addition, 
through this action, GD claims, mainly, impact through the dimensions of ‘spontaneous reaction’ and ‘the 
size of its gatherings’. In terms of places, the overwhelming majority of impact-claims through these 
actions occur in migrants’ settlements, as well as in other places, such as town streets, border stations 
and historical sites. For example, direct impact through confrontational actions is evident when GD claims 
that, during a demonstration by members from the local branch of Corinth, led by MP Boukouras, outside 
a military camp about to be transformed into a ‘migrants detention centre’, they clashed with the police 
and “deterred the illegal transformation of the camp into a ‘tourist centre for illegal immigrants’ ” (GD, 
2012:35). Furthermore, there are instances where GD does not specify the action through which it has 
delivered impact, though the use of violence through mainly demonstrative actions is evident in the latent 
content of the impact-claim, where GD attempts to emphasise the effectiveness of its violent actions. For 
example, GD claimed, in May 2012, that through unconventional actions, its members managed to force 
out, from the Peireiki-Patraiki building, in the city of Patras, settled migrants. GD concluded, ‘Greek 
Nationalists would remain by the side of Greeks who suffer until the final victory, as this is our priority, 
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and not the parliamentary benches’ (GD, 2012:2). This points to the importance GD was attaching to its 
movements-face in Phase 1.  
 
6.1.3.1 Framing the context as favourable 
 
This part of the section delves further into the impact-claims and seeks to answer how the GD was seeing 
itself so effective at providing various local ‘solutions’ through its unconventional means of behaviour in 
the grassroots arena in Phase 1. The qualitative content analysis of impact-claims suggests that this was 
because of two contextual frames that emerge in the impact-claims of GD in Phase 1, which rendered 
GD’s unconventional actions as legitimate and effective in delivering impact: a frame of ‘public demand 
for unconventional actions’ and a frame of ‘a crisis of the state’. How this process plays out is shown in 
Table 6.1 (below).  
In the first frame, ‘public demand for unconventional actions’, GD was portraying a picture where there 
was public demand for the use of unconventional means and GD was able to supply this demand through 
unconventional actions. By justifying its unconventional behaviour as a response to peoples’ demands, 
who had engaged in such behaviour in the first place, or by indicating that the people had been 
encouraging GD to act spontaneously and resort to unconventional means, GD was attempting to render 
its unconventional actions as largely legitimate among the wider public.  
The second frame is the ‘crisis of the state’. In Phase 1, GD was justifying its use and the effectiveness of 
its unconventional means, based on the claim that the state and its institutions (most notably the police) 
were incapable of containing immigration or imposing law & order, in contrast to GD, which was able to 
mobilise its local teams quickly, having legitimacy with the people, and provide ‘solutions’ relatively 
directly and fast, through the use of unconventional means.  
The combination of these two frames rendered the unconventional actions of GD as effective and 
legitimate. Table 6.1 (see below) breaks down each of the three impact-claims into three steps, in order 






Table 6.1 The framing of GD’s unconventional behaviour: External Phase 1 (continued) 
Step 1: Crisis of The State (context)  Step 2: Public Demand for 
unconventional actions 
(context) 
Step 3: GD’s ability to 
supply this demand 
through 
unconventional action 
“[local residents] have asked for help 
from the local police to deal with 
incidents of robbery committed by illegal 
immigrants at the street market, but 
there wasn’t any capability….” 
“…Instead of calling the 
police, local residents and 
street market vendors 
called GD…” 
“…Once the GD team 
arrived, many things 
had changed. Gypsies, 
foreigners and illegal 
market vendors packed 
up their stuff and went 
away while, as long as 
the team was there, not 
a single incident 
occurred” (GD, 2012:11) 
“[local residents] have asked for help 
from the Western Ahaia Mayor, but 
people from the Mayor’s services had 
informed them that they will provide a 
solution in a few days, as there is no 
vehicle available right now…” 
“…Someone suggested to 
contact GD…” 
“In just a matter of few 
hours, a GD team 
arrived and the water 
piles ran again” (GD, 
2012:17) 
“Next, we paid a visit at Shimatari Police 
Department, where we observed that 
the situation is the same as at Artakis 
Police Department, with only two police 
officers on every shift. The two young 
police officers had informed us that they 
were doing their best given the present 
conditions, but DEFINETELY it does not 
suffice in filling the increasing need for 
further patrolling in the area” 
“…We had received 
complaints that Pakistanis 
harass children in Dilesi…” 
“Thus, we showed up 
there. ‘’..Our 
appearance there was 
enough to make all the 
illegal immigrants go 
away immediately and 
many Greeks were 
asking us to intensify 
our visits because there 
is no police, ‘there is no 
state’” (GD, 2012:23) 
 
Peoples’ Demand 
In Phase 1, for GD, the issue of immigration was salient (see more in the next section) amid the publicity 
surrounding the supposedly increased criminal acts by illegal immigrants against Greeks, which had been 
the motivation for residents to demand unconventional actions of political behaviour, such as protesting 
in the streets (GD, 2013:126)147. For example, according to GD, the events in Patras, which saw the loss of 
a human life, supposedly caused by migrants, ‘were the cause of a wrath explosion on the part of local 
residents against illegal-immigrants and the authorities’ (GD, 2012:4). According to GD, ‘the people took 
                                                            
147 https://bit.ly/2OwBAPH  
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the situation into their own hands’. GD was able to exploit this wrath and demonstrate along with the 
people through unconventional means, thus achieving impact. ‘The peoples’ uprising, where GD local 
members stood by their side, resulted in the Peireiki-Patraiki building being evacuated…’ (GD, 2012:4). 
In almost all ‘team visits’ actions, GD was claiming that it had intervened and created a ‘solution’, after 
first having received various complaints from local residents. GD was claiming that the people were 
demanding GD intensify the frequency of its grassroots actions because, during its actions, any ‘illegal 
immigrants are gone’ (July, 2013:128)148. Thus, GD was claiming ‘the Nationalist Popular Movement sides 
with the Greek citizen, who suffers from the issue of illegal-immigration’ (GD, 2012:3). Moreover, in a visit 
to the street market of Mesologgi by a GD team, led by MP Barbarousis, where GD stated that they had 
destroyed stalls of allegedly illegal migrant retailers, the MP stated: ‘The people are encouraging us and 
tell us to move ahead’ (GD, 2012:41). Along similar lines, during a visit to the street market in Rafina, GD 
stated that it had resorted to material violence after first having received ‘tens of requests’ from Greek 
street market vendors (GD, 2012:42).  
 
Crisis of the State 
According to the second frame, GD was able to respond back to peoples’ requests for intervention quite 
quickly and was effective in delivering local impact, largely because the state and its institutions were 
unable to intervene, mainly on the issues of illegal immigration and law & order. In other words, in Phase 
1, GD was claiming throughout to have filled in a state gap on issues of immigration and law & order 
because these actors were experiencing a deep crisis. This is mainly a crisis of governance, in general, and 
a crisis of being unable to impose law & order, in particular. Suffice to say that, for GD, the law & order 
issues are directly interlinked with the immigration issue.    
In the codesheet, there was a question added, with a dichotomous question (e.g. yes or no), as to whether, 
in the impact-claims, GD was making a reference to a ‘crisis of the state’ in both Phases. With regards to 
Phase 1, the results show that, in 40 out of 73 (or 55%), where impact-claims have a claimed cause of 
grassroots actions, GD refers to a ‘crisis of the state’. More specifically, GD claims that it has been effective 
in delivering either direct or indirect impact because the state and its institutions have neglected peoples’ 
                                                            




demands or are unable to deal with salient issues among the public, such as immigration and law & order, 
because they are in a state of a crisis.  
Therefore, in Phase 1, GD had been able to claim impact, mainly through unconventional means, because 
the state has been largely incapable in doing so. GD claimed ‘The fighters of GD have learnt to provide 
solutions on issues where the state is completely absent’ (GD, 2012:3). What is more, in Phase 1, for many 
impact-claims, the title of post items already refers to a crisis of the state. Many post items that include 
impact-claims are titled: ‘When the state does not care, Golden Dawn intervenes’ (GD, 2012:17) or ‘When 
the state does not care, Greeks are turning to Golden Dawn’ (GD, 2012:60) or ‘They fill in the state’s voids: 
Golden-Dawners even as border guards!’ (GD, 2012:70). 
Table 6.2 summarises this crisis of the state presenting the characterisations (e.g. adjectives and verbs) 
GD attributes to the state and its institutions, found in the impact-claims of Phase 1, where the claimed 
cause is movement actions. GD refers to the ‘state’ in general, although sometimes it specifies the actors 
it refers to.  
Table 6.2 GD’s framing of political and state actors: External Phase 1. 
Actors What is it/what is it doing? 
The State (in general) & local authorities Completely absent 
The State (in general) Closes its ears on peoples’ calls for help 
The State (in general) Occupied 
The State (in general) It’s late or lacks the ability in giving a solution 
The State (in general) Is non-existent 
The State (in general) Does not care 
The State (in general) Shows no interest at all 
The State (in general) Is indifferent 
The State (in general) Show no interest in the unemployment of Greeks 
and continues to privilege foreigner workers over 
Greeks 
Ministry of Public Order & Citizens’ Protection Do not do their job and are encouraging 
unlawfulness 
Political system Cleptocratic and does not care at all about Greeks 
State & Police Tolerate the increasing criminal behaviour of 
Pakistanis or Roma  
Police Trafficking is taking place under their own eyes 
Police Is Obstructing 
Police Does not have the capacity 
Police Does not have enough units 
Police Protects trafficking 




Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims. 
As Table 6.2 above shows these specific state actors are predominantly the police, but others as well, such 
as the ‘coalition government’ and other governing actors, and the Ministry of Public Order, & state 
institutions, such as IKA-Welfare Services, SDOE and the ‘Labour Inspection Unit’.   
GD has been able to satisfy peoples’ demand on salient issues, such as immigration, law & order and 
economic crisis related-issues, through its unconventional means because the state has no capacity, as it 
does not respond to their requests. For example, GD was claiming that the police do not have the capacity 
to contain the crimes by allegedly illegal migrants or trafficking at various street markets, as it lacks 
enough units (GD, 2012:69). For GD, the state could not provide ‘solutions’ to local issues that concern 
local residents and, thus, “Not long from now, it will be established as a daily phenomenon: When the 
state is late, or incapable of giving a solution, GD undertakes action” (GD, 2012:17).  
In this context, GD was presenting an image of itself as the only actor able to force the state and its 
institutions to do their job and deliver outcomes favourable to GD’s interests and ideas, most prominently 
on the issues of ‘illegal’ immigration and law & order. In this regard, GD was able to impact on other actors 
indirectly, as well: ‘Local authorities showed no interest at all and, as a result, violent assaults against 
Greek citizens increased sharply, now being a daily habit for them. However, GD’s presence was intense 
and caused …the mobilisation of local authorities, despite their reluctance’ (GD, 2012:28). At times, the 
state was ready to provide solutions, but only in the ‘fear’ that GD would intervene though its 
unconventional means. The following extract illustrates this quite vividly: 
“We are saying that the ‘state is destroyed’, ‘nothing is working’, etc., but the reality is…. different! When 
the state is being forced to do its job, it can do it very well, indeed. But, it has to be forced. But, by whom 
is it forced?” (GD, 2012:50). 
 
6.1.4 Phase 2: After arrests 
 
Figure 6.6 below illustrates all of the grassroots actions through which GD claimed to have achieved either 
direct or indirect impact in Phase 2. Visits by members of GD branches at various places across the country 
remain the largest category, though less than in Phase 1. However, there emerge new categories of 
actions, such as ‘legal actions, ‘public requests/claims’ and ‘various’. All of these are conventional actions 
and refer to an attempt by GD to present its impact as taking place within the legal limits.  
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 Figure 6.6 PICs’ specific grassroots actions categories: External Phase 2 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s impact-claims. 
 
In Phase 2, throughout the impact-claims, irrespective of the specific claimed grassroots action, there 
emerges an attempt by GD to frame its impact-claims as having resorted to conventional means. In 
essence, GD is more specific on its conventional means, by providing more evidence in order to back up 
its claims that it has resorted to conventional means. This tactic of providing more evidence gives the 
reader the opportunity to validate GD’s claims that it has, indeed, used conventional actions. In Phase 1, 
GD claims that the people had been calling GD to intervene unconventionally or that the public was 
demanding use of unconventional means, without, however, providing any further evidence for these 
claims. In Phase 2, not only are such calls or a demand absent, but GD attempts to justify its either direct 
or indirect impact-claims by resorting first (if claimed unconventionally) or having resorted to 




































External Phase 2: grassroots actions as the claimed cause of PICs
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behaviour. Even in these impact-claims, where GD referred to the use of unconventional actions for 
materialising outcomes, the claim of resorting to the most extreme of them is absent, namely, violence. 
These findings indicate that GD, after the external shock, was on a course of significantly changing its 
movement face: quantitatively speaking, emphasising it less, and qualitatively speaking, transforming it 
into a more conventional one, at the same time. Therefore, this suggests that GD was entering a process 
of de-radicalisation in Phase 2.  
Golden Dawn team visits: While in Phase 1, through ‘team visits’, GD claimed to have resorted to the use 
of unconventional means, in Phase 2, it mainly claims impact through conventional means. In addition, in 
Phase 2, GD team visits do not claim to have delivered impact through the steps of ‘spontaneity’ or 
‘frequency’ or a ‘call from the people’. On the contrary, in Phase 2, GD was claiming impact through these 
actions by using conventional public claims as the initial trigger of these visits. In essence, these were 
references to public statements that were visible among the wider public, rather than direct calls and 
complaints to GD’s local branches and its members. Thus, at the heart of these impact-claims lies the 
argument, as put forward by GD, that it has been delivering impact conventionally.     
Thus, in a direct impact-claim, GD claimed that it managed to cancel a mayors’ plan regarding the creation 
of a park for ‘illegal immigrants’ in the Athens district of Agios Panteleimonas. GD claimed “local residents 
reacted quickly, as there was no official motion by the local council. A team from ‘Greek Dawn’ visited the 
area immediately, led by MP Kasidiaris. We asked from the police that the procedures must stop 
immediately and our request was accepted” (GD, 2014:161)149. GD’s attempt to frame this impact-claim 
as being materialised through conventional means is captured here by referring to a motion of the local 
council. In another impact-claim, GD claims to have delivered direct impact when members from Kavala 
local branch visited and cleaned up a dirty billboard of the ‘Cyprus Association Do not Forget’, placed in 
the entrance of Kavala city, only after reading a complaint in the local newspaper ‘Chronometro’ (GD, 
2016:243)150. Along similar lines, GD claims that members from the local branch of Sparta had raised a 
Greek flag at the monument of King Leonidas only after the mayor had neglected an earlier request of 
theirs. As GD claimed:  
“For some days now, and in the midst of the tourist season, the Greek flag at Leonidas monument was 
half-raised and torn, while neither a single local authority, nor the Sparta Mayor, cared to replace our 
                                                            
149 https://bit.ly/32aODtS  
150 http://bit.ly/2B9FzcN  
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national symbol. After asking ourselves why no one is seeing it or calling it in to the mayor, we called the 
mayor ourselves, who promised us that, in 24 hours, the issue would be solved and that GD does not need 
to intervene. After 24 hours, the flag was in the same terrible situation, until our local members took action 
and replaced the flag in ten minutes” (GD, 2016:250)151. 
The action ‘GD team visits’ in Phase 2 took a conventional form. For example, GD claimed that its MPs 
visited the islands of Kos and Lesvos, which had seen a sharp increase in migrant inflows during the long 
summer of the refugee crisis. According to GD, the MPs met with various local political actors, such as 
members of the local council, while, in the post item, GD also provides video content in order to back up 
this claim (GD, 2015:229)152. As a result, GD claims, right after its visit there, the government sent ships to 
these islands in order to transfer migrants to the mainland (GD, 2015:224)153. Along similar lines, GD 
claimed that once it had publicly announced that its representatives in the town of Kastoria would meet 
with the local head of ‘Trade Unit of Kastoria’, ‘the NODE154 head remembered, out of nowhere, that, in 
his town, beyond cafes and tavernas, there is such a building, as well’. As a result, GD claimed, ‘GD sets 
the political agenda’ (GD, 2016:275)155. 
Demonstrations: Through demonstrative actions, GD claims to have achieved impact by resorting to 
confrontational actions, such as blockades and events disruptions. However, GD soon attempts to state 
that these actions have been made in a ‘dynamic, but completely lawful way’. In November 2016, GD 
makes an impact-claim where the most extreme behaviour of GD in Phase 2 can be found, however still 
too lenient when compared to Phase 1. In this impact-claim, GD claimed that it intervened, with a team 
led by three MPs, at a journalistic conference at the building of ESHEA (journalist centre) and managed to 
disrupt and cancel the conference, which was about the rights of ethnic minorities in Thrace. In this 
incident, according to GD, the party did not resort to violence. On the contrary, it intervened ‘dynamically’, 
but ‘lawfully’. GD claimed: “A few hours ago, GD intervened dynamically, but in an absolute lawful way, 
against the Turkish agents, who talk about a Turkish minority in Thrace; something which does not exist 
according to the Lausanne International Treaty. GD intervened and cancelled their conference, and it is us 
who will fight for the Greekness of Thrace in every way possible, for our Homeland.” (GD, 2016:283)156. In 
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154 ND’s organ of ‘Prefectural Governing Committees’. 
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the post item, GD provides video content showing the GD team disrupting the conference, but not 
engaging in violent behaviour, while its MPs argued that their intervention was lawful. GD also appeals to 
the ‘Treaty of Lausanne’ in order to give legitimacy to its action. In this impact-claim, GD attempts to keep 
balanced behaviour between being lawful, on the one hand, while being effective through unconventional 
means, on the other hand. In other words, it seems that GD, in Phase 2, was attempting to avoid claiming 
impact through violent means, at least in cases which might get a lot of public visibility.  
Public requests: In actions of public requests, GD claimed to have delivered indirect impact through the 
likelihood that, if an issue is not solved, then GD would intervene. However, through these actions, too, 
GD claimed to have resorted to conventional public claims, which could be visible to the wider public. 
Such public claims were being made in the news media by other actors or GD was making them by issuing 
press releases or during meetings of the local council. GD was more specific by providing more evidence 
to validate its claim and convince its readers that the impact was achieved through conventional actions. 
These public requests were also, perhaps, an attempt by GD to substitute for its absence in the media. 
For example, GD claimed that MP Kasidiaris requested, during a local council meeting in the municipality 
of Athens, that the dirtied statue of history hero ‘Kolokotronis’ be cleaned up. In GD words, ‘If you do not 
clean up the statue by Monday, then we will take action and you will be saying that we have replaced the 
duty of local authorities’ (GD, 2016:253)157. GD also provided video content showing the MP, during the 
local council meeting, making this request, in order to justify its claim that it had resorted to conventional 
actions first, in case its request was not accepted.   
In another impact-claim, GD attempted to claim that its unconventional actions, such as the likelihood 
that it would intervene unlawfully, are still effective in delivering impact. However, GD soon referred to 
conventional public claims, in order to frame its impact-claim, as such. For example, GD claimed that illegal 
immigrants were driven away from Victoria Square right after MP Kasidiaris ‘threatened that he would 
take action’. However, GD claims that this phrase has been the title of a news story published in 
Kathimerini newspaper and GD provides, verbatim, this news story in the post item, claiming this phrase 
as the cause of the impact-claim (GD, 2015:233)158. 
Another impact-claim illustrates how GD was claiming impact through public conventional requests. For 
example, GD claims that the local news media reported that various NGOs were planning to hire hotel 
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rooms in the city of Trikala, for settling in migrants. Next, GD claimed that it had issued a press release, 
through its local branch, condemning the plans of the NGOs, accusing the local political actors of ‘bending 
their heads to the NGOs’. GD then claimed ‘A few days after the press release by the local branch of 
Trikala, the residents of the village Chrisomilia met, and ALL signed a motion expressing their 
disagreement about the plans of the NGOs. The pressure bore fruit and the NGOs are stepping back from 
the village’ (GD, 2016:279)159. This impact-claim illustrates how GD frames the ‘public demand’ in Phase 
2, compared to Phase 1. In Phase 1, GD was claiming that local residents were demanding use of 
unconventional methods by directly calling GD and encouraging it to deliver direct impact through the use 
of force because the state lacks the capacity (GD, 2012:8; 67; 2013:132160). On the contrary, in Phase 2, 
the frames ‘crisis of the state’ and ‘public demand for unconventional actions’ are absent and GD seeks 
the public demand through conventional means. In other words, in Phase 2, what emerges from the 
impact-claims is a picture where GD had lost, to a great extent, its direct communication with the people, 
who no longer demanded the use of unconventional actions. 
Legal, various, and ‘both’ actions: Of particular interest are the action categories ‘legal’ and ‘various 
actions’ (and both). These are two new actions that only emerge in Phase 2 and, through them, GD always 
claims to have materialised impact through conventional actions. With regards to legal actions, GD makes 
two impact-claims on the same instance. Although they are too few, they do, however, indicate a 
qualitative change, in that GD had been seeking conventional means in order to achieve impact, even at 
the grassroots arena, in Phase 2. In the impact-claims, GD claims that it had filed a lawsuit against the 
‘Political Party of Friendship and Equality’ of the Turkish Minority, in the local court in the city of Komotine, 
by members from its local branch in the city. This is because of (GD claimed) the party’s decision to stage 
a protest, which threatens the ‘public peace’. As a result, GD claimed, the court took GD’s lawsuit into 
account and began investigating the case by calling in the leader of the party to testify (GD, 2016: 
256a161;256b162).      
Movement & party actions: The argument of GD that it had been delivering impact through conventional 
means, evident in the impact-claims of Phase 2, is also evident in the category ‘both’ and ‘various actions’. 
This category refers to impact-claims where GD claimed impact through both grassroots and party actions. 
For example, in late 2016, there was an increase in impact-claims caused by movement actions (shown in 
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Figure 6.1 at the beginning of this chapter). However, this rise goes hand-in-hand with a similar rise in the 
category ‘both actions’. This pattern was part of GD’s attempt to claim impact through conventional and 
institutional means in the grassroots arena, while still presenting its movement actions as effective. This 
suggests that GD was attempting to regain its momentum in the grassroots arena and emphasise again 
its movement-face. This seems to suggest that, for GD in Phase 2, impact can be achieved in the grassroots 
arena only if there is use of institutional means, as well. This is best captured when GD claimed that, 
through various grassroots actions, such as visits to various state institutions, and party actions, such as 
parliamentary interpellations concerning the issues local residents are faced with, it had impacted on ND 
to adopt its own agenda. As GD claimed: 
“It is crucially important that New Democracy returns to places where GD had recently visited first, and 
bore to the surface, through its parliamentary actions, all the local and regional issues these areas are 
faced with. The recent and absolutely successful visits by MP and compatriot Lagos in Eastern Macedonia 
and Thrace, the promotion of issues concerning the farmers of the Greek north and the frequent 
interventions in local news media for promoting various issues, for which all other political parties ignore, 
have been the only cause which mobilised ND to visit the same areas, same institutions and same trade 
unions, with the only aim of stealing their vote…’’ 
 
6.1.4.1 Framing the context as unfavourable 
 
The analysis of political impact-claims so far indicates that GD witnessed a significant change in its 
movement-face in the period following the external and shock exclusion. With regards to actions, whereas 
in Phase 1, GD claims impact mainly through unconventional actions, in Phase 2, it claims impact mainly 
through conventional actions. With regards to issues, whereas in Phase 1, GD claims impact on its core 
issues, such as immigration and law & order, in Phase 2, it claims significantly lower impact on these issues, 
while it discovers new minor issues to claim impact on. So, what was GD saying about these changes? 
What causes did it attribute to these changes? This part of the section presents an overarching frame that 
is evident throughout GD’s impact-claims in Phase 2, and which, according to GD, has impacted on it to 
make a change in tactics with regards to its movement face. This frame is about the effects the external 




In Phase 2, GD had been weakened in delivering impact through unconventional means, while it decreased 
its salience on the immigration and law & order issues (see more in the next section on issue salience). 
Thus, in Phase 2, in its claims, GD was frequently referring to the shock exclusion as impacting negatively 
on its ability to deliver impact in the grassroots arena. As GD was claiming:   
‘’After the second consecutive victory of GD, in June 2012 , the Samaras-Venizelos government, and being 
under a status of panic - because of GD continuous rising popularity, made some spasmodic moves in 
containing illegal-immigration (the so-called broom police operations, etc.); however, without any 
tentative results and with no expulsions. (…) Of course, it is a fact that, during the early period of 
Samarocracy, illegal immigrants’ inflows were reduced, compared to earlier [i.e. before 2012 elections]. 
But, this, as well, was because of GD…’’  (GD, 2016:242)163.  
However, GD would soon downplay the effectiveness of these measures and would attribute the reduced 
inflows to allegedly false information spread by the news media before and after the arrests. GD 
continued:  
‘’…Back then [i.e. early period], the media of the political establishment were reporting, on a daily basis, 
about ‘paramilitary battalions’ and ‘racist attacks’, framing, as ‘racist attack’, every fight between 
foreigners, and ‘racist murder’ every fight between rival mafia gangs. Nowadays, news travel fast and 
illegal-immigrants were made terrified by this news and, thus, they were avoiding Greece as their 
destination. But, soon after GD’s arrests, the news media spread the info that ‘paramilitary battalions’ do 
not exist anymore. So, the cathode of thousands of illegal-immigrants to Greece had begun once again. 
The proof for this is the ‘Illegal-Immigration Daily News Bulletins’ we were publishing [on the website], 
which showed that the inflows were too high. These high numbers are what forced us to publish these 
‘Bulletins’ (GD, 2016:242)164.  
In these extracts above, it becomes clearer that, for GD its ‘hit squads’ were effective in dealing with the 
issue of ‘illegal’ immigration through the use of unconventional actions in Phase 1. The arrests impacted 
on its ability to sustain its unconventional actions. In turn, this meant a decreasing emphasis on the issue 
of immigration on the part of GD, as without the use of violence, or unconventional actions in general, GD 
found it difficult to be concerned with this issue.  
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Furthermore, there is another important observation in Phase 2, which lies behind the steady rise of 
movement-actions as the claimed cause of impact-claims in November 2016. GD repeated an instance of 
an impact-claim four more times; this about the cancellation of a hot-spot in Keratsini, as claimed by GD. 
GD described it as a ‘HUGE VICTORY’ again and again, and it seems that it felt that it had to repeat it four 
more times in only one month’s time. This is the one and only time that GD would repeat one impact-
claim outcome so many times in such a short time period (25 days). It seems that GD repeated this impact-
claim outcome in an attempt to reclaim ownership over impact on the immigration issue, as it was facing 
difficulty in being impactful because of the arrests, even 3 years after the event had taken place. For 
example, in this impact-claim, GD concluded: ‘As long as the Greeks are fighting, the Popular Association 
will be by their side, and despite the difficult days we are facing, small and big battles would continue to 
be won inside and outside the Parliament’ (GD, 2016:271)165. In Phase 2, GD kept referring back to the 
effects of the arrests, saying that it has been facing ‘hard times’, attempting, however, to convince its 
audience that it has not changed its ideology: ‘…In this context, the only power of resistance is Golden 
Dawn, who, during these hard times, remains loyal to its ideas of the nation...’ (GD, 2015:223)166.   
 
6.2 Issue Salience 
 
6.2.1 Before and after arrests  
 
Figure 6.7 (below) illustrates all of the policy issues of the impact-claims, where the claimed cause is the 
overarching category ‘movement actions’, categorised by external Phase. It shows that two of the most 
salient policy issues of FRPs, in general, and of GD, in particular, (that is, immigration and law & order) are 
the most salient issues where GD claims impact, through its movement actions. However, these two issues 
display significant variations in the two phases. More specifically, in Phase 1, immigration is, by far, the 
largest issue on which GD claims to have realised impact through its movement actions. It is also the 
largest issue in both Phases.  
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Figure 6.7 PICs' policy issue salience in the grassroots arena per external Phase 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s PICs. 
In Phase 1, ‘Immigration’ is twice as salient as the second most-salient issue, which is ‘Law & Order’, with 
consistency 76% and intensity 2.4 impact-claims per month. In contrast, in Phase 2, ‘Immigration’ shows 
a huge drop, despite still being the largest issue, seeing its consistency and intensity at 23% and 0.3 
impact-claims per month, respectively. However, it is slightly higher than the second most-salient issue, 
which is ‘Culture’. It is also interesting to note the pattern of the ‘Law & Order’ issue. Although it is the 
second most-salient issue in claiming impact through movement actions, and with consistency at 41% and 
intensity at 0.9 impact-claims per month in Phase 1, it completely disappears in Phase 2. There is not a 
single impact-claim on ‘Law & Order’ in Phase 2, where the claimed cause is ‘movement-face actions’. The 
issue of ‘Social Policy’ also drops in Phase 2, though this decline is considerably lower compared to 
‘Immigration’ and ‘Law & Order’. In contrast, ‘Culture’ seems to be more or less stable in both Phases. In 
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which show very low salience.  Thus, Figure 6.7 (above) seems to suggest that GD had significantly changed 
the issue salience of its movement-face in Phase 2, with regards to its core issues. The issue of 
‘Immigration’ was featuring prominently in movement-face impact-claims. These findings suggest that, in 
Phase 1 was on a radicalisation course while it had changed towards de-radicalisation in Phase 2.  
 
6.2.2 Before arrests: The salient issue of immigration 
 
In Phase 1, according to GD, the immigration issue was its top priority. Throughout the impact-claims, GD 
was describing the issue as a ‘mega and super topical’ issue, featuring prominently amongst the top issues 
in Greek politics (GD, 2012:6). Already, in May 2012, GD stated:  
‘’Yesterday’s events in Patras - due to the tragic death of a 30-year-old Greek man by three Afghans -
brought to the surface, for an umpteenth time, the major issue of illegal immigration and the huge impact 
it has on our homeland, such as unemployment, environment degradation and crime, but, mainly, loss of 
human life. An issue which, for other political actors, features as a second issue, and for some other 
political actors is a chance for vote hunting (as beyond asylum, papers and job, they also wish to give them 
political rights, as well!), for GD, it remains a priority issue, as it risks de-Hellenizing our homeland. The 
Nationalist Popular Movement stands by the Greek citizen who suffers from illegal-immigration, since life 
in big cities, particularly in Athens, has been becoming unbearable’’ (GD, 2012:3).    
GD was justifying its various visits in street markets because of peoples’ complaints regarding ‘the 
increased robberies against both locals and visitors, supposedly committed by migrants (GD, 2012:11). 
Through actions of party material dissemination, GD was stating ‘The purpose of our presence was to 
inform the residents and visitors about the positions of our movements on the major issue of trafficking 
by illegal foreign retailers’. For example, in a party dissemination action at the street market of Rhodes, 
GD stated: “Members from the local branch of Rhodes visited, on Saturday morning, on 13 October 2012, 
the street market in order to disseminate news material regarding the topical issue of illegal-immigration 
and the set-up of ‘tourist centres’ (…) most issues were centred on the criminal activity and the trafficking 
by illegal-immigrants and Roma, which expand across, not only the city, but the entire island, making 
Rhodites feel insecure and scared about their life and properties” (GD, 2012:65). Through demonstrative 
actions, GD claimed that it had blocked the tolls in Rio of Patras, along with local residents protesting 
against the crimes of Roma people in their neighbourhoods, as ‘the local authorities showed no interest’ 
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and, as a result, ‘violent assaults against Greek citizens has increased sharply, now being a daily 
phenomenon’ (GD, 2012:31).   
 
6.2.3 After arrests: The declining salience of immigration  
 
The main finding so far is that, for GD, the immigration issue was on the agenda in Greek politics in Phase 
1, while it was not in Phase 2. The declining salience of immigration in Phase 2, for GD, was largely a result 
of the exclusion. This had impacted on its ability to engage in unconventional actions, which, in turn, 
impacted on its ability to keep its salience high on the issue of immigration.  
These changes are evident when GD stated, in October 2014: “In essence, the major and extremely crucial 
issue of illegal immigration is not on the agenda for the news media pimps. And, how could this have 
happened given that, under Juntas’ orders, a fake picture of pseudo social harmony is being presented, 
whereas [the Junta] demands for the political power, which dares to doubt it [the GD] is to be slandered. 
In other words, the issue of illegal immigration is a taboo issue for the news media of mass deception and 
it’s a forbidden fruit for domestic propaganda. (…) In addition, the issue of ‘racism’ has been on the agenda 
for more than a year now, where, by this way, it is attempted to harm the picture of GD” (GD, 2014:192)167.  
In this extract, it is evident the effects the arrests had on GD and how they have affected its ability to claim 
impact on the immigration issue. The phrase ‘for more than a year now’ is a direct reference to September, 
2013, when the arrests took place. Since then, the issue began to be downplayed on the agenda, implying 
that, during Phase 1, the issue was high on the agenda in Greek politics because of the unconventional 
actions of GD (see more below). 
What is more, impact-claims on the immigration issue in Phase 2 are overwhelmingly claimed through 
conventional actions, whereas in Phase 1, the majority of them are claimed through unconventional 
actions. There also emerges another pattern on the issue of immigration in Phase 2. To this, GD makes 
impact-claims on the immigration issue that had materialised in Phase 2. In other words, in Phase 2, GD 
begins to repeat impact-claims on the immigration issue, the outcomes of which had occurred in Phase 1. 
By referring to impact-claims on the immigration issue that occurred in Phase 1, GD recalls a period when 
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it was very impactful, in general, and through its unconventional actions, in the grassroots arena, in 
particular. The following impact-claim exemplifies this: 
On 8 April, 2015, GD made an impact-claim that the Mayor of Athens, Giorgos Kaminis, made some anti-
immigration statements, amidst increased migrant inflows heading to the centre of Athens, and that the 
cause for these was his fear that GD might benefit from this situation. According to GD, Kaminis stated: 
‘We cannot tolerate this situation, which eats out the inwards of our city’. But, GD continued commenting, 
which further exemplifies the fact that GD was considering itself impactful in Phase 1 and, more 
specifically, during 2012. GD stated:  
“Behind the hypocritical cries of Kaminis is hidden the definite concern that, not long from now, GD will 
again be on the lips of many Athenians (and, in turn, of all Greeks) as the only actor which would salvage 
the people from the national and social catastrophe, which is a result of the criminal politics conducted by 
the anti-constitutional bow on the issues of illegal-immigration. But, it is impossible to escape destiny. ‘We 
are going back to 2012’, Kaminis mumbles terrified. But, this time, the repeat of 2012 would be 100 times 
stronger because the Greek people would know that the actors responsible for the huge issue of 
immigration are not them, but the domestic supporters of anti-racism” (GD, 2015:211)168.  
The extract above is indicative of the fact that GD was considering itself impactful in Phase 1 on the 
immigration issue. More or less, GD reveals that its impact, and its salience on immigration at large, has 
gone (‘GD would again be on the lips of many Athenians’), at least for now, and that during 2012, it was 
more impactful than ever.  
There is also another qualitative difference. While, in Phase 1, most of immigration impact-claims took 
place at street markets, in Phase 2, there is only one immigration impact-claim which claims impact at a 
street market. This is important, as it indicates that GD had lost its ability to deliver impact at street 
markets. Street markets also have a symbolic significance for GD for ideological reasons, as, according to 
GD, they were sponsored a lot (GD, 2014:156b)169 by the Greek fascist regime of Metaxas of the inter-war 
period170. Additionally, while, in Phase 1, GD was claiming impact on immigration delivered at street 
markets through various unconventional ways (as shown previously in this chapter), GD was claiming, in 
Phase 2, that the street markets are now ‘over-populated with illegal-immigrants’ and this was another 
                                                            
168 http://bit.ly/318uLGH  
169 https://bit.ly/2oRwXoZ  
170 GD sees the fascist regime of Metaxas (1936-1941) as the ideal regime for Greece, compared for example to the 
junta regime (1964-1974) where its relationship is more complex (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou, 2015:57-58). 
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reason why it ‘is being prosecuted so passionately’ (GD, 2014:191)171. This seems to suggest that, in Phase 
1, GD was seeing itself as impactful in driving ‘illegal immigrants’ away from street markets. This largely 
captures the causes GD attributed to its low salience on immigration in Phase 2; that is, its inability to act 
unconventionally and deliver direct impact. 
There is also another qualitative difference with regards to changes in issue salience. This is about the 
claimed outcomes of impact between the two external Phases. In Phase 2, GD was considering itself less 
impactful in the grassroots arena, compared to Phase 1. This shift is evidenced by GD claiming fewer 
grassroots-caused impact in Phase 2, compared to Phase 1, as well as from the fact that, in Phase 2, GD 
was claiming to have achieved impact by achieving political outcomes of minor significance on non-core 
issues (e.g. environment), compared to Phase 1. For example, in Phase 1, many of the claimed outcomes 
were of ‘high significance’, compared to Phase 2, which were of ‘lower significance’ in terms of causing a 
lasting effect on Greek politics. Simply put, if policy change and implementation could be considered the 
highest levels of impact, GD, a party of opposition (with no coalition potential, especially in Phase 2) could 
achieve, then GD was claiming impact on that level in Phase 1, while it was not in Phase 2. Some notable 
examples of policy change impact-claims by GD in Phase 1 are: the abolition of the citizenship law (GD, 
2013:93)172, the banning of foreigners entering military schools (immigration & defence) (GD, 
2013:102)173, a law which requires the establishment of ‘detention centres’ for illegal immigrants (GD , 
2015:206)174, a law change restricting the employment criteria of foreign exclusive nurses (health) (GD, 
2013:105)175 and the implementation of police operations across the country for cracking down on illegal 
trafficking at street-markets (GD, 2012:45). But, GD’s claimed impact of ‘high significance’ is also evident 
in claiming outcomes with local effects, as argued previously, such as finding jobs for Greeks (e.g. GD, 
2012:66), breaking down migrants’ settlements in various places (e.g. GD, 2012:77)176, decreasing the 
presence of illegal immigrants at street markets across the country (e.g. GD, 2012:52; 53; 55) and forcing 
the state to impose law & order, in general.  
On the contrary, in Phase 2, there is no grassroots-caused impact-claim outcome that speaks about policy 
change, while impact-claims with local effects are of minor, often symbolic, significance. For example, in 
                                                            
171 https://bit.ly/2MB4F9N  
172 https://bit.ly/35jNjXy  
173 https://bit.ly/2osd0ET  
174 https://bit.ly/31cfdSp  
175 https://bit.ly/325r8m4  
176 https://bit.ly/2OuiR7b  
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Phase 2, most of the impact-claims claimed through grassroots actions are about replacing torn Greek 
flags in various areas (e.g. historical sites) across Greece (e.g. GD, 2014;156177, 2014:175178, 2016:250179), 
cleaning dirty billboards in historic monuments (2016:243)180, pulling down billboards at a historical site 
because it refers to the ‘wrong’ side of history (GD, 2014:190)181, achieving the power to play the national 
anthem in a commemoration event of a fallen hero (in a village) (GD, 2016:266)182, planting trees in parks 
(GD, 2016:263)183 and cleaning up a public school yard because local authorities showed ‘apathy’ (GD, 
2014:168)184. Perhaps, the most significant in terms of impact effects are claimed outcomes like the 
cancellation of planned hot-spots for refugees in towns (e.g. GD, 2016:251;271;274) 185. In other words, 
in Phase 2, what is missing from the direct impact-claims is not the use of unconventional means of 
political behaviour, but the most extreme of them; namely, the use of violence (material and/or physical), 
which seems to suggest that it has impacted on GD’s overall ability to claim impact. Conclusively, in Phase 





This chapter has tested the external factors de-radicalisation and radicalisation hypotheses on GD’s 
movement-face behaviour, over the two ‘external Phases’ and according to the thesis’ studied timeframe 
(May 2012 – December 2016), through GD’s PICs. The findings indicate that GD was on a radicalisation 
course before exclusion (Phase 1) and then changed its behaviour towards de-radicalisation following 
exclusion (Phase 2). This is evidenced by the fact that GD was emphasising its movement-face more in 
Phase 1, while it was emphasising its party-face more following the exclusion in Phase 2. Specifically, when 
it comes to actions, in Phase 2, GD was toning down its use of unconventional means (in sharp contrast 
to Phase 1) and, instead, was opting for more conventional actions, in order to claim impact in the 
                                                            
177 https://bit.ly/2AYZfjB  
178 https://bit.ly/2MvU401  
179 http://bit.ly/2MDYxh7  
180 http://bit.ly/2B9FzcN  
181 https://bit.ly/2B2mqtr  
182 http://bit.ly/2OMCZS4  
183 http://bit.ly/2IOsquc  
184 https://bit.ly/2B5ccbE  
185 http://bit.ly/2VGBgPH; http://bit.ly/2nOkNN4; http://bit.ly/2OMPoWs  
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grassroots arena. When it comes to changes on issue salience in Phase 1, the most salient issue was 
‘Immigration’; an issue directly relevant to GD’s mobilisation in the grassroots arena. In Phase 2, the 
salience of immigration declined significantly and GD was attributing this decline to the effects of the 
































This chapter tests the external factors hypotheses (e.g., de-radicalisation and radicalisation) on GD’s party-
face (electoral and parliamentary arena), over the two ‘external Phases’ (see Chapter 4) and according to 
the thesis’ studied timeframe (May 2012 – December 2016), by analysing GD’s PICs. The chapter consists 
of two main sections, consistent with the main behavioural dimensions: 1) political praxis and 2) issue 
salience. Both follow a timeframe sub-distinction based on the two ‘external Phases’. 
The first section begins by providing a comparative analysis of GD’s party-face actions over the two 
Phases, by discussing the quantitative findings derived from the PICs analysis. It shows that, in Phase 1, 
GD was emphasising its political praxis more in the electoral arena than in the parliamentary arena, 
through the claimed action-cause of ‘electoral strength’ (as evidenced in the polls). In contrast, in Phase 
2, GD displayed a noticeable change to its party-face, by emphasising its impact in the parliamentary arena 
more. The section proceeds with an in-depth analysis of GD’s specific actions across the two arenas and 
over the two external Phases. 
The second section begins by showing that the most salient issue over the two Phases, across both party 
arenas, was, by far, the immigration issue, primarily claimed in the electoral arena (in Phase 1). However, 
in Phase 2, the most salient issue was ‘Corruption’, mainly claimed in the parliamentary arena.  
Specifically, ‘Corruption’ (an issue that could, in principle, predominantly be addressed in the party 
arenas) was the most salient issue across all three political arenas in Phase 2. This change in issue salience 
points towards a change of de-radicalisation. Through this issue, GD was preoccupied with those political 
actors who, from its own understanding, repressed it through corrupted means.  
Taking into account the findings from the previous chapter (Chapter 6), as well, the chapter shows that, 
in Phase 2, GD was de-emphasising its political praxis and core mobilisation issues in the grassroots arena 
and was becoming more concerned with party-face related actions and issues. These findings tend to lead 
to a conclusion that GD was on a radicalisation course before exclusion (Phase 1) and changed towards 




7.1 Political Praxis: Electoral & Parliamentary Arenas 
 
Figure 7.1 below shows the evolution of all the party-face action categories over the two Phases, as per 
party arena.  
Figure 7.1 The evolution of GD’s party face across party arenas: Entire Period 
Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims. Note: dotted line indicates the event of GD leadership arrests. 
 
Figure 7.1 above shows that, at the beginning of Phase 1, there is high activity of claiming impact in the 
electoral arena, through either electoral strength or because other party actors were adopting GD’s 
programmatic agenda in order to deter its electoral strength. Impact claimed through these actions in the 
electoral arena steadily declines in Phase 1, whereas actions inside the parliamentary arena tend to 
increase steadily from September 2012 onwards, reaching their peak in January and February 2013. After 
that time, up until the end of Phase 1, party actions in both arenas decline steadily. At the beginning of 
Phase 2, up until April 2014, party actions impact-claims in both the electoral and parliamentary arena 
remain at low levels, with only an isolated peak of party actions impact-claims in the parliamentary arena 






























































































Total of party-face impact-claims per party arena: Entire Period




at relatively high levels, up until February 2015.  During the same timeframe, impact-claims in the 
parliamentary arena also reach high levels of frequency. From June 2015, up until the end of Phase 2, 
impact-claims in both the electoral and parliamentary arenas decline, compared to earlier, with impact-
claims in the electoral arena significantly losing their consistency, as well.  
As Table 7.1 shows (below), overall, impact-claims in the electoral arena lose, to a noticeable extent, their 
consistency and intensity in Phase 2, compared to Phase 1. In addition, impact-claims claimed through 
party actions that belong to both arenas also significantly lose their consistency and intensity in Phase 2. 
At first glance, this finding is, perhaps, reflective of the more exclusionary context GD was facing in Phase 
2. However, in terms of consistency and intensity, impact-claims in the parliamentary arena remain at 
very similar levels in both Phases.   
Table 7.1 Consistency and Intensity of GD’s party-face impact-claims per party arena External Phase  
 
Consistency Intensity 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2 
Electoral Arena 88% 69% 2.1 1.4 
Parliamentary 
Arena 
64% 66% 1.4 1.3 
Electoral & 
Parliamentary 
29% 5% 0.4 0.1 
                            Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims. 
 
Figure 7.2 (below) sums up the total of impact-claims per arena in both Phases. In Phase 1, impact-claims 
in the electoral arena were significantly higher, compared to the parliamentary arena, while in Phase 2, 
impact-claims claimed through party actions in both arenas are at very similar levels.  
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Figure 7.2 GD’s party-face impact-claims per party arena per External Phase 
Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims. 
 
However, the most important finding from Figure 7.2 (above) is that, in Phase 2, party-face Impact-claims 
in both arenas are significantly higher, compared to Phase 1, with impact-claims in the parliamentary 
arena being twice as many in Phase 2 as in Phase 1, and impact-claims in the electoral arena also seeing 
a very significant increase (by 47%) in Phase 2. Even though impact-claims in the electoral arena lose their 
consistency and intensity in Phase 2, as Table 7.1 (above) showed, overall, this finding suggests that, in 
Phase 2, GD was emphasising more its party face than in Phase 1. An initial conclusion from this 
quantitative analysis, reflecting the findings in the previous chapter, is that, following the external shock, 
GD was becoming more of a political party and less of a movement, thus shifting direction towards de-
radicalisation. What follows is an in-depth qualitative analysis of the specific actions as the claimed cause 
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Total of party-face political impact-claims per party arena: Phase 1 & Phase 
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7.2 Electoral Arena 
 
7.2.1 Phase 1 
 
Figure 7.3 below shows the main claimed causes of impact in the electoral arena, as identified by the 
analysis of political impact-claims in Phase 1. 







Electoral strength:  
The overarching pattern in Phase 1 is one where GD was claiming that its electoral strength was mostly 
evident in ND actors, which, in turn, was provoking three main ND reactions: 
1) Seeking alliances with other radical-right actors in the electoral arena, so as to appease the 
electoral strength of GD. 
2) Appealing to GD’s electorate by adopting GD’s programmatic agenda, in terms of issues positions 
and issue salience (mostly on the issues of immigration and law & order) or, more generally, by 
adopting a ‘far-right rhetoric’. 
3) Implementing tough anti-immigration policies, with the aim of containing GD’s electoral strength. 
 
At the beginning of Phase 1 and, more specifically, in the period leading up to June 2012 and after it, GD 
was frequently claiming that, in the electoral arena, its sharp electoral strength was causing other actors 
to deliver outcomes on issues such as law & order and immigration, in order to deter its further rise. Thus, 
on 28 May 2012, GD was claiming that in three towns of the Messinia constituency, policing was 
intensified in order to prevent the supposedly increased crime rates caused by gypsies. However, 








“What a coincidence! In these three towns, GD scored its highest results in the 6 May 2012 elections, in 
the constituency of Messinia! These range from 10 – 13%. And now, after years of complete apathy, 
authorities got ‘sensitised’ and decided to protect themselves from the criminal activities of ‘vulnerable 
social groups’.  Conclusion: In whatever region of Greece, residents are dealing with similar issues (that is, 
in all regions!). They must do one thing so as to find a solution: vote Golden Dawn! Right after, the 
‘authorities’ will look after them!” (GD, 2012:7).  
In the period leading up to the June 2012 election, GD was also frequently claiming that its electoral 
strength was causing actors from ND to appeal to the GD electorate. For example, through its electoral 
strength, GD was claiming that ND’s leader, Antonis Samaras, was seeking allies in the electoral arena to 
make up for the votes lost to GD: ‘Having been accepted back into his party…he made another surprising 
move!... and cooperated with the ‘Hunters’ Party’. This was not so unexpected, given that Samaras has 
been seeing real patriots joining GD, to proceed to any kind of collaborations’ (GD, 2012:8). How the 
electoral strength of GD over ND was influencing Prime Minister Samaras to look for allies, in order to 
capture back votes that had gone to GD in 2012 double elections, is exemplified in the following impact-
claim: “The fear of GD unites and, since, in Samaras’ block, we see that not even the ‘far-right’ rhetoric is 
working, as the awakened Greek people would never be caged in again, they are thinking to play their last 
card” (GD, 2013:95)186. By stating ‘the fear of GD unites’, GD was referring to the alleged cooperation of 
Samaras, along with Karatzaferis, in order to tame the electoral strength of GD. 
GD was also making impact-claims that its electoral appeal to certain electorates, such as police officers 
and personnel of Armed Forces, impacted on the Prime Minister and ND to pledge potential privileges to 
these electorates. As GD claimed, “During the pre-electoral period, Samaras and other leading ND figures 
paid many visits to various police stations and pledged ‘a complete reform’ for better dealing with crime 
and illegal-immigration. The main cause for this delirium of pledges was the fact that, in the 6 May 2012 
election, the overwhelming majority of police officers voted for GD” (GD, 2012:16). Along similar lines, GD 
claimed that its electoral appeal to army officials persuaded Samaras to pledge to them that their salary 
would not be reduced further if he was elected as Prime Minister. For GD, this pledge was nothing less 
than an electoral tactic by Samaras, intended to deter this electorate from voting GD again. As GD claimed: 
‘Samaras pledges a fight over saving the salaries of army officials because, if he lies again, then the other 
half of them would vote for GD, as well. In other words, all of them!’ (GD, 2012:21). 
                                                            
186 https://bit.ly/35i6lxG  
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Moreover, GD was claiming that its electoral strength was able to deliver outcomes at the level of policy 
implementation. For example, GD claimed that its electoral strength over ND was the main cause that 
influenced the governing party to implement the anti-immigration police operation ‘Hospitable Zeus’. “In 
the context of this operation, we learn, on a daily basis, about thousands of illegal immigrants’ 
apprehensions, which, of course, are only on paper and only for containing Golden Dawn’s rise. Besides, 
if Golden Dawn did not exist, the ‘tiny-new democracy’ would continue thanking them for coming to 
Greece, if just to remind ourselves about earlier statements made by Prokopis Pavlopoulos…” (GD, 
2012:37). In addition, in Phase 1, GD was claiming impact at the level of policy-making, as well. For 
example, according to GD, the Ministry of Labour passed a motion according to which Greek workers have 
an advantage in employment over foreigners. GD claimed that this outcome happened ‘because of GD’s 
continuous rise in electoral strength and not because the Ministry of Labour suddenly cared for Greek 
workers’ rights’ (GD, 2013:111)187. In another example, GD claimed that ND’s votes leakage to GD had 
influenced the Ministry of Education to limit the privileges of Muslim students, by dropping the term 
‘Muslims’ as part of the social criteria list for school students, as this privileges Muslim students over 
Greeks. As GD claimed, ‘Advisors at the Ministry of Education suggested this ridiculous trick in order to 
limit the votes leakage to GD’ (GD, 2013:136)188. 
GD was also claiming that its electoral strength was causing the Prime Minister to either make new policy 
pledges or reject proposals from his coalition partners because, if he did otherwise, he would have seen 
votes switch from his party to GD. For example, according to GD, Samaras had pledged to propose a bill 
amendment according to which any crime committed by undocumented migrants would be treated as a 
felony. For GD, the reason for this pledge by Samaras was its popularity: ‘In fear of our enormous electoral 
strength at the polls, the government obeys Golden Dawn’ (GD, 2012:48), GD claimed. Similarly, in 
another impact-claim, GD claimed that the Prime Minister declined their coalition partners’ proposal of 
shutting down the defence industry (as part of the economic austerity measures) at the very last moment, 
fearing that such a move would have caused further electoral strength for GD: “Samaras thought up this 
proposal and calculated it against Golden Dawn’s sharp electoral strength at the polls. As you can see, 
only votes count for the corrupted politicians and Samaras understood that such a move would cause him 
                                                            
187 https://bit.ly/2Iwpi63  
188 https://bit.ly/2VvpuaK  
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huge electoral damage and Golden Dawn would have risen further. So, he rejected the proposal of his 
coalition partners” (GD, 2013:122)189.  
 
7.2.2 Phase 2 
 
Electoral strength causes policy positions co-optation:  
In the period leading up to the 2014 local election, GD claimed, more frequently than before, impact in 
the electoral arena through its electoral success, and through the process whereby other party actors 
were copying its policy positions on a variety of policy issues. Thus, GD claimed that other actors were co-
opting its policy positions, mainly by co-opting its programmatic agenda on the issues of immigration and 
law & order, or by engaging in ‘far-right rhetoric’, with the aim of reducing its electoral strength ahead of 
the local election. For GD, this ‘far-right rhetoric’ is adopted mainly by ND: ‘The adoption of a patriotic 
rhetoric in the hopes that naïve voters would stick with Samaras’ pledges on the citizenship law and the 
‘re-occupation of our cities from immigrants', which aims ‘at keeping in balance the votes leakage to GD, 
as well absorbing back those voters who have already crossed the Rubicon’ (2014:172)190. From November 
2013, GD had already begun talking about the likelihood that it would perform strongly in the May 2014 
local election. For example, GD quoted the current head of Attica prefecture and ND candidate in the 
upcoming election, Sgouros, as stating that: ‘If someone asked what products are being produced here in 
Attica, I would tell them that we have so many (illegal) migrants, but unfortunately they cannot stock the 
shelves’ (GD, 2013:150)191. According to GD, this statement by Sgouros was an ‘opening to the ‘clean’ right 
of GD’s votes for the second round of election, who are estimated to be 15-20% of the entire electorate 
in the Attica prefecture’, according to GD (GD, 2013:150). When the 2014 local election were approaching, 
GD further intensified its impact-claims in the electoral arena. For example, GD claimed that ND’s 
candidate for Mayor of Athens, Aris Spiliotopoulos, was being tough on law & order issues by stating ‘zero 
tolerance to trafficking’ because GD brought those issues onto the agenda, as a result of its electoral 
strength tapping into ND’s electorate. As GD claimed: “The rise from 0.29% in 2010 to 7% in 2012 and to 
20% in 2014 is the sole leverage of any improvement in your life.” In another impact-claim, GD claimed: 
                                                            





“Greek man, you are very well aware that Dendias did not care for you. Now, all of a sudden, increased 
police patrolling, but the electoral rates of GD, which continue to rise, have achieved it” (GD, 2014:164)192.  
As part of its impact-claims in the electoral arena ahead of the May 2014 local and European elections, 
GD intensified its impact-claims, which skyrocketed in April 2014. Thus, GD was also claiming that it had 
caused ND to turn more ‘rightwards’, in order to absorb votes back from GD. According to GD, this 
‘rightward shift’ was also manifested in ND by, firstly, allying with radical-right actors in the electoral arena 
or by, secondly, offering many executive posts to personnel affiliated with the so-called ‘popular right’ 
wing of ND, during the government reshuffle in June 2013. Regarding the first point, for example, GD 
claimed that Samaras, on his party’s candidate list for the upcoming 2014 European election, put in 
Velopoulos, a former LAOS MP: ‘so as to save as many votes as possible’, which were going to GD. As GD 
claimed: “This tactic by Samaras is not something new, given that, for decades, ND puts on its ballots ‘blue 
nationalists’ in order to keep a safe distance with patriotic voters. Under the fear that GD might enlarge 
electorally, ND has created ‘blue small shops – which, in the end, when expired, absorbs them back into 
its ranks” (GD, 2014:162)193. 
During the pre-electoral 2014 period, GD also claimed that its electoral strength was encouraging other 
party actors to co-opt its policy positions on other minor issues. For example, GD claimed that ND 
‘confessed defeat’ and ‘has entirely copied’ GD’s positions about constitutional reform. As GD put it: ‘The 
pledges ND makes pre-electorally, which they would definitely forget after the elections (…) tend to be 
completely identical to those of GD’ (GD, 2014:165)194. GD would claim this same outcome on this issue, 
in yet another impact-claim, by claiming: ‘Samaras copies, verbatim, GD’s positions about constitutional 
reform’ (…), in the hope that he would entice any naïve voter’ (GD, 2014:166)195.  
In the period leading up to the January 2015 election, GD re-intensified its impact-claims in the electoral 
arena by claiming, again, that ND began a ‘rightwards turn’ in order to absorb GD votes. GD gave the 
example of ND beginning to oppose and blame its coalition partner, PASOK, in order to create intense 







polarisation and reduce any potential votes leakage to GD (GD, 2015:203)196. In the period leading up to 
the September 2015 national election, GD intensified, once again, its impact-claims in the electoral arena, 
with the issue of immigration now being more salient on the impact-claims. The claimed impact of GD on 
ND’s ‘rightward turn’ was exemplified in the impact-claim below, where GD claimed its electoral strength 
over ND forced the latter to adopt an anti-immigration agenda. As GD claimed: 
“In New Democracy, they decided that the leader of the party will announce next week 
his anti-immigration positions in hope of containing GD’s sharp rise. Another mistake 
by Vangelis! Because, as it is observed in other European countries as well, when dying 
off right-wing parties hypocritically adopt anti-immigration positions – so that they 
would contain nationalists’ rise- they only strengthen them even more! This is because 
they, firstly, put on the agenda an ownership issue for the nationalists and, secondly, 
the people, who suffer from the consequences of illegal-immigration, prefer the 
original to the…copy” (GD, 2015:225)197.  
Perhaps, this was also because the election took place during the refugee crisis. On 9 September 2015, 
GD claimed that, because GD was likely to perform very well in the upcoming election (held on 20 
September) on islands which are density-populated with newly-arrived refugees, the government started 
shipping them into continental Greece. As GD claimed, during the last two days, 10,000 ‘illegal-
immigrants’ were transferred away from Lesvos. In another impact-claim, GD claimed that the shipping 
of migrants away from those refugee-populated islands onto the mainland continued in the period after 
the elections, and once GD had polled well in those islands (GD, 2015:228198; 229199). In another impact-
claim, GD claimed that the government removed migrants away from Victoria Square in Athens a few days 
before the election, so as to appease potential electoral benefits for GD (GD, 2015:231)200.  
 








Other political actors co-opt GD’s policy positions  
In the run-up to the 2014 double elections (local and European), and a while afterwards, GD was 
frequently claiming that, mainly SYRIZA and ND actors, had co-opted its programmatic agenda. This seems 
to suggest that GD expanded its electoral strategy beyond the right-wing pole, attempting to appeal to 
other voters, as well. Perhaps, this is indicative of the fact that GD was emphasising vote-maximisation 
during this period. In one impact-claim, GD claimed that the PM co-opted its positions on the issue of 
homeless people. As GD put it: ‘Samaras: A complete copying of GD’s programmatic agenda on the issues 
of homeless people’ (…) ‘The agenda of ‘Greek Dawn’ is being copied all the time” (…) and “Would they 
even adopt the meander as their emblem?”(GD, 2014:163)201. Along similar lines, GD was also claiming 
impact over SYRIZA actors. According to GD, SYRIZA’s candidate for the prefecture of Attica in the 2014 
local election, Dourou, had copied GD’s agenda on refuse management ‘every word until the last full stop’ 
and presented them in an electoral TV spot. GD concluded: ‘In that way, Mrs Dourou has not only stolen 
the agenda of Greek Dawn, but the vote of many of our fellow citizens, as well’ (GD, 2014:184)202. Around 
the same period, GD also claimed: ‘After the far-right turn of the dying-right and their fuss about illegal-
immigrants and anti-communism, now it is the turn of SYRIZA to copy GD’s positions’ (GD, 2014:159)203.  
 
7.3 Parliamentary Arena 
 
7.3.1 Phase 1 
 
Inside the parliamentary arena, GD claimed to have achieved impact through actions such as: 
i) Parliamentary interpellations 
ii) Speeches 
iii) Bill motions 
Actions ii and iii are discussed below, under the category ‘other parliamentary actions’. 
 







Around September 2012, GD begins claiming, more frequently, impact through actions inside the 
parliamentary arena. The most frequent parliamentary action through which GD claims impact is 
parliamentary interpellations. For example, GD claimed that it had submitted such interpellation to the 
Ministries of Education and Public Order regarding the satire Facebook page of Greek Orthodox monk 
‘Paisios’, run by a 27-year old man. As a result, according to GD, the young man was arrested. GD claimed 
this outcome by stating ‘(…) This event confirms the fact that Golden Dawn’s actions mobilise the state 
apparatus’ (GD, 2012:54).  
Moreover, GD was claiming that its parliamentary actions were able to deliver outcomes at the policy-
making level as well, with regards to its core issue of immigration. For example, GD claimed ‘With regards 
to illegal immigration, with continuous interpellations and its general political stance, it has forced the 
state to deal, for the first time, with illegal inflows and the illegal residence of foreigners in the country’ 
(GD, 2012:64). According to GD, these actions caused, among others, the implementation of the police 
operation ‘Hospitable Zeus’ and the opening of an anti-tank ditch near the fence in Evros. Throughout 
Phase 1, GD continued claiming that its parliamentary interpellations were able to cause a major effect at 
the policy-making level. An indicative example is the following impact-claim where, in essence, GD claimed 
to have managed to change the procedures through which nurses were being employed at public hospitals 
across the country. On 28 April 2013, GD claimed that the Minister of Health decided to implement the 
policy measure entitled ‘Register for Exclusive Nurses’, according to which the criteria regarding the 
selection, labour and organisation of exclusive nurses would be upgraded. GD claimed that it had put a 
lot of effort into this issue by submitting various interpellations, in the period from August 2012 up until 
February 2013, regarding the illegal employment of foreign exclusive nurses at various public-run 
hospitals (GD, 2013:118)204. According to GD, after this ministerial decision for registration to the ‘Register 
of Exclusive Nurses’, every healthcare region now requires, among other things, a labour permit, as well 
as certification of Greek language for foreigners. GD concluded: “After multiple parliamentary 
interpellations, submitted over time by its MPs who worked methodically to promote Greek workers’ 
rights, the government was finally convinced to adopt measures that are in accordance with GD’s agenda” 
(GD, 2012:118). 
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GD also claimed policy-position co-optation in the parliament arena, where other political actors were 
copying its interpellations and were re-submitting them as their own. For example, GD claimed that ND’s 
MP, Georgiades, had copied GD initial interpellation regarding the temple of Saint Sophia of Trapezounta 
and the alleged ‘Turks’ plans for transforming it into a mosque’, and re-submitted it, presenting it as his 
own position (GD, 2013:121)205. Through interpellations, GD also claimed to have delivered outcomes on 
non-core issues, such as ‘Economy’ and ‘Health’. On the issue of ‘Economy’, GD claimed that its MP, 
Panagiotaros, submitted an interpellation requesting compensation for small businessmen at the centre 
of Athens, whose properties sustained huge damage in the February 2012 riots. GD stated that the 
Ministers ignored its request. However, GD claimed: ‘All of a sudden, all the bureaucratic obstacles were 
removed and affected merchants are now being called for compensation from the State’s General 
Accounting Office. Is that a coincidence? We don’t think so. (…) It is another victory, one among the many 
we achieve every day…’ (GD, 2013:99)206. On the issue of ‘Health’, GD claimed that, after a submission of 
an interpellation by the MP Germenis, it had forced SDOE to begin checks on the economics of KEELPNO, 
‘which wastes public funds and its employees are being paid without showing up to their working posts’ 
(GD, 2013:120)207. 
 
7.3.2 Phase 2 
 
Interpellations 
Similar to Phase 1, in Phase 2, the most frequent action in claiming impact in the parliamentary arena was 
submissions of parliamentary interpellations. However, interpellations were, now, more frequent and 
consistent, which was part of GD’s larger change in claiming impact, mostly through parliamentary actions 
in Phase 2. Additionally, through interpellations, in particular, and parliamentary actions, in general, any 
impact-claims on GD’s core issues, such as ‘Immigration’ and ‘Law & Order’, is almost non-existent, 
compared to Phase 1. An important finding is that, through interpellations and parliamentary actions, GD 
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expanded its issue agenda to claim impact on more issues than in Phase 1. In this section are impact-
claims, where the claimed cause is interpellation, discussed on an issue-by-issue basis.  
On the ‘Defence’ issue, GD claimed that its MP, Zisimopoulos, publicised his intention to submit an 
interpellation to the Ministry of Defence, requesting the intervention of the military attorney regarding a 
beating of an Army official by leftists and anarchists during an anti-fascist demonstration on 1 February 
2014 in the centre of Athens. As a result, GD claimed: “All of a sudden…a miracle happened, where the 
Minister of Defence stated: ‘Whoever touches a single hair of any army official, he/she would have to face 
the entire Ministry of Defence’, while the military attorney issued an investigative examination on the 
issue”. As GD concluded, GD’s intention to submit this interpellation ‘was the only reason why the Minister 
of Defence reacted’ (GD, 2014:155)208. On ‘Culture’, GD claimed that 24 ND MPs had copied one of its 
interpellations and re-submitted it as their own. This involved MP Panagiotaros’ interpellation, requesting 
the construction of an ‘Alexander the Great’ statue in the centre of Athens. GD concluded: ‘ND is 
completely incompetent in doing national politics. Despite this, they are also sneaky, as they copy GD’s 
position when in need of hiding their treacherous acts, and present a ‘patriotic’ profile to the voters’ (GD, 
2014:185)209. On ‘Education’, GD claimed that its MP, Zaroulia, submitted an interpellation requesting 
measures be taken in dealing with the issue of political propaganda in schools. As a result, GD claimed 
that the Ministry of Education took this request into account and begun investigating GD’s claims: ‘The 
Marxist para-state, which is active in Greek schools, was panicked after the submission of GD MP 
Zaroulia’s interpellation’ (GD, 2014:188)210. On ‘Environment’, GD claimed that it had brought to the 
surface the malpractices through which the landfill in Kiato was functioning, through an interpellation by 
its MP Zaroulia. According to GD, the landfill did not meet the environmental criteria. As a result, GD 
claimed that the management of landfills in the Peloponnese prefecture decided to close it down until it 
satisfied regulations (GD, 2016:240)211. On the issue of ‘Ethnic Minorities’ GD claimed on 22 May 2016: 
‘Padlock in illegal Turkish boarding schools in Thrace after intervention by Golden Dawn’ (GD, 2016:247)212. 
GD claimed that, right after its MP Lagos had submitted a parliamentary interpellation, where it claimed 








that kindergartens in Xanthe and Komotine are operating under illegal status, ‘the state apparatus was 
forced to get mobilised’. More specifically, according to GD, a district attorney and the competent services 
of the Municipality of Komotine paid a visit there and checked the legality of those kindergartens.  
More than any other issue in Phase 2, GD claimed most of its impact on the issue of ‘Corruption’, 
particularly through the actions of parliamentary interpellations. These impact-claims were particularly 
directed at those main actors that GD considered as most responsible for the arrests and systematic 
exclusion that it was facing, such as ND, Samaras, the TV media and all the established parties. For GD, 
these were ‘corrupt’ actors, as they were repressing the ‘only voice of the people’, through corrupt means 
(e.g. arrests and prosecution). For example, GD claimed: ‘The Parliament initiates an investigation on the 
massive banking loans of hyper-bankrupted TV media after a GD interpellation.’ In the interpellation, GD 
MP Papas made a submission to the Minister of Epikrateias, asking which businesses groups owe 11 billion 
euros to the banks. As a result, according to GD, the Minister informed parliament that he had requested, 
from the Attorney of Economic Crimes, an investigation regarding potential economic crimes (GD, 
2015:212)213. In April 2015, in an impact-claim, GD claimed: ‘Catharsis under GD’s command’ (GD, 
2015:214)214. This impact-claim was about the alleged involvement of Samaras’ closed associate, Stavros 
Papastavrou, in the case of ‘Langarde List’. More specifically, GD claimed that, after interpellations 
submitted by its MPs Kasidiaris and Panagiotaros, on this issue, the Minister of Justice informed 
parliament that the Attorney of Economic Crimes had issued the SDOE (e.g. ‘Financial Crimes Prosecution 
Body’) to initiate a preliminary investigation regarding Papastavrou’s involvement in the ‘Langarde List’, 
while the attorney was already examining criminal files of anyone who might have had involvement in the 
case. In April 2016, GD made an impact-claim regarding the supposed illegal procedures through which 
established parties were enjoying favourable criteria for getting excessive bank loans. As GD claimed, the 
SYRIZA-ANEL government proposed, in parliament, the set-up of an examination committee regarding this 
issue, ‘a position initially put forward by GD’. GD claimed its MPs were the first to bring this issue to the 
surface, through a plethora of interpellations, the last one by MP Zaroulia to the Minister of Economy. As 
GD concluded: ‘While 20 days after the Minister of Economy never replied to Zaroulia’s interpellation, 
SYRIZA and ANEL thought to table a motion on this issue for setting up a committee’ (GD, 2016245)215.  







Through law proposals, GD claimed that it had achieved impact on the ‘Corruption’ issue. For example, 
GD claimed that it had managed to increase the saliency of issues, such as the hyper-excessive MPs’ salary 
in Greek politics since it had entered parliament, and had proposed a bill demanding salary reductions for 
all MPs. This issue got a lot of attention in a mainstream TV political show where, according to GD: ‘Of 
course, no one mentioned that, for forty years, no one attempted to reveal this omerta regarding the 
parliamentary salary, until the moment GD did so.’ GD claimed this outcome by stating: ‘We, on our side, 
leave it to the establishment’s media to spread their establishment misinformation, and we feel happy 
that we have revealed one of the secrets of kleptocracy to the Greek people, despite the fact that these 
state-run puppets wish to twist facts’ (GD, 2013:149)216. 
In another impact-claim, GD claimed that the law proposal it had submitted in 2012, requesting an 80% 
reduction in public funding to political parties, was ‘shamelessly copied’ by the government in order to 
steal any votes. GD claimed that the reduction of public funds to political parties was finally taking flesh 
and that, a new bill, Article 12, foresees the keeping of ‘third category books’ for political parties, which 
increases transparency procedures on how parties spend public funds. GD claimed that this is another 
success for GD, as well as the amendment where political parties can now open up only three bank 
accounts, thus rendering checks on their public funding spending more direct and transparent. GD 
claimed: ‘The transparency of GD forces politicos to copy GD’.  When the bill for reducing public funding 
to political parties was finally proceeded on by the government into voting, GD made yet another impact-
claim on this issue. It claimed: “GD has been condemning these things for decades and introduced this 
issue in its manifesto; in all of these things, which are one among the causes why it has 10% of Greek 
people by its side, they have copied our positions, in an unacceptable way, bringing them forward as a bill 









7.4 Issue Salience: Electoral & Parliamentary Arenas 
 
Figure 7.4 below illustrates the salience of policy issues by Phase, with regards to the party arenas. It 
shows that there is significant variation of issue salience over the two Phases. For example, whereas in 
Phase 1, the most salient issue is immigration, far ahead of other issues, in Phase 2, the most salient issue 
is the issue category of ‘Populist Issues’. The category ‘Populist Issues’ includes three policy issues: 
corruption, measures of direct democracy and anti-establishment rhetoric, with 19, 5 and 1 impact-claims, 
respectively. 
Figure 7.4 GD’s party-face impact-claims: Policy issues per External Phase  
 
Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims 
 
Although, in Phase 2, ‘Populist Issues’ are slightly more salient than ‘Immigration’, with 26 and 21 impact-
claims, respectively, this change is even more noticeable when compared to Phase 1, where ‘Immigration’ 
was, by far, the most salient issue, with 25 impact-claims; far ahead of the second most salient issue of 
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the impact-claims in the grassroots arena, where, in Phase 2, GD repeats impact-claims which occurred in 
Phase 1. In other words, GD looks back to Phase 1 and recalls a period where it was enjoying a more 
favourable context and was more influential, when compared with the period after the arrests. This 
pattern also emerges in the party arenas of Phase 2. For example, in Phase 2, on the ‘Immigration’ issue, 
GD made 8 impact-claims that occurred in Phase 1, such as Samaras’ pledges for abandoning the 
citizenship law, his anti-immigration rhetoric in the 2012 elections and the implementation of police 
operation ‘Hospitable Zeus’, and 3 impact-claims on the issue of ‘Corruption’ that occurred in Phase 1, 
such as reducing the salary and other privileges of MPs. In other words, in Phase 2, the single most salient 
issue of GD’s party face is the issue of ‘Corruption’. Moreover, the findings, as shown in Figure 6.6, indicate 
that there is a qualitative change in issue salience in Phase 2, in terms of the core ideological features of 
GD. Whereas, in Phase 1, the most policy salient issues concerned ‘Immigration’ (nativism) and ‘Law & 
Order’ (authoritarianism) ideological features of GD, in Phase 2, the most salient ideological feature was 
‘Populism’, along with its related policy issue of ‘Corruption’.  Lastly, in Phase 2, the other minor issues, 
such as ‘Current Affairs’, ‘Culture’, ‘Ethnic Minorities’, ‘Defence’ and ‘Education’, are also slightly more 
salient, when compared to Phase 1. Added to this, in Phase 2, there emerge two new issues: ‘Environment’ 
and ‘Social Policy’.  
In short, these findings indicate that, following the exclusion, in Phase 2, GD changed, to a noticeable 
extent, the issue profile of its party face, compared to Phase 1, in two aspects: i) showing alteration to its 
most salient issue, ii) increasing its salience on minor issues.  
 
7.4.1 Phase 1: The salience of a core policy issue 
 
Figure 7.5 (below) shows the most salient issues of GD’s impact-claims, as per party arena in Phase 1. The 
most salient issues occur in the electoral arena and include two of the core GD issues, namely 
‘Immigration’ and ‘Law & Order’. More specifically, the immigration issue in the electoral arena is, by far, 
the most salient issue across both the electoral and parliamentary arenas. All the other issues are 
attributed relatively similar, and low, levels of salience in both arenas.  
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Figure 7.5 GD’s impact-claims issues per party arena: External Phase 1  
Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims 
 
According to Figure 7.5 above, the finding that immigration was, by far, the most salient issue – and law 
& order the second most salient - meets the theoretical expectations of the literature (Mudde, 2007). In 
other words, GD was emphasising those policy issues core to its ideology. These findings indicate that, for 
GD, the immigration issue was, perhaps, the primary tool for vote-maximisation, as it was its most 
frequent issue in claiming impact through the claimed cause of ‘electoral strength’. The pursuit of this 
goal was aided by the claim, according to GD, that the immigration issue topped the Greek political agenda 
in Phase 1, as argued in the previous chapter, as well by GD’s claim that it had ownership over this issue, 
which was a key reason why people voted for GD in the 2012 double elections. In turn, for GD, this was 
the main reason why the (centre-right) Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, was tough on immigration; that 
is, in order to contain GD’s rising popularity. Thus, according to GD, the Prime Minister pledges to deal 
with the issue of illegal immigration because: “He observed that public opinion DEMANDS their ‘massive’ 
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‘immigration card’ at the very last moment, so as to absorb votes from GD and add them to his own party!”  
(GD, 2012:10). 
According to the findings of Figure 7.5 above, in Phase 1, the high salience of the immigration issue, 
perhaps, also reflects the more favourable context GD was facing on that issue because of ND and 
Samaras’ tough anti-immigration agenda, and the generally more accommodative stance vis-à-vis GD. 
Indeed, in the 17 out of total 25 impact-claims on the immigration issue in both party arenas, GD mentions 
either Samaras, ND or the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen’s Protection, or any combination of these 
three actors, as the entities which delivered the outcome of the impact-claims. In addition, GD was noting 
a more accommodative stance of ND vis-à-vis its core issues in Phase 1. GD was seeing itself as competing 
for votes over the immigration issue with ND. This finding is reflected qualitatively, as well. For example, 
in the period leading up to the June 2012 election, GD frequently claimed impact on ND’s leader, Samaras. 
This is exemplified when GD claimed: “It is, indeed, a bit late for his interest to drive illegal immigrants 
away, given that such a thing has never, so far, been one of his slogans.” (GD, 2012:10). 
Furthermore, GD made various impact-claims regarding the Prime Minister’s pledge of abolishing the 
citizenship law (2010/3838), known as the so-called ‘Ragousis law’, named after the previous PASOK 
Minister who drafted the law. The following impact-claim exemplifies this:   
“During the pre-electoral period, Samaras was emphasising the issue of illegal immigration, threatening 
that he would drive illegal immigrants away, etc. In fact, he declared that, firstly, he would abolish the so-
called Ragousis law, ‘which transforms Greece into a magnet for illegal immigrants’, as he was putting it 
characteristically. We have warned the people that ND, which is also responsible for the creation of the 
problem, does not want and cannot solve it, and all of these nice words are nothing more than an attempt 
to contain Golden Dawn’s rise….” (GD, 2012:15).  
GD was also making impact-claims on that specific issue even in the period following the elections. GD 
claimed again: “Samaras did not abolish the Ragousis law…It has been entirely proven that all of the 
Samara’s claptrap pledges during the pre-electoral period against illegal immigration had, as their only 
goal, to stop vote leakage of ND’s votes towards Golden Dawn, something which the party has succeeded 
in…” (GD, 2012:14). In August 2012, GD was still claiming that: “One of the most popular of Samaras’ pre-
electoral pledges, in order to ‘cage in’ patriotic voters, had been the abolition of the infamous Ragousis 
law.” (GD, 2012:29). When, according to GD, the Ragousis law was frozen from being implemented, GD 
made yet another impact-claim on that issue: “But, what has really happened? Did Samaras get caught 
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up in a patriotic mood and cared for the good of his homeland and of the people? No, of course. Simply 
put, GD’s sharp electoral influence and wider impact on the Greek people, in combination with ND’s 
continuous decline, drove Samaras towards these actions” (GD, 2012:72). 
In the parliamentary arena, as Figure 6.7 showed, the issues of immigration and corruption are the most 
salient issues, sharing the same salience, with 5 impact-claims each. What is also interesting is the salience 
of the issue of ‘Economy’, which is, perhaps, indicative of the effects the Greek crisis had on all political 
parties, forcing them, in one way or another, to talk more about economic-related issues. However, in the 
parliamentary arena, there is no clear salient issue. In Phase 1, GD focused more of its attention on the 
electoral arena and on the two main issues central to its ideological features: ‘Immigration’ and ‘Law & 
Order’.  
 
7.4.2 Phase 2: The salience of a secondary policy issue 
 
Figure 7.6 (below) illustrates the issue salience of GD across the two-party arenas in Phase 2. It shows that 
there is significant variation of issue salience across the two party arenas. Whereas ‘Immigration’ is, by 
far, the most salient issue in the electoral arena, the category of ‘Populist Issues’ is, by far, the most salient 
issue in the parliament arena, and more specifically the issue of ‘Corruption’. This finding indicates that 
GD was mobilising on different issues across the two-party arenas in Phase 2.  
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Figure 7.6 GD’s impact-claims issues per party arena: External Phase 2 
Source: Database of GD’s impact-claims 
 
Moreover, Figure 7.6 (above) shows that GD expands, to a noticeable extent, its issue agenda in Phase 2, 
when compared to Phase 1, with regards to the party arenas. Whereas in Phase 1, GD made impact-claims 
on 8 different issues in the electoral arena and on 7 different issues in the parliament arena, in Phase 2, it 
made impact-claims on 12 and 11 different issues, respectively.  
What does this change of issue salience in the period before and after the external shock say about GD’s 
party change? Is it a finding that points towards the direction of de-radicalisation (or moderation, more 
generally) or towards radicalisation? On the one hand, although GD expanded, to a considerable extent, 
its issue agenda of impact-claims in Phase 2, when compared to Phase 1, its most salient issues, such as 
‘Corruption’, ‘Immigration’, ‘Law & Order’ and ‘Ethnic Minorities’, did not constitute a direct departure 
from those policy issues that are core to ERPs and FRPs in general. In other words, GD did not significantly 
increase, or show any alteration in, its emphasis on issues that are less related to its ‘niche’ profile (e.g. 
socio-cultural issues), such as the economy (Akkerman et al., 2016). Therefore, with regards to changes in 
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radicalisation or radicalisation. On the other hand, in Phase 2, there is a noticeable change in the most 
salient issue. The core issue that initially sparked the mobilisation in Phase 1 across all three arenas, 
namely ‘Immigration’ (and ‘Law & Order’ to a lesser extent), was downplayed and gave way to a new 
issue: ‘Corruption’. The findings indicate a move away from the movement face and the grassroots arena, 
and towards an issue that is predominantly concerned with the party arenas and the party face of GD. In 
short, this change in issue salience suggests a move away from the movement-face, as Kitschelt (2006) 
would argue. 
 
7.4.2.1 The declining salience of immigration 
 
In Phase 2, in the electoral arena, immigration continued being the most salient issue of GD’s impact-
claims. However, as previously noted, for GD, the ‘Immigration’ issue was off the agenda in Greek politics. 
Following the arrests, GD did not opt to engage in unconventional actions, which seems likely to have 
significantly reduced its emphasis on the ‘Immigration’ issue in the grassroots arena. The salience of 
immigration slightly decreased (from 25 to 20 impact-claims) in the party arenas following the arrests. 
However, considering, as noted, that from those 20 impact-claims in Phase 2, only 12 involved the 
electoral arena, then this decrease is rather significant. That said, this decline was significantly less when 
compared to the grassroots arena in Phase 2, where impact-claims on the ‘Immigration’ issue almost 
disappeared.  
In Phase 2, GD was describing, at times, the ‘Immigration’ issue as a salient issue in its programmatic 
agenda and in Greek politics. This sporadic salience was mainly during periods when national elections, 
such as in January and September 2015, were around the corner. In particular, according to GD, 
‘Immigration’ was mostly a hot topic on the agenda in Greek politics when elections were approaching, 
only to decrease in salience afterwards. For example, in September 2015, GD stated: ‘The issue of illegal-
immigration would retreat to the levels it was before the election simply because of the danger of a 
massive peoples’ turn towards GD, which would have gone away’ (GD, 2015:227)218. GD was seeing itself 
as unable to deliver impact on the ‘Immigration’ issue during non-electoral periods. For example, after 
claiming that the government removed refugees (away from Victoria Square) in central Athens because 
of the likelihood that GD would perform well in the upcoming election, GD stated: ‘After the election, the 
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Square filled up with migrants again. Now, with the election gone, they do not care for Greeks and so we 
witness this situation’ (GD, 2015:231)219. In other words, it seems that GD was remembering immigration 
only during electoral periods. Added to this, the finding that GD was claiming most of its impact on the 
‘Immigration’ issue as having been realised in the electoral arena, it seems to suggest that the immigration 
issue was, for GD, throughout both Phases, a tool for vote-maximisation. The declining salience of the 
‘Immigration’ issue in Phase 2 in both of the party arenas also seems to indicate that GD had reduced its 
emphasis in pursuing vote-maximisation as its primary goal.   
 
7.4.2.2 The salient issue of Corruption in the Parliamentary Arena 
 
Is this quantitative change in the most salient issue across party arenas in Phase 2, as showed in Figure 
6.8 (above), also reflected qualitatively? The short answer is ‘yes’. In Phase 2, and more specifically in the 
period after the leader got out of jail, GD saw itself, more than ever, as highly impactful on the issue of 
‘Corruption’. GD claimed: ‘Now, GD is inside the parliament and political scandals cannot remain hidden. 
Thus, the parliament must present a face of self-catharsis, so as to contain the Movement of Greek 
Nationalists’ (GD, 2014:153)220. GD was trying to claim ownership over the issue of ‘Corruption’, largely 
through the effectiveness of its parliamentary actions, by stating to ‘have brought to the surface another 
political scandal through the consistency of its parliamentary actions’ (GD, 2016:241)221.  In another 
example, GD claimed that it is ‘the only political power which, with two key interpellations, brought many 
former and current Mministers before their responsibilities, revealing, once again, the natural 
continuation of former liberal politics with that of the current leftist politics’ (GD, 2015:219)222. In addition, 
GD was emphasising its impact on corruption in the titles of many of its posts, such as ‘War against 
Corruption’ (GD, 2016:268)223 and ‘Victory for GD against Corruption’ (GD, 2016:284)224. In these texts, 
GD was emphasising that corruption had been one of its salient issues in Phase 2, as it was bounded by 
                                                            
219 http://bit.ly/2M8bNvC  
220 https://bit.ly/31adJYQ  
221 http://bit.ly/2op5cnz  
222 http://bit.ly/2Vzy5cx  
223 http://bit.ly/2VDBsiQ  
224 http://bit.ly/2VCFk3E  
224 
 
one of its key slogans, as expressed in its 2015 election manifesto (see the GD 2015 manifesto). For 
example, GD claimed: ‘It is another victory for GD against corruption, as we remain loyal to our pledge: 
Thieves must go to jail, the stolen must be returned to the people’ (GD, 2016:284).   
The issue of ‘Corruption’ was peripheral to its mobilisation repertoires in the grassroots arena and was an 
issue that naturally could only really be addressed in the party arenas, through party-related actions. This 
shift suggests that GD had entered a course of de-radicalisation in Phase 2. The issue of ‘Corruption’ was, 
perhaps, for GD, part of its victimisation discourse of being systematically excluded by the established 
parties in every political arena, and a direct reaction of GD, vis-à-vis the means of exclusion, embracing 
issues that supported its wider attempts to gain legitimacy and influence as a non-violent party. As a party, 
it felt that it was being excluded illegally from all political arenas and was deprived of its leadership and 
of public funding through corrupt means (e.g. GD, 2013:150b)225. Part of this wider attempt to gain further 
legitimacy was GD’s move to become more populist in Phase 2 (see also Charalampous & Christoforou, 
2019). This populist turn was, perhaps, an attempt by GD to defend itself against the establishment as a 
result of the exclusion. This populist turn was mainly manifested in criticising the internal elites (mainly 
party actors and the media) more than any other enemy, which, for GD, meant that they were repressing 
the only true voice of the people, which is GD, through corrupted means (e.g. GD, 2013:145; 146 149b)226. 
In the Phase 2 impact-claims, these were mainly actors directly related to the arrests, such as ND, PASOK, 
Prime Minister Samaras, the Minister of Justice, Charalampos Athanasiou and the TV media, and actors 
indirectly related to the arrests, such as all other political parties and all of the political actors that had 
governed Greece in the Metapolitefsi era. For GD, these were the corrupt actors who, through criminal 
actions, had instigated the largest prosecution in Greece against a lawful party. GD was framing actors as 
‘dishonest’, ‘vicious’ and ‘sneaky’, and the Metapolitefsi era as ‘40 years of dictatorship’ and ‘kleptocracy’ 
(GD, 2014:178)227. Therefore, the issue of ‘Corruption’ was the most salient issue of this more populist 
turn. In Phase 2, GD referred back to the arrests throughout its impact-claims, also evidenced by the fact 
that many of its impact-claims regarding ‘Corruption’ were about the alleged misuse of public funds by 
political parties, mainly of ND and PASOK, to which GD attributed most of the blame for its leadership 
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arrests (GD, 2014:177228; 2016:245229). In addition, many other impact-claims on this issue were about 
the alleged misuse of huge bank loans by TV station owners. GD also frequently criticised the media, 
because of their political affiliation to the established Greek parties, for systematically excluding GD (GD, 
2015:212230). The following extract, which concluded one impact-claim in the parliamentary arena, 
exemplifies this alleged corrupt interconnectedness between political actors and the media:  
‘If the kleptocratic establishment thinks that, through its illegal and anti-constitutional methods, it is done 
with GD, then it is in a deep sleep: They have on their side the media-pimps of deception, whilst GD has on 
its side the majority of the Greek People’ (GD, 2013:145)231.    
This de-radicalisation on issue salience in Phase 2, was evident through the high salience of another issue, 
that of ‘Current Affairs’. On this issue, GD made 7 impact-claims about the election of the President for 
the Republic (in December 2014, through a parliamentary voting), claiming throughout that if GD’s MPs 
had voted in favour of ND’s candidate, a new president would have been elected and election would not 
have followed (GD, 2014:197)232. Throughout these impact-claims, GD uses a harsh anti-establishment 
rhetoric; a further indication of its more populist turn in criticising the internal elites (GD, 2014:198; 200; 
201; 202)233. GD framed ND, Samaras and PASOK as the instigators of the arrests, and claims to have 
achieved a huge impact by breaking down the ND-led coalition government through its parliamentary 
actions. In these impact-claims, GD condemned the ND-PASOK government: ‘For two-and-a-half years, 
their arrogance and tyrannical power led them to instigate the biggest constitutional deviation by 
imprisoning the leader and the MPs of the third largest political force in the country’ (GD, 2014:197). GD 
was also attributing much of the blame for its arrests to Samaras, who, allegedly, after receiving orders 
from Jews, proceeded to imprison GD’s leadership. When GD voted down ND’s candidate for the President 
of the Republic, GD referred to Samaras as one who was struggling to remain in power, which led him to 
‘manipulate everything and humiliate the institutions’, referring to his alleged illegal decision and the 
corrupt means that he had resorted to in order to imprison GD’s leadership. For GD, the ND-led 
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government was the ‘Junta of Samaras’, which did everything possible to drown GD’s voice. According to 
GD, the aim of Samaras and ND was to repress GD and get back lost voters who had gone to GD. However, 
GD was claiming to have achieved a big impact: ‘GD being, literally, AGAINST ALL has proved that Greek 
Nationalists DO NOT BOW and go into election having, as their only ally, the Greek People’ (GD, 
2014:199)234. In other words, having voted down the ND-led government, these impact-claims were a 
further GD attempt to enhance its victimisation discourse, by presenting itself as the real victim of the 
establishment which, however, can cause impact even if repressed. 
The intensification of this anti-establishment rhetoric was, perhaps, also part of GD’s efforts to highlight 
its distinctiveness from other parties. For example, GD was claiming to have ‘crumbled down’ the ND-led 
government by itself, in its attempt to distinguish its anti-establishment behaviour from other anti-
establishment parties. The following extract exemplifies this: 
“…We are laughing at the supposed bravery of centre-right and left parties that they have brought down 
the Samaras government. Not only did they not bring it down, but they have formed, along with it, the 
corrupted anti-constitutional bow, through which they approved the anti-constitutional nastiness and 
Samaras’ crimes against GD. But, above all, they cooperated with the horrible crimes on the part of 
perjuries and the justice system, as well as approving Samaras’ crude intervention to the supposedly 
independent justice… Be sure that if the fear of GD was not casting a shadow over the camp of vicious and 
corrupt people of the anti-constitutional bow, the election of the President of the Republic would have 
already been realised…”  (GD, 2014:197)235. 
Whereas this distinctiveness in Phase 1 was aided through unconventional actions in the grassroots arena 
and inside a more favourable context, in Phase 2, GD was attempting to achieve this distinctiveness 
through other issues in the party arenas, as a reaction to the means of exclusion inside a more 
unfavourable context. Its attempt to remain a distinctive party, despite being more pre-occupied with 
party-face issues, suggests that its goal was not so much to adopt office-seeking or gain any coalition 
potential in order to bring down the cordon sanitaire, but, rather, to overcome the cordon sanitaire 
through this issue distinctiveness (e.g. Akkerman et al., 2016). In short, this more populist turn was taking 
place through being more active in the party arenas than in the grassroots arena, and by embracing issues 
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that were not so much related to its mobilisation repertoires in the grassroots arena. As a result, it is more 





This chapter has tested the external factors de-radicalisation and radicalisation hypotheses on GD’s party-
face behaviour, over the two ‘external Phases’ and according to the thesis’ studied timeframe (May 2012 
– December 2016), through GD’s PICs. The findings showed that, in Phase 1, GD mostly emphasised its 
actions in the electoral arena. In addition, immigration was, by far, the most salient issue in the electoral 
arena. These findings seem to suggest that GD was following, with regards to its party-face, a 
predominantly vote-maximisation goal in Phase 1. GD was claiming impact most frequently through its 
electoral strength and on its core issue. In other words, it seems that immigration was a tool for vote-
maximisation. However, taking into account the findings from the previous chapter (Chapter 6), as well 
(where immigration was the most salient in the grassroots arena, and the finding that GD was claiming 
more impact mostly through unconventional actions), they seem to suggest that, in Phase 1, GD was 
prioritising policy purity. Thus, in Phase 1, GD was on a course of radicalisation. 
The chapter has shown that, in Phase 2, GD showed significant changes to its party-face. The most 
emphasised action was the category ‘Parliamentary Actions’. This was an indication that GD was 
increasing its attention in parliament and was de-emphasising a vote-maximisation strategy.  Additionally, 
in Phase 2, GD emphasised, mostly, its impact on the issue of ‘Corruption’, and on other issues that 
included a rich anti-establishment stance, in an attempt to enhance its status as the true martyr of the 
establishment and present itself as a distinctive party. Having in mind the findings from Chapter 6, to 
secure the legitimacy of being a non-violent party and a victim of the establishment, GD chose to 
emphasise an issue that could be largely addressed through conventional actions in the party arenas and 
abandon issues through unconventional means in the grassroots arena. This finding suggests that this 
change in issue salience, in Phase 2, was part of GD’s wider change in the political behaviour of mostly 
emphasising its party-face, while, at the same time, de-emphasising its movement-face. In conclusion, in 








This chapter tests the internal factors hypotheses by presenting and discussing the main PICs’ quantitative 
patterns only, as per political arena and behavioural dimension, over the ‘factional Phases’ (see Chapter 
5). Thus, this chapter does not delve into an in-depth discussion of the specific PICs, as the overwhelming 
majority of all the PICs identified have already been presented in the two previous empirical chapters. 
However, the findings presented in Chapters 6 and 7 will also be taken into account in order to reach a 
conclusion about whether the GD de-radicalised or not, and how it did so, over the period when the 
moderates and militants were the dominant faction.  
This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first three sections share the same structure. For 
example, Section 1 presents the quantitative findings of the grassroots arena as per the behavioural 
dimensions: political praxis and issue salience. Then, each dimension is discussed as per factional Phase. 
The same goes for Sections 2 and 3. Section 2 is concerned with the electoral arena and Section 3 with 
the parliamentary arena. The last section of the chapter sums up the findings (taking into account the 
findings presented in Chapter 6 and 7, as well) and provides a comparative analysis of GD’s political praxis 
and issue salience across the three political arenas and its two faces. The aim is to conclude the 
behavioural outcome in each ‘factional’ Phase; that is, whether the GD was on a course of de-racialisation 
or radicalisation. In short, the findings show that, in factional Phase 1 (militants), GD was on a 
radicalisation course. It changed its behaviour towards de-radicalisation in Phase 2 (moderates) and, in 
Phase 3 (militants), GD changed towards a ‘partial de-radicalisation or partial radicalisation’.  
 
8.1 Grassroots Arena 
 
This section presents the quantitative findings of GD’s PICs as per behavioural dimension in the grassroots 
arena over the three ‘factional’ Phases. Political praxis is discussed first and issue salience next. The 
section shows that, in the grassroots arena, GD was on a course of radicalisation in Phase 1, on a course 
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of de-radicalisation in Phase 2 and on a course of ‘partial’ de-radicalisation or ‘partial’ radicalisation in 
Phase 3.  
 
8.1.1 Political Praxis 
 
Figure 8.1 (below) presents the PICs where the claimed causes are grassroots-related actions per 
‘factional’ Phase. As it shows, GD claimed most of its impact, materialised in the grassroots arena, in Phase 
1, the most euphoric period in GD’s history. As discussed in Chapter 5, this was a period when the GD 
began to experiment with managing the large influx of moderate members at the electoral and grassroots 
arena, as a result of its electoral breakthrough. However, in Phase 1, the militants still had complete 
control inside the GD (see Chapter 5). As Figure 8.1 (below) also shows, in Phase 2, PICs in the grassroots 
arena decreased significantly, while they increased to a noticeable extent in Phase 3. At first, these 
findings thus far show that, in factional Phase 2, the GD entered a significant de-radicalisation course in 
the grassroots arena. This course, however, began to reverse when the leader was released from jail and 














Figure 8.1 PICs in the grassroots arena per factional Phase 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s PICs 
In short, these findings, thus far, are in accordance with the theoretical expectations of the internal factors 
hypotheses: When the moderates were dominant (Phase 2), the GD was on a de-radicalisation path, while 
when the militants were dominant (Phases 1 and 3), the GD was on a radicalisation path. 
However, there are other aspects that must be examined before reaching the conclusion that the GD was, 
indeed, de-radicalised in Phase 2 and then somewhat re-radicalised its behaviour in Phase 3, in the 
grassroots arena. As explained in the previous empirical chapters (5 - 7), the GD had abandoned 
contentious actions following the external shock, a trend evident up until the end of the thesis’ studied 
timeframe. This pattern is also evident in the PICs of GD, across the three ‘factional Phases’.  
Figure 8.2 (below) presents the PICs of GD per factional Phase, where the claimed cause is either a 
conventional or an unconventional action in the grassroots arena. As it shows, in Phase 2, GD’s 
unconventional PICs were decreased significantly, compared to Phase 1, and increased slightly in Phase 3. 
Conventional PICs also decreased considerably in Phase 2, compared to Phase 1. However, they increased 
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increasing significantly its grassroots PICs, however it claimed impact predominantly through 
conventional actions. So, what can these findings tell us? How was GD changing and in which direction?  
 
Figure 8.2 Conventional & Unconventional grassroots actions as the claimed cause of PICs per factional 
Phase 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s PICs. 
In short, the findings presented in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 (above) are in accordance with some of the 
expectations of the de-radicalisation, as well as of the radicalisation factional theories. When the 
moderates were mostly influential (Phase 2), the GD turned its attention away from the grassroots arena 
by claiming less impact, only to turn its attention back in the grassroots arena by claiming significantly 
more impact when the militants re-emerged as the dominant faction (Phase 3). Consequently, these 
findings point towards an outcome of ‘partial re-radicalisation’ or partial de-radicalisation’. In other 
words, the GD began finding its way back to the grassroots arena by claiming more impact in Phase 3. 
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Conventional & Unconventional grassroots actions as the claimed cause of 




‘partial de-radicalisation’ because the GD had also abandoned, to a great extent (compared to Phase 1), 
claiming impact through unconventional actions.  
Figure 8.3 (below) presents the specific grassroots action through which GD claimed impact as per the 
factional Phases. As it shows, the activity ‘visits by GD team members’ is the most frequent grassroots 
action claiming impact throughout the three phases. This is the main action where the GD was claiming 
impact through the use of mainly unconventional actions, as explicated in the previous empirical chapters. 
According to Figure 8.3 (below), this action decreased significantly in Phase 2, but increased again in Phase 
3, though still being significantly below that of Phase 1.  
Figure 8.3 Number of Specific grassroots actions per factional Phase 
 























Number of Specific Grassroots actions per factional Phase
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Consequently, regarding the political praxis in the grassroots arena, the GD entered a de-radicalisation 
course when the moderates were more influential inside the GD; that is, in Phase 2. This de-radicalisation 
was evident quantitatively as well as qualitatively in the PICs of GD. Quantitatively speaking, the GD was 
claiming far less impact materialised as a result of its grassroots actions in the grassroots arena in Phase 
2, compared to the other two ‘factional’ Phases. In Phase 3, these PICs were increased. This suggests that 
the GD was back on a re-radicalisation course again. However, qualitatively speaking, in both Phase 2 and 
3, the GD was claiming far less impact materialised as a result of its unconventional actions, compared to 
Phase 1. Thus, this re-radicalisation, evident in Phase 3 (militants), was left ‘partial’, as unconventional 
actions were missing from the PICs of the GD in the grassroots arena. Thus, the end outcome in the 
grassroots arena in Phase 3 can be better defined as ‘partial de-radicalisation’ or ‘partial radicalisation’. 
 
8.1.2 Issue Salience 
 
Figure 8.4 (below) presents the issue salience of GD’s grassroots PICs throughout the three factional 
Phases. As it shows, the most salient issue in all Phases is ‘Immigration’, a core policy issue for FRPs. This 
issue was more salient than ever in Phase 1 (40 PICs) and it dropped dramatically in Phase 2, to 4 PICs, 
only to rise again to a noticeable extent in Phase 3, to 10 PICs. Other core issues, such as law & order, 
which is linked to the ideological feature of authoritarianism of ERPs, was the second most salient issue 
in Phase 1, only to disappear altogether during Phase 2 and 3. Other core issues of GD, such as social 
policy/activism, displayed a significant drop in Phase 2 and disappeared altogether in Phase 3. The core 
issues of ‘ethnic minorities’ was salient only in Phase 3, with 4 PICs. The core issue of culture, which was 
most salient in Phase 1 (7 PICs), dropped to 3 PICs in Phase 2 and, afterwards, it slightly increased in Phase 







Figure 8.4 PICs' policy issue salience in the grassroots arena per Factional Phase 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s PICs 
So, what does this change in issue salience tell us about the de-radicalisation and radicalisation of the GD 
with regards to the internal factors hypotheses? At first, most of the core issues of GD, and the most 
salient ones (except law & order and social policy), such as immigration, culture and ethnic minorities, 
displayed a noticeable increase in Phase 3 when compared to Phase 2. In other words, when the 
moderates were most visible (Phase 2), the core issues of GD’s policy profile were the least salient in its 
grassroots PICs. On the contrary, when the militants were most influential, in Phase 1 and 3, these same 
























PICs' policy issue salience in the grassroots arena per factional Phase
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Moreover, other observations can be drawn from Figure 8.4 (above), as well. First, in both Phases 1 and 
3, when the militants were most influential, the ownership and core issues to the policy agenda of GD 
(that is, issues that belong to the socio-cultural political axis) were the most salient. Specifically, the top 
ownership issue by GD (and FRPs in general), immigration, was, by far, the most salient issue in both Phase 
1 and Phase 3 in the grassroots PICs of GD. However, in Phase 2, a particularly highly salient policy issue 
could not be distinguished. In Phase 2, the most salient issue is immigration, along with social policy, with 
only 4 PICs each. With regards to the total of policy issues, the GD did not expand noticeably its issue 
palette throughout Phase 2 and 3. Specifically, in Phase 1, the GD claimed impact on 7 different policy 
issues, on 6 in Phase 2 and on 8 in Phase 3. This indicates that, when the moderates were most influential, 
the GD did not expand its issue profile in claiming impact in the grassroots arena, specifically on non-core 
issues such as the economy. This goes somewhat contrary to the theoretical expectations of the internal 
factors hypotheses, as one would expect the GD to expand its issue palette the most in Phase 2, when the 
moderates were most visible. However, it is worth noting again that the grassroots arena is not the arena 
where the moderates are the most experienced or influential. Thus, this pattern (claiming more impact 
on non-core policy issues & expanding the issue palette) is expected to be more evident in the party-face 
arenas (discussed next). Therefore, the low issue salience in Phase 2 is likely related to the fact that, in 
Phase 2, the grassroots PICs were far less when compared to the other two ‘factional phases’.  
Based on the finding that in Phase 1 and 3, when the militants were more influential than the moderates, 
the most salient issues in GD’s grassroots PICs were its ownership issues, this indicates that the GD was 
on a course of radicalisation, by sticking to core policy issues that are informed by its core ideological 
features and which can be primarily addressed in the grassroots arena, as well. Added to this, the finding 
that these core issues were the least salient in Phase 2, when the moderates were the most influential 
faction, indicates that the GD was on a de-radicalisation course during this period, by de-emphasising its 








8.2 Electoral Arena 
   
8.2.1 Political Praxis  
 
Figure 8.5 (below) presents GD’s PICs in the electoral arena over the three Phases. It illustrates that, in 
both Phase 1 and Phase 2, the GD made the same (35) PICs. In Phase 3, PICs in the electoral arena dropped 
significantly, to 18.  
 
Figure 8.5 PICs in the Electoral Arena per factional Phase 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s PICs 
At a first glance, this finding indicates that, following the external shock, when the moderates were more 
influential (Phase 2), the GD was paying more attention to the electoral arena, by claiming significantly 
more impact than in Phase 3, when the militants had the upper hand. This finding indicates that the GD 
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Figure 8.6 (below) presents the claimed cause in the PICs of the GD in the electoral arena per factional 
Phase. It shows that GD claimed most of its impact in the electoral arena through the claimed cause of 
‘electoral strength’. Again, ‘electoral strength’ refers to the electoral appeal of the GD, where, in its PICs, 
it was claiming that opponents were delivering outcomes in its favour in order to appease its rising 
electoral strength, as evidenced, mainly, in the polls (see chapter 7). Thus, the claimed cause ‘electoral 
strength’ can also be read as a proxy to the attention the GD was paying to vote-maximisation; a 
predominant electoral strategy preferred mainly by the moderates in the electoral arena. Most of the PICs 
in the electoral arena caused by ‘electoral strength’ were in Phase 1 (29 PICs), which dropped significantly 
in the following two ‘factional phases’: 16 PICs in Phase 2 and 10 PICs in Phase 3. Regarding the internal 
factors hypotheses, this finding presented in Figure 8.6 (below) also indicates that the GD was 
emphasising a vote-maximisation strategy more when the moderates were most influential; that is, in 
Phase 2, in contrast to Phase 3, when the militants re-gained the upper hand. 
 
Figure 8.6 Specific 'claimed cause' of PICs in the Electoral Arena per factional Phase 
 
 
























Specific 'claimed cause' of PICs in the Electoral Arena per Phase
Electoral strength Policy Positions Co-optation
238 
 
As shown in Figure 8.6 (above), the evolution of the claimed cause ‘political positions’ in the electoral 
arena is also curiously interesting. As it shows, the GD claimed most of its impact as a result of its political 
positions being adopted by its opponents in Phase 2 (19 PICs), when the ‘moderates’ faction were most 
visible. This claimed cause dropped considerably in Phase 3, to 6 PICs, the same as in Phase 1. This finding 
is also an indication of a de-radicalisation course of the GD when the moderates were dominant, and a 
sign of re-radicalisation when the militants were dominant.  
 
8.2.2 Issue Salience 
 
Figure 8.7 (below) presents the policy issues of GD’s PICs in the electoral arena as per factional Phase. The 
most salient issue throughout all three Phases is the immigration issue. In Phase 2, the immigration issue 
is equally salient, along with the issue category ‘Populist Issues’, with 7 PICs each. In Phase 1 and 3, the 
immigration issue is, by far, the most salient issue, with 17 and 10 PICs respectively; far ahead of the 
second most salient issue, which is ‘current affairs’ and ‘law & order’ in Phase 1 (5 PICs each), and ‘law & 














Figure 8.7 PICs' issues salience in the Electoral Arena per factional Phase 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s PICs 
Furthermore, in Phase 2, the GD expanded its issue palette in the electoral arena to a noticeable extent, 
especially when compared to Phase 3. For example, in Phase 1, the GD claimed impact on 9 different 
policy issues, on 11 in Phase 2 and on 7 in Phase 3. This finding indicates that when the moderates were 
the most influential faction inside the GD, the GD claimed impact on most policy issues. In Phase 3, when 
the militants were the dominant faction, GD decreased significantly its issue palette (from 11 to 7 different 
policy issues). With regards to the key core policy issue of GD, that is immigration, this was, by far, the 
most salient issue among all issues of each Phase, when the militants had the upper hand (e.g., Phases 1 
and 3).  
With regards to secondary issues to the policy issue profile of the GD, a striking finding from Figure 8.7 
(above) is that issues such as ‘Economy’ and the ‘Environment’ were most salient in the PICs of GD in the 
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direct democracy’ is another striking finding from Figure 8.7 (above). This issue category was the second 
most salient issue in Phase 2, behind immigration. Interestingly, in both Phase 1 and 3, this policy issue is 
completely absent from GD’s PICs.  
Policy issues informed by the ideological feature of populism, such as the issue of ‘direct democracy 
measures’, are not considered as core policy issues for ERPs (Mudde, 2007). Although policy issues that 
are framed in a populist rhetoric by ERPs as well can be found (Caiani & Della Porta, 2012), including GD 
(Charalampous & Christophorou, 2019; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015), this is not necessarily 
considered as a core policy issue to ERPs’ policy agenda, as populism is not a core ideological feature for 
them (Papas, 2016).  
Based on these findings, the GD entered a de-radicalisation course when the moderates were the most 
influential faction (Phase 2) and a course of (re)-radicalisation when the militants emerged as the 
dominant faction at the end (Phase 3). In Phase 2, the de-radicalisation course on the behavioural 
dimension of issue salience was evident by the:  
i) expanded issue palette including secondary policy issues as well, which were far more salient 
in this Phase, than in the other two Phases,  
ii) the lowest salience on its key core policy issue, that is, immigration,  
iii) the high salience of policy issues which are informed by the core ideological feature of 
populism for PRRPs, such the issue of ‘direct democracy measures’.  
In Phase 3, when the militants eventually dominated, the GD turned back to radicalisation in the electoral 
arena. This was evidenced by the fact that:  
i) the core policy issue of immigration was again by far the most salient issue,  
ii) the issue palette was decreased significantly and GD claimed significantly less impact on 
secondary issues compared to Phase 2,  
iii) the issue category of populist issues such as ‘measures of direct democracy’ (as addressed by 




8.3 Parliamentary Arena 
 
8.3.1 Political Praxis  
 
As Figure 8.8 (below) shows, the PICs of the GD in the parliamentary arena remained stable throughout 
the three Phases. Specifically, in Phase 1, the GD made 24 PICs, 26 in Phase 2 and 25 in Phase 3. Thus, no 
discernible pattern can be distinguished, as per the ‘factional Phases’, with regards to the political praxis 
of the GD in the parliamentary arena, as well as whether this points towards de-radicalisation or 
radicalisation.  
Figure 8.8 PICs in the Parliamentary per Factional Phase 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s PICs 
In Figure 8.8 (above), parliamentary activities refer to various activities inside the parliament, such as 
parliamentary and bill motions, parliamentary reports, speeches in the plenary and roll-call voting, with 
the majority being interpellations. Here, as well, no discernible pattern can be distinguished regarding the 
nature of these parliamentary actions, which would suggest a change towards de-radicalisation or de-
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8.3.2 Issue Salience 
 
Figure 8.9 (below) presents the salience of policy issues of GD’s PICs in the parliamentary arena, as per 
factional Phase. It shows that the most salient issue during the entire period is the issue of ‘corruption’, 
with 21 PICs, followed by current affairs with 10 PICs and ethnic minorities with 8 PICs.   
Figure 8.9 PICs' issue salience in the Parliamentary Arena per factional Phase 
 
Source: Author’s Database of GD’s PICs 
Specifically, in Phase 1, ‘Corruption’ is the most salient issue, along with ‘Immigration’, with 5 PICs each. 
‘Economy’ is slightly behind with 4 PICs as the second most salient issue in Phase 1, while ‘Law & Order’ 
and ‘Culture’ follow, with 3 PICs each, as the third most salient issues. In fact, in Phase 1, there is not a 
particularly ‘highly salient’ issue in the PICs of GD in the parliamentary arena. In Phase 2, the most salient 
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issue of ‘Defence’, at 3 PICs. Thus, current affairs, and to a lesser extent ‘Corruption’, are the ‘highly 
salient’ issues in Phase 2.  In Phase 3, ‘Corruption’ is now the most salient issue, with 10 PICs, followed by 
‘ethnic minorities’ at 6 PICs, as the second most salient issue.  
In terms of issues agenda expansion, a clear pattern cannot be distinguished. In Phase 1, the GD claimed 
impact in the parliamentary arena on 7 different policy issues, and on 8 different policy issues in both 
Phase 2 and 3.  
At a first glance, the GD seems to have been on a de-radicalisation course in all three Phases. In Phase 1, 
this was evidenced by the fact that secondary policy issues to the agenda of GD, most prominently the 
issue of ‘economy’, were almost equally salient as the core policy issue of immigration, as well as slightly 
more salient than other core policy issues, such as ‘culture’ and ‘law & order’. In Phase 2, de-radicalisation 
was evidenced with the very low salience of all the core policy issues, and the high salience of ‘Current 
Affairs’, an issue rather secondary to the policy agendas of ERPs, as it is not, per se, concerned with a 
particular policy issue. In Phase 3, de-radicalisation was evidenced with the high salience of ‘Corruption’ 
(10 PICs). Although corruption is not a secondary policy issue for ERPs in particular, it is, however, an issue 
that cannot primarily be addressed in the grassroots arena. In Phase 3, a core policy issue, ethnic 
minorities’, was also highly salient as the second most salient issue (6 PICs), while other policy issues, core 
and secondary, were far behind, displaying very low salience (e.g., 1 or 2 PICs).  
Taking into account the findings presented in the previous empirical chapters as well, this leads to the 
conclusion that, in Phase 3, the GD changed towards a direction of partial de-radicalisation/radicalisation, 
with regards to the dimension of issue salience. It did so by increasing the salience in its PICs, to a 
noticeable extent, on an issue that usually neither belongs to the core policy issues of ERPs nor is usually 
a secondary policy issue for them. 
 
8.4 De-Radicalisation & Radicalisation Outcomes: Internal factors 
 
This final section of this chapter sums up the main findings presented in the previous three sections and 
provides a comparative analysis in order to conclude whether the GD changed towards de-radicalisation 
and/or radicalisation, according to the expectations of the internal factors hypotheses (as developed in 
Chapter 5), over the three ‘factional Phases’. 
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8.4.1 Political Praxis 
 
Figure 8.10 (below) illustrates the evolution of PICs over the three ‘factional phases’ during the thesis 
timeframe, as per arenas, according to the claimed cause of GD’s PICs; that is, the political praxis. As it 
shows, in Phase 1, GD claimed (by far) most of its impact through grassroots actions. In fact, PICs 
grassroots actions are even more than the two party-face arenas combined. This indicates that the GD 
was on a course of radicalisation in Phase 1. However, the pattern is considerably different in Phases 2 
and 3. While in Phase 2, GD made most of its PICs in the electoral arena, and the least in the grassroots, 
in Phase 3, it made most of its PICs in the grassroots arena (though slightly more than in the legislative 
arena) and the least in the electoral arena. What is also interesting is the variation with regards to the 
PICs, where the claimed cause action happens in both the ‘grassroots and party arenas’. This ‘arenas 
category’ is significantly more salient in Phase 3 than in the two previous phases.  
Figure 8.10 PICs per political arena & factional Phase 
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Figure 8.10 (above) shows that there is a significant alteration in the most active arena over the period 
when the leader was in and out of jail. For example, while, in Phase 2, the most emphasised arena for 
claiming impact was the electoral, in Phase 3, it was the grassroots. Even though: i) grassroots is slightly 
more emphasised in Phase 3 than in the other two party arenas, and ii) both party-face arenas combined 
are emphasised mostly in Phase 3 rather than in the grassroots arena, this finding shows a significant 
qualitative change, when compared to Phase 2. Specifically, whereas in Phase 2, the most emphasised 
arena (e.g., electoral) was an arena that has to do with the party-face of GD, in Phase 3, the most 
emphasised arena is an arena that has to do with the movement-face of GD.  
Table 8.1 (below) shows how the intensity and consistency of GD’s PICs has evolved over the three Phases, 
as per political arena. At first glance, the findings in Table 8.1 seem to corroborate the findings presented 
in Figure 8.10 (above). In terms of intensity, Table 8.1 shows that PICs in the electoral arena witnessed a 
slight drop in Phase 2, and a further higher drop in Phase 3. In contrast, PICs in the grassroots arena 
dropped significantly in Phase 2, only to rise again to a noticeable extent in Phase 3.  
Table 8.1 Intensity and consistency of GD’s PICs per political arenas & factional Phase 
Political Arena 
Intensity Consistency 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Electoral 2.1 1.8 0.9 88% 89% 50% 
Parliamentary 1.4 1.4 1.2 65% 68% 65% 
Grassroots 4.2 0.7 1.3 88% 58% 60% 
 
Source: Database of GD’s PICs. Note: The categories ‘electoral and parliamentary’ and grassroots and 
party arenas’ are not included, as they displayed negligent intensity and consistency. Phase 2: leader in 
jail. Phase 3: leader out of jail.  
 
In terms of consistency, as Table 8.1 above shows, PICs in the electoral arena are similarly consistent in 
both Phase 1 and Phase 2, while they lose, to a significant extent, their consistency in Phase 3. There is 
also a significant drop in the grassroots arena in Phase 2, while there is a very slight increase in Phase 3. 
Lastly, with regards to PICs in the parliamentary arena, these show, to a large extent, similar intensity and 
consistency over the three Phases. In short, the findings in Figure 8.10 and Table 8.1 (above) suggest a 
qualitative ‘change of faces’ for the GD over the three ‘factional phases’, with regards to the behavioural 
dimension of political praxis. Subsequently, when the moderates were the most dominant faction (Phase 
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2), the GD changed towards de-radicalisation, while when the militants were the dominant faction (Phase 
1 and Phase 3), the GD was on a radicalisation path.  
However, and as presented previously in this chapter, the radicalisation in Phase 3 was ‘partial’ (see Table 
8.2 below). This was evidenced by the fact that, even though the GD had increased its claimed impact 
significantly, materialised as a result of its grassroots actions in Phase 3 (compared to Phase 2), the 
grassroots arena was the most emphasised arena in Phase 3. The GD, however, did not claim to have 
materialised impact as a result of its unconventional actions. Thus, this pattern, which was first observed 
in Phase 2, continued in Phase 3, where the GD had abandoned claiming impact through contentious 
political praxis. Additionally, while, in Phase 3, the GD claimed to have materialised most of its impact 
inside the grassroots arena, compared to the electoral or parliamentary arenas separately, thus increasing 
its emphasis on its movement-face in Phase 3 compared to Phase 2, the actions through which GD claimed 
to have materialised impact in the two party-face arenas combined in Phase 3 still made up most of its 
PICs, when compared to the PICs in the grassroots arena. In short, these two important findings indicate 
that the GD was not on a radicalisation course in Phase 3 in the same way it was in Phase 1. Thus, the 
change in Phase 3 can be best termed as ‘partial de-radicalisation’ or ‘partial radicalisation’. Table 8.2 
(below) sums up the findings. 
 
Table 8.2 Behavioural Change Outcome: Political Praxis 
Political Praxis 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Most emphasised 
face 
movement party Party  
Behavioural Change radicalisation De-radicalisation Partial de-radicalisation 
/ partial radicalisation 
 
As shown in Table 8.2 (above), the movement-face in Phase 3 is termed as ‘partial’ because the nature of 
the movement-face had an important qualitative change in Phase 3; that is, it was lacking unconventional 




8.4.2 Issue Salience 
 
Figure 8.11 (below) shows that the core policy issues were significantly more salient in the PICs of the GD 
in Phase 1 when compared to Phase 2 and 3, specifically in the grassroots arena. In Phase 2, the salience 
of core policy issues in the grassroots arena witnessed a dramatic drop, compared to Phase 1, while the 
salience of core issues in the electoral arena fell considerably as well.  
 
Figure 8.11 PICs' core Policy Issues salience per Political Arena & factional Phase 
 
Source: Author’s database of GD’s PICs.  
The salience of core policy issues in the parliamentary arena was relatively stable over the three Phases. 
In Phase 3, the salience of core policy issues in the grassroots PICs, when compared to Phase 2, rose 
slightly, while, in the electoral arena, the salience rose a very small extent. Overall, for both Phase 2 and 


















Factional Phase & Political Arena




significantly lower when compared to Phase 1. This is because of the very high salience of core policy 
issues in the grassroots arena in Phase 1.   
Moreover, Figure 8.11 (above) shows that, in Phase 1, GD claimed more of its impact on core policy issues 
in the grassroots arena (71 PICs) than in the party-face arenas (44 PICs). In both Phases 2 and 3, GD claimed 
most of its impact on core policy issues in the party-face arenas. Specifically, in Phase 2, 30 PICs on core 
policy issues were made in the party-face arenas, compared to 12 in the grassroots arena, while, in Phase 
3, 34 PICs were made in the party arenas, compared to 19 PICs in the grassroots arena. This finding is a 
strong sign of de-radicalisation in both Phases 2 and 3. 
Figure 8.12 (below) presents the salience of the secondary policy issues in the PICs of GD, across all the 
three political arenas and over the three Phases. As Figure 8.12 (below) shows, GD made most of its PICs 
on secondary issues in all three Phases in the party-face arenas. This is not surprising as secondary issues 
are expected to be addressed primarily in the party-face arenas, as, by nature, they cannot, in principle, 
be addressed in the grassroots arena.  





















Factional Phase & Political Arena




Source: Author’s database of GD’s PICs. 
The most striking fact from Figure 8.12 (above) is that secondary policy issues were, by far, more salient 
than ever in the party-face arenas, when the moderates had the upper hand (e.g., Phase 2), with 33 PICs, 
compared to 18 in Phase 1 and 15 in Phase 3. From those 33 PICs in Phase 2, the majority (19 PICs) were 
in the electoral arena, the preferred arena for moderates, while 12 PICs happened in the parliamentary 
arena, and only 2 PICs in the grassroots arena.  
Therefore, the findings presented in Figures 8.11 and 8.12 above on the behavioural dimension of issue 
salience lead, so far, to the same conclusion as the findings on the political praxis presented previously, 
regarding the de-radicalisation and radicalisation of the GD over the ‘factional Phases’. The de-
radicalisation and radicalisation findings on the issue salience are summed up in Table 8.3 (below), as per 
political arena and Phase. Thus, Table 8.3 sums up the behavioural outcomes, based on the analysis thus 
far. In Phase 1, the GD was on a radicalisation course. This was evidenced in the PICs by the exceptionally 
higher salience of core policy issues in the grassroots arena, when compared to both the party-face 
arenas, and the minimal salience in the grassroots arena on secondary policy issues. Thus, in terms of 
issue salience, the movement-face was emphasised more, compared to the party-face.  
  
Table 8.3 Behavioural Change Outcome: Policy Issue Salience 
Core policy Issues Salience 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Most emphasised 
face  
movement party party 
Secondary Policy Issues Salience 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Most emphasised 
face 
party party Movement & party 
Behavioural Change radicalisation De-radicalisation Partial de-radicalisation 




In Phase 2, as Table 8.3 (above) shows, when the moderates were most influential, the GD entered a de-
radicalisation course, with regards to the dimension of issue salience. This was evidenced by the 
exceptionally higher salience of secondary policy issues in the PICs in Phase 2, in the party-face arenas and 
in the electoral arena in particular. For example, in Phase 1, PICs on secondary issues in the party-face 
arenas were 15, 31 PICs in Phase 2 and 8 PICs in Phase 3. Additionally, in Phase 2, on core policy issues, 
GD made more PICs in the party-face arenas than in the grassroots arena, as compared to Phase 1. Thus, 
in a period when the moderates were influential, core and secondary policy issues were much more salient 
in the party-face arenas than in the grassroots arena. In particular, in Phase 2, on both core and secondary 
policy issues, most PICs were claimed in the electoral arena, the preferable arena for moderates. At the 
same time, in Phase 2, the GD expanded its issue palette to a more significant extent when compared to 
Phase 1, and to a lesser extent to Phase 3, thus claiming impact on more (mainly secondary) policy issues, 
when compared to Phase 1 and Phase 3. For example, in Phase 1, GD claimed impact on 9 different policy 
issues (both core and secondary) in the party-face arenas, on 14 in Phase 2 and on 12 in Phase 3. In other 
words, in Phase 2, when the moderates were more influential, GD emphasised mostly its party-face, 
entering a de-radicalisation course.  
In Phase 3, the GD entered a course of ‘partial de-radicalisation’ or of ‘partial radicalisation’. This was 
evidenced with the significant increase of PICs on secondary policy issues in the grassroots arena, the 
highest over the three Phases in the grassroots arena. This is a rather unexpected outcome in a period 
when the militants were dominant. This radicalisation however, was partial as said, exactly because this 
increase of PICs in the grassroots arena was on secondary issues, while core policy issues in Phase 3 in the 
grassroots arena were only slightly more salient than in Phase 2, and far less salient compared to Phase 
1. In other words, in Phase 3, GD had abandoned claiming impact on core policy issues in the grassroots 
arena. To this, as the previous empirical chapters have shown, PICs on core policy issues in the grassroots 
arena involved, mainly, unconventional actions (e.g. Phase 1). What is more, in Phase 3, (as in Phase 2, as 
well), PICs on core policy issues in both the party-face arenas were slightly more than in the grassroots 








This chapter tested the internal factors de-radicalisation and radicalisation hypotheses on GD’s movement 
and party faces, over the three ‘factional Phases’ and according to the thesis studied timeframe (May 
2012 – December 2016), through the PICs. 
It has shown that, in Phase 1 (moderates), GD was on a radicalisation course and on a de-radicalisation 
course in Phase 2 (moderates). In Phase 3 (militants), GD changed towards ‘partial de-
























This conclusion is divided into three main sections. The first section sums up the research design, 
theoretical argument and methodological approach of the thesis. Section two sums up the empirical 
findings of the thesis. The third section concludes the thesis. 
Section three starts, firstly, by discussing the main limitation of the empirical approach. It argues that this 
is its internal data triangulation. An analysis of additional primary sources of GD, such as newspapers, 
parliamentary speeches, etc., would have strengthened the internal empirical validity of the thesis.  The 
section proceeds with discussing the wider relevance of the thesis in terms of its broader academic 
contributions, such as theoretical. It argues that its theoretical contribution lies in its theoretical 
framework, which approaches ERPs as movement-parties and which examines politics across three 
political arenas. Based on this framework, ERPs’ behaviour can be studied through their transition from 
one face to the other and through their interaction between arenas. Another theoretical contribution is 
the merging of political praxis and issue salience into a unified theoretical framework of ERPs’ behaviour. 
The methodological contribution of the thesis lies in the development of political impact-claims analysis, 
through which the thesis was able to measure, systematically, the behaviour of GD across its two faces 
and the three arenas. The process through which political impact-claims are being coded bring to the 
surface hidden features of party behaviour. The empirical contribution of the thesis lies in the analysis of 
a vast amount of primary data, rare for even case-study projects, which, thanks to the analysis of political 
impact-claims, enabled the systematic study of GD’s behaviour. This has led the thesis to uncover 
numerous patterns, both qualitative and quantitative, of behavioural change towards de-radicalisation 
and radicalisation, and to solve the empirical puzzle regarding under what conditions ERPs are 
transitioning back and forth from movement to party. The section proceeds with the theme of 
generalisation. It argues that the political impact-claims analysis can also be applied to other political 
parties. Section three discusses the potential avenues for future research that this thesis has opened up, 




9.1  Part I: Research design, concepts, theory and methodology 
 
This thesis’ research question was: ‘Under what conditions do extreme-right parties change their political 
behaviour towards de-radicalisation and radicalisation? The case of the Golden Dawn’. The main puzzle 
of the thesis was an empirical one, namely how ERPs transition from movement to party (thus de-
radicalising their behaviour) and from party to movement (thus radicalising their behaviour). The thesis 
developed alternative hypotheses with regards to when, how and where ERPs, and the GD in particular, 
are more or less likely to change their behaviour towards de-radicalisation and radicalisation. These were 
then tested through extensive empirical research, mainly by analysing the PICs of GD. 
To answer the research question, the thesis has sought to build a theoretical framework showing how 
extreme-right party change plays out, in order to investigate changes in the political behaviour of a single 
ERP (the GD). In doing so, it argued that it is, first, important to distinguish ERPs from PRRPs, as these are 
two qualitatively different types of parties, even though they both belong to the same far-right party 
family. The thesis argued that what sets ERPs apart from PRRP is their core ideological feature of anti-
democracy and their commitment to the fascist myths. In this regard, their behaviour can be better 
studied by approaching them as movement-parties. Therefore, the grassroots arena, which makes up 
their movement-face, is vital to their existence because, in here, they can exercise their main ideological 
feature of violence through unconventional actions, most notably violent actions; a feature that sets them 
apart from any other movement-party of any party family. However, because ERPs also run elections, they 
also have a party-face. The latter can, mainly, be exercised in the electoral and legislative arenas.  
The thesis theorised that political parties, including ERPs, are more or less likely to change when the 
external and internal conditions within which they operate alter profoundly. The thesis identified the most 
relevant factors that are more likely to alter these conditions for ERPs: political and legal means/actors of 
exclusion (external) and leadership and factions (internal).  An external shock is a particular event where 
external and internal factors interact, thus starting a change in the external and internal conditions of 
parties. For GD, this external shock was the arrests of its leadership in September 2013. The thesis argued 
that, for ERPs, such a shock can be an intensification of the legal and political means of exclusion, as they 
are constantly under threat of exclusion. The thesis developed alternative hypotheses regarding de-
radicalisation and radicalisation, as a result of changing external and internal conditions within ERPs.   
According to the argument of the thesis, de-radicalisation and radicalisation is observed as follows: ERPs 
tend to change towards radicalisation when they emphasise their movement-face more, while 
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downplaying their party-face. If they do the opposite, they tend to change towards de-radicalisation. 
Regarding the internal factors hypotheses, the thesis expected to find de-radicalisation when moderates 
are the dominant faction within ERPs and radicalisation when the militants are the dominant faction. The 
thesis, then, investigated where best to look in order to observe ERPs’ behavioural change. It argued that 
the two most relevant dimensions of ERPs’ change of political behaviour are political praxis and issue 
salience (across both faces, political arenas and over time). It argued that if significant changes were to be 
found over time on these dimensions, then changes in the political behaviour of ERPs can be observed. 
The thesis, then, introduced GD and the context within which it operated, mainly following its electoral 
breakthrough, as a classic example of a movement-party and of an ERP of the neo-Nazi variant. It showed 
that, following its electoral breakthrough, GD faced a relatively favourable context, which was about to 
change following a full-blown exclusion resulted from its leadership arrests in September 2013. The latter 
had the characteristics of an external shock, as it altered, quickly and dramatically, the external and 
internal environment of the movement-party.  
In solving the empirical puzzle, the thesis introduced (Chapter 4) the analysis of GD’s PICs, through which 
it aimed to test its alternative hypotheses in reaching the conclusion of when, how and where the GD de-
radicalised and/or radicalised its behaviour. PICs are instances when a party claims that it has influenced, 
through its own actions, other political actors to deliver outcomes that are in favour of its interests and 
ideas. This analysis bridges methodological insights from the literature on measuring party and social 
movement changes in political behaviour. It showed that the novelty of this method lies in its ability to 
measure, systematically and simultaneously, the behaviour of ERPs over time, with regards to both of 
their faces and across the three political arenas, and the dimensions of political praxis and issue salience.  
 
9.2 Part II: Findings and conclusion 
 
Part II of the thesis was comprised of three empirical chapters, which presented the findings and a 
conclusion. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 6) tested the external factors hypotheses (de-
radicalisation and radicalisation) on GD’s movement face, while the second chapter (Chapter 7) was 
concerned with external factors and GD’s party-face. The last empirical chapter (Chapter 8) tested the 




9.2.1 GD: External, internal conditions & changes of political behaviour 
 
For purposes of external data triangulation (additional to the PICs, which was the primal source for testing 
its hypotheses), the thesis first provided an empirical narrative (e.g., Beach & Pedersen, 2016) of GD’s 
changing patterns of behaviour across the three political arenas, at critical points in the chronology (e.g., 
before/after the arrests). The aim was to generate case-specific hypotheses on the GD itself. In other 
words, this chapter aimed at generating the question ‘Based on what we know so far about GD’s changing 
patterns of behaviour, under what conditions (e.g., when, how and where) can we expect to see GD de-
radicalising and/or radicalising its behaviour?’ This question was, then, answered in the next three 
empirical chapters, through the analysis of GD’s PICs. In generating the case-specific hypotheses, the 
empirical narrative thoroughly analysed the ‘up to now’ existing literature on GD and provided some 
original findings, as well.  
The empirical narrative showed that the external conditions of GD changed dramatically following the 
external shock of the arrests. In Phase 1 (since its foundation up until September 2013), GD was enjoying 
a favourable context, evidenced through a dismissive strategy adopted by political and institutional actors. 
This changed into an unfavourable one in Phase 2 (October 2013 – December 2016), with political and 
institutional actors adopting a strategy of exclusion and isolation vis-à-vis GD. 
Moreover, the empirical narrative showed that the internal conditions of GD changed as well, following 
the arrests.  Three ‘factional Phases’ were distinguished, where one faction was more dominant that the 
other. In Phase 1 (early ‘80s – September 2013), the militants were the dominant faction, evidenced 
though the emphasis the GD placed on grassroots activism. In Phase 2 (October 2013 – April 2015), while 
the leadership was in jail, a new faction of moderates began gaining influence inside the GD. This was 
mainly evident in the electoral arena, where moderates made up the bulk of GD’s electoral lists and 
achieved significantly higher electoral results than the militants, specifically in the 2014 election for the 
European parliament. In Phase 3 (May 2015 – December 2016), following the release of the leadership 
from jail, militants began re-gaining their influence in GD. This was evidenced with the resilience of its 
grassroots activism, which was sustained largely due to the experience of the militants. However, the 
chapter has identified that militants in Phase 3 were unable to sustain contentious activism, at least to 
the same extent as they did in Phase 1. In the meantime, the GD had also witnessed defections of many 
prominent militants following the external shock of the arrests.  
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The narrative developed alternative hypotheses (e.g., de-radicalisation and radicalisation) with regards to 
GD, as part of the external factors hypotheses. Regarding the internal factors, the narrative hypothesised 
finding radicalisation in Phase 1 and de-radicalisation in Phases 2 and 3.  
 
9.2.2 External factors & the movement face of GD 
 
Table 9.1 (below) summarises the main findings of external factors hypotheses on GD’s movement face 
(Chapter 6), before (Phase 1) and after exclusion (event of the arrests) (Phase 2) and according to the 
thesis timeframe (May 2012 – December 2016), derived from the analysis of its PICs. The thesis has shown 
that, in Phase 1 (May 2012 – September 2013), GD was on a radicalisation course, and that it changed its 
behaviour towards de-radicalisation in Phase 2 (October 2013 – December 2016). For example, in Phase 
1, GD predominantly emphasised its movement face. GD engaged in a variety of actions in the grassroots 
arena, with the most frequent being team visits. The most important finding is that GD claimed to have 
delivered impact in this arena predominantly through unconventional actions, on its core issues of 
immigration and law & order. In order to justify its unconventional behaviour, GD was framing a 
favourable context, with the state facing a crisis of governance and lacking the capacity to provide 
effective solutions to various local problems concerning the public, such as the highly salient issues of 
immigration and law & order. Therefore, GD claimed it was able to satisfy peoples’ demand for 
unconventional actions by responding to their requests and filling the vacuum left by the state’s inaction 
by intervening directly (via teams of local members), usually led by MPs at various places, and effectively 
solving these issues through unconventional actions. Thus, GD frequently claimed to have delivered direct 









Table 9.1: Findings summary: External factors & changes in the movement-face of GD 
 External Phase 1 (before 
exclusion): May 2012 – 
September 2013 
External Phase 2 (after 
exclusion): October 2013 – 
December 2016 
Most emphasised actions 
 
Team visits Team visits 
Nature of actions Unconventional Conventional 
 






Most salient Issues  
 
Immigration and law & order 
 
Culture and immigration 
 













In the period following the external shock of exclusion and the arrests of its leadership (Phase 2), GD 
considerably de-emphasised its movement-face, while emphasising its party-face. For example, it had 
completely stopped claiming impact through unconventional actions. However, during the late external 
Phase 2 (e.g. late 2016), GD turned towards a partial radicalisation, having substantially increased its 
impact claimed through grassroots actions. This re-radicalisation, however, was partial and short, as the 
pattern of abandoning claiming impact through unconventional actions remained stable throughout 
Phase 2. GD attempted to turn back to unconventional actions, mainly by resorting to a couple of 
disruptive actions, but the most extreme form of unconventional actions, namely violence, was missing 
from the impact-claims. Additionally, this partial radicalisation was accompanied by GD offering further 
evidence in order to justify its claimed impact in the grassroots arena, delivered through conventional 
actions. Thus, GD framed the context as unfavourable and the exclusion as having impacted significantly 
on its ability to claim impact through unconventional means. As a result, GD de-emphasised its direct 




9.2.3 External factors & the party face of GD 
 
Table 9.2 (below) summarises the main findings of external factors hypotheses on GD’s party-face 
(Chapter 7), before (Phase 1) and after exclusion (event of the arrests) (Phase 2) and according to the 
thesis timeframe (May 2012 – December 2016), derived from the analysis of its PICs. It shows that, in 
Phase 1, GD was emphasising its impact in the electoral arena more than in the legislative arena. More 
specifically, GD was more frequently claiming that its electoral strength (as evidenced in the polls) was on 
the rise, and it was causing other political and state actors to deliver outcomes, mainly on the issue of 
immigration. Also, GD was claiming that its electoral strength was able to impact at the policy making and 
policy implementation levels as well, though to a lesser extent. The impact-claims analysis has also shown 
that GD was engaging in a variety of parliamentary actions for claiming impact, the most frequent being 
parliamentary interpellations. The most salient issue across the party arenas was, predominantly, 
immigration in the electoral arena, an issue which likely was mainly a vote-maximisation tool for GD.  
 
Table 9.2 Findings summary: External factors & changes in the party-face of GD 
 Phase 1 (before 
exclusion/arrests) 
Phase 2 (after 
exclusion/arrests) 
Most emphasised actions Electoral success Parliamentary actions 
(interpellations) 
Most emphasised arena Electoral Legislative 
 



















In Phase 2, overall, GD, mainly emphasised its impact in the legislative arena, with its most frequent 
claimed action being parliamentary actions (specifically interpellations) across both party arenas. The 
most salient issue was, now, corruption, not necessarily a core policy issue, as it was almost completely 
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claimed inside the legislative arena. These findings pointed towards a de-radicalisation of GD in the 
external Phase 2.  
 
9.2.4 Internal factors & the movement party faces of GD 
 
Table 9.3 (see below) summarises the main findings of internal factors hypotheses on GD’s movement 
face (Chapter 8), over the three factional Phases (Phase 1: militants; Phase2: moderates; Phase 3: 
militants) and according to the thesis timeframe (May 2012 – December 2016), derived from the analysis 
of its PICs. 
In factional Phase 1 (militants: May 2012 – September 2013), GD was on a radicalisation course. This was 
evident with GD claiming far more impact through its movement-face than its party-face. Additionally, 
unconventional actions were far more frequent in Phase 1 than in the other two Phases. In terms of issue 
salience, the most salient issues were the core policy issues of immigration and law & order. 
Table 9.3 Findings summary: Internal factors & changes in the party-face of GD 
 Phase 1 (militants) Phase 2 (moderates) Phase 3 (militants) 
Primary goal(s) Policy-purity (primarily) 
along with vote-
maximisation, policy 




arena (most PICs) 
Grassroots Electoral Grassroots 
 
Most emphasised face 
(most PICs) 
Movement-face Party-face Party-face 
 
Most salient actions 
(political praxis) 
Unconventional 
grassroots & electoral 
strength 
Electoral strength Conventional 
grassroots & 
parliamentary actions 
Two most salient 
policy issues 
Immigration and law & 
order 
Not specifically a 







Most salient core 
policy issues 
addressed through: 





Party-face Party-face Movement & party 
 
BEHAVIOURAL 











In factional Phase 2 (moderates: October 2013 – April 2015), GD changed towards de-radicalisation. This 
was evidenced by the finding that GD mostly emphasised its party-face, specifically its impact in the 
electoral arena, compared to any other arena. In contrast to Phase 1, GD was, now, frequently claiming 
that its policy positions were being co-opted by other actors, so as to deter its electoral strength. To this, 
no salient issue could be discerned, with GD attributing equal salience to various issues. This was an 
indication that GD had de-radicalised its behaviour significantly, having also in mind that it de-emphasised 
its impact in the grassroots arena, as well.  
In factional Phase 3 (militants: May 2015 – December 2016), GD changed towards partial re-
radicalisation/de-radicalisation again. This was evidenced by the increased impact-claims in the grassroots 
arena and the significant decrease of impact-claims in the electoral arena, compared to Phase 2. In fact, 
the grassroots arena was the most emphasised arena. However, overall, the party-face (electoral and 
parliamentary arenas) was still emphasised. Additionally, unconventional actions were missing from the 
PICs. In terms of issue salience, in Phase 3, the GD significantly increased its salience on secondary issues 
in the grassroots arena, while core policy issues were still more salient in the party-face arenas. Thus, GD 
was not on a radicalisation course in the same way as it was in Phase 1. In Phase 3, GD changed towards 




9.3 Wider relevance of the thesis 
 
9.3.1 Limitations of the empirical approach 
 
In order to reach safe conclusions regarding the de-radicalisation and radicalisation of GD, the thesis has 
analysed a vast amount of empirical data for testing its hypotheses. However, the data come from a single 
source (GD’s old website), and look at a single thing (e.g. PICs only). This might highlight some limitations 
of the empirical approach, specifically of empirical validity. In addressing this issue, the thesis resorted to 
external data triangulation by analysing the changing patterns of GD’s behaviour (Chapter 5) at key critical 
points in the chronology of the studied timeframe, with further primary and secondary data beyond the 
PICs, such as data from various newspapers and reports, GD electoral lists, and grassroots and 
parliamentary activities. To this, it has presented some additional and original findings.  To a large extent, 
the findings derived from the external triangulation (Chapter 5) corroborate with the findings of the PICs 
presented in the further empirical chapters (Chapters 6 – 8). This task has largely strengthened the validity 
of the empirical approach.  
However, the empirical approach still faces the limitation of internal data triangulation. This refers to 
analysing further primary data from alternative sources of the case-study (GD). For example, an analysis 
of GD’s PICs, as found in its newspapers and/or parliamentary speeches, would have strengthened the 
validity of the internal empirical approach. An analysis of further primary data would have been a very 
time-consuming task, which was out of the scope of this thesis, though.  However, future studies analysing 
the PICs of GD, or changing patterns of behaviour in general, across a variety of different primary sources 
could address this limitation.  
 
9.3.2 Broader contribution 
 
The thesis has made significant theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions.  
Theoretical: For its theoretical contribution, the thesis has built a novel theoretical framework for 
analysing ERPs’ political behaviour, deriving ideas from various literatures, such as social movements, far-
right party politics and party change. Contrary to the existing literature, at the heart of the thesis’ 
theoretical model lies the assumption that it is problematic to see ERPs as solely political parties. This is 
because ERPs are, by their very nature, movement parties which have two faces, a movement-face and a 
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party-face, as these political organisations are exercising politics in the way that political parties and social 
movements do. According to this theoretical model, as part of ERPs’ two faces, their political behaviour is 
manifested across three political arenas: grassroots arena (movement-face), electoral and parliamentary 
arenas (party-face). Thus, the novelty of the framework lies to the fact that it can analyse ERPs’ behaviour 
through their transition from one face to the other and through their interaction between arenas. In short, 
the model theorises that a change towards radicalisation is observed when the movement-face 
(grassroots arena) is mostly emphasised, compared to the party-face (electoral and parliamentary arenas), 
while a change towards de-radicalisation is observed when the party-face is most emphasised, compared 
to the movement-face. This theoretical framework can also be used for comparative studies on tracking 
changes in the behaviour of other ERPs. Moreover, some aspects of this theoretical model can, also, be 
used in studying party behaviour, in general; paying more attention to the actions and issues of political 
parties across political arenas and not predominantly inside the ‘usual suspect’ arena; that is, the electoral 
arena.   
The thesis makes another theoretical contribution in the merging of political praxis and issue salience into 
the behaviour of ERPs. This allows the framework to systematically assess changes in the political 
behaviour of ERPs across their movement/party dichotomy and detect how they are transitioning back 
and forth from movement to party. Of particular theoretical contribution is the incorporation of political 
praxis into the study of ERPs’ political behaviour. Political praxis has largely been neglected in the study 
of party behaviour, in general. However, political praxis is particularly important to the identity of ERPs, 
as they are mostly known for their unconventional actions in the grassroots arena. Thus, it constitutes an 
important dimension to their behaviour. The contribution of the theoretical model is that it allows it to 
study changes in the political praxis of ERPs across their two faces and the three arenas in which they are 
practising politics.  
Methodological: The thesis has, also, made significant methodological contributions. Relying on the 
literature on measuring party and social movements’ behaviour, the analysis of PICs can measure 
behavioural changes on both of the two faces of ERPs at the same time. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, no previous studies have analysed the PICs of a political party. The novelty of PICs lies in the 
way that they are used as an analytical tool for investigating changes in ERPs’ behaviour. In particular, the 
process of coding PICs brings to the surface a variety of hidden features of party behaviour across the 
three political arenas. For example, the claimed cause in a single political impact-claim brings to the 
surface the political praxis of parties, while the nature of the praxis can tell us with which arena the party 
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is concerned. At the same time, every PIC talks about a specific policy issue. This can tell us about the issue 
agenda of political parties. The novelty lies in the fact that PICs can look at the same thing across various 
political arenas, thus providing a methodological homogeneity. To this end, PICs can systematically 
measure changes in the political behaviour of ERPs, (or of any movement-party irrespective of party 
family), across the two faces and the three political arenas of ERPs, on a month-by-month basis.  
Empirical: To this, the thesis has made a noticeable empirical contribution, as well. It has analysed a vast 
amount of primary data qualitatively. An analysis of such an amount of primary data (see below) is rare 
in studies of FRPs, in general; either in case studies or small-N comparative studies. To the best of author’s 
knowledge, this is the first study that analyses this primary data systematically for GD, during the studied 
timeframe. Thus, the thesis has been able to identify a substantial amount of ERPs’ political behavioural 
change towards de-radicalisation and radicalisation and contribute to an understanding of how de-
radicalisation and radicalisation of ERPs play out. The empirical results suggest that ERPs’ back and forth 
transition between their movement and party face can happen more frequently than previously thought. 
In other words, we do not have to wait until national elections take place in order to detect party change.  
 
9.3.3 Generalisability  
 
At a higher level of generalisability, by studying party change through the prism of political arenas in 
theory, this model can also be applied to other political parties, especially to movement-parties that are 
mainly active across the three arenas (e.g., electoral, parliamentary and grassroots), such as Green parties 
(e.g., Kitschelt, 2006) or radical left parties (e.g., Della Porta et. al., 2017). The literature often neglects 
the fact that political parties do politics in a variety of arenas. Most studies on party change focus on 
changes in the programmatic agendas of parties over time. This is predominantly related to the electoral 
arena, as it is mainly concerned with policy positions co-optation in the competition over votes. Such an 
approach leaves behind an array of actions that political parties resort to. However, (electorally 
successful) political parties are also active in parliament, while other parties might be active in the 
executive arena, as well. In theory, it is reasonable to assume what parties (of any party family) do and 
say once inside a different arena might differ over time and across arenas. Investigating their actions and 
issues across arenas seems to be a promising approach for delving further into parties’ political 
behaviours. In this regard, an assessment of political parties’ actions and issues across arenas might be a 
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very useful exploratory exercise and could help, for example, to identify a wider variety of actions and 
policy issues, beyond the most common ones, as the literature would predict. 
At a lower level of generalisability, investigating extreme-right behaviour and change according to their 
main two faces and across the three political arenas they are practicing politics, seems to be a promising 
starting point. For example, ERPs, such as Jobbik, L’SNS and ELAM, have been electorally successful at the 
national level, while others, such as the NPD, Casa Pound or the BNP, have been electorally successful 
mainly at the local level thus far. Regarding the three aforementioned electorally successful ERPs, these 
have been quite active in the grassroots arena, as well. Some of these ERPs have, also, at times, faced 
political and legal means of exclusion. It would be interesting to identify what specific actions these 
movement-parties resort to across different arenas and over time, when their external and internal 
conditions change dramatically. To this, it is very likely that their actions through which they claim impact 
would differ, dependent upon how they frame their contextual opportunities. For example, GD was 
claiming to have delivered impact through spontaneous team visits, within a context of a ‘state crisis’. It 
could be assumed that other ERPs, which operate in a less favourable context, would adjust their actions 
accordingly. Thus, it may be less likely that the BNP was claiming impact through these actions, as GD did, 
in a highly more restrictive context, although this is more likely for Jobbik, when it had the assistance of 
its paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard (but less likely when the latter was banned). Identifying the 
interaction of ERPs with their political arenas, as well as their transition from movement to party (and vice 
versa), can tell us much about how their behaviour evolves over time between de-radicalisation and 
radicalisation.  
The theoretical argument of the thesis can also be applied to studying the behaviour of these various non-
party extreme-right groups, focusing only on their political praxis and issues in the grassroots, or electoral, 
arenas. While in the US, an ERP, such as the Golden Dawn, has not achieved electoral success thus far, 
extreme-right groups of the non-party sector are abundant. For example, various US extreme-right groups 
of the non-party sector (e.g. KKK groups, white supremacist and neo-Nazi groups) have, over time (e.g. 
2000 to 2010), resorted to a variety of conventional and unconventional political praxis in the grassroots 
arena. These actions, however, are oscillating over time, by being more frequent at some times than at 
others (Caiani and della Porta, 2012:80-87). Therefore, according to the theoretical argument of this 
thesis, it could be hypothesised that, in periods when these various extreme-right groups tend to tone 
down their unconventional actions in the grassroots arena, it might be the case that they embed 
themselves more in electoral politics, and the electoral arena at large, or that their agendas and issues 
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are being absorbed by radical right parties or politicians; a sign of de-radicalisation. In contrast, when an 
opposite pattern is observed, they might be on a course of (re)-radicalisation. 
Along similar lines, the findings might show applicability to other similar cases beyond Europe, such as in 
Australia. The  Australian ERP of ‘Fraser Anning’s Conservative National Party’, one of the most extreme 
far-right elements of the country, participates in electoral politics, while, simultaneously, maintaining 
close ties with extreme-right groups of the non-party sector that resort to street-level political praxis in 
the grassroots arena (McSwiney, 2020). Additionally, many Australian extreme-right groups of the non-
party sector are notorious for their violent activity in the grassroots arena, such as the ‘United Patriots 
Front’, Rise Up Australia’, ‘Reclaim Australia’ and the ‘True Blue Crew’ (Hutchinson, 2019). In this regard, 
tracing patterns of their political praxis and salient issues in the grassroots arena over time, much can be 
learnt with regards to changes in their behaviour towards de-radicalisation and re-radicalisation. 
The Indian ‘Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh’ (RSS), a Hindu nationalist far-right movement, reminiscent of 
other European neo-fascist groups in many aspects, is quite active, with a long history of militancy in the 
grassroots arena and with deep organisational roots in civil society (Chidambaram, 2020:12-13). Often 
described as currently one of the largest (in terms of members), most powerful and violent far-right 
groups in the world (Mudde, 2019:93), the RSS might better be categorised into the non-party sector of 
the far-right, as it does not participate in electoral politics. However, its close ties with the governing 
radical right party of ‘Bharatiya Janata Party’ led the RSS to increase its attention on electoral affairs, as it 
is assumed that it spent many of its resources on the electoral campaign of Narendra Mondi for prime 
minister in 2014 (Chidambaram, 2020:13). In this regard, an examination of its political praxis and salient 
issues over time in the grassroots arena might be useful in tracing behavioural patterns of RSS towards 
de-radicalisation and radicalisation, over the time when it has increased its attention on electoral affairs, 
throughout the governing period of Narendra Modi (from 2014 – today).  
The empirical contribution of the thesis , specifically the analysis of PICs, also has the potential of 
generalisability. In theory, political impact-claims can be found not only in other FRPs, but, perhaps, at 
least in all movement-parties as well, such as the Greens and radical left parties. This is because political 
parties make claims all the time (Saward, 2006) and it is reasonable to assume that they also make impact-
claims. The analysis of political impact-claims can produce both quantitative and qualitative evidence and, 
thus, it is, methodologically speaking, ‘friendly’ to both quantitative and qualitative analysis. On the 
quantitative side, a larger database, with more observations of impact-claims than this thesis, could allow 
further statistical analysis. In this regard, a huge database of impact-claims can offer a large-N comparative 
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analysis of political parties over time and cross-nationally. This can open up new promising avenues for 
further investigation into party behaviour. This is because impact-claims can identify a variety of patterns 
of party behaviour, such as: actions, issues, strategies, party competition dynamics, interaction of political 
parties with contextual opportunities, political arenas of action and process of impact (e.g., direct, 
indirect). On the qualitative side, impact-claims can also reveal how a party interacts with discursive and 
political opportunities. When a party talks about impact, it constructs frames on how its impact came into 
realisation. Thus, a party would construct contextual frames, ascribing a meaning to it and to other 
political actors, in order to justify its actions.  
 
9.3.4 Directions for future research 
 
Firstly, future research can also apply the theoretical framework this thesis has developed to the study of 
other ERPs’ political behaviour, or other movement-parties. Studying how movement-parties transition 
between movement and party, and vice versa, through their interaction with political arenas, seems a 
promising avenue of research in understanding their changing patterns of behaviour. What is more, the 
study of their political praxis, a largely neglected dimension of party behaviour, can tells us much about 
this interaction across arenas, such as their changing strategies and the conditions under which 
movement-parties opt for change.  
 
Secondly, future research must also assess changes in the behaviour of FRPs in general, in periods when 
their internal living conditions are changing. The literature is scant when it comes to investigating FRPs’ 
changes in their behaviour following leadership change and factional reconfigurations. To this, future 
research can also delve into explanations and answer why FRPs have changed their behaviour. In 
particular, future studies must further investigate the effects of leadership and factions in bringing about 
extreme-right party change. As this thesis has shown, the GD displayed significant behavioural changes in 
periods of factional reconfigurations. This can be done by theorising on the actions party actors are likely 
to pursue following exclusion. A first step is how party actors initially perceive the effects of exclusion. If 
they perceive it as negatively impacting on their ability to pursue their primary goal, this might, in turn, 
radicalise the hardliners. However, hardliners/militants would be able to have the upper hand, as long as 
they dominate over moderates and the leadership sides with them. If this happens, then we could 
anticipate radicalisation. However, this might not always be the expected scenario. In Phase 2b, this is 
what happened, more or less, to GD. Instead, it changed towards a partial radicalisation.  
267 
 
Thirdly, future research can use the analysis of impact-claims as a means for investigating how their 
impact is being materialised. In this regard, impact-claims (e.g., Williams, 2018) could be a useful tool for 
theory development in another area of research within the literature on far-right party politics; an area 
where ‘we know as little about as we do about black holes in outer space’ (Carvalho, 2015:1363; Williams, 
2015), that of their political impact (e.g., Williams, 2018). Given that most of FRP’s impact is indirect, 
understanding how FRPs impact has been described as a ‘difficult and tricky task’ because of the 
complexity of the social world, where multiple causal factors interact (Williams, 2018:311; Art, 2015; 
Perlmutter, 2015; Mudde, 2007). Thus, future research might draw many useful insights in its attempt to 
sort out the causal factors involved in how far-right impact occurs, by following an inductive path first and 
looking at what the FRPs themselves say about their impact. This might help to identify, and theorise on, 
the specific actions followed by certain FRP actors, as well as the actions of other entities involved in the 
impact-claim up until the realisation of the final outcome. The method of impact-claims can provide 
fruitful insights here. For example, impact-claims seem to indicate that, in some way, the party is being 
forced to be more revealing and accurate when it claims impact. It must provide some evidence in order 
to justify its claimed impact. This helps to directly identify those claims where the party claims to have 
spent the most energy realising impact, by either validating or falsifying its claims through further 
research. This task can be very fruitful in digging deeper into the black box of how political impact of FRPs 
plays out, from the initial cause until the end outcome.  
Lastly, future studies can also analyse more primary sources, such as official party newspapers, party 
flyers, tweets and parliamentary speeches. For example, with regards to GD, its two official newspapers 
can be analysed for detecting impact-claims. It would be very interesting to see if there would be any 
variation of impact-claims across sources. For example, GD’s newspaper, ‘EMPROS’, targets, mainly, a 
broader pool of far-right voters and personnel, while ‘Golden Dawn’ primarily targets its members. This 
suggests that GD might be emphasising its party face more in the former and its movement-face more in 
the latter. Lastly, we could ask ERPs’ party elite themselves: ‘What message do you want to pass on when 
you claim impact?’ Related to this, an expanded studied timeframe for investigating party change is 
something that future studies can examine, mainly with regards to the case of GD. This is important in 
order to identify more patterns of party change, as party change can only be measured over time (Bale, 
2012). Expanding this timeframe would definitely help to better understand GD’s party change. It would 
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Appendix 2: Parliamentary actions by Golden Dawn: 2012- 2016  
 
Illustrated on Figure 7.5 
Parliamentary actions by Golden Dawn: 2012 - 2016 
Month/
Year 




Monthly total of actions per parliamentary action 
Ερωτήσεις  Επίκαιρες 
Ερωτήσει
ς  









Jul-12 48 32 12 2 2 0 0 
Aug-12 95 73 12 1 9 0 0 
Sep-12 114 78 24 8 3 0 1 
Oct-12 122 77 27 14 1 2 1 
Nov-12 149 116 14 17 2 0 0 
Dec-12 142 106 16 18 2 0 0 
Jan-13 191 154 20 11 6 0 0 
Feb-13 213 171 26 14 2 0 0 
Mar-13 205 154 18 26 7 0 0 
Apr-13 229 185 27 14 3 0 0 
May-13 151 125 14 9 3 0 0 
Jun-13 142 120 14 7 1 0 0 
Jul-13 183 159 16 7 1 0 0 
Aug-13 120 117 1 2 0 0 0 
Sep-13 107 96 4 3 4 0 0 
Oct-13 57 45 7 5 0 0 0 
Nov-13 119 100 19 0 0 0 0 
Dec-13 49 46 2 0 1 0 0 
Χρυσή* Αυγή* OR Λαϊκ* Σύνδεσμ* OR Συνδέσμ* OR Εθνικιστ* OR εμείς OR εμάς OR 
μας OR ήμασταν  OR είμαστε OR Κίνημα* OR Κινήματ* OR Χρυσαυγ* OR  συναγωνιστ* 
OR κλιμάκι* OR τοπικ* οργάνωσ* OR ΧΡΥΣΗ* ΑΥΓΗ*  OR επιρροή* OR επίδραση* OR 
άνοδο* OR ανόδο* OR απήχησ* OR ΧΡΥΣ'Η* ΑΥΓ'Η* πατριώ* πατριωτ* συναγωνί* OR 
πυρήν*  OR βουλευτ* 
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Jan-14 86 70 16 0 0 0 0 
Feb-14 104 89 9 3 1 2 0 
Mar-14 62 60 1 0 1 0 0 
Apr-14 28 28 0 0 0 0 0 
May-14 33 32 0 1 0 0 0 
Jun-14 40 34 5 1 0 0 0 
Jul-14 66 66 0 0 0 0 0 
Aug-14 29 25 0 4 0 0 0 
Sep-14 99 93 4 2 0 0 0 
Oct-14 76 68 7 1 0 0 0 
Nov-14 92 85 6 1 0 0 0 
Dec-14 123 121 2 0 0 0 0 
Jan-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Feb-15 107 104 0 0 3 0 0 
Mar-15 233 214 11 5 3 0 0 
Apr-15 158 145 10 0 2 1 0 
May-15 177 163 12 0 2 0 0 
Jun-15 207 188 16 0 3 0 0 
Jul-15 76 67 3 5 0 1 0 
Aug-15 45 44 1 0 0 0 0 
Sep-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Oct-15 102 99 1 2 0 0 0 
Nov-15 164 143 14 5 2 0 0 
Dec-15 139 123 12 3 1 0 0 
Jan-16 172 156 8 4 2 2 0 
Feb-16 209 185 12 8 4 0 0 
Mar-16 171 154 5 8 2 2 0 
Apr-16 216 207 4 3 2 0 0 
May-16 160 154 5 1 0 0 0 
Jun-16 289 275 9 1 3 1 0 
Jul-16 266 248 11 6 1 0 0 
Aug-16 128 119 6 2 1 0 0 
Sep-16 384 348 20 14 2 0 0 
Oct-16 348 319 22 7 0 0 0 
Nov-16 349 330 7 8 4 0 0 









Source: www.hellenicparliament.gr   Note: Ερωτήσεις = Interpellations, Επίκαιρες Ερωτήσεις= Timely 
Interpellations, Αναφορές= Reports, Ερώτηση σε συνδυασμό με Α.Κ.Ε. (Αίτηση Κατάθεσης Εγγράφων) 
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= Interpellation submitted with documentation request , Α.Κ.Ε.= Documents request , Επίκαιρες 
Επερωτήσεις= Timely Interpellations 
 
Appendix 3: All Movement-face impact-claims Codesheet  
 
How to read the codesheet on movement-face impact-claims: 
Date: when the item was posted on Golden Dawn’s website 
Post item: This is the title of the post item on Golden Dawn’s website that includes the impact-claim 
CS: ‘crisis of the state’ The impact-claim includes this frame. 
PD: ‘Public Demand’ for unconventional actions frame. 
A: ‘Arrests’. The codesheet question asked if the impact-claim referred to the arrests as impacting on 
Golden Dawn’s ability to materialise impact.  
T: ‘Type’ of impact claim: ‘D’=Direct or ‘I’=Indirect 
SGA: ‘Specific Grassroots Action’ 
C/U: ‘C’=conventional, ‘U’=unconventional grassroots action 
IL: ‘impact level’. Either ‘N’=national, ‘L’=local or ‘R’=regional. It refers to where the effects of the claim 
are manifested.  
Issue: the policy issue of the impact-claim 
Entities: entities/actors which delivered the claimed outcome of the impact-claim. They are state ore 
political usually. 
 
The reader can go to: politicalimpactclaims.blogspot.com (last accessed: 20/03/2021) and access the 
actual post items which include the impact-claim and cross-check with the codesheets below.  
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Party-face impact-claims by Golden Dawn - Codesheet 
Date Post item CS P
D 


















I party material 
dissemination 




της Ν.Ε. Καβάλας 




I party material 
dissemination 
C L Immigration State 
29/09
/12 
Ν. Πέλλας: Η ΧΡΥΣΗ 





D party material 
dissemination 












I party material 
dissemination 
C L Immigration State 
09/10
/12 
Όταν το κράτος 
αδιαφορεί, οι 
Έλληνες στρέφονται 
στην Χρυσή Αυγή  
Y Y 
 




Παναγιώτης Ηλιόπουλος στο 
elnewsgr: Όσο υπάρχει έστω και 
ένας Χρυσαυγίτης, θα υπάρχει 
και Ελληνισμός 










   











D party material 
dissemination 






Εύβοια και Βοιωτία  
Y 
  









I party material 
dissemination 
C L law & order Police 
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Εύβοιας - Βοιωτίας, 
Σερρών  
   

















I GD team visit U L law & order Police 
15/11
/12 
Κλείνουν κενά του 











Σάμου, Εύβοιας - 
Βοιωτίας  
   
I party material 
dissemination 
















Οι «Γιατροί με 
σύνορα» ξύπνησαν 
την κυβέρνηση 









“Να παραιτηθεί ο 
μαρξιστής κομισάριος 
Ρουπακιώτης... έχει 
λαγνεία με τους 
λαθρομετανάστες”  
  










στην Ιονία Οδό  
Y 
  






Τρίπολη, Πειραιάς  
   
D party material 
dissemination 












   








Γεώργιου Μισιάκα  
  
D party material 
dissemination 




Μεγάλη νίκη της 




   






















   
D party material 
dissemination 





Τοπικών: Εύβοιας - 
Βοιωτίας, Πέλλας - 
Ημαθίας  
   




Μεγάλη Νίκη της 
Χρυσής Αυγής: 
Μόνο Έλληνες στις 
Στρατιωτικές Σχολές  
   





















   













   
D commemoratio
n event 

















στο Φλοίσβο από 
τον φόβο της 
Χρυσής Αυγής 
   





Χρυσής Αυγής στα 
γραφεία της Δ.Ε.Η 
στα Καμίνια  
   
















Χρυσή Αυγή “ΔΕΝ 
ΠΛΗΡΩΝΩ”: Το δώρο 
μας στους 
μεγαλοεργολάβους για 
την Λαμπρή... - ΒΙΝΤΕΟ 
  
D party material 
dissemination 

































D party material 
dissemination 









τη ΧΡΥΣΗ ΑΥΓΗ» 
   



















Η απάτη της ΝΔ και 
οι εκατοντάδες 
τόνοι τροφίμων που 
έχει μοιράσει η 
Χρυσή Αυγή  
  




Δώρο 19 εκατ. ευρώ 
από το ελληνικό 
δημόσιο στον 









της ΝΔ προσπαθούν 
να μιμηθούν το 
κοινωνικό έργο της 
Χρυσής Αυγής 
   























Αυγή για την Δυτική 
Ελλάδα 
  




Πάλι “καθάρισε” η Χρυσή Αυγή 
στον Άγιο Παντελεήμονα: τα 
μάζεψαν κι έφυγαν τα συνεργεία 
του Καμίνη - ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  




Συνεχίζονται αμείωτα οι 
πολιτικές δράσεις της 
“Ελληνικής Αυγής για την 
  












   




Πασόκ και ΝΔ 
διαλύουν τον θεσμό 
των λαϊκών αγορών 
προς όφελος των 
μεγάλων τραστ 
   
I demonstration
s 






Ελληνισμού: Ο ΙΣΑ 
αντιγράφει τις 
θέσεις μας για τις 
ιατρικές συμβάσεις  
   







στήλη στην Δοϊράνη Ν. Κιλκίς 
- Η φιλοσκοπιανή 
προπαγάνδα δεν θα 
περάσει!  
 






Φυλή - Καματερό, 
Θάσος, Πειραιάς  
  














Μαζική δράση της 








Η επίσκεψη της 
Χρυσής Αυγής στην 
Κω έπιασε τόπο! 
Αδειάζουν άρον - 
άρον το νησί  
   




Η βόμβα της 
λαθρομετανάστευσ
ης και η... ατυχία 
του συστήματος 
   




Ραγδαία άνοδος της Χρυσής 
Αυγής στα νησιά που πλήττονται 
από τη λαθρομετανάστευση: 








“Καθημερινή” για εκκένωση 
πλατείας Βικτωρίας: “Όλη η 
κίνηση έγινε όταν απείλησε ότι 
θα αναλάβει δράση ο 
Κασιδιάρης”  






Βικτωρίας: “Όλη η 
κίνηση έγινε όταν 
απείλησε ότι θα 
αναλάβει δράση ο 
Κασιδιάρης”  
   




ΠΟΤΑΜΙ: ΝΑΙ στην 
παρανομία στα 
νοσοκομεία, ΟΧΙ 
στην Χρυσή Αυγή! 
   




ΠΟΤΑΜΙ: ΝΑΙ στην 
παρανομία στα 
νοσοκομεία, ΟΧΙ 
στην Χρυσή Αυγή! 
   




Μία απάντηση στα 
ορφανά του 
Σαμαρά «για τις 
αλήθειες που δεν 
λέγονται» 
  






Καβάλα, Κομοτηνή  
  







   




Θα υπήρχε κράτος, 
αν δεν υπήρχε η 
Χρυσή Αυγή; 
Αποκαταστάθηκε σε 




   




Ξεκινάνε οι έρευνες 
κατά του DEB 
ύστερα από την 
μήνυση της Χρυσής 
Αυγής: Στην 
αστυνομία για 
   















Ελλάδος: Και ο 
πρόεδρος του 
τουρκοκόμματος 
των Σκοπίων στο 
μνημόσυνο του 
Σαδίκ  
   













Σοκ και δέος στους 
φιλότουρκους 
συριζαίους  
   
D demonstration
s 













στους Εθνικιστές  
   







Κρέμασε πανό κατά 
της τρίτης πολιτικής 
δύναμης στην Χώρα  
   







Χρυσή Αυγή στην 








   
D commemoratio
n events 






την περιοδεία της 
Χρυσής Αυγής: 
   








έτρεξαν στη Θράκη!  
25/11
/16 
Η Χρυσή Αυγή 
διαμορφώνει την 
πολιτική ατζέντα! Η 
ΝΔ ξαφνικά 
θυμήθηκε τους 
αγρότες και την... 
Θράκη  
   




Η Χρυσή Αυγή 
διαμορφώνει την 
πολιτική ατζέντα! Η 
ΝΔ ξαφνικά 
θυμήθηκε τους 
αγρότες και την... 
Θράκη  
   








σωματεία, Αχαρνές  
   




Η Χρυσή Αυγή 
τίμησε τον Εθνικό 
Ήρωα Λορέντζο 
Μαβίλη στο Δρίσκο 
Ιωαννίνων - 
Φωτορεπορτάζ 
   
D commemoratio
n events 











στην περιοχή - 
Παρέμβαση της 
Χρυσής Αυγής 
   






«Ημερησία»: Σε όλη 





   









Χρυσής Αυγής σε 
τουρκική φιέστα 
στην αίθουσα της 
ΕΣΗΕΑ - BINTEO, 
ΦΩΤΟΓΡΑΦΙΕΣ  
   
D demonstration
s 






























Appendix 4: All Party-face impact-claims Codesheet 
 
How to read the codesheet 
Date: when the item was posted on Golden Dawn’s website 
Post item: This is the title of the post item on Golden Dawn’s website that includes the impact-claim 
PA: ‘Party Arenas: ‘E’=Electoral, ‘P’=Parliamentary ‘E’ & ‘P’=Electoral & Parliamentary 
ES: ‘Electoral Strength, ‘Y’ goes for ‘Yes’ for policy co-optation impact-claims where GD claimed that this 
policy co-optation resulted because of its electoral strength. On the contrary, there are impact-claims 
where GD claimed that other actors co-opted its positions on a given issue without referring to its electoral 
strength as the claimed cause of the claimed outcome, thus there is no ‘Y’.  
IL: ‘Impact Level’. Either ‘N’=national, ‘L’=local or ‘R’=regional. It refers to where the effects of the claim 
are manifested.  
C: Claimed cause: ‘ES’= electoral strength, ‘PA’= parliamentary actions, ‘PC’= Policy co-optation ‘ES’ & 
‘PA’= electoral strength & parliamentary actions 
Issue: the policy issue of the impact-claim 
Entity: entities/actors which delivered the claimed outcome of the impact-claim. They are state ore 
political usually. 
 
Party Face impact-claims by Golden Dawn - Codesheet 
Date Post item PA ES Issue C Entities 
13/05/2012 Τι έγιναν άραγε εκείνα τα “κέντρα 
λαθρομεταναστών”;  
E Y Immigration ES Media 
actors 
24/05/2012 Δεν πιάνει η λάσπη κατά των Ελλήνων 
Εθνικιστών  




28/05/2012 Η λύση στο πρόβλημα της 
εγκληματικότητας: Ψήφος στην Χρυσή 
Αυγή! 
E Y law & order ES Police 
30/05/2012 Κυνηγάει τους ψηφοφόρους με το... 
τουφέκι  




10/06/2012 Κουτσός στον κάμπο έτρεχε να πιάσει 
καβαλάρη!  






16/06/2012 Το νέο πολιτικό ανέκδοτο: Θα διώξει τους 
λαθρομετανάστες ο Σαμαράς; 
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
17/06/2012 Σε πείσμα των σάπιων του χθες η Χρυσή 
Αυγή ανατέλλει ισχυρότερη από ποτέ  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
20/06/2012 Μπερίσα: «Η νίκη της ΝΔ είναι θετική για 
τους μετανάστες»  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
21/06/2012 Δεν καταργεί τον νόμο Ραγκούση ο 
Σαμαράς 
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
23/06/2012 Πάει και η αντιμετώπιση της 
λαθρομετανάστευσης και η ΑΟΖ με 
πρόσχημα την ΔΗΜΑΡ  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
27/06/2012 «Αναβαθμίζεται» η ΕΛ.ΑΣ... Χωρίς βενζίνη 
έμειναν τα οχήματα της Αστυνομίας στην 
Πάτρα! 
E Y law & order ES ND 
actors 
10/07/2012 Η κυβέρνηση Σαμαρά οδηγεί στην 
εξαθλίωση και τους ενστόλους 
E Y law & order ES ND 
actors 
14/07/2012 Δηλώσεις Δένδια για λαθρομετανάστευση 
και εγκληματικότητα: Η απόλυτη δικαίωση 
της Χρυσής Αυγής  
E N Immigration PC ND 
actors 
15/07/2012 Γιατί καίγεται ο Σαμαράς για τους μισθούς 
των ενστόλων; Ποιος ο ρόλος της Χρυσής 
Αυγής;  
E Y law & order ES ND 
actors 
16/07/2012 Parapolitika.gr: Ο Παπούλιας φοβήθηκε την 
Χρυσή Αυγή και ματαίωσε την χλιδάτη 
γιορτή της δημοκρατίας  
P N Culture PC The 
Presiden
t 
23/07/2012 Συριζαίοι αφήστε τα παπατζιλίκια και 
μοιράστε την κομματική επιχορήγηση!  




30/07/2012 Ανήγγειλαν μειώσεις στις κομματικές 
χρηματοδοτήσεις έπειτα από τις συνεχείς 
πιέσεις της Χρυσής Αυγής  
b 
 





09/08/2012 «Βήμα»: Ψέματα ήταν, δεν καταργείται ο 
νόμος Ραγκούση...  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
13/08/2012 Επιστρέφουν στον δρόμο αστυνομικοί που 
απασχολούνταν στην φύλαξη πολιτικών 
προσώπων;  





27/08/2012 Επιχείρηση εξαπάτησης ο δήθεν “Ξένιος 
Ζεύς”  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
17/09/2012 Υπακούει την Χρυσή Αυγή η κυβέρνηση 
φοβούμενη την τεράστια δημοσκοπική μας 
άνοδο (Βίντεο) 
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
17/09/2012 Υπακούει την Χρυσή Αυγή η κυβέρνηση 
λόγω δημοσκοπήσεων  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 




law & order PA State & 
Police 
30/09/2012 Το ανφάν γκατέ της αριστεράς αγωνιά για 
την «ελευθερία της έκφρασης»  
P 
 
law & order PA State 
11/10/2012 Και οι Έλληνες μαθητές πυκνώνουν τις 
τάξεις της Χρυσής Αυγής!  
E Y Education ES Unspecif
ied 
12/10/2012 Το κοινοβουλευτικό έργο της Χρυσής Αυγής  b 
 





12/10/2012 Το κοινοβουλευτικό έργο της Χρυσής Αυγής  P 
 
Immigration PA The 
State 
12/10/2012 Το κοινοβουλευτικό έργο της Χρυσής Αυγής  P 
 
law & order PA The 
State 
16/11/2012 Ξεφτίζει ο “θεσμός” του Πολυτεχνείου P N Culture PC Parliame
nt 
21/11/2012 O “νόμος Ραγκούση”, η ΧΡΥΣΗ ΑΥΓΗ και 
κάποιες καθεστωτικές φωνές  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
23/11/2012 Μειώνονται οι απολαβές των βουλευτών 
μετά τις αποκαλύψεις της Χρυσής Αυγής 
P 
 
Populism PA ND 
actors 
20/12/2012 Η δουλειά της ΧΡΥΣΗΣ ΑΥΓΗΣ (και) μέσα στο 
Κοινοβούλιο φέρνει αποτέλεσμα  
P 
 
Immigration PA ND 
actors 
05/01/2013 Διέγραψε την ΑΟΖ ο Σαμαράς - Η θέση της 
Χρυσής Αυγής 




08/01/2013 Δικαίωση Χρυσής Αυγής: Ενήλικος ο 
πακιστανός βιαστής της Πάρου! 
P 
 




09/01/2013 Η Χρυσή Αυγή κάνει το κράτος να δουλεύει  P 
 
Immigration PA State 
284 
 
10/01/2013 ΝΔ - ΣΥΡΙΖΑ: Βίοι παράλληλοι στην 
υπεράσπιση πασόκων  
P 
 
Populism PA ND 
actors 




23/01/2013 “Καθ΄υπόδειξη” της Χρυσής Αυγής οι 
αστυνομικές επιχειρήσεις  
b 
 





26/01/2013 Δραστηριότητες Τοπικών: Εύβοιας - 
Βοιωτίας, Καβάλας  
b 
 









10/02/2013 ΠΙΣΩ ΣΤΟ ΜΑΝΤΡΙ: Σαμαράς και 
Καρατζαφέρης έτοιμοι για την κωλοτούμπα 
του αιώνα  




20/02/2013 Ρεσιτάλ ψευδολογίας από τον Σαμαρά  E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
23/02/2013 Ο κοινοβουλευτικός έλεγχος της Χρυσής 
Αυγής ανάγκασε το κράτος να αποζημιώσει 
τους Έλληνες εμπόρους  
P 
 
Economy PA ND 
actors 
24/02/2013 26% μείωση στις αποδοχές βουλευτών μετά 
τις σφοδρές αντιδράσεις της Χρυσής Αυγής 





25/02/2013 Μεγάλη Νίκη της Χρυσής Αυγής: 
Αποσύρουν άρον-άρον τους αλλοδαπούς 
από τις Στρατιωτικές Σχολές 
b 
 





27/02/2013 Άτακτη υποχώρηση Ρουπακιώτη - Επιτυχία 






14/03/2013 Η. Παναγιώταρος: Χιλιάδες Ελληνικές 
οικογένειες μένουν χωρίς ρεύμα - ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
P 
 




21/03/2013 Επαναλειτούργησε η καρδιοχειρουργική 
κλινική του “Αγία Σοφία” μετά από 
παρέμβαση της Χρυσής Αυγής  
b 
 







27/03/2013 Σκάνδαλο Μπιρμπίλη - Επιτυχία Χρυσής 






02/04/2013 Πληρώνουμε ΜΚΟ για να προσλαμβάνουν 
λαθρομετανάστες  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
12/04/2013 Υπό το φόβο της Χρυσής Αυγής η 
κυβέρνηση για την όποια συμφωνία με 
τους σκοπιανούς 




25/04/2013 Η Χρυσή Αυγή βάζει τέλος στην εργασιακή 
ομηρία των καθαριστριών  
P 
 
Economy PA Media 
actors 
28/04/2013 Σέρνεται η κυβέρνηση πίσω από την 
ατζέντα της Χρυσής Αυγής - Φέρνουν 
μητρώο αποκλειστικών νοσοκόμων  
P 
 





17/05/2013 Έλληνες Γιατροί: Το ΣΔΟΕ στο ΚΕΕΛΠΝΟ 
μετά από επίκαιρη ερώτηση της Χρυσής 
Αυγής - BINTEO 
P 
 
Health PA ND 
actors 
27/05/2013 Η Χρυσή Αυγή τους κάνει να τρέχουν - Οι 
κουτοπονηριές του Άδωνη...  
P 
 
Culture PA ND 
actors 
19/06/2013 ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ: Πώς η Χρυσή Αυγή έσωσε την 
αμυντική βιομηχανία της χώρας  
E Y Defense ES ND 
actors 
21/06/2013 ΑΝΑΔΗΜΟΣΙΕΥΣΗ: Η Χρυσή Αυγή και η 
διάσωση ιερών κειμένων της Ορθοδοξίας 
E Y Culture ES Unspecif
ied 
04/07/2013 ΝΔ: “Κανένα όφελος από τον TAP. Ο Θεός 
ξέρει πότε θα βγάλουμε το ελληνικό φυσικό 
αέριο” - BINTEO 
P 
 
Economy PA ND 
actors 
18/07/2013 Εφημερίδα “Δημοκρατία”: «Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ 
αντιγράφει τη ΧΡΥΣΗ ΑΥΓΗ»  
E N Populism PC 
 
29/07/2013 Δίνει μάχη για τη ζωή η Μυρτώ που 
κακοποιήθηκε από το πακιστανό κτήνος  
P 
 




13/08/2013 Έκρυψε την συνάντηση με το εβραϊκό λόμπι 
των ΗΠΑ ο Αντωνάκης, για το φόβο της 
Χρυσής Αυγής 






20/08/2013 Η Νέα Πασοκρατία ετοιμάζει νέους 
ψηφοφόρους με ελληνοποιήσεις 
λαθρομεταναστών  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
29/08/2013 Να καταργηθούν τα προνόμια των 
μουσουλμάνων στις πανελλήνιες εξετάσεις  




13/09/2013 ΑΣΟΕΕ: Λαθρομετανάστες κυνήγησαν τα 
ΜΑΤ - Κατέρρευσε ο “Ξένιος Δίας”  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors & 
Police 
13/09/2013 Οι λαθρομετανάστες της ΑΣΟΕΕ διέσυραν 
τον Δένδια  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors & 
Police 
09/10/2013 Την ώρα που ψάχνουν μπαζούκας και 
αμνοερίφια...Στο «αρχείο» η Λίστα 
Λαγκάρντ - Σταματάνε οι έρευνες!  
E Y Populism ES Media 
actors 
31/10/2013 Καθάρισαν το Πεδίον του Άρεως ύστερα 








01/11/2013 Ηλίας Κασιδιάρης: Με παρέμβασή μας οι 








06/11/2013 Υπαναχώρησαν οι επίορκοι της Βουλής: 
αναγγέλθηκαν τα ονόματα των 







24/11/2013 Μεϊμαράκης: «Δεν θα μειώσουμε τους 
βουλευτικούς μισθούς»  
b 
 





27/11/2013 Προπαγανδίζουν τις αποκαλύψεις της 
Χρυσής Αυγής για τα προνόμια του 
συστήματος ως έργο άλλων  
P 
 
Populism PA Media 
actors 
06/12/2013 Ψηφοθηρική ατάκα Σγουρού: “Γεμίσαμε 
μετανάστες, αλλά δυστυχώς δεν 
ανεβαίνουν στα ράφια!”  
E Y Immigration PC ND 
actors 
07/01/2014 Παραδοχή Τραγάκη: «Δέκα χρόνια ξέραμε 
για τις μίζες στα εξοπλιστικά και το 
κρύβαμε»  




17/02/2014 Κινητοποιήθηκαν οι στρατιωτικές αρχές για 
την επίθεση στον αλεξιπτωτιστή από 
αναρχικούς λόγω Χρυσής Αυγής  
P 
 
Defense PA ND 
actors 
28/02/2014 Μυστικό ραντεβού για την προδοσία της 
Κύπρου στο ΥΠΕΞ υπό τον φόβο της Χρυσής 
Αυγής  
E Y Foreign 
Policy 
ES ND & 
PASOK 
actors 
23/03/2014 Η απόλυτη ξεφτίλα: Ο Σύριζα αντιγράφει 
κατά γράμμα το πρόγραμμα της Χρυσής 
Αυγής - ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
E N Populism PC SYRIZA 
actors 
01/04/2014 Χρυσή Αυγή: Ενός λεπτού σιγή για τους 





14/04/2014 Αμνησία στο ευρωψηφοδέλτιο της ΝΔ: 
Κάποιοι ξέχασαν το σκάνδαλο Καραμπέρη  




15/04/2014 Σαμαράς: Ολική αντιγραφή του 
προγράμματος της Χρυσής Αυγής για τους 
αστέγους 1  
E N Environment PC SYRIZA 
actors 
15/04/2014 Σαμαράς: Ολική αντιγραφή του 
προγράμματος της Χρυσής Αυγής για τους 
αστέγους  
E N social policy PC ND 
actors 
24/04/2014 Θέμις Σκορδέλη: Έλληνα, σκέψου εσύ τον 
εαυτό σου, τους λαθρομετανάστες τους 
σκέφτονται οι άλλοι! 
b 
 





24/04/2014 Θέμις Σκορδέλη: Έλληνα, σκέψου εσύ τον 
εαυτό σου, τους λαθρομετανάστες τους 
σκέφτονται οι άλλοι! 
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
24/04/2014 Θέμις Σκορδέλη: Έλληνα, σκέψου εσύ τον 
εαυτό σου, τους λαθρομετανάστες τους 
σκέφτονται οι άλλοι! 
E Y law & order ES ND 
actors 
29/04/2014 Ομολογία ήττας και αντιγραφή των θέσεων 
μας οι προτάσεις της ψοφοδεξιάς για 
Συνταγματική Αναθεώρηση  
E Y Populism PC ND 
actors 
08/05/2014 Ο Σαμαράς αντιγράφει κατά γράμμα τις 
θέσεις της Χρυσής Αυγής για την 
Συνταγματική αναθεώρηση - ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
E Y Populism PC ND 
actors 
12/05/2014 Αχυράνθρωπος του Μπόμπολα ο 
«ποταμάρχης» απαιτεί την κατάργηση του 
«βασικού μετόχου» 




04/06/2014 Σε άτακτη φυγή το καθεστώς: Έκλεισαν 







16/06/2014 Διεθνή ισλαμικά νέα: Στην Ελλάδα 
σχεδιάζουν τζαμί και στον κόσμο θρηνούν 
τα θύματα της ισλαμικής τρομοκρατίας  
E Y Culture ES governm
ent 
24/06/2014 «Καθημερινή» προς νουδούλα: Ξεχάστε 
επαναπατρισμό ψηφοφόρων της Χρυσής 
Αυγής  







08/07/2014 Με «δεξιό λόγο» προσπαθεί μάταια η 
ψοφοδεξιά να επαναπατρίσει ψηφοφόρους 
από την Χρυσή Αυγή  
E Y law & order ES ND 
actors 
09/07/2014 Ο χριστιανικός αποχρωματισμός της 
κοινωνίας και ο κίνδυνος της 
ισλαμοποίησης  
E Y Immigration ES Unspecif
ied 
14/07/2014 Έλληνες Γιατροί: Ο Βορίδης αποφάσισε την 
εξόντωση καρδιοπαθών και διαβητικών με 
το πενιχρό πλαφόν συνταγογράφησης των 
φαρμάκων τους 
E N Health PC Unspecif
ied 
05/08/2014 Η καθαρότητα της Χρυσής Αυγής αναγκάζει 
τους πολιτικάντηδες να την αντιγράψουν 
P 
 
Populism PA ND & 
PASOK 
actors 
22/08/2014 Το ανέκδοτο της ημέρας: O Χ. Αθανασίου 
τολμά να μιλά για Πόθεν Έσχες και Νόμο 
περί ευθύνης υπουργών  
E N Populism PC ND 
actors 
01/09/2014 Πάει για μετά τις εκλογές ο γάμος των 
“τοιούτων” υπό τον φόβο της Χρυσής Αυγής  
E Y law & order ES ND 
actors 
09/09/2014 Εμπαιγμός: Τώρα θυμήθηκαν ότι τα 
κόμματά τους αρπάζουν εκατομμύρια εις 
βάρος του Ελληνικού Λαού 
P N Populism PC ND & 
PASOK 
actors 
11/09/2014 Με εντολή Σαμαρά: ανοίγουν οι πόρτες των 
κέντρων κράτησης για τους 
λαθρομετανάστες!  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
22/09/2014 Προς «καραγκιόζηδες» επιστολή: περί sms, 
«επισκέψεων Μπαλτάκου» κ.ο.κ.  






23/09/2014 Προς «καραγκιόζηδες» επιστολή: περί sms, 
«επισκέψεων Μπαλτάκου» κ.ο.κ.  
P Y Defense PC ND 
actors 
29/09/2014 Η Δούρου, αφού έκλεψε την ψήφο του 
κόσμου πουλώντας ανακύκλωση, τώρα 
βάζει τους εργολάβους να πηγαίνουν τα 
απορρίμματα στην Κίνα!  
E N Environment PC SYRIZA 
actors 
30/09/2014 Προσπαθούν να παραστήσουν τους 
εθνικόφρονες οι ψοφοδεξιοί, 
αντιγράφοντας την Χρυσή Αυγή  
P 
 
Culture PA ND 
actors 
06/10/2014 Μόνο οι προτάσεις της “Ελληνικής Αυγής” 
μπορούν να λύσουν το πρόβλημα των 
σκουπιδιών  
E N Environment PC SYRIZA 
actors 
07/10/2014 Με εντολή Σαμαρά στην «ανεξάρτητη» 
δικαιοσύνη του Αθανασίου: Αλβανοί και 
Τούρκοι στις στρατιωτικές σχολές! ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
P N Defense PC ND 
actors 
11/10/2014 Η Συναγωνίστρια Ζαρούλια ταράζει τα 




Education PA ND 
actors 
11/10/2014 Ηλίας Παναγιώταρος: Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ έχει 
ολόκληρο τμήμα αντιγραφής των θέσεων 
της Χρυσής Αυγής - 2 ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
E Y Economy PC SYRIZA 
actors 
11/10/2014 Ηλίας Παναγιώταρος: Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ έχει 
ολόκληρο τμήμα αντιγραφής των θέσεων 
της Χρυσής Αυγής - 2 ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
E Y Environment PC SYRIZA 
actors 
29/10/2014 Προαναγγελία μαζικής εισβολής 
λαθρομεταναστών στην Ελλάδα από τον 
τσεκουράτο Βορίδη 
E Y Immigration PC ND 
actors 
19/11/2014 Η Χούντα Σαμαρά στην υπηρεσία των 
αριστεριστών: Ετοιμάζουν νομοσχέδιο 
νομιμοποίησης των λαθρομεταναστών  
P 
 
Immigration PA ND 
actors 
29/11/2014 Ηλίας Παναγιώταρος: Τι φοβάται η κα 
Δούρου και αποφεύγει να συζητηθεί το 
θέμα της διαχείρισης των απορριμμάτων;  
E N Environment PC SYRIZA 
actors 
30/11/2014 Μωραίνει Κύριος ον βούλεται απολέσαι.... 
Παραλήρησε εντελώς ο Σαμαράς και 
αντιγράφει συνθήματα της Χρυσής Αυγής! 






16/12/2014 Είμαι καλά γιατρέ μου; Ο πρόεδρος Πάνος 
το παίζει τώρα… αντισιωνιστής, νομίζοντας 
πως θα πάρει ψήφους της Χρυσής Αυγής! 




26/12/2014 Οι τελευταίες ώρες της Σαμαρικής 








29/12/2014 Απολείπειν ο Θεός Aντώνιον - Η Χρυσή 







29/12/2014 ΑΥΤΟΙ EΡΙΞΑΝ ΤΗΝ ΧΟΥΝΤΑ: Περήφανο 
«ΟΧΙ» των Συναγωνιστών μας μέσα στη 







29/12/2014 Μήνυμα Γενικού Γραμματέα Χρυσής Αυγής 





PA ND & 
PASOK 
actors 
01/01/2015 Η Χρυσή Αυγή γκρέμισε την ανθελληνική 






PA ND & 
PASOK 
actors 






PA ND & 
PASOK 
actors 
01/01/2015 Με εντολή Σαμαρά: η γραμματέας της ΠΑΣΠ 
Χημικού Θεσσαλονίκης, εκπρόσωπος Τύπου 
της ψοφοδεξιάς! 




13/01/2015 Δραστηριότητες Τοπικών: Καστοριά, 
Αλεξανδρούπολη, Θάσος, Βόρεια Προάστια  
P 
 
law & order PA ND 
actors 
15/01/2015 Αγωνιστικό μήνυμα του συναγωνιστή 
Γιώργου Γερμενή στην Τ.Ο. Βορείων 







15/02/2015 Μήνυμα συγκυβέρνησης προς επίδοξους 
λαθρομετανάστες: Η Ελλάδα είναι ο 
παράδεισος σας, προτιμήστε την!  
E Y Immigration ES 
 
19/02/2015 Δραστηριότητες Τοπικών: Πειραιάς, Εύβοια E N Economy PC SYRIZA 
actors 
20/02/2015 Δραστηριότητες Τοπικών: Καβάλα, 
Ανατολική Αττική, Βόρεια Προάστια  





17/03/2015 Η Χρυσή Αυγή στηρίζει τους άπορους 
συμπολίτες μας με έργα και όχι με λόγια 
P 
 
Health PA SYRIZA 
actors 
09/04/2015 Έρευνα της Βουλής για τα θαλασσοδάνεια 
στα υπερχρεωμένα ΜΜΕ μετά από 
ερώτηση της Χρυσής Αυγής 
P 
 
Populism PA SYRIZA 
actors 
15/04/2015 25 λεπτά κράτησε του Σύριζα η «αποκοτιά»: 
Αντέγραψαν τις θέσεις της Χρυσής Αυγής 
για την λαθρομετανάστευση και τις 
ανακάλεσαν αμέσως!  
E N Immigration PC SYRIZA 
actors 
21/04/2015 Κάθαρση με εντολή Χρυσής Αυγής: 
Ξεκίνησε η έρευνα για τους λογαριασμούς 
του συμβούλου του Σαμαρά, 
Παπασταύρου, στην Λίστα Λαγκάρντ  
P 
 
Populism PA SYRIZA 
actors 
22/04/2015 Ούτε ο Σαμαράς τέτοια ρεζιλίκια: Κόψανε 
το ρεύμα στην υπηρεσία που ελέγχει την 
Λίστα Λαγκάρντ  
P 
 
Populism PA SYRIZA 
actors 
04/05/2015 Στην φάκα των ελεγκτικών αρχών όσοι 
έβγαλαν χρήματα στο εξωτερικό ύστερα 
από ερώτηση της Χρυσής Αυγής  
P 
 
Populism PA SYRIZA 
actors 
16/05/2015 Δραστηριότητες Τοπικών: Βόρεια Προάστια, 
Πιερία, Ανατολική Αττική, Αχαρνές  
E N Health PC SYRIZA 
actors 
22/05/2015 Παραδοχή από τον Σύριζα: Το προηγούμενο 
λαθρονομοσχέδιο καταργήθηκε λόγω 
Χρυσής Αυγής! 




27/05/2015 Βαρουφάκης και Στουρνάρας καλύπτουν τα 
θαλασσοδάνεια κομμάτων και καναλαρχών  
P 
 
Populism PA SYRIZA 
actors 
08/07/2015 Σωρεία παρατυπιών από το Προεδρείο της 
Βουλής κατά την ψήφιση του 





31/07/2015 Στον εισαγγελέα το κολλητάρι του Σαμαρά 
και συνεταίρος του σιωνιστή Μιωνή, 
Παπασταύρου, για τα 5,5 εκατομμύρια της 
λίστας Λαγκάρντ  
P 
 




01/08/2015 Καθαρίζει ο Γιάννος για τις μίζες 
Λιακουνάκου λόγω... παραγραφής: Ούτε 
λέξη για Μπένι και Βαγγέλα! - ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
P 
 




29/08/2015 Γιατί το βράδυ της 20ης Σεπτεμβρίου θα 
στείλουμε στον Βαγγέλα μία... ανθοδέσμη; 
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
30/08/2015 Γιατί το βράδυ της 20ης Σεπτεμβρίου θα 
στείλουμε στον Βαγγέλα μία... ανθοδέσμη; 
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
09/09/2015 Έρχονται στον Πειραιά οι καραβιές με 4.500 
λαθρομετανάστες! Εποικισμός με σφραγίδα 
«δημοκρατικού» τόξου 




10/09/2015 Αδειάζουν άρον - άρον τα νησιά από 
λαθρομετανάστες υπό τον φόβο της Χρυσής 
Αυγής  
E Y Immigration ES Unspecif
ied 
29/09/2015 Υγειονομική βόμβα στο κέντρο των Αθηνών: 
Καμπούλ η Πλατεία Βικτωρίας - ΒΙΝΤΕΟ 
E Y Immigration ES Unspecif
ied 
04/10/2015 “Καθημερινή” για εκκένωση πλατείας 
Βικτωρίας: “Όλη η κίνηση έγινε όταν 
απείλησε ότι θα αναλάβει δράση ο 
Κασιδιάρης”  
E Y Immigration ES SYRIZA 
actors 
17/10/2015 Από το 2013 έχει ξεπουλήσει η Νέα 
Δημοκρατία το όνομα της Μακεδονίας 








06/11/2015 Τι θα ψηφίσουν οι βουλευτές του 
“μνημονιακού τόξου” στην άρση ασυλίας 
του Φίλη;  
P 
 




30/11/2015 «Τουρκικό σαμποτάζ» στις εγκαταστάσεις 
της ΕΡΤ στην Ροδόπη αποκάλυψε με 







24/12/2015 Είναι βιαστικά της Μυκόνου τα παιδιά: 
Ετοιμάζουν διάσπαση της ΝΔ για να 
προλάβουν τη στροφή της Εκκλησίας προς 
τη Χρυσή Αυγή 
E Y law & order PC ND 
actors 
28/12/2015 ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ: Το σύμφωνο συμβίωσης, η 
κωλοτούμπα της ψοφοδεξιάς και η 
εκτόξευση των ποσοστών της Χρυσής Αυγής  
E Y law & order ES ND & 
PASOK 
actors 
28/12/2015 ΑΝΑΛΥΣΗ: Το σύμφωνο συμβίωσης, η 
κωλοτούμπα της ψοφοδεξιάς και η 
εκτόξευση των ποσοστών της Χρυσής Αυγής  





23/01/2016 Ξεκίνησε η εξυγίανση και η αποκατάστασή 
του ΧΥΤΑ Κιάτου μετά από ερώτηση της 
Συναγωνίστριας Ελένης Ζαρούλια 
P 
 




23/01/2016 ΑΠΟΚΑΛΥΨΗ ΧΡΥΣΗΣ ΑΥΓΗΣ: Πάνω από 20 
εκατομμύρια ευρώ τον χρόνο πληρώνουμε 
τις συντάξεις των εθνοπατέρων! 
P 
 
Populism PA Syriza 
actors 
07/01/2016 Προσχώρησε στην Χρυσή Αυγή δημοτική 





29/02/2016 Μία απάντηση στα ορφανά του Σαμαρά 
«για τις αλήθειες που δεν λέγονται» 
E Y Immigration ES ND & 
PASOK 
actors 
05/04/2016 Έγραψε η εφημερίδα “Δημοκρατία”: Σε 
δικαστικό κλοιό ο βουλευτής του Σύριζα 








06/04/2016 Σύσταση εξεταστικής κατόπιν εορτής... 
Πρώτη η Χρυσή Αυγή ανέδειξε τα 




Populism PA SYRIZA 
& ANEL 
actors 
20/05/2016 Το μισό πολυνομοσχέδιο - τέρας θα 
ψηφίσει η ΝΔ του Μητσοτάκη 
     
22/05/2016 Λουκέτο σε παράνομα τουρκικά 
νηπιαγωγεία στην Θράκη μετά από 









23/05/2016 Χρήστος Χατζησάββας: Η δήθεν αντίστασή 
σας στα Μνημόνια είναι για γέλια! 
E Y Economy PC ND 
actors 
24/05/2016 Υπό τον φόβο της Χρυσής Αυγής: 
Επιχείρηση εκκένωσης της Ειδομένης από 
τους λαθρομετανάστες  
E Y Immigration ES SYRIZA 
actors & 
Police 
07/07/2016 Τσάτσοι του Ψυχάρη οι Νεοδημοκράτες - 
Αποκαλύψεις Χρυσής Αυγής για τα 






15/07/2016 Κράτος εν κράτει οι πράκτορες της Άγκυρας 









δικαιωμάτων» οργανώνουν οι 
τουρκόφρονες στην Κομοτηνή!  
21/07/2016 Δακρύβρεχτες συγγνώμες από τον Μουζάλα 
για την... ποιότητα χλιδής που παρέχεται 
στους λαθρομετανάστες  
E Y Immigration ES ND 
actors 
03/08/2016 Έκθετος και πάλι ο Πολάκης: Δεν απάντησε 
σε επίκαιρη ερώτηση της Χρυσής Αυγής, 
ενώ ήταν στην αίθουσα - BINTEO 
P 
 
Health PA SYRIZA 
actors 
04/08/2016 Ηλίας Παναγιώταρος: Σύγχρονοι 
«εφιάλτες» όσοι συνηγορούν υπέρ της 





07/08/2016 Σε τουρκική εφημερίδα έτρεξε να κλαφτεί ο 








05/09/2016 Οργή της Πανελλήνιας Ομοσπονδίας 
Πολιτιστικών Συλλόγων Μακεδόνων για την 
εθνοπροδοσία Σύριζα να θεωρεί τα 






08/10/2016 Λουκέτο σε παράνομες δομές τουρκικής 
προπαγάνδας στην Ξάνθη μετά από 









11/10/2016 Μέχρι και ο Ψυχάρης κράζει τον 
Μητσοτάκη: “Παλτό” ο Κυριάκος!  
E N Populism PC ND 
actors 
18/10/2016 Πόλεμος στη διαφθορά: Προκαταρκτική 
έρευνα για τα δάνεια των κομμάτων μετά 
το σφυροκόπημα Χρυσής Αυγής σε 
Στουρνάρα! ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
P 
 




18/11/2016 Λόγω του φόβου της Χρυσής Αυγής μέχρι 
και για την Σημαία έβγαλε ανακοίνωση η 
ψευτοδεξιά  
E Y Culture ES ND 
actors 
23/11/2016 Οι βυσματίες Τσίπρας και Καμμένος που 
λουφάρανε την θητεία τους, εξαγγέλλουν 
τώρα στράτευση στα 18 
E Y Defense PC ND & 
ANEL 
actors 
01/12/2016 Ο Γιάννης Λαγός στην «Θρακική Αγορά» για 
τον αγώνα της Χρυσής Αυγής στην Θράκη 









19/12/2016 Νίκη Χρυσής Αυγής απέναντι στην 
διαφθορά: Η κυβέρνηση απέσυρε την 
τροπολογία που διέγραφε σκάνδαλο 30 
εκατομμυρίων ευρώ - ΒΙΝΤΕΟ  
P 
 
Populism PA Syriza 
actors 
20/12/2016 Ο Γιάννης Λαγός για τον ΦΠΑ στα νησιά, 
την χρήση πλαστικού χρήματος και τους 































List of abbreviations 
 
AME Ανένταχτοι Μεάνδριοι Εθνικιστές (Unaffiliated Meander Nationalists, Greece) 
ANEL Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες (Independent Greeks, Greece) 
BNP British National Party (Britain) 
CHES Chapel Hill Expert Survey 
CMP Comparative Manifesto Project 
DIMAR Δημοκρατική Αριστερά (Democratic Left, Greece) 
DSSS Dělnická strana (Workers' Party, Czech Republic) 
ELAM Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο (Popular National Front, Cyprus) 
EOKA Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters, Cyprus) 
ERP Extreme Right Party 
ERPs Extreme Right Parties 
ESHEA 
Ένωσις Συντακτών Ημερήσιων Εφημερίδων Αθηνών (Association of Editors of  
Athens Daily Newspapers, Greece) 
FN Front National (National Front, France) 
FPO Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party, Austria) 
FRP Far Right Party 
FRPs Far Right Parties 
FYROM Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia 
GD Χρυσή Αυγή (Golden Dawn, Greece) 
KEELPNO 
Κέντρο Ελέγχου και Πρόληψης Νοσημάτων (Hellenic Centre for Diseases  
Control and Prevention, Greece) 
KKE Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (Communist Party of Greece) 
LAOS Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός (Popular Orthodox Rally, Greece) 
LEPEN Λαϊκή Ελληνική Πατριωτική Ένωση (Popular Greek Patriotic Union, Greece) 
L'SNS Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko (Peoples' Party Our Slovakia) 
MPOCP 
Υπουργείο Δημόσιας Τάξης και Προστασίας Του Πολίτη (Ministry of Public Order  
and Citizen’s Protection, Greece) 
MSI Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social Movement, Italy) 
ND Νέα Δημοκρατία (New Democracy, Greece) 
NPD Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany) 
NPU  Εθνική Πολιτική Ένωσις (National Political Union, Greece) 
NRM Nordiska motståndsrörelsen (Nordic Resistence Movement, Sweden) 
NRP Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (National Rebirth of Poland, Poland) 
PASOK Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα (Panhellenic Socialist Movement, Greece) 
PATRIE Πατριωτική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωση  (Patriotic Radical Union, Greece) 
PICs Political Impact-Claims 
PRRP Populist Radical Right Party 
PRRPs Populist Radical Right Parties 
SD Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats, Sweden) 
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SDOE Σώμα Δίωξης Οικονομικού Εγκλήματος (Financial Crimes Prosecution Body, Greece) 
SYRIZA 
Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς (Coalition of the Radical Left, 
Greece) 
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